Battleship "Admiral Graf Spee" or Hitler's lost ship. Admiral Graf Spee (heavy cruiser) German warship Admiral Graf Spee

After Germany's defeat in World War I, the victorious powers decided to impose many different restrictions on its navy. They carefully worked out the paragraphs of the agreements, according to which the displacement of the new ships, designed to replace the battleships that had served for 20 years, could not exceed 10,000 tons (“long”, 1016 kg each). At the same time, the maximum caliber of artillery was not specified: it was believed that only a heavy cruiser or a coastal defense ship could be “shoved” into the allotted framework. At the same time, the winners themselves, when concluding the Washington Treaty, decided to set not only a similar displacement limit for their cruisers, but also limit the caliber of their artillery to no more than 203 mm.

"Admiral Count Spee"

When the Germans began designing ships to replace battleships, they first really followed the usual path: they developed a coastal defense ship with 38 cm guns and a conventional Washington-type heavy cruiser with 210 mm guns. However, after several studies, they came up with a completely unusual project.

Firstly, they decided to use diesel engines as the main vehicles. Secondly, the main armament was to consist of six 28 cm guns in two three-gun turrets. Thirdly, much attention was paid to the fire control system, which turned out to be very successful and perfect. Fourthly, the armor protection became unusually powerful for a cruising class ship. The use of diesel engines was directly linked to the enormous cruising range, and the desire for comprehensive weight savings led to the use of a number of technological innovations during construction. True, the new battleships turned out to be expensive, and therefore the Weimar Republic could not immediately allocate funds for the construction of three units. As a result, the lead Deutschland was laid down in February 1928, the second in the Admiral Scheer series in June 1931, and the last Admiral Graf Spee only on October 1, 1932. It entered service in January 1936. The construction of this most advanced of diesel raiders was actually carried out after the Nazis came to power, who were not so afraid of international scandals due to the violation of “vile and criminal treaties unfairly imposed on Germany.”

The ship, built at the shipyard in Wilhelmshaven, had the following tactical and technical characteristics: standard displacement - 12,100 tons, total displacement - 16,582 tons. Waterline length - 181.7 m, maximum - 186 m, width - 21.65 m, draft the largest is 7.43 m. The total power of the eight main diesel engines is 56,800 hp, the speed is 26 (maximum - 28) knots, the cruising range at economic speed is 16,300 miles. The thickness of the armor belt is up to 100 mm, decks are up to 70 mm, towers are up to 140 mm, deckhouses are 150 mm. The total weight of the armor was 3000 tons. The artillery armament consisted of 2? 3 28 cm (283 mm) main caliber guns, 8 1 15 cm auxiliary caliber guns, 3 2 105 mm anti-aircraft guns, as well as 4 2 37 mm 10 1 20 mm anti-aircraft guns. The artillery was complemented by two four-tube 533 mm torpedo tubes in lightly armored mounts. There was also a catapult and equipment to accommodate two float scouts. The crew exceeded 1000 people. It is worth noting that even before the start of World War II, “Admiral Count Spee” received, albeit still quite primitive, but already quite functional radar.

It was completely clear what class these ships should belong to; the British came up with a special name for them: “Pocket battleship” - “pocket battleship”. In Germany they were officially listed as armadillos (Panzerschiffe).

Soon after the completion of the tests, the battleship set off on a test voyage to the Atlantic, and in December 1936 it became part of the German squadron operating off the coast of Spain, engulfed in the civil war. The “pocket battleship” visited the waters off the Iberian Peninsula several times, but each time it was there for a relatively short time and did not make a special mark, but it often took part in various ceremonial events. For example, he represented Germany during the celebrations at the Spithead raid in May 1937.

When, in August 1939, tensions in Europe began to rapidly increase and it became clear that things were heading towards another war, the command decided to take the raider to the vastness of the Atlantic ahead of time. The ship, commanded by Captain Zur See G. von Langsdorff, left Wilhelmshaven on the 21st and successfully entered the ocean. By September 1 - the day of the German attack on Poland - he was in the Central Atlantic, where he successfully met with the supply ship Altmark, which had also left Germany ahead of time.

