Signing of the Russian-French military convention. Russian-French Union: history of origin and significance. Reasons for the development of economic relations

Bismarck, as far as possible, tried to maintain close relations with Russia and prevent her rapprochement with France. However, at the end of the 1980s, Russian-German economic contradictions escalated. The reason for this was the longest and deepest in the XIX century. economic crisis associated with the fall of first agricultural and then industrial prices. It started in the 70s and continued until the mid 90s. Contemporaries called it the "Great Depression" (in the future, this name will move to an even more catastrophic crisis in its consequences in the early 30s of the 20th century). This crisis has forced most of Europe

abandon the policy of free trade, which they pursued in the 60-70s, by several times lowering customs duties compared to the previous period. Considering that the fall in prices is due to cheap imports, most European countries have embarked on the path of customs protectionism, i.e. introduction of high customs duties on imported goods. Naturally, such a policy hit the main trading partners especially painfully, which in the last third of the 19th century. Germany and Russia were for each other.

In the context of the economic crisis, the German government tried to put pressure on Russia in order to reduce its duties on German goods. In 1887, on the direct instructions of Bismarck, German banks refused credit to the Russian government, which systematically resorted to foreign loans to finance government spending. This forced Russia to turn to France for help. In 1888, the largest Parisian banks for the first time granted her a loan guaranteed by the French government. This deal was followed by new ones, and by 1914 the state debt of Russia to French investors reached 10 billion francs. At the same time, France's direct investment in the Russian economy also increased - from 200 million francs. in 1888 to 2.2 billion francs. in 1914.

Thus began a historic turn in relations between the two states. They were separated by deep political and ideological differences. Russia was an autocratic monarchy, France was a democratic republic. In Russia, for republican propaganda, including the singing of the Marseillaise, they were thrown into prison; in France, the Marseillaise from the early 80s of the XIX century. became national anthem. What decisively contributed to their rapprochement was the feeling of a threat emanating from the powers united in the Triple Alliance.

Germany's refusal in 1890 to renew the "reinsurance" contract, as well as rumors of Britain joining the tripartite alliance accelerated the process of Russian-French rapprochement. In 1891, in Paris, Russia and France concluded an agreement on mutual consultations in the event of a "threat to world peace." And just a year later, on August 5 (17), 1892, representatives of the Russian and French general staffs of the army signed a military convention, according to which they pledged to provide each other with military assistance in the event of an attack on one of them by Germany. Moreover, the number of troops that Russia and France were supposed to put up was even determined - 1.3 million and from 700 to 800 thousand, respectively. The military convention entered into force as a result of an exchange of official letters between the Minister of Foreign Affairs

Affairs of Russia and the French ambassador in St. Petersburg December 15 (27), 1893 - December 23, 1893 (January 4, 1894).

The creation of the Russian-French alliance finally led to the exit of Russia from the international isolation in which it had chronically been after the collapse of the Vienna system, since the Crimean War. The hopes that she placed in the Alliance of the Three Emperors did not come true, as the Congress of Berlin and, in particular, the formation of the Triple Alliance, hostile to her, clearly demonstrated.

The difficult task of overcoming the international isolation of Russia fell to the lot of the Minister of Foreign Affairs N.K. Gears. He had vast experience in practical work, accumulated over many years. diplomatic service. In addition, he was a flexible and tactful person who managed to win the full confidence of both Alexander II and Alexander III, who considered themselves to be the most competent in all matters of foreign policy. Contemporaries argued that Gire, like no one else, was suitable for the post of Minister of Foreign Affairs under these monarchs. The minister proceeded from the conviction that Germany and Austria-Hungary were Russia's main partners in the international arena. In particular, he valued good relations with Germany. The aggravation of contradictions with Germany and Austria-Hungary made him turn his attention to France. But even during the negotiations with the French, Gire did not leave hope for an improvement in relations with Germany. He regarded the agreement eventually reached with France as nothing more than a "marriage of convenience" that met not so much the sympathies of the government as the interests of the state.

V.N., who replaced Girs as the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Russia. Lamsdorf took a prudent attitude to the political legacy of his predecessor. He was a staunch supporter of the Russian-French alliance, but he considered this alliance not at all as a measure aimed at preparing for war with Germany, but as a guarantee, a guarantee of maintaining good partnership relations with her. Therefore, in the 1990s, Lamzdorf opposed the attempts of the French government to give a more binding, official character to the cooperation of the general staffs of the armies of both states. He urged them "to be content with those excellent, documented relations that do not compromise us, which now exist between France and Russia."

The creation of a Russian-French alliance contributed to the stabilization of the international situation. The balance in the forces of the major powers, which had previously developed as a result of national wars, acquired a stable character. The presence of two pro-

military alliances opposing each other, uniting the largest and most powerful states of Europe, made any attempt to upset the existing balance of power extremely risky. It is no coincidence that the largest states for the next 20 years refrained not only from the use of military force in Europe, but even from the threat of its use.

