Tank counterattack. Still from the film “Liberation: Arc of Fire.” 1968

There is silence over the Prokhorovsky field. Only from time to time you can hear the bell, calling parishioners to worship in the Church of Peter and Paul, which was built with public donations in memory of the soldiers who died on the Kursk Bulge.
Gertsovka, Cherkasskoe, Lukhanino, Luchki, Yakovlevo, Belenikhino, Mikhailovka, Melekhovo... These names now hardly say anything to the younger generation. And 70 years ago, a terrible battle was in full swing here; the largest oncoming tank battle took place in the Prokhorovka area. Everything that could burn was burning; everything was covered in dust, fumes and smoke from burning tanks, villages, forests and grain fields. The earth was scorched to such an extent that not a single blade of grass remained on it. Soviet guards and the elite of the Wehrmacht - the SS tank divisions - met head-on here.
Before the Prokhorovsky tank battle, there were fierce clashes between the tank forces of both sides in the 13th Army of the Central Front, in which up to 1000 tanks took part in the most critical moments.
But tank battles took on the largest scale in the Voronezh Front. Here, in the first days of the battle, the forces of the 4th Tank Army and the 3rd Tank Corps of the Germans collided with three corps of the 1st Tank Army, the 2nd and 5th Guards Separate Tank Corps.
“LET'S HAVE DINNER IN KURSK!”
The fighting on the southern front of the Kursk Bulge actually began on July 4, when German units attempted to knock down military outposts in the zone of the 6th Guards Army.
But the main events unfolded early in the morning of July 5, when the Germans launched the first massive attack with their tank formations in the direction of Oboyan.
On the morning of July 5, the commander of the Adolf Hitler division, Obergruppenführer Joseph Dietrich, drove up to his Tigers, and an officer shouted to him: “Let's have lunch in Kursk!”
But the SS men did not have to have lunch or dinner in Kursk. Only by the end of the day on July 5 did they manage to break through the defensive line of the 6th Army. Exhausted soldiers of the German assault battalions took refuge in the captured trenches to eat dry rations and get some sleep.
On the right flank of Army Group South, Task Force Kempf crossed the river. Seversky Donets and attacked the 7th Guards Army.
Tiger gunner of the 503rd heavy tank battalion of the 3rd Panzer Corps Gerhard Niemann: “Another anti-tank gun about 40 meters ahead of us. The gun crew flees in panic, with the exception of one man. He leans towards the sight and shoots. A terrible blow to the fighting compartment. The driver maneuvers, maneuver - and another gun is crushed by our tracks. And again a terrible blow, this time to the rear of the tank. Our engine sneezes, but nevertheless continues to work.”
On July 6 and 7, the 1st Tank Army took the main attack. In a few hours of battle, all that was left of its 538th and 1008th anti-tank fighter regiments, as they say, were only numbers. On July 7, the Germans launched a concentric attack in the direction of Oboyan. Only in the area between Syrtsev and Yakovlev on a front stretching five to six kilometers, the commander of the 4th German Tank Army, Hoth, deployed up to 400 tanks, supporting their offensive with a massive air and artillery strike.
Commander of the 1st Tank Army, Lieutenant General of the Tank Forces Mikhail Katukov: “We got out of the gap and climbed a small hill where a command post was equipped. It was half past four in the afternoon. But it seemed that a solar eclipse had arrived. The sun disappeared behind clouds of dust. And ahead in the twilight bursts of shots could be seen, the earth took off and crumbled, engines roared and tracks clanged. As soon as enemy tanks approached our positions, they were met by dense artillery and tank fire. Leaving damaged and burning vehicles on the battlefield, the enemy rolled back and went on the attack again.”
By the end of July 8, Soviet troops, after heavy defensive battles, retreated to the second army line of defense.
300 KILOMETER MARCH
The decision to strengthen the Voronezh Front was made on July 6, despite violent protests from the commander of the Steppe Front, I.S. Koneva. Stalin gave the order to move the 5th Guards Tank Army to the rear of the troops of the 6th and 7th Guards Armies, as well as to strengthen the Voronezh Front with the 2nd Tank Corps.
The 5th Guards Tank Army had about 850 tanks and self-propelled guns, including T-34-501 medium tanks and T-70-261 light tanks. On the night of July 6-7, the army moved to the front line. The march took place around the clock under the cover of aviation from the 2nd Air Army.
Commander of the 5th Guards Tank Army, Lieutenant General of Tank Forces Pavel Rotmistrov: “Already at 8 o’clock in the morning it became hot, and clouds of dust rose into the sky. By noon, dust covered roadside bushes, wheat fields, tanks and trucks in a thick layer, the dark red disk of the sun was barely visible through the gray dust curtain. Tanks, self-propelled guns and tractors (pulling guns), armored infantry vehicles and trucks moved forward in an endless stream. The soldiers' faces were covered with dust and soot from the exhaust pipes. It was unbearably hot. The soldiers were thirsty, and their tunics, soaked with sweat, stuck to their bodies. It was especially difficult for the driver mechanics during the march. The tank crews tried to make their task as easy as possible. Every now and then someone would replace the drivers, and during short rest stops they would be allowed to sleep.”
The aviation of the 2nd Air Army so reliably covered the 5th Guards Tank Army on the march that German intelligence was never able to detect its arrival. Having traveled 200 km, the army arrived in the area southwest of Stary Oskol on the morning of July 8. Then, having put the material part in order, the army corps again made a 100-kilometer throw and, by the end of July 9, concentrated in the area of ​​Bobryshev, Vesely, Aleksandrovsky, strictly at the appointed time.
MAN MAIN CHANGES THE DIRECTION OF THE MAIN IMPACT
On the morning of July 8, an even more fierce struggle broke out in the Oboyan and Korochan directions. The main feature of the struggle that day was that the Soviet troops, repelling massive enemy attacks, themselves began to launch strong counterattacks on the flanks of the 4th German Tank Army.
As in previous days, the most fierce fighting broke out in the area of ​​the Simferopol-Moscow highway, where units of the SS Panzer Division "Gross Germany", the 3rd and 11th Panzer Divisions, reinforced by individual companies and battalions of the Tigers and Ferdinands, were advancing. Units of the 1st Tank Army again bore the brunt of enemy attacks. In this direction, the enemy simultaneously deployed up to 400 tanks, and fierce fighting continued here all day.
Intense fighting also continued in the Korochan direction, where by the end of the day the Kempf army group broke through in a narrow wedge in the Melekhov area.
The commander of the 19th German Panzer Division, Lieutenant General Gustav Schmidt: “Despite the heavy losses suffered by the enemy, and the fact that entire sections of trenches and trenches were burned out by flamethrower tanks, we were unable to dislodge the group entrenched there from the northern part of the defensive line enemy force up to a battalion. The Russians settled in the trench system, knocked out our flamethrower tanks with anti-tank rifle fire and put up fanatical resistance.”
On the morning of July 9, a German strike force of several hundred tanks, with massive air support, resumed the offensive in a 10-kilometer area. By the end of the day, she broke through to the third line of defense. And in the Korochan direction, the enemy broke into the second line of defense.
Nevertheless, the stubborn resistance of the troops of the 1st Tank and 6th Guards armies in the Oboyan direction forced the command of Army Group South to change the direction of the main attack, moving it from the Simferopol-Moscow highway to the east to the Prokhorovka area. This movement of the main attack, in addition to the fact that several days of fierce fighting on the highway did not give the Germans the desired results, was also determined by the nature of the terrain. From the Prokhorovka area, a wide strip of heights stretches in a northwestern direction, which dominate the surrounding area and are convenient for the operations of large tank masses.
The general plan of the command of Army Group South was to launch three strong strikes in a comprehensive manner, which should have led to the encirclement and destruction of two groups of Soviet troops and to the opening of offensive routes to Kursk.
To develop the success, it was planned to introduce fresh forces into the battle - the 24th Panzer Corps as part of the SS Viking division and the 17th Panzer Division, which on July 10 were urgently transferred from Donbass to Kharkov. The German command scheduled the start of the attack on Kursk from the north and south for the morning of July 11.
