L. S. Vygotsky collected works

L.S.VYGOTSKY

MEETING

ESSAYS

SECOND

PROBLEMS

GENERAL PSYCHOLOGY

Edited by V.V. DAVYDOV

MOSCOW 1982

L.S.VYGOTSKY

COLLECTED WORKS

TOMACH

Editor-in-Chief

A.V. ZAPOROZHETS

Members editorial board: T. A. VLASOVA G. L. VYGODSKAYA

B.V. DAVYDOV
A. N. LEONTIEV
A. R. LURIA

A. V. PETROVSKY

A.A. SMIRNOV

B.S. HELEMENDIK

D. B. ELKONIN

M. G. YAROSHEVSKY

Secretary of the Editorial Board L. A. RADZIKHOVSKY

MOSCOW PEDAGOGY

Reviewer: Doctor of Psychology, Professor

A. N. Sokolov

Compiled by G. L. Vygodskaya

Vygotsky L. S.

Collected works: In 6 volumes. T. 2. Problems of general psychology / Ed. V.V. Davydova. - M.: Pedagogy, 1982. - 504 p., ill. - (Academician of Pedagogical Sciences of the USSR),

The second volume of the Collected Works of L. S. Vygotsky includes works containing the author’s main psychological ideas. This includes the famous monograph “Thinking and Speech,” which represents the result of Vygotsky’s work. The volume also includes lectures on psychology.

This volume directly continues and develops the range of ideas presented in the first volume of the Collected Works.

For psychologists, teachers, philosophers.

THINKING

PREFACE 1

This work is a psychological study of one of the most difficult, intricate and complex issues in experimental psychology - the issue of thinking and speech. Systematic experimental development of this problem, as far as we know, has not been undertaken by any of the researchers. The solution to the problem facing us, at least with an initial approximation, could be carried out in no other way than by a series of private experimental studies of individual aspects of the issue that interests us, for example, the study of experimentally formed concepts, the study writing and its relationship to thinking, the study of inner speech, etc.

In addition to experimental research, we inevitably had to turn to theoretical and critical research. On the one hand, we had to, through theoretical analysis and generalization of the large amount of factual material accumulated in psychology, through comparison and comparison of phylo- and ontogenesis data, outline the starting points for solving our problem and develop the initial prerequisites for independently obtaining scientific facts in the form of a general doctrine of genetic roots thinking and speech. On the other hand, it was necessary to subject to critical analysis the most ideologically powerful of modern theories of thinking and speech in order to build on them, understand the paths of our own searches, draw up preliminary working hypotheses and contrast from the very beginning the theoretical path of our research with the path that led to building dominant modern science, but untenable and therefore in need of revision and overcoming theories.

During the study, we had to resort to theoretical analysis twice more. The study of thinking and speech inevitably affects a number of related and borderline areas scientific knowledge. A comparison of data from the psychology of speech and linguistics, experimental study of concepts and the psychological theory of learning turned out to be inevitable. It seemed to us that it is most convenient to resolve these questions that arise along the way in a purely theoretical formulation, without analyzing independently accumulated factual material. Following this-

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As a rule, we introduced into the context of development research scientific concepts a working hypothesis about training and development that we developed in another place and on other material. And finally, theoretical generalization, bringing together all experimental data turned out to be the last point of application of theoretical analysis to our research.

Thus, our study turned out to be complex and diverse in composition and structure, but at the same time each private problem, which stood before the individual segments of our work, was so subordinated to a common goal, so connected with the previous and subsequent segments, that the work as a whole - we dare to hope for this - is essentially a single, albeit divided into parts, study, which entirely, in all its parts is aimed at solving the main and central task - the genetic analysis of the relationship between thought and word.

The program of our research and this work was determined in accordance with the main task. We started by posing the problem and searching for research methods. We then attempted, in a critical study, to analyze the two most complete and powerful theories of speech development and thinking - theory J. Piaget and V. Stern, in order from the very beginning to contrast our formulation of the problem and the method of research with the traditional formulation of the question and the traditional method and thereby outline what, in fact, we should look for in the course of our work, to what final point it should bring us. Further, we had to precede our two experimental studies of the development of concepts and basic forms of verbal thinking with a theoretical study that would clarify the genetic roots of thinking and speech and thereby outline the starting points for our independent work on the study of the genesis of speech thinking. Central part the whole book forms two experimental research, of which one is devoted to elucidating the main path of development of the meanings of words in childhood, and the other to a comparative study of the development of scientific and spontaneous concepts of a child. Finally, in the final chapter we tried to bring together the data from the entire study and present in a coherent and integral form the process of verbal thinking, as it is drawn in the light of these data.

As with any research that seeks to bring something new to the solution of the problem being studied, and with regard to our work, the question naturally arises of what it contains that is new and, therefore, controversial, which requires careful analysis and further verification. We can list in a few words the new things that our work brings to the

L. S. VYGOTSKY

general doctrine of thinking and speech. Without dwelling on the somewhat new formulation of the problem that we assumed, and in a certain sense, the new research method that we applied, what is new in our research can be reduced to the following points: 1) experimental establishment of the fact that the meanings of words develop in childhood, and identifying the main stages in their development; 2) revealing the unique path of development of a child’s scientific concepts in comparison with the development of his spontaneous concepts and clarifying the basic laws of this development; 3) revealing the psychological nature of written speech as an independent function of speech and its relationship to thinking; 4) experimental revelation of the psychological nature of inner speech and its relationship to thinking. In this enumeration of the new data contained in our research, we meant, first of all, what this research can contribute to the general doctrine of thinking and speech in the sense of new, experimentally established psychological facts, and then those working hypotheses and theoretical generalizations , which inevitably had to arise in the process of interpretation, explanation and comprehension of these facts.

This book is the result of almost ten years of continuous work by the author and his collaborators on the study of thinking and speech. When this work began, we were not yet clear not only about its final results, but also about many questions that arose during the research process. Therefore, in the course of our work, we repeatedly had to revise previously put forward provisions, discard and cut off many things as incorrect, rebuild and deepen others, and finally develop and write others completely anew. The central line of our research has all the time been steadily developing in one main direction, taken from the very beginning, and in this book we have tried to expand explicitlye much of what was contained implicite in our previous works, but at the same time also much of what was before us it seemed right to exclude it from this work as an outright fallacy.