In fact, by the end of the XIX century. a new, fairly stable system international relations, characterized by such signs as the balance of power of the main powers, the presence of generally recognized and fixed by international treaties borders between European states, the existence of two opposing military-political groups. The latter was a thorough innovation that distinguished the new system of international relations from both the Westphalian and the Vienna systems. An important loss compared to the previous time was that, despite individual attempts (such as the convening of the Berlin Congress and a number of international conferences, which we will talk below), the "European Concerto" was never restored. Probably because the new system there was neither a specific place nor a time of birth; unlike the Westphalian and Vienna systems, it remained without a generally recognized name.

At the end of XIX - beginning of XX century. peace, at least in Europe, seemed more solid and unshakable than ever. States found the opportunity to resolve even long-standing and painful contradictions through compromises. In particular, Lamsdorf pursued a balanced policy in the Balkans. He did not abandon the traditional Russian role of patron and protector of Turkish Christians. At the same time, in the interests of peace, he supported the power of the Sultan and advocated the territorial integrity of the Ottoman Empire. Thanks to his efforts, in April-May 1897, Russia and Austria-Hungary signed an agreement on Balkan affairs, which condemned "any conquest intention in the Balkan Peninsula", no matter who it came from.

But the international order that had taken shape towards the end of the 19th century was not without serious flaws. Like any stable order, it was based on the balance of power of the major powers and the authority of treaties between states. But brute military force still played a much greater role than law. Following the example of Bismarckian Germany, it is in the military force European powers saw the main guarantee of security and protection of their interests. The fact that in Europe at the end of the XIX century. peace reigned, explained not so much

their sincere desire for peace, as much as the greatest caution, fueled by the conviction of the aggressive intentions of their neighbors. Therefore, during the last third of the XIX century. the major powers forged military alliances and built up armaments. It is noteworthy that both the Triple Alliance and the Russian-French alliance were defensive in nature, i.e. they envisaged joint actions of their participants only to repel aggression.

Peace in Europe, although seemingly solid, was in fact quite fragile. In any case, the threshold for military danger was low and tended to decrease steadily. This was evidenced by the changes in German military strategy at the end of the 19th century. Bismarck took into account the vulnerability of the geographical position of a united Germany, bordering on the west and east with the largest and strongest states of Europe: France and Russia. Considering a war on two fronts disastrous for Germany and trying to avoid it, he advocated maintaining good neighborly relations at least With one of them, Russia. After Bismarck retired in 1890, General Leo von Caprivi was appointed Chancellor. He was convinced that a clash between Germany and Russia was inevitable, and called for preparations for a war on two fronts.

The creation of a Russian-French alliance did not cool the ardor of German politicians and the military for a long time. The General Staff of the Army prepared a plan for the "lightning" defeat of France and Russia, supposedly guaranteeing the victory of Germany even in the event of a war on two fronts. By the name of the chief of the general staff, he received the name "Schlieffen Plan". And in 1898, the German Reichstag adopted a program for the construction of the navy, the implementation of which was supposed to turn Germany into the largest maritime power in the world. Of course, these actions of Germany by no means contributed either to its reconciliation with France, or to the strengthening of confidence in it on the part of Russia and Great Britain.

Such a fragile world was saved for a long time only by the fact that at the end of the 19th century. the main conflicts and crises occurred far beyond the borders of Europe and were associated with colonial division peace.

Questions:

\. How did the balance of power between the main states of Europe change after the end of the era of national wars?

2. What were the goals pursued by Germany in the field of foreign policy immediately after the Franco-Prussian war?

3. What are the causes of the Eastern Crisis and the Russo-Turkish War of 1877-1878?

4. Why was the Triple Alliance formed?

5. What were the challenges facing the Russian-French alliance?

Literature:

Main:

History of Russia's foreign policy. Second half of the 19th century. M., 1997. Ch. 5 and 7.

History of diplomacy. M., 1963. T. 2. Ch. 3-5, 8.

Additional:

Klyuchnikov Yu.V., Sabanin A. International politics of modern times in treaties, notes and declarations. Part I. From French Revolution before the imperialist war. M., 1925 (Documents No. 215, 218, 221, 230, 244, 255, 257, 258).

Yerusalimsky A.S. Bismarck: diplomacy and militarism. M., 1968. S. 172-184 (“From the Austro-German Alliance to the Triple Alliance”).

Kinyapina N.S. The Balkans and Straits in Russia's Foreign Policy at the End of the 19th Century (1878-1898). M., 1994.

The Eastern Question in Russia's Foreign Policy. (Late XVIII - early XX century). M., 1978.

Skazkin S.D. End of the Austro-Russian-German alliance. Studies on the history of Russian-German and Russian-Austrian relations in connection with the Eastern question in the 80s of the XIX century. M., 1974.

Manfred A.Z. Formation of the Russian-French Union. M., 1975. Ch. 7 and 8.

Chubinsky V. Bismarck. SPb., 1997. Ch. VIII, IX.