In turn, the command of the Voronezh Front, having received the approval of the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command, decided to prepare and conduct a counter-offensive with the aim of encircling and defeating enemy groups advancing in the Oboyan and Prokhorovsky directions. Formations of the 5th Guards and 5th Guards Tank Army were concentrated against the main group of SS tank divisions in the Prokhorovsk direction. The start of the general counteroffensive was scheduled for the morning of July 12.
On July 11, all three German groups of E. Manstein went on the offensive, and later than everyone else, clearly expecting the attention of the Soviet command to be diverted to other directions, the main group launched an offensive in the Prokhorovsk direction - the tank divisions of the 2nd SS Corps under the command of Obergruppenführer Paul Hauser, awarded the highest award of the Third Reich "Oak leaves to the Knight's Cross".
By the end of the day, a large group of tanks from the SS Reich Division managed to break through to the village of Storozhevoye, posing a threat to the rear of the 5th Guards Tank Army. To eliminate this threat, the 2nd Guards Tank Corps was sent in. Fierce oncoming tank battles continued throughout the night. As a result, the main strike group of the 4th German Tank Army, having launched an offensive on a front of only about 8 km, reached the approaches to Prokhorovka in a narrow strip and was forced to suspend the offensive, occupying the line from which the 5th Guards Tank Army planned to launch its counteroffensive.
The second strike group - the SS Panzer Division "Gross Germany", the 3rd and 11th Panzer Divisions - achieved even less success. Our troops successfully repulsed their attacks.
However, northeast of Belgorod, where the Kempf army group was advancing, a threatening situation had arisen. The enemy's 6th and 7th tank divisions broke through to the north in a narrow wedge. Their forward units were only 18 km from the main group of SS tank divisions, which were advancing southwest of Prokhorovka.
To eliminate the breakthrough of German tanks against the Kempf army group, part of the forces of the 5th Guards Tank Army was sent: two brigades of the 5th Guards Mechanized Corps and one brigade of the 2nd Guards Tank Corps.
In addition, the Soviet command decided to begin the planned counteroffensive two hours earlier, although preparations for the counteroffensive were not yet completed. However, the situation forced us to act immediately and decisively. Any delay was beneficial only to the enemy.
PROKHOROVKA
At 8.30 on July 12, Soviet strike groups launched a counteroffensive against the troops of the 4th German Tank Army. However, due to the German breakthrough to Prokhorovka, the diversion of significant forces of the 5th Guards Tank and 5th Guards armies to eliminate the threat to their rear and the postponement of the start of the counteroffensive, Soviet troops launched an attack without artillery and air support. As the English historian Robin Cross writes: “Artillery preparation schedules were torn to shreds and rewritten again.”
Manstein threw all his available forces into repelling the attacks of the Soviet troops, because he clearly understood that the success of the offensive of the Soviet troops could lead to the complete defeat of the entire strike force of the German Army Group South. A fierce struggle broke out on a huge front with a total length of more than 200 km.
The most fierce fighting during July 12 broke out on the so-called Prokhorov bridgehead. From the north it was limited by the river. Psel, and from the south - a railway embankment near the village of Belenikino. This strip of terrain measuring up to 7 km along the front and up to 8 km in depth was captured by the enemy as a result of intense fighting during July 11. The main enemy group deployed and operated on the bridgehead as part of the 2nd SS Panzer Corps, which had 320 tanks and assault guns, including several dozen Tiger, Panther and Ferdinand vehicles. It was against this grouping that the Soviet command delivered its main blow with the forces of the 5th Guards Tank Army and part of the forces of the 5th Guards Army.
The battlefield was clearly visible from Rotmistrov's observation post.
Pavel Rotmistrov: “A few minutes later, the tanks of the first echelon of our 29th and 18th corps, firing on the move, crashed head-on into the battle formations of the Nazi troops, literally piercing the enemy’s battle formation with a swift through attack. The Nazis, obviously, did not expect to encounter such a large mass of our combat vehicles and such a decisive attack. Control in the enemy's advanced units was clearly disrupted. His "Tigers" and "Panthers", deprived of their fire advantage in close combat, which they enjoyed at the beginning of the offensive in a clash with our other tank formations, were now successfully hit by Soviet T-34 and even T-70 tanks from short distances. The battlefield swirled with smoke and dust, and the ground shook from powerful explosions. The tanks ran at each other and, having grappled, could no longer disperse, they fought to the death until one of them burst into flames or stopped with broken tracks. But even damaged tanks, if their weapons did not fail, continued to fire.”
West of Prokhorovka along the left bank of the Psel River, units of the 18th Tank Corps went on the offensive. His tank brigades disrupted the battle formations of the advancing enemy tank units, stopped them and began to move forward themselves.
Deputy commander of the tank battalion of the 181st brigade of the 18th tank corps, Evgeniy Shkurdalov: “I only saw what was, so to speak, within the boundaries of my tank battalion. The 170th Tank Brigade was ahead of us. With tremendous speed, it wedged itself into the location of the heavy German tanks that were in the first wave, and the German tanks penetrated our tanks. The tanks were walking very close to each other, and therefore they literally shot at point-blank range, simply shooting at each other. This brigade burned down in just five minutes—sixty-five vehicles.”
Radio operator of the command tank of the Adolf Hitler tank division, Wilhelm Res: “Russian tanks were rushing at full throttle. In our area they were prevented by an anti-tank ditch. At full speed they flew into this ditch, due to their speed they covered three or four meters in it, but then seemed to freeze in a slightly inclined position with the gun raised up. Literally for a moment! Taking advantage of this, many of our tank commanders fired directly at point-blank range.”
Evgeniy Shkurdalov: “I knocked out the first tank when I was moving along the landing along the railway, and literally at a distance of a hundred meters I saw a Tiger tank, which stood sideways to me and fired at our tanks. Apparently he knocked out quite a lot of our vehicles, since the vehicles were moving sideways towards him, and he fired at the sides of our vehicles. I took aim with a sub-caliber projectile and fired. The tank caught fire. I fired again and the tank caught fire even more. The crew jumped out, but somehow I had no time for them. I bypassed this tank, then knocked out the T-III tank and the Panther. When I knocked out the Panther, you know, there was a feeling of delight that you see, I did such a heroic deed.”
The 29th Tank Corps, with the support of units of the 9th Guards Airborne Division, launched a counteroffensive along the railroad and highway southwest of Prokhorovka. As noted in the corps' combat log, the attack began without artillery bombardment of the line occupied by the enemy and without air cover. This enabled the enemy to open concentrated fire on the corps’ combat formations and bomb its tank and infantry units with impunity, which led to large losses and a decrease in the tempo of the attack, and this, in turn, enabled the enemy to conduct effective artillery and tank fire from the spot.
Wilhelm Res: “Suddenly one T-34 broke through and moved straight towards us. Our first radio operator began handing shells to me one at a time so that I could put them in the cannon. At this time, our commander above kept shouting: “Shot! Shot!" - because the tank was moving closer and closer. And only after the fourth – “Shot” – did I hear: “Thank God!”
Then, after some time, we determined that the T-34 had stopped just eight meters from us! At the top of the tower he had, as if stamped, 5-centimeter holes located at the same distance from each other, as if they had been measured with a compass. The battle formations of the parties were mixed up. Our tankers successfully hit the enemy from close ranges, but they themselves suffered heavy losses.”
From the documents of the Central Administration of the Russian Ministry of Defense: “The T-34 tank of the commander of the 2nd battalion of the 181st brigade of the 18th tank corps, Captain Skripkin, crashed into the Tiger formation and knocked out two enemy tanks before an 88-mm shell hit his T turret -34, and the other penetrated the side armor. The Soviet tank caught fire, and the wounded Skripkin was pulled out of the wrecked car by his driver, Sergeant Nikolaev, and radio operator Zyryanov. They took cover in a crater, but still one of the Tigers noticed them and moved towards them. Then Nikolaev and his loader Chernov again jumped into the burning car, started it and aimed it straight at the Tiger. Both tanks exploded upon collision.”