Some of its chapters were previously used by us in other works and published as a manuscript in one of the courses distance learning(Chapter Five). Other chapters were published as reports or prefaces to the works of the authors they criticize (chapters two and four). The remaining chapters, like the book as a whole, are being published for the first time.

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We are well aware of the inevitable imperfection of the first step in a new direction, which we tried to take in this work, but we see our justification in the fact that this step, in our opinion, moves us forward in the study of thinking and speech in comparison with the state of this problems that had developed in psychology by the time we began our work, revealing the problem of thinking and speech as a key problem of all human psychology, directly leading the researcher to a new psychological theory of consciousness. However, we touch on this problem only in a few final words our work and stop the research at its very threshold.

Chapter one

PROBLEM AND RESEARCH METHOD

The problem of thinking and speech belongs to the range of those psychological problems, in which the question of the relationship between various mental functions comes to the fore, various types activity of consciousness. The central point of this whole problem is, of course, the question of the relationship between thought and word. All other questions related to this problem are, as it were, secondary and logically subordinate to this first and main question, without the resolution of which even the correct formulation of each of the further and more specific questions is impossible. Meanwhile, it is precisely the problem of interfunctional connections and relationships, oddly enough, that is for modern psychology an almost completely undeveloped and new problem.

The problem of thinking and speech - as ancient as the science of psychology itself - is precisely at this point, in the question of the relationship of thought to word, the least developed and most obscure. Atomistic and functional analysis, which dominated scientific psychology throughout the last decade, led to the fact that individual mental functions were considered in an isolated form, the method of psychological cognition was developed and improved in relation to the study of these individual, isolated, separate processes, while the problem of the connection of functions with each other, the problem of their organization in the holistic structure of consciousness remained outside the attention of researchers.

That consciousness is a single whole and that individual functions are connected in activity with each other into an indissoluble unity - this idea does not represent anything new for modern psychology. But the unity of consciousness and the connection between individual functions in psychology were usually postulated rather than served as the subject of research. Moreover, by postulating the functional unity of consciousness, psychology, along with this indisputable assumption, based its research on the tacitly accepted, although clearly not formalized,

THINKING AND SPEECH

a simulated, completely false postulate, consisting in the recognition of the immutability and constancy of interfunctional connections of consciousness, and assumed that perception is always and in the same way connected with attention, memory is always and in the same way connected with perception, thought with memory, etc. From this, Of course, it followed that cross-functional connections are something that can be bracketed as common multiplier and what may not be taken into account when carrying out research operations on the individual and isolated functions remaining inside the brackets. Thanks to all this, the problem of relationships is, as said, the least developed part in the entire range of problems of modern psychology.

This could not but have a very serious impact on the problem of thinking and speech. If you look at the history of the study of the problem, you can easily see that the central point about the relationship of thought to word has always eluded the researcher’s attention and the center of gravity of the whole problem has shifted and shifted to some other point, switched to some other question.

If we try to briefly formulate the results of historical work on the problem of thinking and speech in scientific psychology, we can say that the solution to this problem, which was proposed by various researchers, has always and constantly fluctuated - from the most ancient times to the present day - between two extreme poles - between identification, complete fusion of thought and word and between their equally metaphysical, equally absolute, equally complete rupture and separation. Expressing one of these extremes in its pure form or combining both of these extremes in its constructions, occupying, as it were, an intermediate point between them, but all the time moving along an axis located between these polar points, various teachings about thinking and speech revolved in the same a vicious circle, a way out of which has not yet been found. Starting from ancient times, the identification of thinking and speech through psychological linguistics, which declared that thought is “speech minus sound,” and right up to modern American psychologists and reflexologists, who consider thought as an inhibited reflex, not identified in its motor part, follows a single line of development "one and the same idea, identifying thinking and speech. Naturally, all the teachings adjacent to this line, by the very essence of their views on the nature of thinking and speech, always faced the impossibility of not only solving, but even raising the question of the relationship of thought to word If thought and word coincide, if they are one and the same, there is no relationship between them.

L. S. VYGOTSKY

cannot arise and cannot serve as the subject of research, just as it is impossible to imagine that the subject of research can be the relationship of a thing to itself. Whoever merges thought and speech closes his own way to posing the question of the relationship between thought and word and makes this problem insoluble in advance. The problem is not resolved, but simply circumvented.

At first glance, it may seem that the doctrine that is closer to the opposite pole and develops the idea of ​​independence of thought and speech is in a more favorable position regarding the issues that interest us. Those who look at speech as the external expression of thought, as its clothing, those who, like representatives of the Würzburg school 2, strive to free thought from everything sensory, including the word, and to present the connection between thought and word as purely external connection, they really not only pose, but also try in their own way to solve the problem of the relationship between thought and word. However, such a solution, proposed by a variety of psychological trends, always turns out to be unable not only to solve, but also to pose this problem, and if it does not bypass it, like the researchers of the first group, then it cuts the knot instead of untie it. Decomposing speech thinking into its constituent elements, alien to each other - into thought and word - these researchers then try, by studying the pure properties of thinking as such, regardless of speech, and speech as such, regardless of thinking, to imagine the connection between both as a purely external mechanical dependence between two different processes.

As an example, one could point to the attempts of one of modern authors Using this technique, study the decomposition of verbal thinking into its component elements, the connection and interaction of both processes. As a result of this research, he comes to the conclusion that speech-motor processes play a large role in facilitating better thinking. They help the processes of understanding in that when verbal material is difficult, inner speech does the job of facilitating better imprinting and unification of what is understood. Further, these same processes benefit in their course as a certain form of active activity if they are joined by inner speech, which helps to feel, embrace, and separate the important from the unimportant during the movement of thought. Finally, inner speech plays a facilitating role in the transition from thought to loud speech.