On September 10, the “pocket battleship” crossed the equator and headed further south, but the order to begin active operations from Germany came only on the 25th. On the last day of the month, the British steamer Clement was captured, and its sinking was accompanied by a number of “jokes”: the ship did not want to sink, and two fired torpedoes missed. We had to use artillery. Observing the laws of cruising warfare, Langsdorff provided the English sailors with the opportunity to escape, but unmasked his ship. The British and French immediately sent several strong formations to search for the pickpocket. Subsequently, operating in the South Atlantic and entering the Indian Ocean, the Admiral Graf Spee captured eight more prizes. At the same time, the Ar-196 airborne aircraft was actively used to search for the next victims. The raider sent his last loot to the bottom on December 3, and after that he transferred the next prisoners to the Altmark, sending it to Germany. The trade fighter himself moved to the mouth of La Plata.

By this time, the British were able to correctly determine the location of the battleship, and Commodore G. Harwood’s squadron arrived in the same area, consisting of the heavy cruiser Exeter and the light cruisers Ajax and Achilles. The opponents discovered each other early in the morning of December 13, and the Germans initially mistook the light cruisers for destroyers. The commander of the “pocket battleship” decided to concentrate fire only on the heavy ship, and from 06:18 to 07:40 “Exeter” received several hits and left the battle. However, the light cruisers took advantage of the fact that the enemy's attention was focused on the heavy cruiser and decisively moved towards rapprochement. They scored many hits and, although their six-inch shells could not inflict too much damage on the battleship, they forced her to abandon her intention to finish off the Exeter. Although as a result of the battle all three “British” were injured ( total losses- 72 killed), and the strongest of them was out of action, the “pocket battleship” also suffered. It killed 36 people and was damaged, but most importantly, its commander lost confidence in himself. Without trying to deal with the “impudent people,” he preferred to go to a neutral port - the capital of Uruguay, Montevideo.

The period of stay there, according to international laws, expired on the evening of December 17, 1939. By this time, the heavy cruiser Cumberland came to the aid of Ajax and Achilles, but the Germans overestimated the enemy’s strength and decided not to go to sea to certain death. At about 6 p.m., the Admiral Graf Spee left, and two hours later it was blown up by its own crew on the border of territorial waters. The ship burned for three days, and its destroyed skeleton sank in shallow water. Captain zur see Langsdorff shot himself in Buenos Aires on December 20...

The Altmark was intercepted by British destroyers in Norwegian waters, and all the prisoners were freed. Two other battleships - Lützow (formerly Deutschland) and Admiral Scheer - were transferred to heavy cruisers in December 1939. Both of them died in the last month of the war. And the skeleton of the “Admiral Graf Spee” was partially dismantled for metal, and partially left at the scene of death. Already in the 2000s. underwater archaeologists brought to the surface many different objects, including individual tools.

Hans Langsdorff - captain of a German ship " Admiral Graf Spee"At the beginning of the Second World War, she sank British merchant ships without any hindrance. He became Britain's enemy number 1, and the captain himself was hunted by the most powerful navy in the world. 70th anniversary of the battleship " Admiral Graf Spee"kept its secrets at the mouth of the La Plata River, but today it can reveal the secrets of its death.

Every day, the crew of a minesweeper goes on patrol from the seaport of Montevideo. The purpose of their destination is the remains of the battleship " Admiral Graf Spee", which are located just 7 km east of the capital. The Uruguayan Navy is "looking after" a sunken monument to the great naval battle that took place here 72 years ago. Sailors must ensure that the ship's wreckage does not fall apart and that gun turrets do not break off and fall into the waterway, threatening shipping. The Uruguayan Navy declared the area off-limits in 2006, but patrol ships have another goal: to keep neo-Nazi souvenir hunters away from the ship. Now the 186-meter colossus is covered with a layer of marine organisms. Battleship lies at the mouth of the La Plata River, recalling the fatal decision made on December 17, 1939.

idea of ​​creating a pocket battleship

Battleship « Admiral Graf Spee” became the child of the dilemma. After defeat in the First World War, Germany was prohibited from having ships with a displacement of more than 10,000 tons. Engineers at the Imperial shipyards were tasked with developing new ships for Germany, and the result was the so-called “pocket battleships.” Assembly soon began on the first three, each of which had the firepower of a ship three times the displacement. Nothing like this has ever happened in the history of the navy. Thanks to pocket battleships, Germany hoped to once again become a great naval power without violating the conditions established by the victors of the First World War, and especially Great Britain.