The impact of Soviet armor and new tanks with a full set of ammunition thoroughly shook Hauser's battle-weary divisions, and the German offensive stopped.
From the report of the representative of the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command in the Kursk Bulge region, Marshal of the Soviet Union Alexander Vasilevsky, to Stalin: “Yesterday I personally observed a tank battle of our 18th and 29th corps with more than two hundred enemy tanks in a counterattack southwest of Prokhorovka. At the same time, hundreds of guns and all the PCs we had took part in the battle. As a result, the entire battlefield was littered with burning German and our tanks within an hour.”
As a result of the counter-offensive of the main forces of the 5th Guards Tank Army southwest of Prokhorovka, the offensive of the SS tank divisions “Totenkopf” and “Adolf Hitler” to the northeast was thwarted; these divisions suffered such losses that they could no longer launch a serious offensive.
Units of the SS tank division "Reich" also suffered heavy losses from attacks by units of the 2nd and 2nd Guards Tank Corps, which launched a counteroffensive south of Prokhorovka.
In the breakthrough area of ​​the Army Group "Kempf" south and southeast of Prokhorovka, fierce fighting also continued throughout the day on July 12, as a result of which the attack of the Army Group "Kempf" to the north was stopped by tankers of the 5th Guards Tank and units of the 69th Army .
LOSSES AND RESULTS
On the night of July 13, Rotmistrov took the representative of the Supreme Command Headquarters, Marshal Georgy Zhukov, to the headquarters of the 29th Tank Corps. On the way, Zhukov stopped the car several times to personally inspect the sites of recent battles. At one point, he got out of the car and looked for a long time at the burnt-out Panther, rammed by a T-70 tank. A few tens of meters away stood a Tiger and a T-34 locked in a deadly embrace. “This is what a through tank attack means,” Zhukov said quietly, as if to himself, taking off his cap.
Data on the losses of the parties, in particular tanks, vary dramatically in different sources. Manstein writes in his book “Lost Victories” that in total, during the battles on the Kursk Bulge, Soviet troops lost 1,800 tanks. The collection “The Classification of Secrecy Has Been Removed: Losses of the Armed Forces of the USSR in Wars, Combat Actions and Military Conflicts” talks about 1,600 Soviet tanks and self-propelled guns disabled during the defensive battle on the Kursk Bulge.
A very remarkable attempt to calculate German tank losses was made by the English historian Robin Cross in his book “The Citadel. Battle of Kursk". If we put his diagram into a table, we get the following picture: (see the table for the number and losses of tanks and self-propelled guns in the 4th German Tank Army in the period July 4–17, 1943).
Cross's data differs from Soviet sources, which may be understandable to a certain extent. Thus, it is known that on the evening of July 6, Vatutin reported to Stalin that during the fierce battles that lasted all day, 322 enemy tanks were destroyed (Kross had 244).
But there are also completely incomprehensible discrepancies in the numbers. For example, aerial photography taken on July 7 at 13.15, only in the area of ​​Syrtsev, Krasnaya Polyana along the Belgorod-Oboyan highway, where the SS Panzer Division “Great Germany” from the 48th Panzer Corps was advancing, recorded 200 burning enemy tanks. According to Cross, on July 7, 48 Tank lost only three tanks (?!).
Or another fact. According to Soviet sources, as a result of bombing attacks on concentrated enemy troops (SS Great Germany and 11th TD) on the morning of July 9, many fires broke out throughout the area of ​​the Belgorod-Oboyan highway. It was German tanks, self-propelled guns, cars, motorcycles, tanks, fuel and ammunition depots that were burning. According to Cross, there were no losses at all in the 4th German Tank Army on July 9, although, as he himself writes, on July 9 it fought stubbornly, overcoming fierce resistance from Soviet troops. But it was precisely by the evening of July 9 that Manstein decided to abandon the attack on Oboyan and began to look for other ways to break through to Kursk from the south.
The same can be said about Cross's data for July 10 and 11, according to which there were no losses in the 2nd SS Panzer Corps. This is also surprising, since it was on these days that the divisions of this corps delivered the main blow and, after fierce fighting, were able to break through to Prokhorovka. And it was on July 11 that Hero of the Soviet Union Guard Sergeant M.F. accomplished his feat. Borisov, who destroyed seven German tanks.
After archival documents were opened, it became possible to more accurately assess Soviet losses in the tank battle of Prokhorovka. According to the combat log of the 29th Tank Corps for July 12, of the 212 tanks and self-propelled guns that entered the battle, 150 vehicles (more than 70%) were lost by the end of the day, of which 117 (55%) were irretrievably lost. According to combat report No. 38 of the commander of the 18th Tank Corps dated July 13, 1943, corps losses amounted to 55 tanks, or 30% of their original strength. Thus, it is possible to obtain a more or less accurate figure for the losses suffered by the 5th Guards Tank Army in the battle of Prokhorovka against the SS divisions “Adolf Hitler” and “Totenkopf” - over 200 tanks and self-propelled guns.
As for the German losses at Prokhorovka, there is an absolutely fantastic discrepancy in the numbers.
According to Soviet sources, when the battles near Kursk died down and broken military equipment began to be removed from the battlefields, more than 400 broken and burned German tanks were counted in a small area southwest of Prokhorovka, where an oncoming tank battle unfolded on July 12. Rotmistrov claimed in his memoirs that on July 12, in battles with the 5th Guards Tank Army, the enemy lost over 350 tanks and more than 10 thousand people killed.
But in the late 1990s, German military historian Karl-Heinz Friser published sensational data he obtained after studying German archives. According to these data, the Germans lost four tanks in the battle of Prokhorovka. After additional research, he came to the conclusion that in fact the losses were even less - three tanks.
Documentary evidence refutes these absurd conclusions. Thus, the combat log of the 29th Tank Corps states that enemy losses included 68 tanks (it is interesting to note that this coincides with Cross’s data). A combat report from the headquarters of the 33rd Guards Corps to the commander of the 5th Guards Army dated July 13, 1943 states that the 97th Guards Rifle Division destroyed 47 tanks over the past 24 hours. It is further reported that during the night of July 12, the enemy removed his damaged tanks, the number of which exceeded 200 vehicles. The 18th Tank Corps chalked up several dozen destroyed enemy tanks.
We can agree with Cross’s statement that tank losses are generally difficult to calculate, since disabled vehicles were repaired and went into battle again. In addition, enemy losses are usually always exaggerated. Nevertheless, it can be assumed with a high degree of probability that the 2nd SS Panzer Corps lost at least over 100 tanks in the battle of Prokhorovka (excluding the losses of the SS Reich Panzer Division, which operated south of Prokhorovka). In total, according to Cross, the losses of the 4th German Tank Army from July 4 to July 14 amounted to about 600 tanks and self-propelled guns out of 916 at the start of Operation Citadel. This almost coincides with the data of the German historian Engelmann, who, citing Manstein’s report, claims that in the period from July 5 to 13, the German 4th Tank Army lost 612 armored vehicles. The losses of the 3rd German Tank Corps by July 15 amounted to 240 tanks out of 310 available.
The total losses of the parties in the oncoming tank battle near Prokhorovka, taking into account the actions of Soviet troops against the 4th German Tank Army and the Kempf Army Group, are estimated as follows. The Soviet side lost 500 and the German side lost 300 tanks and self-propelled guns. Cross claims that after the Battle of Prokhorov, Hauser's sappers blew up damaged German equipment that was beyond repair and standing in no man's land. After August 1, German repair shops in Kharkov and Bogodukhov accumulated such a quantity of faulty equipment that they had to be sent even to Kyiv for repairs.
Of course, the German Army Group South suffered its greatest losses in the first seven days of fighting, even before the battle of Prokhorovka. But the main significance of the Prokhorovsky battle lies not even in the damage caused to the German tank formations, but in the fact that the Soviet soldiers dealt a powerful blow and managed to stop the SS tank divisions rushing to Kursk. This undermined the morale of the elite of the German tank forces, after which they finally lost faith in the victory of German weapons.