Bismarck, as far as possible, tried to maintain close relations with Russia and prevent her rapprochement with France. However, in the late 1880s, Russian-German economic contradictions escalated. The reason for this was the longest and deepest in the XIX century. economic crisis associated with the fall of first agricultural and then industrial prices. It began in the 1870s and continued until the mid-1890s. Contemporaries called it the "Great Depression" (in the future, this name will move to an even more catastrophic crisis in its consequences in the early 1930s of the 20th century). This crisis forced most European countries to abandon the free trade policy they pursued in the 1860s and 1870s, reducing customs duties by several times compared to the previous period. Considering that the fall in prices is due to cheap imports, most European countries have embarked on the path of customs protectionism, i.e. introduction of high customs duties on imported goods. Naturally, such a policy hit especially hard on the main trading partners, who in the last third of the 19th century. Germany and Russia were for each other. In the context of the economic crisis, the German government tried to put pressure on Russia in order to reduce its duties on German goods. In 1887, on the direct instructions of Bismarck, German banks refused credit to the Russian government, which systematically resorted to foreign loans to finance government spending. This forced Russia to turn to France for help. In 1888, the largest Parisian banks for the first time granted her a loan guaranteed by the French government. This deal was followed by new ones, and by 1914 the state debt of Russia to French investors reached 10 billion francs. At the same time, France's direct investment in the Russian economy also increased - from 200 million francs. in 1888 to 2.2 billion francs. in 1914. Thus began a historic turn in relations between the two states. They were separated by deep political and ideological differences. Russia was an autocratic monarchy, France was a democratic republic. In Russia, for republican propaganda, including the singing of the Marseillaise, they were thrown into prison; in France, the Marseillaise from the beginning of the 80s of the XIX century. became the national anthem. What decisively contributed to their rapprochement was the feeling of a threat emanating from the powers united in the Triple Alliance. Germany's refusal in 1890 to renew the "reinsurance" Treaty, as well as rumors of Britain joining the Triple Alliance, accelerated the process of Russian-French rapprochement. In 1891, in Paris, Russia and France concluded an agreement on mutual consultations in the event of a "threat to world peace." And just a year later, on August 5 (17), 1892, representatives of the Russian and French general staffs of the army signed the Military Convention, in accordance with which they pledged to provide each other with military assistance in the event of an attack on one of them by Germany. Moreover, the number of troops that Russia and France were supposed to put up was even determined - 1.3 million and from 700 to 800 thousand, respectively. The military convention entered into force as a result of the exchange of official letters between the Russian Foreign Minister and the French ambassador in St. Petersburg December 15 (27), 1893 - December 23, 1893 (January 4, 1894).

The creation of the Russian-French Union finally led to Russia's exit from international isolation, in which she had chronically been after the collapse of the Vienna system, since the Crimean War. The hopes that she placed in the Alliance of the Three Emperors did not come true, as the Congress of Berlin and, in particular, the formation of the Triple Alliance, hostile to her, clearly demonstrated.

The difficult task of overcoming the international isolation of Russia fell to the lot of the Minister of Foreign Affairs N.K. Gears. He had great experience practical work accumulated over many years of diplomatic service. In addition, he was a flexible and tactful person who managed to win the full confidence of both Alexander II and AlexandraIII(Alexander III (1845-1894) - Russian emperor since 1881. The second son of Alexander II. In the first half of the 1880s. carried out the abolition of the poll tax, lowered the redemption payments. From the 2nd half of the 1880s. carried out counter-reforms. Strengthened the role of the police, local and central administration. During the reign, the annexation of Central Asia to Russia (1885) was completed, the Russian-French Union (1891-1893) was concluded), who considered themselves the most competent in all matters of foreign policy. Contemporaries argued that Girs, like no one else, was suitable for the post of Minister of Foreign Affairs under these monarchs. The minister proceeded from the conviction that Germany and Austria-Hungary were Russia's main partners in the international arena. He especially valued good relations with Germany. The aggravation of contradictions with Germany and Austria-Hungary made him turn his attention to France. But even during negotiations with the French, Giers did not give up hope for an improvement in relations with Germany. He regarded the agreement eventually reached with France as nothing more than a "marriage of convenience" that met not so much the sympathies of the government as the interests of the state.

V.N., who replaced Girs as the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Russia. Lamsdorf took a prudent attitude to the political legacy of his predecessor. He was a staunch supporter of the Russian-French alliance, but he considered this alliance not at all as a measure aimed at preparing for war with Germany, but as a guarantee, a guarantee of maintaining good partner relations with her. Therefore, Lamzdorf in the 1890s resisted the attempts of the French government to give a more binding, official character to the cooperation of the general staffs of the armies of both states. He urged them "to be content with those excellent, documented relations that do not compromise us, which now exist between France and Russia."

The creation of the Russian-French alliance contributed to the stabilization of the international situation. The balance in the forces of the major powers, which had previously developed as a result of national wars, acquired a stable character. The presence of two opposing military alliances, uniting the largest and most powerful states of Europe, made any attempt to upset the existing balance of power extremely risky. It is no coincidence that the largest states for the next 20 years refrained not only from the use of military force in Europe, but even from the threat of its use.

In fact, by the end of the XIX century. a new, rather stable system of international relations was formed, characterized by such signs as the balance of power of the main powers, the presence of generally recognized and fixed by international treaties borders between European states, the existence of two opposing military-political groups. The latter was a thorough innovation that distinguished the new system of international relations from both the Westphalian and the Vienna systems. An important loss compared to the previous time was that, despite individual attempts (such as the convening of the Berlin Congress and a number of international conferences, which will be discussed below), the "European concert" was never restored. Probably because the new system did not have a specific place or time of birth, unlike the Westphalian and Vienna systems, it remained without a generally recognized name.