The strategic basis of the idea of ​​​​creating a battleship " Admiral Graf Spee" consisted of powerful weapons, speed and the purpose of fighting on trade routes. The idea was truly revolutionary, but was there a pocket battleship capable of all this?

To understand this, it is necessary to evaluate the strengths and weaknesses of the ship. Battleship " Admiral Graf Spee" was ideal for his role as a "sea pirate". Even in the hull of the ship innovative technologies were used. For the first time, a ship of this size had a welded rather than riveted hull. The smoother surface meant less water resistance, and of course a significant reduction in weight. But in order to reduce the weight of the ship, German shipbuilders also sacrificed vital armor.

Battleship was driven by diesel engines rather than conventional steam engines. Eight nine-cylinder diesel engines produced more than 55,000 hp. pp., providing the ship with high speed and an incredible range. It was an effective power plant, but complex and not fully technically tested.

Battleship " Admiral Graf Spee"can be compared to a high-speed artillery platform. On board were two main turrets fore and aft, each with six 283 mm guns with a firing range of up to 22 km; eight 150 mm and six 88 mm guns completed the arsenal with ten 20 mm anti-aircraft guns and eight torpedo tubes. However, the artillery could fire at only one target at a time, and as a result, one side of the ship was always vulnerable, and in combination with light or almost non-existent armor battleship « Admiral Graf Spee" can be considered a "sea robber" who can strike and escape.

Even during the two-year construction of the pocket battleship, the ship suddenly had a new role - it was to become an example and pride of the Nazi regime. As storm clouds began to gather over Europe, it was not the ardent Nazi Hans Langsdorff, a decorated World War I veteran, who took command of the ship in October 1938.

Hans Langsdorff joined the Imperial Navy as an eighteen-year-old cadet. After the First World War, he served in Berlin in the War Ministry and by the mid-30s already had a reputation as an excellent manager. Against the wishes of his parents (he was brought up in a strict Protestant atmosphere), he saw himself as a sailor and warrior with high moral principles. Hans Langsdorff was not particularly sympathetic to the Nazi government in Berlin, so he applied for a transfer to active duty as far away from the capital as possible. As a result, he was given command of the most prestigious ship of the German fleet - the battleship " Admiral Graf Spee" The sailors greeted the captain with due respect, because he had an impressive reputation. He soon earned high praise from them due to his loyalty to the crew and his ability to get along with people. From the very beginning, Langsdorff treated officers and enlisted men with equal respect. Putting aside class differences, he managed to weld 1,100 people into one team. Soon the captain had a chance to test himself and his ship.

secret battleship mission

The situation in Europe was heating up and on August 21, 1939, the battleship was sent on a secret mission to the North Sea. None of the crew members knew where the ship was heading, only the captain had this information. Having received the order, battleship began his sea voyage with a deliberate feint, heading for the North Atlantic, where he arrived after three days of travel. Then the ship turned south and disappeared into the boundless expanses of the ocean.

When the battleship Admiral Graf Spee"left his home port, hidden mobilization began in Germany. The ship's secret mission was to attack British merchant ships in the southern regions of the Atlantic. By thus depriving Great Britain of sea supplies of food and raw materials, the Wehrmacht hoped to economically weaken the island state. But the ship's commander had another task - battleship was to force the Royal Navy to send warships to the South Atlantic, which would make England weaker in the English Channel and the North Sea, where Germany was planning an invasion. Therefore the battleship " Admiral Graf Spee" had orders to indiscriminately sink as many British cargo ships as possible. However, there was only one difficulty - Great Britain and Germany were not yet at war, so the battleship had to hide and wait for now.

For the ship's crew, this trip was more like an innocent vacation under the tropical sun. Every day the ship's orchestra played on deck, and German popular tunes were heard from the loudspeakers. Many of the sailors were away from home for the first time, and the captain allowed them to enjoy the peace, because soon they would be at war.

On September 1, 1939, Hitler spoke on the radio, accusing Polish troops in the attack on Germany. On the same day, German troops invaded Poland. The Second World War began. But the commander of the battleship " Admiral Graf Spee"inactive, he was ordered to continue hiding off the African coast. Hitler was convinced that Britain would not enter the war on Poland's side, but Britain's declaration of war against Germany took Hitler by surprise.