Number and losses of tanks and self-propelled guns in the 4th German Tank Army July 4–17, 1943
Date	The number of tanks in the 2nd SS Tank Tank	Number of tanks in the 48th Tank Tank	Total	Tank losses in the 2nd SS Tank Tank	Tank losses in the 48th Tank Tank	Total	Notes
04.07	470	446	916	39	–	39	48th TK – ?
05.07	431	453	884	21	–	21	48th TK – ?
06.07	410	455	865	110	134	244
07.07	300	321	621	2	3	5
08.07	308	318	626	30	95	125
09.07	278	223	501	–	–	–	?
10.07	292	227	519	–	6	6	2nd SS Tank - ?
11.07	309	221	530	–	33	33	2nd SS Tank - ?
12.07	320	188	508	68	–	68	48th TK – ?
13.07	252	253	505	–	36	36	2nd SS Tank - ?
14.07	271	217	488	11	9	20
15.07	260	206	466	–	–	–	?
16.07	298	232	530	–	–	?
17.07	312	279	591	no data	no data	–
Total tanks lost in the 4th Tank Army			280	316	596

On August 23, Russia celebrates the Day of the Defeat of Nazi Troops in the Battle of Kursk

There is no analogue in world history to the Battle of Kursk, which lasted 50 days and nights - from July 5 to August 23, 1943. The victory in the Battle of Kursk was a decisive turn in the course of the Great Patriotic War. The defenders of our Motherland managed to stop the enemy and inflict a deafening blow on him, from which he could not recover. After the victory in the Battle of Kursk, the advantage in the Great Patriotic War was already on the side of the Soviet army. But such a radical change cost our country dearly: military historians still cannot accurately estimate the losses of people and equipment on the Kursk Bulge, agreeing on only one assessment - the losses of both sides were colossal.

According to the plan of the German command, the Soviet troops of the Central and Voronezh fronts defending in the Kursk region were to be destroyed as a result of a series of massive attacks. The victory in the Battle of Kursk gave the Germans the opportunity to expand their plan of attack on our country and their strategic initiative. In short, winning this battle meant winning the war. In the Battle of Kursk, the Germans had high hopes for their new equipment: Tiger and Panther tanks, Ferdinand assault guns, Focke-Wulf-190-A fighters and Heinkel-129 attack aircraft. Our attack aircraft used new anti-tank bombs PTAB-2.5-1.5, which penetrated the armor of the fascist Tigers and Panthers.

The Kursk Bulge was a protrusion about 150 kilometers deep and up to 200 kilometers wide, facing west. This arc was formed during the winter offensive of the Red Army and the subsequent counter-offensive of the Wehrmacht in Eastern Ukraine. The battle on the Kursk Bulge is usually divided into three parts: the Kursk defensive operation, which lasted from July 5 to 23, the Oryol (July 12 - August 18) and the Belgorod-Kharkov (August 3 - 23).

The German military operation to seize control of the strategically important Kursk Bulge was codenamed “Citadel”. The avalanche attacks on Soviet positions began on the morning of July 5, 1943, with artillery fire and air strikes. The Nazis advanced on a broad front, attacking from heaven and earth. As soon as it began, the battle took on a grandiose scale and was extremely tense. According to data from Soviet sources, the defenders of our Motherland were confronted by about 900 thousand people, up to 10 thousand guns and mortars, about 2.7 thousand tanks and more than 2 thousand aircraft. In addition, aces of the 4th and 6th air fleets fought in the air on the German side. The command of the Soviet troops managed to assemble more than 1.9 million people, more than 26.5 thousand guns and mortars, over 4.9 thousand tanks and self-propelled artillery units and about 2.9 thousand aircraft. Our soldiers repelled attacks by enemy strike forces, showing unprecedented tenacity and courage.

On July 12, Soviet troops on the Kursk Bulge went on the offensive. On this day, in the area of ​​the Prokhorovka railway station, 56 km north of Belgorod, the largest oncoming tank battle of the Second World War took place. About 1,200 tanks and self-propelled guns took part in it. The battle of Prokhorovka lasted all day, the Germans lost about 10 thousand people, over 360 tanks and were forced to retreat. On the same day, Operation Kutuzov began, during which the enemy’s defenses were broken through in the Bolkhov, Khotynets and Oryol directions. Our troops advanced into German positions, and the enemy command gave the order to retreat. By August 23, the enemy was thrown back 150 kilometers to the west, and the cities of Orel, Belgorod and Kharkov were liberated.