At the end of XIX - beginning of XX centuries. peace, at least in Europe, seemed more solid and unshakable than ever. States found the opportunity to resolve even long-standing and painful contradictions through compromises. In particular, Lamsdorf pursued a balanced policy in the Balkans. He did not abandon the traditional Russian role of patron and protector of Turkish Christians. At the same time, in the interests of peace, he supported the power of the Sultan and advocated territorial integrity. Ottoman Empire. Thanks to his efforts, in April-May 1897, Russia and Austria-Hungary signed the Agreement on Balkan Affairs, which condemned "any aggressive intention in the Balkan Peninsula", no matter who it came from.

But the international order that had taken shape towards the end of the 19th century was not without serious flaws. Like any stable order, it was based on the balance of power of the major powers and the authority of treaties between states. But brute military force still played a much greater role than law. Following the example of Bismarck's Germany, it was in the military force that the European powers saw the main guarantee of ensuring security and protecting their interests. The fact that in Europe at the end of the XIX century. peace reigned, was explained not so much by their sincere desire for peace, but by the greatest caution, fueled by the conviction of the aggressive intentions of their neighbors. Therefore, during the last third of the XIX century. the major powers forged military alliances and built up armaments. It is noteworthy that both the Triple Alliance and the Russo-French Alliance were defensive in nature, i.e. they envisaged joint actions of their participants only to repel aggression.

Peace in Europe, although seemingly solid, was in fact quite fragile. In any case, the threshold for military danger was low and tended to decrease steadily. This was evidenced by the changes in German military strategy at the end of the 19th century. Bismarck Considered Vulnerability geographical location united Germany, in the west and east bordering on the largest and strongest states of Europe: France and Russia. Considering a war on two fronts to be detrimental to Germany and seeking to avoid it, he advocated maintaining good neighborly relations with at least one of them, Russia. After Bismarck retired in 1890, General Leo von Caprivi was appointed Chancellor. He was convinced that a clash between Germany and Russia was inevitable, and called for preparations for a war on two fronts.

The creation of the Russian-French alliance did not cool the ardor of German politicians and the military for a long time. The General Staff of the Army prepared a plan for the "lightning" defeat of France and Russia, supposedly guaranteeing the victory of Germany even in the event of a war on two fronts. By the name of the chief of the general staff, he received the name "Schlieffen Plan". And in 1898, the German Reichstag adopted a program for the construction of the navy, the implementation of which was supposed to turn Germany into the largest maritime power in the world. Of course, these actions of Germany by no means contributed either to its reconciliation with France, or to the strengthening of confidence in it on the part of Russia and Great Britain.

Such a fragile world was saved for a long time only by the fact that at the end of the 19th century. the main conflicts and crises occurred far beyond the borders of Europe and were associated with the colonial division of the world.

I. Letter from the Ambassador of Russia in Paris Morenheim to the French Foreign Minister Ribot

G. minister,

During my recent stay in St. Petersburg, where I was summoned by order of my august monarch, the sovereign was pleased to provide me with special instructions set forth in the letter enclosed in a copy sent to my name by His Excellency Mr. Giers, Minister for Foreign Affairs, which His Majesty was pleased to direct me to inform the Government of the Republic.

In pursuance of this highest command, I make it my duty to bring this document to the attention of Your Excellency, in the firm hope that its content, previously agreed upon and jointly formulated by our two cabinets, will find the full approval of the French government and that you, Mr. Minister, deign, in accordance with the desire expressed by Mr. Gears, to honor me with an answer testifying to the complete agreement happily established for the future between our two governments.

The further development which these two points, agreed upon and established in common, not only permit, but which must constitute their natural and necessary complement, may be the subject of confidential and strictly personal negotiations and exchange of opinions at the moment when this or that Cabinet finds it timely. , and where they deem it possible for themselves to proceed with them at the right time.

Putting myself on this occasion at the full disposal of Your Excellency, I am happy to take this opportunity to ask you to accept the assurances of my highest consideration.

Morenheim

Lamadorf V. N. Diary (1891‑1892), M.‑L. Academy. 1934, pp. 176-177.

II. Letter from the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Russia Girs to the Ambassador of Russia in Paris Morenheim

St. Petersburg, 9/21August 1891G.

The situation which has arisen in Europe, by virtue of the open renewal of the Triple Alliance and the more or less probable accession of Great Britain to the political aims pursued by this alliance, caused, during M. de Laboulay's recent stay here, an exchange of opinions between the French Ambassador and myself in order to a position which, under present conditions, in the event of certain circumstances, would be most expedient for our two governments, who, having remained outside any alliance, nevertheless sincerely desire to create the most effective guarantees for the preservation of peace. Thus, we have arrived at the formulation of the following two points:

2) If the world were really in danger, and especially if one of the two sides was under the threat of attack, both sides agree to agree on measures, the immediate and simultaneous implementation of which, in the event of the occurrence of the events in question, will be imperative. for both governments.

Having reported to the sovereign on these negotiations, as well as the text of the adopted final formulations, I have the honor to inform you now that his majesty deigned to fully approve the aforementioned principles of the agreement and agree to their acceptance by both governments.