Battleship " Admiral Graf Spee“We didn’t have to wait long for the start of hostilities. Crossing the British trade routes sailing to South America, the battleship intercepted its first victim. A warning shot forced the transport ship to stop. The commander of the ship Langsdorff respected the laws of war, so before sinking the ship, he captured the entire crew, and this is what he did with every attack.

Twice a day, the ship's commander sent out an onboard seaplane to search for new targets, which inspected the route planned for the next day. Upon returning from the plane, the coordinates of any spotted enemy merchant ships were transmitted, so all that remained for the battleship to do was follow the instructions. Seaplane " Arado 196"was launched from a catapult and winched back to the ship after completing the patrol. The plane was just a prototype, so it regularly needed engine repairs. Finally, she was completely out of action, but there were still enough targets for the battleship’s torpedoes. During the first week of hostilities, the battleship " Admiral Graf Spee» sunk sea ​​vessels with a total tonnage of 14,000 tons. By the end of October, this number had doubled to 28,000 tons. The Admiralty in London began to show concern - a month later, without killing a single sailor and without giving away its location, the battleship sank seagoing ships with a total tonnage of 50,000 tons.

fatal mistake of the battleship commander

Like any ship, the commander had his own weakness - Langsdorff was demanding that each member of the crew fulfill his duties, and he often had to take risks, which later became a fatal decision.

Pocket battleship " Admiral Graf Spee"always managed to disappear unnoticed, hiding in the vastness of the ocean. He maneuvered so quickly that the British could not tell whether they were dealing with one or two enemy ships. British intelligence reported to the Admiralty a tragic picture of losses, and a decision was made immediately - battleship « Admiral Graf Spee" must be found. Soon the British command sent eight ship search groups.

On December 6, 1939, the ship's commander conducted exercises on working with search lights, since the crew seriously blundered during the last attempt at a night attack. Battleship lights " Admiral Graf Spee", which should remain undetected, were visible for many miles. The dazzling show put on by the captain became fatal.

Suddenly the lookout reported that he was observing a merchant ship sailing without lights, but the commander, without trying to identify it, allowed it to leave. As it turned out, the Norwegian merchant ship immediately reported the coordinates of the battleship to London. The Admiralty immediately sent one heavy cruiser to the area. Exeter"and two light cruisers" Ajax" And " Achilles"to intercept the enemy battleship, which in the meantime was heading to Germany for routine repairs and replenishment of supplies.

battle between a battleship and British cruisers

On the morning of December 13, 1939, the sea was calm. At 06:00 a lookout noticed columns of smoke and mast tops on the horizon. The commander gave the order and battleship set course for the target. The ships, mistaken for merchant ships, turned out to be armed British cruisers. Captain Langsdorff decided not to retreat. In a matter of minutes, more than a thousand people took up their combat posts.

Having entered into battle with the British, Langsdorff made two serious mistakes: he violated the direct instructions of his command and gave the order to approach the enemy much closer. The fact is that the main guns of the battleship had a range of 22 km, but by reducing this distance, the British cruisers had a significant advantage. In a word, at a critical moment, the main towers of the battleship turned out to be useless, so that at the beginning of the battle, at the most important moment, the ship’s commander had only half of the arsenal at his disposal.

The British ships opened fire, launching a massive attack. Captain Langsdorff made a desperate attempt to evade, moving in a zigzag, but in vain. He was throwing away any real attempt to use his main weapons - powerful guns. The Battle of the South Atlantic lasted more than an hour. The pocket battleship continued to come under attack from both sides, suffering losses. The lack of armor quickly took its toll, but the battleship also hit its targets. Several precise attacks forced the cruiser " Exeter» leave the battle. Then battleship began to turn around, and at that moment the British cruisers managed to approach the German ship. It was then that several shells hit the main deck of the battleship, causing very serious damage. By 08:00 the naval battle was over and the ships dispersed. Nobody knew who won this battle. On board the battleship " Admiral Graf Spee» Langsdorff saw only one option further actions- get to the nearest deep-sea port, which is Montevideo. Slowly moving, the battleship entered the port. The cruisers pursued the wounded giant like shadows, keeping a distance of more than 30 km.

battleship "Admiral Graf Spee" - an unwanted guest of Uruguay

Hans Langsdorff was confident that Uruguay would assist them in carrying out repairs, but the condition of the ship was far from ideal - the diesel fuel cleaning system was damaged, the ship had holes above and below the waterline.