Aviation played a significant role in the Battle of Kursk. Air strikes destroyed a significant amount of enemy equipment. The advantage of the USSR in the air, achieved during fierce battles, became the key to the overall superiority of our troops. In the memoirs of the German military one can feel admiration for the enemy and recognition of his strength. German General Forst wrote after the war: “Our offensive began, and a few hours later a large number of Russian aircraft appeared. Air battles broke out above our heads. During the entire war, none of us saw such a spectacle.” A German fighter pilot from the Udet squadron, shot down on July 5 near Belgorod, recalls: “Russian pilots began to fight much harder. Apparently you still have some old footage. I never thought that I would be shot down so soon...”

And about how fierce the battles were on the Kursk Bulge and about the superhuman efforts that this victory was achieved, the memoirs of the commander of the battery of the 239th mortar regiment of the 17th artillery division, M.I. Kobzev, can best tell:

– “The fierce battles on the Oryol-Kursk Bulge in August 1943 are especially etched in my memory,” Kobzev wrote. - It was in the Akhtyrka area. My battery was ordered to cover the retreat of our troops with mortar fire, blocking the path of the enemy infantry advancing behind the tanks. The calculations of my battery had a hard time when the Tigers began to shower it with a hail of fragments. They disabled two mortars and almost half the servants. The loader was killed by a direct hit from a shell, an enemy bullet hit the gunner in the head, and number three had his chin torn off by a shrapnel. Miraculously, only one battery mortar remained intact, camouflaged in the thickets of corn, which, together with a scout and a radio operator, the three of us dragged 17 kilometers for two days until we found our regiment retreating to the assigned positions.

On August 5, 1943, when the Soviet army clearly had an advantage in the Battle of Kursk in Moscow, for the first time in 2 years since the beginning of the war, an artillery salute thundered in honor of the liberation of Orel and Belgorod. Subsequently, Muscovites often watched fireworks on the days of significant victories in the battles of the Great Patriotic War.

Vasily Klochkov

Thousands of books have been written about this battle, but many facts are still little known to a wide audience. Russian historian and writer, author of more than 40 published works on the history of the Battle of Kursk and the Battle of Prokhorov, Valery Zamulin recalls the heroic and victorious battle in the Black Earth Region.

The article is based on material from the program “The Price of Victory” of the radio station “Echo of Moscow”. The broadcast was conducted by Vitaly Dymarsky and Dmitry Zakharov. You can read and listen to the original interview in full at this link.

After the encirclement of the Paulus group and its dismemberment, the success at Stalingrad was deafening. After February 2, a number of offensive operations were carried out. In particular, the Kharkov offensive operation, as a result of which Soviet troops captured significant territory. But then the situation changed dramatically. In the Kramatorsk area, a group of tank divisions, some of which were transferred from France, including two SS divisions - Leibstandarte Adolf Hitler and Das Reich - launched a crushing counterattack by the Germans. That is, the Kharkov offensive operation turned into a defensive one. I must say that this battle came at a high price.

After German troops occupied Kharkov, Belgorod and adjacent territories, the well-known Kursk ledge was formed in the south. Around March 25, 1943, the front line finally stabilized in this sector. Stabilization occurred due to the introduction of two tank corps: the 2nd Guards and the 3rd "Stalingrad", as well as the operational transfer at the request of Zhukov from Stalingrad of the 21st Army of General Chistyakov and the 64th Army of General Shumilov (later referred to as 6 -I and 7th Guards Armies). In addition, by the end of March there was a muddy road, which, of course, helped our troops hold the line at that moment, because the equipment was very bogged down and it was simply impossible to continue the offensive.

Thus, given that Operation Citadel began on July 5, then from March 25 to July 5, that is, for three and a half months, preparations were made for summer operations. The front stabilized, and in fact, a certain balance, equilibrium was maintained, without sudden, as they say, movements on both sides.

The Stalingrad operation cost the Germans the 6th Army of Paulus and himself

Germany suffered a colossal defeat at Stalingrad, and most importantly, the first such stunning defeat, so the political leadership was faced with an important task - to consolidate its bloc, because Germany’s allies began to think that Germany was not so invincible; What will happen if suddenly there is another Stalingrad? Therefore, Hitler needed, after a fairly victorious offensive in Ukraine in March 1943, when Kharkov was recaptured, Belgorod was taken, the territory was captured, another, perhaps small, but impressive victory.

Although no, not small. If Operation Citadel had been successful, which the German command naturally counted on, then two fronts would have been encircled - Central and Voronezh.

Many German military leaders took part in the development and implementation of Operation Citadel. In particular, General Manstein, who initially proposed a completely different plan: to cede the Donbass to the advancing Soviet troops so that they would pass there, and then with a blow from above, from the north, press them, throw them into the sea (in the lower part were the Azov and Black Seas).

But Hitler did not accept this plan for two reasons. Firstly, he said that Germany cannot make territorial concessions now, after Stalingrad. And, secondly, the Donetsk basin, which the Germans needed not so much from a psychological point of view, but from a raw material point of view, as an energy base. Manstein's plan was rejected, and the forces of the German General Staff concentrated on developing Operation Citadel to eliminate the Kursk salient.

The fact is that it was convenient for our troops to launch flank attacks from the Kursk ledge, so the area for the start of the main summer offensive was precisely determined. However, the process of forming tasks and the preparation process took a lot of time because there were disputes. For example, Model spoke and persuaded Hitler not to start this operation due to understaffing both in manpower and technical strength. And, by the way, the second date of “Citadel” was set for June 10 (the first was May 3-5). And already from June 10 it was postponed even further - to July 5.

Here, again, we must return to the myth that only “Tigers” and “Panthers” were involved in the Kursk Bulge. In fact, this was not the case, because these vehicles began to be produced in a relatively large series in 1943, and Hitler insisted that about 200 Tigers and 200 Panthers be sent to the Kursk direction. However, this entire 400-vehicle group was not used, because like any new equipment, both tanks suffered from “childhood diseases.” As Manstein and Guderian noted, the Tigers' carburetors caught fire quite often, the Panthers had problems with the transmission, and therefore no more than 50 vehicles of both types were actually used in combat during the Kursk operation. God forbid, the remaining 150 of each type would have been brought into battle - the consequences could have been much more dire.

It is important to understand here that the German command initially planned the Belgorod group, that is, Army Group South, which was headed by Manstein, as the main one - it was supposed to solve the main problem. The attack by Model's 9th Army was, as it were, auxiliary. Manstein had to go 147 kilometers before joining Model’s troops, so the main forces, including tank and motorized divisions, were concentrated near Belgorod.