In informing you of this supreme will, I ask you to bring this to the attention of the French government and notify me of those decisions on which, for its part, it will stop. Accept etc.

Gears

Lamadorff, pp. 171-172.

III. Letter from French Foreign Minister Ribot to Russian Ambassador in Paris Morenheim

You have deigned, on the orders of your government, to communicate to me the text of a letter from the Imperial Minister of Foreign Affairs, which contains the special instructions with which His Majesty the Emperor Alexander decided to provide you as a result of the last exchange of opinions between Mr. Giers and the Ambassador of the French Republic in St. Petersburg caused by the general European situation. Your Excellency was instructed at the same time to express the hope that the content of this document, previously agreed upon between the two Cabinets and formulated jointly, would meet with the full approval of the French Government. I hasten to thank Your Excellency for this message. The Government [of the Republic] can assess the situation created in Europe by virtue of the circumstances under which the renewal of the Triple Alliance took place, only in the same way as the Imperial Government does, and together with it considers that the moment has come to determine the position, under the present situation and under the onset of certain events, the most expedient for both governments, equally striving to ensure the preservation of peace, which consists in maintaining the balance of power in Europe. I am therefore happy to inform Your Excellency that the Government of the Republic associates itself fully with the two points which are the subject of Mr. Girs' communication, which are formulated as follows:

1) In order to determine and establish the cordial agreement that unites them, and desiring to contribute together to the maintenance of peace, which is the object of their most sincere desires, both governments declare that they will consult among themselves on every question that can threaten the world peace.

2) If the world were really in danger, and especially if one of the two sides was under the threat of attack, both sides agree to agree on measures, the immediate and simultaneous implementation of which will be necessary in the event of the occurrence of the events in question. for both governments.

I put myself, however, at your disposal for the discussion of all questions which, in the present general political situation, will attract the special attention of both governments.

On the other hand, the Imperial Government, like us, undoubtedly realizes how important it would be to instruct special delegates, who should be appointed at the earliest possible date, to study in practice the measures that should be countered by the events provided for in the second paragraph of the agreement.

In requesting that the response of the French Government be brought to the attention of the Imperial Government, I consider it my duty to note how valuable it was for me to be able to help, to the best of my ability, to establish consent, which has always been the subject of our common efforts. Accept etc.

A. Ribot

Lamadorff, pp. 177-178.

IV. Draft military convention of 5/17 August 1892

Encouraged by the same desire to preserve the peace, France and Russia, with the sole purpose of preparing for the demands of a defensive war caused by the attack of the troops of the Triple Alliance against one of them, agreed on the following provisions:

1. If France is attacked by Germany or Italy supported by Germany, Russia will use all the troops she can have to attack Germany.

If Russia is attacked by Germany, or by Austria supported by Germany, France will use all the troops it can have to attack Germany. (Original French draft: "If France or Russia is attacked by the Triple Alliance or Germany alone...")¹*

2. In the event of the mobilization of the troops of the Triple Alliance or one of its constituent powers, France and Russia immediately, upon receipt of the news of this, without waiting for any prior agreement, mobilize immediately and simultaneously all their forces and move them as close as possible to their borders.

(Original French draft: "In the event of the mobilization of the forces of the Triple Alliance or Germany alone...")

3. The active armies to be used against Germany will be 1,300,000 men on the French side, and 700,000 to 800,000 men on the Russian side. These troops will be fully and with all speed brought into action, so that Germany will have to fight at the same time both in the east and in the west.

4. The General Staffs of both countries will keep in touch with each other at all times in order to prepare and facilitate the implementation of the measures envisaged above.

They will communicate to each other in peacetime all the data concerning the armies of the Triple Alliance that they know or will know. The ways and means of intercourse during the war will be studied and foreseen in advance.

5. Neither France nor Russia will conclude a separate peace.

6. This Convention shall be in force for the same period as the Triple Alliance.

7. All items listed above will be kept in the strictest confidence.

SIGNED:

Adjutant General, Chief of the General Staff Obruchev,

Divisional General, Assistant Chief of the General Staff Boisdefre.

A. M. Zayonchkovsky, Preparing Russia for World War II in International Relations. Ed. People's Commissariat of Defense. M. 1926, pp. 343‑344 (French text); Lamadorff, p. 388 (Russian translation).

V. Letter from the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Russia Girs to the Ambassador of France in St. Petersburg Montebello

Very secret.

Having studied the draft military convention drawn up by the Russian and French general staffs in August 1892, and having presented my considerations to the Emperor, I consider it my duty to inform Your Excellency that the text of this agreement, in the form in which it was approved in principle by His Majesty and signed gen.-ad. Obruchev and Divisional General Boisdefre, can henceforth be considered as finally accepted in its present form. Both general staffs will thus have the opportunity to periodically come to an agreement and mutually exchange useful information.

VI. Letter from the Ambassador of France in St. Petersburg Montebello to the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Russia Girs

I have received a letter which Your Excellency deigned to address to me on December 15/27, 1893, by which you notify me that, having studied the draft military convention drawn up by the Russian and French general staffs, and having reported to the emperor all your considerations, you considered it their duty to inform me that this agreement, in the form in which it was approved in principle by His Majesty and as signed in August 1892 by the respective representatives of the parties authorized for this purpose by the governments: - Gen.-ad. Obruchev and Divisional General Boisdefre, can henceforth be considered as finally accepted.