However, Uruguay was neutral only in theory - economically dependent on Great Britain, so the British embassy did everything possible to ensure that the German ship was removed from the port. The next day, the bodies of the dead German sailors were delivered to the shores of Montevideo. After a few hours, the British prisoners of war were also allowed to leave the battleship, without any of the prisoners being killed in action. Soon the German ambassador received an ultimatum - battleship due to leave port on December 17, 1939, just 4 days after arrival. This time was not enough for repairs.

On December 15, the funeral of the dead German sailors took place. Another battle with the British could have only one outcome, for which there was no hope, and the sailors sat down to write letters home. The news of the departure of the battleship, which was waiting for the British fleet, spread throughout the city quickly, so on the day of departure thousands of people gathered at the pier.

December 17, 1939 at 18:00 pocket battleship " Admiral Graf Spee" slipped out of the port of Montevideo. The ship's captain was not going to give the British victory, so 20 minutes later the battered warship exploded from six torpedoes set to self-destruct. The ship caught fire and continued to burn for another three days before it sank. The captain secretly transferred his crew to tugboats, which transported the sailors to a German merchant ship. This is how the battleship’s crew reached the capital of Argentina, Buenos Aires.

The ship's commander had one more duty to fulfill before the crew - to provide an alibi for the victims of the shipwreck, this was the only way to avoid internment. But in accordance with international law, neutral Argentina took the sailors into custody, with only one amendment - the sailors were allowed to live with German families in Buenos Aires. The battleship's crew had no prospects of returning home.

Today the wreckage of a pocket battleship " Admiral Graf Spee" rest just below the surface of the water at coordinates 34°30′ south latitude and 58°14′ west longitude. British divers dived to the ship, hoping to find valuable military technology here, but the German demolitions did their best; all valuable equipment was destroyed manually.

Hans Langsdorff took full responsibility for the loss of the ship, but South American newspapers called him a coward. Leaving a letter to his wife, Langsdorff resigned in his room in Buenos Aires on the battle flag of the battleship " Admiral Graf Spee" This was his last act as commander of the ship. The suicide of Hans Langsdorff became international news. At the very beginning of the war, she still had the ability to shock.

The battleship commander was buried with military honors. The streets were filled with thousands of people mourning his death. His team followed the coffin, with Argentines, members of the German community and even a few Britons paying their respects. Hans Langsdorff was buried in a German cemetery in Buenos Aires, and the Nazis used his funeral for propaganda purposes. Hitler later accused him of cowardice for not going down with the ship, but the lives of the crew members meant more to him than blind obedience and loyalty to the Wehrmacht. Argentine Navy officials later helped most of the crew escape and return to Germany to continue participating in the war. Some of them stayed in Argentina forever and still thank their commander who saved their lives.

photographs and illustrations of the battleship

Battle of a battleship with British cruisers

battleship on fire

Let's start with the fact that Count Spee falls into the 6-8th level of battles.

At the 6th level of battles, of course, we have a certain superiority over other ships, but we must not forget about such high-explosive spitters as Cleveland, Nuremberg, Budyonny. If you find yourself under high-explosive fire from such ships, you have the opportunity to “enjoy your own fire” and quickly head to the port. At the 8th level of battles, we are assigned a clearly secondary role as an artillery support ship, and any fall under the focus of high level battleships or cruisers will also not give us much pleasure. In general, combat tactics on Admiral Graf Spee should be careful and thoughtful.

Battle with battleships Despite our 283-mm main battery guns, we should not forget that Spee is still a heavy cruiser. The armor of the bow plating and bow armor belt is only 19 mm. So even following the enemy battleship straight ahead can bring us trouble. It is advisable to look for an enemy target in common with other allied cruisers and operate at a certain safe distance. Accelerated change of shell type due to the “Master Loader” skill will allow us to use our excellent characteristics in a timely manner due to the excellent probability of being set on fire by HE shells. Therefore, whenever possible, we fire cascade fire with HE shells at enemy battleships that are moving bow or stern in relation to us. In the event of an outright duel at close range, we will of course use our torpedo tubes, although we may have to sacrifice bow armor when aiming the torpedo tubes to release torpedoes. In any case, it would be a good idea to install the “Guidance System. Mod.1” upgrade, which will increase the turning speed of our TAs and the accuracy of fire of the main battery guns. Pursuing enemy battleships can be fatal because the latter will also use HE shells when firing at you.