We gave this example only to show that, having decomposed verbal thinking as a well-known unified

THINKING AND SPEECH

psychological education into its constituent elements, the researcher has no choice but to establish purely external interaction between these elementary processes, as if we're talking about about two heterogeneous, internally unrelated forms of activity. This more favorable position in which representatives of the second direction find themselves lies in the fact that for them, in any case, it becomes possible to raise the question of the relationship between thinking and speech. This is their advantage. But their weakness lies in the fact that the very formulation of this problem is incorrect and excludes any possibility the right decision question, because the method they use of decomposing a single whole into individual elements makes it impossible to study the internal relations between thought and word. Thus, the question rests on the research method, and we think that if from the very beginning we pose the problem of the relationship between thinking and speech, it is also necessary to find out in advance what methods should be applicable when studying this problem, which could ensure its successful resolution .

We think that we should distinguish between two types of analysis used in psychology. The study of any mental formations necessarily involves analysis. However, this analysis may have two fundamental implications. various shapes. One of them, we think, is to blame for all the failures that researchers suffered when trying to solve this centuries-old problem, and the other is the only correct starting point for taking at least the very first step towards its solution.

The first method of psychological analysis can be called the decomposition of complex mental wholes into elements. It can be compared with chemical analysis water, decomposing it into hydrogen and oxygen. An essential feature of such an analysis is that it results in products that are alien to the analyzed whole - elements that do not contain properties inherent in the whole as such," and have a number of new properties that this whole could never discover With a researcher who, wanting to solve the problem of thinking and speech, decomposes it into speech and thinking, exactly the same thing happens as would happen to any person who is in search. scientific explanation any properties of water, for example, why water extinguishes fire or why Archimedes' law applies to water, would resort to the decomposition of water into oxygen and hydrogen as a means of explaining these properties. He would be surprised to learn that hydrogen itself burns, and oxygen supports combustion, and would never be able to explain from the properties of these elements the properties inherent

L. S. VYGOTSKY

to the whole. In the same way, psychology, which decomposes speech thinking into individual elements in search of an explanation of its most essential properties inherent in it precisely as a whole, will then search in vain for these elements of unity inherent in the whole. In the process of analysis, they evaporated, disappeared, and he has no choice but to look for an external mechanical interaction between elements in order to use it to reconstruct, in a purely speculative way, properties that disappeared during the analysis process, but are subject to explanation.

In essence, this kind of analysis, which leads us to products that have lost the properties inherent in the whole, is not, from the point of view of the problem to which it is applied, an analysis in the proper sense of the word. Rather, we have the right to consider it as a method of cognition, the opposite of analysis and, in a certain sense, the opposite of it. After all chemical formula water, relating equally to all its properties, in equally applies generally to all its species, equally to the Great Ocean as well as to a raindrop. Therefore, the decomposition of water into elements cannot be a path that will lead us to an explanation of its specific properties. This is, rather, a path of raising to the general than analysis, that is, dismemberment in the proper sense of the word. In the same way, an analysis of this kind, applied to psychological holistic formations, is also not an analysis capable of revealing to us all the concrete diversity, all the specifics of those relationships between word and thought that we encounter in everyday observations, monitoring the development of verbal thinking in childhood. , the functioning of verbal thinking in its most diverse forms.

This analysis, too, essentially turns into its opposite in psychology and, instead of leading us to an explanation of the concrete and specific properties of the whole being studied, it elevates this whole to a more general directive, to a directive that is capable of explaining to us only something related to the whole speech and thinking in all their abstract universality, before the possibility of comprehending the concrete patterns that interest us. Moreover, an analysis of this kind, unplannedly applied by psychology, leads to deep misconceptions, ignoring the moment of unity and integrity of the process being studied and replacing internal relations unity by external mechanical relations of two heterogeneous and alien processes. Nowhere were the results of this analysis reflected so clearly as in the field of the study of thinking and speech. The word itself, which is a living unity of sound and meaning and contains, like a living cell, in itself in simple form basic properties inherent

THINKING AND SPEECH

tions verbal thinking in general, as a result of such an analysis, it turned out to be split into two parts, between which the researchers then tried to establish an external mechanical associative connection.

The sound and meaning of a word are in no way related to each other. Both of these elements, combined into a sign, says one of the most important representatives of modern linguistics, live completely separately. It is not surprising, therefore, that only the saddest results for the study of the phonetic and semantic aspects of language could come from such a view. Sound, divorced from thought, would lose all the specific properties that alone made it the sound of human speech and distinguished it from the rest of the kingdom of sounds existing in nature. Therefore, in a meaningless sound, they began to study only its physical and mental properties, i.e., what is not specific to this sound, but common to all other sounds existing in nature, and, therefore, such a study could not explain to us why a sound that has such and such physical and mental properties is the sound of human speech and what makes it so. In the same way, meaning, divorced from the sound side of the word, would turn into a pure idea, into a pure act of thought, which began to be studied separately as a concept that develops and lives independently of its material carrier. The futility of classical semantics and phonetics is largely due to precisely this gap between sound and meaning, this decomposition of the word into individual elements. In the same way, in psychology, the development of children's speech was studied from the point of view of its decomposition into the development of the sound, phonetic side of speech and its semantic side. The thoroughly studied history of children's phonetics, on the one hand, turned out to be completely unable to unite, at least in the most elementary form, the problem of the phenomena related here. On the other hand, the study of the meaning of a child's word led researchers to an autonomous and independent history of children's thought, between which there was no connection with the phonetic history of the child's language.

emotional processes, “Bodily Changes in Pain, Hunger, Fear and Rage,” published 1915.

16. Russian translation of this book by Cannon entitled “Physiology of Emotions. Bodily changes during pain, hunger, fear and rage,” with a preface and edited by the Soviet biologist B. M. Zavadovsky (1895-1951), published in Leningrad in 1927. Translation made from the 3rd English reprint of Cannon’s book, published in 1923

17. Zavadovsky Boris Mikhailovich (1895-1951) - see vol. 2, p. 491.

18. McDougall(Mc Dougall) William (1871-1938) - English and American psychologist and philosopher. He contrasted behaviorism and associationism with the so-called target hormic psychology. In his work “Introduction to Social Psychology” (1908), he explained social phenomena instincts. This is the work W. Cannon has in mind (W.V. Cannon, 1927, p. 153).