The first offensive in May - Manstein saw (there were reconnaissance reports, photographs) how quickly the Red Army, the Voronezh Front, in particular, was strengthening its positions, and understood that his troops would not be able to reach Kursk. With these thoughts, he first came to Bogodukhov, to the CP of the 4th Tank Army, to Hoth. For what? The fact is that Hoth wrote a letter - there was also an attempt to develop Operation Panther (as a continuation if Citadel was successful). So, in particular, Goth opposed this operation. He believed that the main thing was not to rush to Kursk, but to destroy, as he assumed, about 10 mechanized tank corps that the Russians had already prepared. That is, destroy mobile reserves.

If this whole colossus moves towards Army Group South, then, as they say, it will not seem like much. This is precisely why it was necessary to plan at least the first stage of the Citadel. On May 9–11, Hoth and Manstein discussed this plan. And it was at this meeting that the tasks of the 4th Panzer Army and Task Force Kempf were clearly defined, and the plan for the Prokhorovsky battle was developed here.

It was near Prokhorovka that Manstein planned a tank battle, that is, the destruction of these mobile reserves. And after they are defeated, when the condition of the German troops is assessed, it will be possible to talk about an offensive.

In the area of ​​the Kursk salient, both in the north and in the south, for Operation Citadel, the Germans concentrated up to 70% of the armored vehicles at their disposal on the Eastern Front. It was assumed that these forces would be able to ram the three most fortified lines of the Soviet defense and destroy, given the qualitative superiority of German armored vehicles at that time over our tanks, mobile reserves. After this, under a favorable set of circumstances, they will also be able to advance in the direction of Kursk.

The SS Corps, part of the 48th Corps and part of the forces of the 3rd Panzer Corps were planned for the battles near Prokhorovka. These three corps were supposed to grind down the mobile reserves that were supposed to approach the Prokhorovka area. Why to the Prokhorovka area? Because the terrain there was favorable. It was simply impossible to deploy a significant number of tanks in other places. This plan was largely implemented by the enemy. The only thing is that they didn’t calculate the strength of our defense.

A few more words about the Germans. The fact is that the situation in Africa was already in turmoil. After the loss of Africa, it automatically followed that the British would establish complete control over the Mediterranean Sea. Malta is an unsinkable aircraft carrier, from which they hammer Sardinia first, Sicily, and thus prepare the possibility of landing in Italy, which was ultimately carried out. That is, for the Germans in other areas, everything was not going well either, thank God. Plus the vacillation of Hungary, Romania, and other allies...

Planning for the summer military operations of the Red Army and the Wehrmacht began approximately simultaneously: for the Germans - in February, for us - at the end of March, after stabilization of the front line. The fact is that the containment of the enemy, who was advancing from Kharkov in the Belgorod region, and the organization of defense were controlled by the Deputy Supreme Commander-in-Chief, Marshal Zhukov. And after the front line was stabilized, he was here, in the Belgorod region; Together with Vasilevsky, they discussed future plans. After this, he prepared a note in which he outlined his point of view, which was developed jointly with the command of the Voronezh Front. (By the way, Vatutin became commander of the Voronezh Front on March 27, before which he commanded the Southwestern Front. He replaced Golikov, who, by decision of Headquarters, was removed from this post).

So, at the beginning of April, a note was placed on Stalin’s desk, which outlined the basic principles of conducting military operations in the south in the summer of 1943. On April 12, a meeting was held with the participation of Stalin, in which a proposal was approved to switch to a deliberate defense, to prepare troops and defense in depth in case the enemy goes on the offensive. And the configuration of the front line in the Kursk salient area suggested a high probability of such a transition.

Despite local successes, the Nazi Operation Citadel failed

Here we should return to the system of engineering structures, because until 1943, before the Battle of Kursk, the Red Army did not create such powerful defensive lines. After all, the depth of these three defense lines was about 300 kilometers. That is, the Germans needed to plow, ram, and drill through 300 kilometers of fortified areas. And these are not just full-height trenches dug and reinforced with planks, these are anti-tank ditches, gouges, this is the most powerful system of minefields made for the first time during the war; and, in fact, every settlement on this territory also turned into a mini-fortress.

Neither the Germans nor our side had ever built such a strong defensive line, filled with engineering barriers and fortifications, on the Eastern Front. The first three lines were the most fortified: the main army line, the second army line and the third rear army line - to a depth of approximately 50 kilometers. The fortifications were so powerful that two large, strong enemy groups were unable to break through them within two weeks, despite the fact that, in general, the Soviet command did not guess the main direction of the German attack.

The fact is that in May, fairly accurate data was received about the enemy’s plans for the summer: periodically they came from illegal agents from England and Germany. The headquarters of the Supreme High Command knew about the plans of the German command, but for some reason it was determined that the Germans would deliver the main blow on the Central Front, on Rokossovsky. Therefore, Rokossovsky was additionally given significant artillery forces, an entire artillery corps, which Vatutin did not have. And this miscalculation, of course, influenced how the fighting developed in the south. Vatutin was forced to repel the attacks of the enemy’s main tank group with tanks, not having sufficient artillery to fight; in the north there were also tank divisions that participated directly in the attack on the Central Front, but they had to deal with Soviet artillery, and numerous ones at that.

But let's move smoothly to July 5, when, in fact, the event began. The canonical version is Ozerov’s film “Liberation”: the defector says that the Germans have concentrated there and there, a colossal artillery attack is carried out, almost all the Germans are killed, it is not clear who else has been fighting there for a whole month. How was it really?

There really was a defector, and not just one - there were several of them both in the north and in the south. In the south, in particular, on July 4, a reconnaissance battalion soldier from the 168th Infantry Division came over to our side. According to the plan of the command of the Voronezh and Central Fronts, in order to inflict maximum losses on the enemy, who was preparing to attack, it was planned to carry out two measures: firstly, to conduct a powerful artillery attack, and, secondly, to strike an air strike from the 2nd, 16th and 17th air armies at the base airfield. Let's talk about the air raid - it was a failure. And moreover, it had unfortunate consequences, since the timing was not calculated.

As for the artillery attack, in the zone of the 6th Guards Army it was partially successful: mainly telephone communication lines were disrupted. There were losses in both manpower and equipment, but they were insignificant.

Another thing is the 7th Guards Army, which occupied the defense along the eastern bank of the Donets. The Germans, accordingly, are on the right. Therefore, in order to launch an offensive, they needed to cross the river. They pulled up significant forces and watercraft to certain settlements and sections of the front, and previously established several crossings, hiding them under water. Soviet intelligence recorded this (engineering reconnaissance, by the way, worked very well), and the artillery strike was carried out precisely on these areas: on crossings and on populated areas where these assault groups of the 3rd Tank Corps of Routh were concentrated. Therefore, the effectiveness of artillery preparation in the 7th Guards Army zone was significantly higher. The losses from it both in manpower and equipment, not to mention management and so on, were high. Several bridges were destroyed, which slowed down the pace of the advance and in some places paralyzed it.

Already on July 5, Soviet troops began to split the enemy’s strike force, that is, they did not allow the 6th Panzer Division, Kempff’s Army Group, to cover the right flank of Hausser’s 2nd Panzer Corps. That is, the main strike group and the auxiliary group launched an offensive along diverging lines. This forced the enemy to attract additional forces from the spearhead of the attack to cover their flanks. This tactic was conceived by the command of the Voronezh Front and was perfectly implemented.