I hastened to notify my government of this decision, and I am authorized to inform Your Excellency with a request that this decision be brought to the attention of E.V. Emperor that the President of the Republic and the French Government also regard the aforementioned military convention, the text of which is approved by both sides, as being to be carried out. By virtue of this agreement, both general staffs will now be able to periodically come to an agreement and mutually exchange useful information.

Montebello.

Note :

¹* The words in parentheses were entered into the text of the convention by V. N. Lamadorf.

AVPR. Documents diplomatiques. L "Alliance franco-russe, 1918, p. 129. Paris

1.3 Russo-French alliance

The main reasons for rapprochement with France include: acute contradictions in the Balkans between Russia, on the one hand, Austria-Hungary and Germany, on the other, predetermined the fragility of the "Union of Three Emperors". In 1882, Germany, Austria-Hungary and Italy formed the Tripartite Alliance, directed against France and posing a danger to Russia, which refused to join it. At the end of the 80s. Russia's economic relations with Germany deteriorated sharply, while French capital actively penetrated into Russia, becoming an important source of financing for its economy.

The emerging political and economic rapprochement between Russia and France leads to the conclusion in August 1891 of a secret agreement on mutual assistance in the event of military aggression by the countries of the Triple Alliance. In 1892, a military convention was signed on joint military operations against Germany, Austria-Hungary and Italy in the event of their attack on one of the countries. The final registration of the union took place in 1894 after the approval of the Russian-French military convention by Alexander III.

The Russo-French economic rapprochement paved the way for a political rapprochement between republican France and monarchist Russia. Such rapprochement was also dictated by the entire foreign policy situation of that time. At the beginning of June 1890, 3 months after Bismarck's resignation, Germany refused to renew the "reinsurance agreement". This irritated even the supporters of the German-Russian alliance among Russian government circles.

Under these conditions, the Russian government was forced to think about the further foreign policy orientation of Russia. Fear of isolation forced to speed up the formation of a military-political alliance with France. In 1893, Germany launched a particularly fierce economic war against Russia, the Russian government defiantly sent a Russian squadron on a return visit to Toulon. At the same time, as a result of preliminary negotiations between representatives of the general staffs of both countries, on December 27, 1893, a Franco-Russian military convention was signed. The Franco-Russian alliance has become a fact. The Franco-Russian military convention, developed in connection with the increase in the German army, laid the military foundation for the Russian-French alliance. The convention stated that France should put up armies of 1,300 thousand people against Germany, Russia from 700 to 800 thousand. Both sides pledged to put these forces into action “fully and with all speed”, so that Germany would have to fight simultaneously on West, and in the East. The provisions of the convention were also secret. St. Petersburg insisted on this so as not to speed up the military-strategic rapprochement between Berlin and Vienna. But it was difficult to keep such an important international treaty secret for a long time, and two years later France and Russia officially recognize their allied obligations.

The final registration of the Franco-Russian took place in January 1894.

1.4 Politics in Central Asia

By the beginning of the XX century. Central Asia has become the main supplier of cotton for Russian industry.

The accession of Central Asia was accompanied by the colonization of lands. On average, about 50 thousand people moved here every year. The political stability of the region, the availability of free land and relatively low taxes attracted residents from Russian provinces, China and other neighboring states.

The accession of the Central Asian peoples to Russia was accompanied by many progressive phenomena. Internecine wars ceased, slavery and the slave trade were abolished. In Central Asia, a single legislation with Russia was established, reflecting the positive changes of the era.

The process of capitalist development began in Central Asia. Trade turnover is growing noticeably, especially in connection with the development of cotton growing and sericulture. Secular schools began to be created in the cities. Russian scientists launched a wide range of activities to study the nature, history and culture of Central Asia. A particularly notable contribution belongs to P.L. Semenov-Tyan-Shansky, N.M. Przhevalsky, V.V. Barthold and others.

1.5 Outcomes of foreign policy in the late 19th century

In the last quarter of the XIX century. European tension was constantly growing due to the deepening contradictions between the great powers: Russia, England, France, Germany and Austria-Hungary. Their confrontation determined the situation in the world, affecting the interests of other states as well. Conflicts have engulfed many regions: the Near and Middle East, the Balkan Peninsula. North Africa, Far East, Southeast Asia. Therefore, for Russia, as well as for other states, major problem was the search for allies to solve their own problems in these conflicts. End of the 19th century early 20th century was marked by the creation of two hostile blocs ..

The first of the blocs of the tripartite alliance began to take shape in the late 1970s. In 1879, Germany and Austria-Hungary entered into a secret alliance against Russia and France. After Italy joined it, in 1882 the Tripartite Alliance of the Central European Powers arose. This union pursued an aggressive policy in the Balkans, the Near and Middle East. Austria-Hungary was preparing to invade Serbia. Germany increased its influence in Turkey and Iraq, stepped up its colonial policy in Africa and Far East. The figurative phrase of Chancellor O. Bismarck that the Germans "also need their place in the sun" became the motto of German diplomacy.