19. Sherrington(Sherrington) Charles (1857-1952) - see vol. 1, p. 462.

20. Angell(Angel) James Rowland (1869-1949) - American psychologist, representative of the functional direction. Quote by: W. V. Cannon, p. 108.

21. Compare: Spinoza. Ethics, Part I, Axiom 6: “ True idea must agree with its object.”

22. Goldberg(Holdberg) Ludwig (1684-1754) - Danish writer, comedian. Hermann von Bremen - hero of the comedy of the same name.

23. Vagus nerve. In humans, there is the 10th pair of cranial nerves. Paired mixed nerve containing motor, sensory and autonomic (sympathetic and parasympathetic) fibers. The results of the experiments that Vygotsky talks about here are presented in detail in the famous course of lectures by Charles Sherrington “Interactive Activity” nervous system. Lecture 7. Reflex as a reaction of constant adaptation,” first published in London in 1906. In 1935, part of the lectures (including this one) was published in Russian in the book: R. Creed, D. Denny-Brown, I . Eccles, E. Diddell and C. Sherrington. Reflex activity spinal cord. In the 1930s, while preparing this manuscript of L. S. Vygotsky for publication, Z. S. Vygodskaya and A. R. Luria included in the list of references the Russian translation of this work by Sherrington, leaving, of course, the text of Vygotsky himself unchanged. We considered it possible to also refer the reader to the Russian translation of Sherrington's work. In the following, it is briefly indicated: Reflex activity..., p.

24. Morgan(Morgan) Conway Lloyd (1852-1936) - English biologist, animal psychologist, philosopher. One of the creators of the theory of emergent evolution(see note 90).

25. Bekhterev Vladimir Mikhailovich (1867-1927) - Russian physiologist, neurologist, psychologist. In this work, Vygotsky repeatedly mentions Bekhterev’s research on the emotional reactions of animals in which the cerebral cortex, in particular the visual thalamus, has been removed. L. S. Vygotsky dates these works to 1887. In 1887 it was published on German Bekhterev's article: Die Bedeutung der Sehhügel auf Grund von experimentellen und pathologischen Daten. - Virchows Arch., 1887, p. 110, 102-154, 322-365. The article aroused interest in Bekhterev’s work abroad. Thus, W. Cannon, whose data Vygotsky obviously used, mentions it (W. V. Cannon, p. 115). In 1882-1887. Bekhterev published a number of articles in Russia on this topic, including: On forced movements organized during the destruction of the cerebral cortex. - Russian medicine, 1885, No. 1, p. 6-8; No. 3, p. 54-55; About the departure of the visual hillocks. - Doctor, 1883, No. 4, p. 51-52; No. 5, p. 68-70, etc.

26. Pierron(Pieron) Henri (1881-1964) - French psychologist, student of A. Binet and P. Janet. Worked in the field of experimental psychology, zoopsychology, psychophysiology, pathopsychology, applied psychology.

27. Maranon(Maranon) Gregorio (1887-1960) - Italian endocrinologist.

28. Leman(Lehmann) Alfred (1858-1921) - Danish psychologist.

29 . Cannon compares the results of the following works: S. S. Stewart. Mammalian smoth muscle. - The cat's bladder. - Amer. J. Physiol., 1900, N 4, p. 185-208; E. Sertoli. Contribution a la physiologie generale des muscles lisses. -Arch. ital. de biol., 1883, N 3, p. 86; D. N. Langley. On the physiology of the salivary secretion. - J. Physiol., 1889, N 10, p. 300: J. P. Pawlow, E. O. Schumova-Simanowskaja. Die

Based on theoretical foundations, the schemes for the periodization of child development proposed in science can be divided into three groups.

The first group includes attempts to periodize childhood not by dividing the very course of child development, but on the basis of a step-by-step construction of other processes, one way or another connected with child development. An example is the periodization of child development based on the biogenetic principle. The biogenetic theory assumes that there is a strict parallelism between the development of mankind and the development of the child, that ontogeny in a brief and condensed form repeats phylogeny. From the point of view of this theory, it is most natural to divide childhood into separate periods in accordance with the main periods of human history. Thus, the basis for the periodization of childhood is the periodization of phylogenetic development. This group includes the periodization of childhood proposed by Hutchinson and other authors.

Not all of this group's efforts are equally unsuccessful. This group includes, for example, an attempt to periodize childhood in accordance with the stages of a child’s upbringing and education, with a division of the public education system adopted in a given country (preschool age, primary school age, etc.). The periodization of childhood is not built on the basis of the internal division of development itself, but, as we see, on the basis of the stages of upbringing and education. This is the fallacy of this scheme. But since the processes of child development are closely related to the upbringing of the child, and the very division of upbringing into stages is based on vast practical experience, it is natural that the division of childhood according to the pedagogical principle brings us extremely close to the true division of childhood into separate periods.

The second group includes those most numerous attempts that are aimed at isolating any one sign of child development as a conditional criterion for dividing it into periods. A typical example is the attempt of P. P. Blonsky (1930, pp. 110-111) to divide childhood into eras based on dentition, that is, the appearance and change of teeth. A sign on the basis of which one era of childhood can be distinguished from another must be 1) indicative for judging general development child; 2) easily observable and 3) objective. These requirements are exactly what dentition satisfies.

The processes of dentition are in close connection with the essential features of the constitution of a growing organism, in particular with its calcification and the activity of the endocrine glands. At the same time, they are easily observable and their statement is indisputable. Dentition is a clear sign of age. On its basis, postnatal childhood is divided into three eras: toothless childhood, childhood of milk teeth and childhood of permanent teeth. Edentulous childhood lasts until the eruption of all milk teeth (from 8 months to 2-2"/2 years). Milk-toothed childhood continues until the beginning of teeth change (approximately up to 6"/2 years). Finally, permanent dentition ends with the appearance of the third posterior molars (wisdom teeth). In the eruption of primary teeth, in turn, three stages can be distinguished: completely toothless childhood (first half of the year), the stage of teething (second half of the year), and the stage of eruption of promulars and canines (third year of postnatal life).