Since we are talking about the Soviet command, many will agree that both Vatutin and Rokossovsky are famous people, but the latter has a reputation as, perhaps, a greater commander. Why? Some say that he fought better in the Battle of Kursk. But Vatutin, in general, did a lot, since he still fought with smaller forces, fewer numbers. Judging by the documents that are now open, we can say with confidence that Nikolai Fedorovich very competently, very intelligently and skillfully planned his defensive operation, taking into account that the main group, the most numerous, was advancing against his front (although it was expected from the north). And until the 9th, inclusive, when the situation practically turned around, when the Germans had already sent strike groups to the flanks to solve tactical problems, the troops of the Voronezh Front fought excellently, and control, of course, went very well. As for the next steps, the decisions of front commander Vatutin were influenced by a number of subjective factors, including the role of the supreme commander-in-chief.

Everyone remembers that Rotmistrov’s tankers won a great victory on the tank field. However, before this, at the line of the German attack, at the forefront, there was the well-known Katukov, who, in general, took all the bitterness of the first blows upon himself. How did this happen? The fact is that the defense was built as follows: ahead, on the main line, were the troops of the 6th Guards Army, and it was assumed that the Germans would most likely strike along the Oboyanskoye Highway. And then they had to be stopped by the tankmen of the 1st Tank Army, Lieutenant General Mikhail Efimovich Katukov.

On the night of the 6th they advanced to the second army line and took the main attack almost in the morning. By mid-day, Chistyakov's 6th Guards Army was cut into several parts, three divisions were scattered, and we suffered significant losses. And only thanks to the skill, skill and perseverance of Mikhail Efimovich Katukov, the defense was held until the 9th inclusive.

The commander of the Voronezh Front, Army General N. F. Vatutin, accepts a report from one of the formation commanders, 1943

It is known that after Stalingrad our army suffered huge losses, including among the officers. I wonder how these losses were made up for in a fairly short period by the summer of 1943? Vatutin took over the Voronezh Front in a very poor condition. A number of divisions numbered two, three, four thousand. Replenishment was due to the conscription of the local population that left the occupied territory, marching companies, as well as due to the arrival of reinforcements from the Central Asian republics.

As for the command staff, its shortage in 1942 in the spring was made up for by officers from academies, from rear units, and so on. And after the battles at Stalingrad, the situation with the tactical command staff, especially battalion and regiment commanders, was catastrophic. As a result, on October 9, the well-known order to abolish the commissars, and a significant part of the political staff was sent to the troops. That is, everything that was possible was done.

The Battle of Kursk is considered by many to be the largest defensive operation of the Great Patriotic War. Is this true? At the first stage - undoubtedly. No matter how we now evaluate the battle in the Black Earth Region, it was after August 23, 1943, when it ended, that our enemy, the German army, was no longer able to conduct a single major strategic offensive operation within the army group. He simply had nothing to do with it. In the south, the situation was as follows: the Voronezh Front was tasked with exhausting the enemy’s forces and knocking out his tanks. During the defensive period, until July 23, they were unable to do this completely. The Germans sent a significant part of the repair fund to repair bases, which were located not far from the front line. And after the troops of the Voronezh Front went on the offensive on August 3, all these bases were captured. In particular, in Borisovka there was a repair base for the 10th Tank Brigade. There, the Germans blew up some of the Panthers, up to forty units, and we captured some. And at the end of August, Germany was no longer able to replenish all the tank divisions on the Eastern Front. And this task of the second stage of the Battle of Kursk during the counteroffensive - to knock out the tanks - was solved.

The Battle of Kursk is one of the largest and most important battles of the Great Patriotic War, which took place from July 5 to August 23, 1943.
The German command gave a different name to this battle - Operation Citadel, which, according to Wehrmacht plans, was supposed to counterattack the Soviet offensive.

Causes of the Battle of Kursk

After the victory at Stalingrad, the German army began to retreat for the first time during the Great Patriotic War, and the Soviet army launched a decisive offensive that could only be stopped at the Kursk Bulge and the German command understood this. The Germans organized a strong defensive line, and in their opinion, it should have withstood any attack.

Strengths of the parties

Germany
At the start of the Battle of Kursk, the Wehrmacht troops numbered more than 900 thousand people. In addition to the huge amount of manpower, the Germans had a considerable number of tanks, among which were tanks of all the latest models: these are more than 300 Tiger and Panther tanks, as well as a very powerful tank destroyer (anti-tank gun) Ferdinand or Elephant "including about 50 combat units.
It should be noted that among the tank army there were three elite tank divisions, which had not suffered a single defeat before - they included real tank aces.
And in support of the ground army, an air fleet was sent with a total number of more than 1,000 combat aircraft of the latest models.

USSR
To slow down and complicate the enemy's offensive, the Soviet Army installed approximately one and a half thousand mines on every kilometer of the front. The number of infantrymen in the Soviet Army reached more than 1 million soldiers. And the Soviet Army had 3-4 thousand tanks, which also exceeded the number of German ones. However, a large number of Soviet tanks are outdated models and are not rivals to the same “Tigers” of the Wehrmacht.
The Red Army had twice as many guns and mortars. If the Wehrmacht has 10 thousand of them, then the Soviet Army has more than twenty. There were also more planes, but historians cannot give exact figures.