Despite the twofold (in 1881 and 1884) extension of the treaty of the three emperors and the signing of the "reinsurance treaty" in 1887, distrust in Russian-German relations grew. Both sides imposed protectionist customs tariffs and unfavorable trade terms on each other. Germany was preparing for war against Russia and France. The German General Staff already in the 80s of the XIX century. began to develop similar military-strategic plans.

Russia in its foreign policy was forced to reconsider its traditional orientation towards the Central European states and look for new allies. She began an active rapprochement with France. It was pushed to this by the anti-Russian policy of Germany in the Middle East, the growth of German militarism and the resumption of the Triple Alliance in 1891. In July 1891, the French squadron arrived in Kronstadt. Simultaneously with the visit of warships, Russian-French negotiations between diplomats and the military on the conclusion of an alliance took place. In 1891-1892. the first documents (a political agreement and a military convention) were signed on joint actions in case one of the parties was threatened by an attack by Germany or Austria-Hungary. The ratification of the convention in 1893 meant the finalization of the Russian-French alliance, which had an anti-German orientation.

With the formation of two opposing alliances (Triple and Russian-French) opened new stage in the history of international relations, associated with the deepening of contradictions in Europe and the fierce struggle of the great powers for the further division of the world into spheres of influence.

Chapter 2 Foreign policy Russian Empire early 20th century

Started in the 18th century the policy of limiting and regulating the estate Cossack administration, it functioned within the rigid framework of the autocratic system government controlled. It can be concluded that the functions of local government at the beginning of the 19th century were constantly expanding due to the complication of local life, the aggravation social relations; the administration is constantly...

Regress. 2. Ideas of tradition and modernization in conservative ideology 2.1 From tradition to "conservative creativity" Before speaking, what were the ideas of tradition and modernization expressed in the works of Russian conservatives late XIX- the beginning of the 20th century, let's define the content of these terms. Big soviet encyclopedia gives such a definition to the term "tradition" - (from lat. traditio - ...

The alliance between Russia and France, concluded in December 1893, was dictated not only by the commonality of the military-strategic interests of both powers, the presence of a threat from common enemies. By that time, there was already a solid economic basis for the union. Since the 70s of the 19th century, Russia was in dire need of free capital to invest in industry and railway construction, France, on the contrary, did not find a sufficient number of objects for its own investment and actively exported its capital abroad. Since then, it has gradually grown specific gravity French capital in the Russian economy. For 1869-1887. 17 foreign enterprises were founded in Russia, 9 of them French. The economic prerequisites for the union also had a special military-technical aspect. Already in 1888, the brother of Alexander III, who arrived in Paris on an unofficial visit Grand Duke Vladimir Alexandrovich managed to place a mutually beneficial order for the manufacture of 500,000 rifles for the Russian army at French military factories.

The cultural prerequisites for an alliance between Russia and France were long-standing and strong. No other country had such a powerful cultural impact on Russia as France. The names of Voltaire and Rousseau, Hugo and Balzac were known to every educated Russian. In France, they always knew less about Russian culture than in Russia - about French. But since the 1980s, the French, as never before, have been joining Russian cultural values. There are publishing houses that specialize in replicating the masterpieces of Russian literature - the works of Tolstoy and Dostoevsky, Goncharov and Saltykov-Shchedrin, not to mention I.S. Turgenev, who lived in France for a long time and became one of the most beloved writers for the French.

In the context of the growing rapprochement between Russia and France, champions of an active offensive policy against Germany advocated for an alliance in both countries. In France, as long as she was on the defensive with Germany, an alliance with Russia was not a burning need. But as soon as Paris recovered from the consequences of the defeat of 1870 and the question of revenge arose, the course towards an alliance with Russia began to sharply prevail among the leaders of the country.

At the same time, a "French" party began to take shape in Russia as well. Its forerunner was the famous General Skobelev. On February 5, 1882, in Paris, Skobelev, at his own peril and risk, delivered a speech to Serbian students - a speech that bypassed the European press and plunged into confusion the diplomatic circles of Russia and Germany. He branded official Russia for being a victim of "foreign influences" and losing its bearings as to who is its friend and who is its enemy. “If you want me to name you this enemy, so dangerous for Russia and the Slavs, I will tell you him,” thundered Skobelev. do not forget this: the enemy is Germany. The struggle between the Slavs and the Teutons is inevitable. It is even very close!"

In Germany and France, as well as in Austria-Hungary, Skobelev's speech became the political topic of the day for a long time. The impression from her was all the stronger because she was perceived as an inspiration "from above". "That Skobelev, a general in active service, the most famous of the Russian military leaders of that time, is saying by no one authorized, solely from his own own name, no one believed this either in France or in Germany, "- noted the historian Tarle. Skobelev died suddenly four months after this speech. But Pobedonostsev, Ignatiev and Katkov began to insist on rapprochement with France. In January 1887, Alexander III, in one of his conversations with Girs, remarked: "Before, I thought that it was only Katkov who dislikes Germany, but now I am convinced that it is all of Russia." True, the positions of supporters of rapprochement with Germany were strong at the court and in the government of Russia: Minister of Foreign Affairs Girs, his closest assistant and future successor Lamzdorf, Minister of War Vannovsky.