A similar attempt is made to periodize childhood on the basis of any one aspect of development in the scheme of K. Stratz, who puts forward sexual development as the main criterion. In other schemes built on the same principle, psychological criteria are put forward. This is the periodization of V. Stern, who distinguishes between early childhood, during which the child exhibits only play activity (up to 6 years); a period of conscious learning with a division of play and labor; the period of adolescence (14-18 years) with the development of individual independence and plans for future life.

The schemes of this group, firstly, are subjective. Although they put forward an objective criterion as a criterion for dividing ages, the characteristic itself is taken on subjective grounds, depending on which processes our attention focuses on. Age is an objective category, and not a conditional, arbitrarily chosen and fictitious value. Therefore, milestones that delimit age may not be placed at all points life path child, but exclusively and uniquely in those in which one age objectively ends and another begins.

The second drawback of the schemes of this group is that they put forward a single criterion for distinguishing all ages, consisting of any one sign. At the same time, it is forgotten that in the course of development the value, significance, indicativeness, symptomaticity and importance of the selected attribute changes. A sign that is indicative and essential for judging the development of a child in one era loses its significance in the next, since in the course of development those aspects that were previously in the foreground are relegated to the background. Thus, the criterion of puberty is significant and indicative for puberty, but it does not yet have this significance at previous ages. The eruption of teeth at the border of infancy and early childhood can be taken as an indicative sign for the general development of the child, but the change of teeth around 7 years and the appearance of wisdom teeth cannot be equated in importance for general development with the appearance of teeth. These schemes do not take into account the reorganization of the development process itself. Due to this reorganization, the importance and significance of any characteristic continuously changes as we move from age to age. This excludes the possibility of dividing childhood into separate eras according to a single criterion for all ages. Child development is such a complex process that at no stage can it be fully determined by just one characteristic.

The third drawback of the schemes is their fundamental focus on studying the external signs of child development, and not the internal essence of the process. In fact, the internal essence of things and the external forms of their manifestation do not coincide. “... If the forms of manifestation and the essence of things directly coincided, then all science would be superfluous...” (K. Marx, F. Engels. Works, vol. 25, part II, p. 384). Research Therefore, it acts as a necessary means of cognition of reality, because the form of manifestation and the essence of things do not directly coincide. Psychology is currently moving from a purely descriptive, empirical and phenomenological study of phenomena to the disclosure of their inner essence. Until recently, the main task was to study symptom complexes, that is, a set of external signs that distinguish different eras, stages and phases of child development. Symptom means sign. To say that psychology studies the symptom complexes of various eras, phases and stages of child development means to say that it studies its external signs. The real task is to study what lies behind these signs and determines them, that is, the very process of child development in its internal laws. With regard to the problem of periodization of child development, this means that we must abandon attempts at symptomatic classification of ages and move, as other sciences did in their time, to a classification based on the internal essence of the process being studied.

The third group of attempts to periodize child development is associated with the desire to move from a purely symptomatic and descriptive principle to highlighting the essential features of child development itself. However, in these attempts, the problem is rather correctly posed than solved. Attempts always turn out to be half-hearted in solving problems, never go to the end and reveal inconsistency in the problem of periodization. A fatal obstacle for them turns out to be methodological difficulties stemming from the anti-dialectical and dualistic concept of child development, which does not allow it to be considered as a single process of self-development.

Such, for example, is A. Gesell’s attempt to construct a periodization of child development based on changes in its internal rhythm and tempo, from the definition of the “current volume of development.” Based on basically correct observations of changes in the rhythm of development with age, Gesell comes to the division of all childhood into separate rhythmic periods, or waves, of development, united within themselves by a constancy of tempo throughout a given period and delimited from other periods by a clear change in this tempo. Gesell presents the dynamics of child development as a process of gradual slowdown in growth. Gesell's theory belongs to that group of modern theories which, in his own words, make early childhood the highest authority for the interpretation of personality and its history. The most important and important thing in the development of a child, according to Gesell, occurs in the first years and even in the first months of life. The subsequent development, taken as a whole, is not worth one act of this drama, which is rich in content to the maximum extent.

Where does this misconception come from? It necessarily stems from the evolutionary concept of development on which Gesell relies and according to which nothing new arises in development, no qualitative changes occur, here only what is given from the very beginning grows and increases. In fact, development is not limited to the “more - less” scheme, but is characterized primarily by the presence of high-quality new formations, which are subject to their own rhythm and each time require special measures. It is true that in early ages we observe the maximum rate of development of those prerequisites that determine further development child. Basic, elementary organs and functions mature earlier than higher ones. But it is wrong to believe that all development is exhausted by the growth of these basic, elementary functions, which are prerequisites for the higher aspects of personality. If we consider higher parties, then the result will be the opposite; the pace and rhythm of their formation will be minimal in the first acts of the general drama of development and maximum in its finale.

We have cited Gesell's theory as an example of those half-hearted attempts at periodization that stop halfway in the transition from the symptomatic to the essential division of ages.

What should be the principles of constructing a genuine periodization? We already know where to look for its real basis: only internal changes development itself, only fractures and turns in its course can provide a reliable basis for determining the main eras in the construction of a child’s personality, which we call ages. All theories of child development can be reduced to two main concepts. According to one of them, development is nothing more than the implementation, modification and combination of inclinations. Nothing new arises here - only an increase, deployment and regrouping of those moments that were already given from the very beginning. According to another concept, development is a continuous process of self-propulsion, characterized primarily by the continuous emergence and formation of something new that did not exist at previous stages. This point of view captures something essential in development for the dialectical understanding of the process.

It, in turn, allows for both idealistic and materialistic theories of personality construction. In the first case, it is embodied in theories of creative evolution, guided by the autonomous, internal, vital impulse of a purposefully self-developing personality, the will to self-affirmation and self-improvement. In the second case, it leads to an understanding of development as a process characterized by the unity of the material and mental aspects, the unity of the social and personal as the child ascends the stages of development.

From the latter point of view, there is and cannot be any other criterion for determining specific eras of child development or ages, except for those new formations that characterize the essence of each age. Age-related neoplasms should be understood as that new type of personality structure and its activity, those mental and social changes that first appear at a given age stage and which in the most important and fundamental way determine the child’s consciousness, his relationship to the environment, his internal and external life, the entire course of its development in a given period.