Progress of the battle

During Operation Citadel, the German command decided to launch a counterattack on the northern and southern wings of the Kursk Bulge in order to encircle and destroy the Red Army. But the German army failed to accomplish this. The Soviet command hit the Germans with a powerful artillery strike to weaken the initial enemy attack.
Before the start of the offensive operation, the Wehrmacht launched powerful artillery strikes on the positions of the Red Army. Then, on the northern front of the arc, German tanks went on the offensive, but soon encountered very strong resistance. The Germans repeatedly changed the direction of the attack, but did not achieve significant results; by July 10, they managed to break through only 12 km, losing about 2 thousand tanks. As a result, they had to go on the defensive.
On July 5, the attack began on the southern front of the Kursk Bulge. First came a powerful artillery barrage. Having suffered setbacks, the German command decided to continue the offensive in the Prokhorovka area, where tank forces were already beginning to accumulate.
The famous Battle of Prokhorovka, the largest tank battle in history, began on July 11, but the height of the battle in the battle was on July 12. On a small section of the front, 700 German and about 800 Soviet tanks and guns collided. The tanks of both sides mixed and throughout the day many tank crews left their combat vehicles and fought in hand-to-hand combat. By the end of July 12, the tank battle began to wane. The Soviet army failed to defeat the enemy's tank forces, but managed to stop their advance. Having broken a little deeper, the Germans were forced to retreat, and the Soviet Army launched an offensive.
German losses in the Battle of Prokhorovka were insignificant: 80 tanks, but the Soviet Army lost about 70% of all tanks in this direction.
In the next few days, they were almost completely bled dry and had lost their attacking potential, while the Soviet reserves had not yet entered the battle and were ready to launch a decisive counterattack.
On July 15, the Germans went on the defensive. As a result, the German offensive did not bring any success, and both sides suffered serious losses. The number of those killed on the German side is estimated at 70 thousand soldiers, a large amount of equipment and guns. According to various estimates, the Soviet army lost up to 150 thousand soldiers, a large number of this figure being irretrievable losses.
The first offensive operations on the Soviet side began on July 5, their goal was to deprive the enemy of maneuvering his reserves and transferring forces from other fronts to this section of the front.
On July 17, the Izyum-Barvenkovsky operation began from the Soviet army. The Soviet command set the goal of encircling the Donbass group of Germans. The Soviet army managed to cross the Northern Donets, seize a bridgehead on the right bank and, most importantly, pin down German reserves on this section of the front.
During the Mius offensive operation of the Red Army (July 17 - August 2), it was possible to stop the transfer of divisions from Donbass to the Kursk Bulge, which significantly reduced the defensive potential of the arc itself.
On July 12, the offensive began in the Oryol direction. Within one day, the Soviet army managed to drive the Germans out of Orel, and they were forced to move to another defensive line. After Orel and Belgorod, the key cities, were liberated during the Oryol and Belgorod operations, and the Germans were driven back, it was decided to arrange a festive fireworks display. So on August 5, the first fireworks display during the entire period of hostilities in the Great Patriotic War was organized in the capital. During the operation, the Germans lost over 90 thousand soldiers and a large amount of equipment.
In the southern region, the offensive of the Soviet army began on August 3 and was called Operation Rumyantsev. As a result of this offensive operation, the Soviet army managed to liberate a number of strategically important cities, including the city of Kharkov (August 23). During this offensive, the Germans attempted to counterattack, but they did not bring any success to the Wehrmacht.
From August 7 to October 2, the offensive operation “Kutuzov” was carried out - the Smolensk offensive operation, during which the left wing of the German armies of the “Center” group was defeated and the city of Smolensk was liberated. And during the Donbass operation (August 13 – September 22), the Donetsk basin was liberated.
From August 26 to September 30, the Chernigov-Poltava offensive operation took place. It ended in complete success for the Red Army, since almost all of Left Bank Ukraine was liberated from the Germans.

Aftermath of the battle

The Kursk operation became a turning point in the Great Patriotic War, after which the Soviet Army continued its offensive and liberated Ukraine, Belarus, Poland and other republics from the Germans.
The losses during the Battle of Kursk were simply colossal. Most historians agree that more than a million soldiers died on the Kursk Bulge. Soviet historians say that the losses of the German army amounted to more than 400 thousand soldiers, the Germans talk about a figure of less than 200 thousand. In addition, a huge amount of equipment, aircraft and guns were lost.
After the failure of Operation Citadel, the German command lost the ability to carry out attacks and went on the defensive. In 1944 and 45, local offensives were launched, but they did not bring success.
The German command has repeatedly said that defeat on the Kursk Bulge is a defeat on the Eastern Front and it will be impossible to regain the advantage.

July '43... These hot days and nights of war are an integral part of the history of the Soviet Army with the Nazi invaders. The front, in its configuration in the area near Kursk, resembled a giant arc. This segment attracted the attention of the fascist command. The German command prepared the offensive operation as revenge. The Nazis spent a lot of time and effort developing the plan.

Hitler's operational order began with the words: “I have decided, as soon as weather conditions permit, to carry out the Citadel offensive - the first offensive of this year... It must end with quick and decisive success.” Everything was gathered by the Nazis into a powerful fist. The fast-moving tanks “Tigers” and “Panthers” and super-heavy self-propelled guns “Ferdinands”, according to the Nazis’ plan, were supposed to crush, scatter the Soviet troops, and turn the tide of events.

Operation Citadel

The Battle of Kursk began on the night of July 5, when a captured German sapper said during interrogation that the German Operation Citadel would begin at three in the morning. There were only a few minutes left before the decisive battle... The Military Council of the front had to make a very important decision, and it was made. On July 5, 1943, at two hours and twenty minutes, the silence exploded with the thunder of our guns... The battle that began lasted until August 23.

As a result, events on the fronts of the Great Patriotic War resulted in the defeat of Hitler's groups. The strategy of Operation Citadel of the Wehrmacht on the Kursk bridgehead is crushing blows using surprise against the forces of the Soviet Army, encircling and destroying them. The triumph of the Citadel plan was supposed to ensure the implementation of further plans of the Wehrmacht. To thwart the plans of the Nazis, the General Staff developed a strategy aimed at defending the battle and creating conditions for the liberation actions of the Soviet troops.

Progress of the Battle of Kursk

The actions of the Army Group "Center" and the Task Force "Kempf" of the Armies "South", which came from Orel and Belgorod in the battle on the Central Russian Upland, were to decide not only the fate of these cities, but also change the entire subsequent course of the war. Reflecting the attack from Orel was entrusted to the formations of the Central Front. Units of the Voronezh Front were supposed to meet the advancing detachments from Belgorod.

The steppe front, consisting of rifle, tank, mechanized and cavalry corps, was entrusted with a bridgehead in the rear of the Kursk bend. On July 12, 1943, on the Russian field near the Prokhorovka railway station, the greatest end-to-end tank battle took place, noted by historians as unprecedented in the world, the largest end-to-end tank battle in terms of scale. Russian power on its own soil passed another test and turned the course of history towards victory.

One day of battle cost the Wehrmacht 400 tanks and almost 10 thousand human losses. Hitler's groups were forced to go on the defensive. The battle on the Prokhorovsky field was continued by units of the Bryansk, Central and Western fronts, starting Operation Kutuzov, the task of which was to defeat enemy groups in the Orel area. From July 16 to 18, the corps of the Central and Steppe Fronts eliminated Nazi groups in the Kursk Triangle and began pursuing it with the support of air forces. With their combined forces, Hitler's formations were thrown back 150 km to the west. The cities of Orel, Belgorod and Kharkov were liberated.

The meaning of the Battle of Kursk

• Of unprecedented force, the most powerful tank battle in history, was key in the development of further offensive actions in the Great Patriotic War;
• The Battle of Kursk is the main part of the strategic tasks of the General Staff of the Red Army in the plans of the 1943 campaign;
• As a result of the implementation of the “Kutuzov” plan and the “Commander Rumyantsev” operation, units of Hitler’s troops in the area of ​​​​the cities of Orel, Belgorod and Kharkov were defeated. The strategic Oryol and Belgorod-Kharkov bridgeheads have been liquidated;
• The end of the battle meant the complete transfer of strategic initiatives into the hands of the Soviet Army, which continued to advance to the West, liberating cities and towns.

Results of the Battle of Kursk

• The failure of the Wehrmacht's Operation Citadel presented to the world community the impotence and complete defeat of Hitler's campaign against the Soviet Union;
• A radical change in the situation on the Soviet-German front and throughout as a result of the “fiery” Battle of Kursk;
• The psychological breakdown of the German army was obvious; there was no longer confidence in the superiority of the Aryan race.