The Russo-French alliance took shape slowly and with difficulty. It was preceded by a series of preliminary steps towards rapprochement between the two countries - mutual steps, but more active on the part of France. In the spring of 1890, after Germany refused to renew the Russo-German "reinsurance" treaty, the French authorities skillfully took advantage of the difficult situation for Russia. In order to win the favor of Alexander III, on May 29, 1890, they immediately arrested 27 Russian political emigrants in Paris. The arrested victims of the provocation were put on trial and sentenced to prison terms. Alexander III, learning about this, exclaimed: "At last there is a government in France!" It is interesting that the French government was headed at that time by Charles-Louis Freycinet, who refused to extradite the Narodnaya Volya Hartmann, who was accused of plotting a terrorist act against Alexander II, to Russia.

On July 13, 1891, a French military squadron came to Kronstadt on an official visit. Her visit was an impressive display of Franco-Russian friendship. The squadron was met by Alexander III himself. The Russian autocrat standing, bareheaded, humbly listened to the French revolutionary anthem "Marseillaise", for the performance of which in Russia itself people were punished as a "state crime". Following the visit of the squadron, a new round of diplomatic negotiations took place, the result of which was a kind of consultative pact between Russia and France, sealed by the signatures of two foreign ministers - Girs and Ribot. Under this pact, the parties undertook, in the event of a threat of attack on one of them, to agree on joint measures that could be taken "immediately and simultaneously."

Indeed, the royal reception given to the French sailors in Kronstadt became, as it were, an event of the year with far-reaching consequences. The newspaper "Sankt-Peterburgskiye Vedomosti" stated with satisfaction: "Two powers, connected by natural friendship, have such a formidable force of bayonets at their disposal that the Triple Alliance must involuntarily stop in thought." In a report to the Reich Chancellor, the German Attorney Bülow assessed the Kronstadt meeting as "a very important factor that weighs heavily against the renewed Triple Alliance."

New Year brought new step in the creation of a Russian-French alliance. Boisdefre, who by that time had headed the General Staff of France, was again invited to the military maneuvers of the Russian army. On August 5, 1892, in St. Petersburg, he and General Obruchev signed the agreed text of the military convention, which actually meant an alliance agreement between Russia and France. Here are the main terms of the convention.
1. If France is attacked by Germany or Italy supported by Germany, Russia will attack Germany, and if Russia is attacked by Germany or Austria-Hungary supported by Germany, then France will attack Germany.
2. In the event of the mobilization of the troops of the Triple Alliance or one of its powers, Russia and France will immediately and simultaneously mobilize all their forces and move them as close as possible to their borders.
3. France undertakes to field 1,300 thousand soldiers against Germany, Russia - up to 800 thousand. “These troops,” the convention said, “will be fully and with all speed brought into action so that Germany will have to fight at once both in the East and in the West.”

The Convention was to enter into force after its ratification by the Emperor of Russia and the President of France. The ministers of foreign affairs were supposed to prepare and submit its text for ratification. However, Gears delayed the performance, citing the fact that illness prevented him from studying the details with due care. The French government, beyond his expectations, helped him: it became entangled in the autumn of 1892 in the grandiose Panamanian scam.

An international joint stock company set up in France in 1879 to build the Panama Canal, chaired by Lesseps, went bankrupt as a result of embezzlement and bribery of many prominent officials, including three former prime ministers. A number of these individuals, hopelessly compromised, were put on trial. In France, a ministerial leapfrog began. Giers and Lamzdorf gloated, anticipating the reaction of Alexander III. "The Sovereign," Lamsdorf wrote in his diary, "will have the opportunity to see how dangerous and imprudent it is to be too closely associated with states without a permanent government, which France is at present."

Alexander III really did not rush Giers to study the convention, but then the German government upset his whole game. In the spring of 1893, Germany began another customs war against Russia, and on August 3, its Reichstag adopted a new military law, according to which the German armed forces grew to 4 million in number. Having received detailed information about this from the French General Staff, Alexander III became angry and defiantly took a new step towards rapprochement with France, namely, he sent a Russian military squadron to Toulon on a return visit.

France gave the Russian sailors such an enthusiastic reception that Alexander III left all doubts. He ordered Giers to expedite the presentation of the Russo-French Convention and approved it on December 14. Then, an exchange of letters between St. Petersburg and Paris, as provided for by the diplomatic protocol, took place, and on December 23, 1893, the convention officially entered into force. The Russo-French alliance was formalized.

Like the Triple Alliance, the Russian-French alliance was created outwardly as a defensive one. In essence, both of them harbored an aggressive principle as rivals in the struggle for the division and redistribution of spheres of influence, sources of raw materials, markets on the way to a European and world war. The 1894 alliance between Russia and France basically completed the regrouping of forces that took place in Europe after the Berlin Congress of 1878. The balance of power largely depended on which side England, the most economically developed power of the then world, would take. Foggy Albion still preferred to remain outside the blocs, continuing the policy of "brilliant isolation". But the Anglo-German antagonism, which was growing due to colonial claims to each other, forced England to lean more and more definitely towards the Russian-French bloc.