But this alone is not enough for the scientific periodization of child development. It is also necessary to take into account its dynamics, the dynamics of transitions from one age to another. Through purely empirical research, psychology has established that age-related changes can, according to Blonsky (1930, p. 7.), occur abruptly, critically, and can occur gradually, lytically. Blonsky calls epochs And stages times of a child's life separated from each other crises, more (epochs) or less (stages) sharp; phases- times of a child's life, separated from each other lytically.

Indeed, at some ages development is characterized by a slow, evolutionary, or lytic, course. These are the ages of predominantly smooth, often imperceptible internal changes in the child’s personality, changes that occur through minor “molecular” achievements. Here, over a more or less long period, usually covering several years, no fundamental, sharp shifts and changes occur that restructure the child’s entire personality. More or less noticeable changes in the child’s personality occur here only as a result of a long course of a hidden “molecular” process. They come out and become accessible to direct observation only as the conclusion of long processes of latent development 2 .

At relatively stable, or stable, ages, development occurs mainly due to microscopic changes in the child’s personality, which, accumulating to a certain limit, are then abruptly revealed in the form of some age-related neoplasm. Judging purely chronologically, most of childhood is occupied by such stable periods. Since development within them proceeds, as it were, underground, when comparing a child at the beginning and at the end of a stable age, enormous changes in his personality appear especially clearly.

Stable ages have been studied much more fully than those characterized by another type of development - crises. The latter were discovered purely empirically and have not yet been brought into the system, not included in the general periodization of child development. Many authors even question the internal necessity of their existence. They tend to take them rather as “diseases” of development, for its deviation from the normal path. Almost none of the bourgeois researchers could theoretically understand their real significance. Our attempt at systematization and theoretical interpretation, their inclusion in the general scheme of child development should therefore be considered as perhaps the first.

None of the researchers can deny the very fact of the existence of these unique periods in child development, and even the most undialectical-minded authors recognize the need to admit, at least as a hypothesis, the presence of crises in the development of a child, even in very early childhood.

From a purely external perspective, these periods are characterized by features opposite to stable, or stable, ages. In these periods, over a relatively short period of time (several months, a year, or, at most, two), sharp and major shifts and shifts, changes and fractures in the child’s personality are concentrated. In a very short period of time, the child changes as a whole, in the main personality traits. Development takes on a stormy, rapid, sometimes catastrophic character; it resembles a revolutionary course of events both in the pace of changes taking place and in the meaning of the changes taking place. These are turning points in child development, which sometimes take the form of an acute crisis.

The first feature of such periods is, on the one hand, that the boundaries separating the beginning and end of the crisis from adjacent ages, in highest degree indistinct. A crisis occurs unnoticed - it is difficult to determine the moment of its onset and end. On the other hand, a sharp aggravation of the crisis is characteristic, usually occurring in the middle of this age period. The presence of a climax point, at which the crisis reaches its apogee, characterizes all critical ages and sharply distinguishes them from stable eras of child development.

The second feature of critical ages served as the starting point for their empirical study. The fact is that a significant proportion of children experiencing critical periods of development exhibit difficulties in educating. Children seem to fall out of the system of pedagogical influence, which until quite recently ensured the normal course of their upbringing and education. IN school age During critical periods, children show a decline in academic performance, weakening interest in school activities and a general decrease in performance. At critical ages, the development of a child is often accompanied by more or less acute conflicts with others. The inner life of a child is sometimes associated with painful and painful experiences, with internal conflicts.

True, all this is far from necessary. Different children experience critical periods differently. In the course of a crisis, even among children who are closest in type of development and social situation, there are much more variations than in stable periods. Many children do not experience any clearly defined educational difficulties or decline in school performance. The scope of variations in the course of these ages in different children, the influence of external and internal conditions on the course of the crisis itself are so significant and great that they have given rise to many authors to raise the question of whether crises in child development in general are not a product of exclusively external, unfavorable conditions and should not Is it therefore considered an exception rather than a rule in the history of child development (A. Busemann et al.).

External conditions, of course, determine the specific nature of the detection and occurrence of critical periods. Dissimilar in different children, they determine an extremely motley and diverse picture of critical age options. But it is not the presence or absence of any specific external conditions, but the internal logic of the development process itself that causes the need for critical, turning points in a child’s life. The study of relative indicators convinces us of this.

Thus, if we move from an absolute assessment of the difficult to raise™ to a relative one, based on a comparison of the degree of ease or difficulty of raising a child in the stable period preceding the crisis or following it with the degree of difficult to raise during the crisis, then one cannot help but see that any a child at this age becomes relatively difficult to educate compared to himself at an adjacent stable age. In the same way, if we move from an absolute assessment of school performance to its relative assessment, based on a comparison of the rate of progress of the child in the course of education at different age periods, then one cannot help but see that any a child during a crisis reduces the rate of progress compared to the rate characteristic of stable periods.

The third and, perhaps, the most theoretically important feature of critical ages, but the most unclear and therefore complicating a correct understanding of the nature of child development during these periods, is the negative nature of development. Everyone who wrote about these unique periods noted first of all that development here, in contrast to stable ages, performs more destructive than creative work. The progressive development of the child’s personality, the continuous construction of a new one, which was so clearly evident at all stable ages, during periods of crisis seems to fade, to be temporarily suspended. The processes of death and coagulation, disintegration and decomposition of what was formed at the previous stage and distinguished a child of a given age are brought to the fore. During critical periods, a child does not gain as much as he loses what he previously acquired. The onset of these ages is not marked by the emergence of new interests of the child, new aspirations, new types of activities, new forms of inner life. A child entering periods of crisis is rather characterized by the opposite features: he loses the interests that yesterday directed all his activities, which absorbed most of his time and attention, and now seem to freeze; the previously established forms of external relations and internal life seem to be deserted. L.N. Tolstoy figuratively and accurately called one of these critical periods of child development the wilderness of adolescence!

This is what is meant first of all when they talk about the negative nature of critical ages. By this they want to express the idea that development, as it were, changes its positive, creative meaning, forcing the observer to characterize such periods mainly from a negative, negative side. Many authors are even convinced that negative content exhausts the entire meaning of development during critical periods. This belief is enshrined in the names of critical ages (some such ages are called the negative phase, others - the phase of obstinacy, etc.).

The concepts of individual critical ages were introduced into science empirically and in a random order. Earlier than others, the crisis of 7 years was discovered and described (the 7th year in a child’s life is the transitional period between the preschool and adolescence periods). A 7-8 year old child is no longer a preschooler, but not an adolescent either. A seven-year-old is different from both a preschooler and a schoolchild, so he presents educational difficulties. The negative content of this age manifests itself primarily in mental imbalance, instability of will, mood, etc.

Later, the crisis of 3 years of age was discovered and described, called by many authors the phase of obstinacy or stubbornness. During this period, limited to a short period of time, the child's personality undergoes drastic and sudden changes. The child becomes difficult to educate. He exhibits obstinacy, stubbornness, negativism, capriciousness, and self-will. Internal and external conflicts often accompany the entire period.

Even later, the crisis of 13 years was studied, which is described under the name of the negative phase of puberty. As the name itself shows, the negative content of the period comes to the fore and, upon superficial observation, seems to exhaust the entire meaning of development during this period. A drop in academic performance, a decrease in performance, disharmony in the internal structure of the personality, the collapse and withering away of a previously established system of interests, the negative, protesting nature of behavior allow O. Cro to characterize this period as a stage of such disorientation in internal and external relations, when the human “I” and the world are separated more than in other periods.

Relatively recently, it was theoretically realized that the factually well-studied transition from infancy to early childhood, which takes place around one year of life, is in essence also a critical period with its own distinctive features, familiar to us from general description this unique form of development.

In order to obtain a complete chain of critical ages, we would propose to include in it as the initial link that perhaps the most unique of all periods of child development, which is called newbornness. This well-studied period stands apart from the system of other ages and is, by its nature, perhaps the most striking and undoubted crisis in the development of a child. An abrupt change in developmental conditions during the act of birth, when the newborn quickly falls into a completely new environment, changes the entire structure of his life, characterizes the initial period of extrauterine development.

The neonatal crisis separates the embryonic period of development from infancy. The one-year crisis separates infancy from early childhood. The 3-year-old crisis is the transition from early childhood to preschool age. The 7-year-old crisis is the connecting link between preschool and school age. Finally, the crisis at age 13 coincides with a developmental turning point during the transition from school to puberty. Thus, a logical picture is revealed to us. Critical periods alternate stable ones and are critical turning points in development, once again confirming that the development of a child is a dialectical process in which the transition from one stage to another is accomplished not in an evolutionary, but in a revolutionary way.

If critical ages had not been discovered purely empirically, the concept of them should have been introduced into the development scheme on the basis of theoretical analysis. Now the theory can only realize and comprehend what has already been established by empirical research,

At turning points in development, a child becomes relatively difficult to educate due to the fact that changes in the pedagogical system applied to the child do not keep up with the rapid changes in his personality. The pedagogy of critical ages is the least developed in practical and theoretical terms.

Just as all life is at the same time dying (F. Engels) 3, so child development - this is one of the complex forms of life - necessarily includes the processes of coagulation and dying. The emergence of something new in development certainly means the death of the old. The transition to a new age is always marked by the decline of the previous age. The processes of reverse development, the death of the old, are concentrated mainly at critical ages. But it would be a great mistake to believe that this exhausts the significance of critical ages. Development never stops its creative work, and during critical periods we observe constructive development processes. Moreover, the processes of involution, so clearly expressed at these ages, are themselves subordinate to the processes of positive personality construction, are directly dependent on them and form an inextricable whole with them. Destructive work is carried out during the indicated periods to the extent that this is caused by the need to develop properties and personality traits. Actual research shows that the negative content of development during critical periods is only the opposite, or shadow, side of positive personality changes that constitute the main and fundamental meaning of any critical age.

The positive significance of the 3-year-old crisis is that new characteristic features of the child’s personality arise here. It has been established that if a crisis, for some reason, proceeds sluggishly and inexpressively, then this leads to a profound delay in the development of the affective and volitional aspects of the child’s personality at a later age.

With regard to the 7-year crisis, all researchers noted that, along with negative symptoms, there were a number of great achievements in this period: the child’s independence increases, his attitude towards other children changes.

During a crisis at the age of 13, a decrease in the productivity of a student’s mental work is caused by the fact that there is a change in attitude from visualization to understanding and deduction. The transition to a higher form of intellectual activity is accompanied by a temporary decrease in performance. This is confirmed by the other negative symptoms of the crisis: behind every negative symptom lies a positive content, which usually consists of a transition to a new and higher form.

Finally, there is no doubt about the presence of positive content in the crisis of one year. Here, negative symptoms are obviously and directly related to the positive gains that the child makes as he gets on his feet and masters speech.

The same can be applied to the newborn crisis. At this time, the child initially degrades even in terms of physical development: in the first days after birth, the weight of the newborn drops. Adaptation to new form life places such high demands on the child’s viability that, according to Blonsky, a person never stands so close to death as during the hours of his birth (1930, p. 85). And yet, in this period, more than in any of the subsequent crises, the fact emerges that development is a process of formation and the emergence of something new. Everything that we encounter in the development of a child in the first days and weeks is a continuous new formation. The negative symptoms that characterize the negative content of this period stem from difficulties caused precisely by the novelty of a form of life emerging for the first time and becoming increasingly complex.

The most significant content of development at critical ages lies in the emergence of new formations, which, as specific research shows, are highly original and specific. Their main difference from neoplasms of stable ages is that they are transitional in nature. This means that subsequently they are not preserved in the form in which they arise during the critical period, and are not included as a necessary component in the integral structure of the future personality. They die off, as if absorbed by the new formations of the next, stable age, being included in their composition as a subordinate entity that does not have an independent existence, dissolving and transforming in them so much that without a special and in-depth analysis it is often impossible to discover the presence of this transformed formation of a critical period in acquisitions subsequent stable age. As such, neoplasms of crises die off with the onset of the next age, but continue to exist in a latent form within it, not living an independent life, but only participating in that underground development, which at stable ages, as we have seen, leads to the abrupt appearance of new formations.

The specific content of the general laws on neoplasms of stable and critical ages will be disclosed in subsequent sections of this work devoted to the consideration of each age.

The main criterion for dividing child development into separate ages in our scheme should be neoplasms. The sequence of age periods in this scheme should be determined by the alternation of stable and critical periods. The dates of stable ages, which have more or less distinct boundaries of beginning and end, are most correctly determined precisely by these boundaries. Critical ages, due to the different nature of their course, are most correctly determined by noting the culminating points, or peaks, of the crisis and taking the previous half-year closest to this period as its beginning, and the nearest half-year of the subsequent age as its end.

Stable ages, as established by empirical research, have a clearly defined two-member structure and fall into two stages - the first and second. Critical ages have a clearly defined three-member structure and consist of three phases interconnected by lytic transitions: pre-critical, critical and post-critical.

It should be noted that our scheme of child development differs significantly from other schemes that are close to it in defining the main periods of child development. New in this scheme, in addition to the principle of age-related neoplasms used in it as a criterion, are the following points: 1) the introduction of critical ages into the age periodization scheme; 2) exclusion from the period scheme embryonic development child; 3) exclusion of the period of development, usually called adolescence, covering the age after 17-18 years, until the onset of final maturity; 4) inclusion of the age of puberty among the stable, stable, and not critical ages 4.

We removed the embryonic development of the child from the diagram for the simple reason that it cannot be considered on a par with the extrauterine development of the child as a social being. Embryonic development is a completely special type of development, subject to different laws than the development of the child’s personality, which begins from the moment of birth. Embryonic development is studied by an independent science - embryology, which cannot be considered as one of the chapters of psychology. Psychology must take into account the laws of embryonic development of a child, since the characteristics of this period are reflected in the course of post-uterine development, but because of this, psychology does not include embryology in any way. In the same way, the need to take into account the laws and data of genetics, that is, the science of heredity, does not turn genetics into one of the chapters of psychology. Psychology does not study heredity or uterine development as such, but only the influence of heredity and uterine development of a child on the process of his social development.

We do not include youth in the scheme of age periods of childhood for the reason that theoretical and empirical research equally force us to resist the excessive stretching of childhood development and the inclusion of the first 25 years of a person’s life in it. In the general sense and according to basic laws, the age from 18 to 25 years is, rather, the initial link in the chain of mature ages, rather than the final link in the chain of periods of childhood development. It is difficult to imagine that human development at the beginning of adulthood (from 18 to 25 years) could be subject to the laws of childhood development.

The inclusion of pubertal age among the stable ones is a necessary logical conclusion from what we know about this age and what characterizes it as a period of enormous growth in the life of a teenager, as a period of higher syntheses occurring in the individual. This follows as a necessary logical conclusion from the criticism to which theories were subjected in Soviet science that reduced the period of puberty to a “normal pathology” and to the deepest internal crisis.

Thus, we could present the age periodization in the following form 5.

Newborn crisis.

Infancy (2 months - 1 year).

Crisis of one year.

Early childhood (1 year - 3 years).

Crisis 3 years.

Puberty (14 years-18 years).

Crisis 17 years.

Preschool age (3 years - 7 years).

Crisis 7 years.

School age (8 years - 12 years).

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Name
L.S.Vygotsky
Publishing house: Pedagogy, Phoenix, Academy of Pedagogical Sciences of the RSFSR
Format: PDF
Size: 216 MB
Pages: 4570
Year of publication: 1934-2001

Description: Collection of the main works of L.S. Vygotsky (see list below). All PDFs contain an OCR text layer. Lev Semenovich Vygotsky is a Russian psychologist, specialist in the field of phylo- and ontogenesis, creator of the cultural-historical concept of the development of higher mental functions. Until the second half of the 20s. dealt with the problem of art perception, highlighting in the emotional sphere of the perceiver a particular work of art two differently directed affects, the opposition of which is resolved in catharsis, which is the basis of aesthetic reactions.

In the work “The Historical Meaning of the Psychological Crisis” he began to analyze common problems methodology and theory of psychology and the construction of the methodology of Marxist psychology. He worked on problems of defectology in the laboratory of the psychology of abnormal childhood he created (1925-1926), formulating new theory development of an abnormal child. In the last stage of his work, he explored the relationship between thinking and speech, the development of meanings in ontogenesis, and egocentric speech (“Thinking and Speech”, 1934). Introduced the concept of zone of proximal development. He had a significant influence on both domestic (A.N. Leontiev, A.R. Luria, A.V. Zaporozhets) and world psychological thought.

Collection of the main works of L.S. Vygotsky. List of books:

Vygotsky L.S. Collected works: In 6 volumes
T. 1. Questions of the theory and history of psychology. M.: Pedagogika, 1982. 488 p.
T. 2. Problems general psychology. M.: Pedagogika, 1982. 504 p.
T. 3. Problems of mental development. M.: Pedagogika, 1983. 368 p.
T. 4. Child psychology. M.: Pedagogika, 1984. 432 p.
T. 5. Fundamentals of defectology. M.: Pedagogika, 1983. 368 p.
T. 6. Scientific heritage. M.: Pedagogika, 1984. 400 p.

Monographs not included in the collected works:
Vygotsky L.S. Educational psychology. M.: Pedagogika, 1991. 480 p.
Vygotsky L.S. Psychology of art. Rostov n/d: Phoenix publishing house, 1998. 480 p.
Vygotsky L.S. Lectures on pedology. Izhevsk: Udmurt University Publishing House, 2001. 304 p.
Vygotsky L.S., Luria A.R. Studies on the history of behavior. M.: Pedagogika-Press, 1993. 224 p.

Partially scanned books (only works not included in previous volumes):
Vygotsky L.S. Selected psychological studies. M.: APN RSFSR, 1956. P. 1-36, 453-503.
Vygotsky L.S. Development of higher mental functions. M.: APN RSFSR, 1960. P. 1-10, 364-484.

Original edition:
Vygotsky L.S. Thinking and speech. Psychological research. M.-L.: State. social-economic publishing house, 1934. 362 p.