Battle with cruisers The commander's skills "Master Gunner" and "Master Loader" will not be superfluous in battle with a maneuverable enemy. Frank duels at close ranges with enemy cruisers that have torpedo tubes should be excluded if possible, since overall maneuverability may not be enough to avoid enemy torpedoes. Therefore, we try to maintain a distance of at least 10-12 km. At these distances, our armor-piercing shells of 283 mm main battery guns with a maximum damage of 8.400 can send an enemy cruiser to port in 3-4 aimed shots with knocked out citadels. At the same time, a positive result can be achieved with mixed fire from AP and HE shells. With the first shots of HE shells, it is advisable to disable the steering gears of the enemy cruiser, and then knock out the citadel at a convenient angle with AP shells. Sometimes a full salvo of HE shells with a targeted hit can cause detonation of an enemy cruiser. I had such a case with an enemy Hipper, who stood at a distance of about 14 km with almost full HP and the salvo hit him with 38k and sent him to the port. Possibly a bug, perhaps an accident. Well, during close combat, do not forget about the 105 mm and 150 mm secondary guns. In any case, we prioritize the secondary guns on the approaching enemy cruiser. But again, we should not forget that dangerous approach with several enemy cruisers cannot always lead to positive results. For a more effective fight against enemy cruisers, we need to strengthen our survivability through the “Fundamentals of the fight for survivability” skill, upgrading to the third slot “System for combating survivability. Mod.1” and survivability flags November Foxtrot, Juliet Yankee Bissotwo, India Delta, India Yankee.

Fight with destroyers Our weak point is the longest rudder shift time of 10.3 seconds. among all cruisers at the level. Therefore, we definitely check the “Steering gears. Mod.2” upgrades, and also check the box to increase the speed of Sierra Mike. But even despite the presence of these modifiers, we should not forget that the dimensions of our cruiser still do not allow us to comfortably launch an aggressive close attack on enemy destroyers. Aimed fire from a safe distance of 8-10 km will allow us to at least maneuver from enemy torpedoes in time. Here it would be a good idea to use the Hydroacoustic Search equipment, which will allow us to detect in advance the direction of enemy torpedoes from a safer distance. We actively use the indication of a priority target for our secondary guns, which, thanks to the skills “Basic fire training”, “Enhanced fire training” and the Mike Yankee Soxisix flag, which will improve the characteristics of the firing range and reloading of secondary guns.

Fight with air groups Even a full air defense build will not allow us to feel safe in front of attacking enemy air groups and will not be able to completely destroy the entire group of torpedo bombers or bombers. So I don't think it's worth pumping it up. Let's limit ourselves to using the "Defensive Air Defense Fire" equipment, learning the universal skills "Basic Fire Training", "Enhanced Fire Training" and checking the November Echo Setteseven flag. However, even this configuration will not be able to completely destroy the entire group of torpedo bombers or bombers of high-level aircraft carriers. When enemy air groups approach, we try, if possible, to go to the nearest allied cruisers and battleships that have good air defense weapon characteristics. But don’t forget about helping allied battleships near you that come under attack from air groups.

"Graf Spee" - ("Graf Spee"), a battleship of the German Navy, a symbol and pride of the growing power of the Nazi fleet. Named in honor of Count Maximilian von Spee (1861-1914), who died on the flagship Scharnhorst during World War I in the battle with an English squadron off the Falkland Islands. Built at the shipyards of Wilhelmshaven and launched in 1934 in violation of the terms of the Treaty of Versailles of 1919. It was armed with 6 11-inch guns, 8 6-inch and eight torpedo tubes. The speed reached 26 knots. Crew - 1107 people. For its time, the "Graf Spee" was the pinnacle of design and technological thought and was considered practically unsinkable. With the outbreak of World War II, the Graf Spee, under the command of Captain Hans Langsdorff, set sail for the South Atlantic to intercept English merchant ships. Hitler was not embarrassed by the fact that in this area globe there were no hostilities and not a single Allied warship was here. Within a few months, the Graf Spee sank at least 8 English ships. In early December 1939, the British Admiralty demanded that the Brazilian authorities sell British oil for German tankers exclusively through Brazilian ports, since there were reasons to believe that this fuel was used to refuel German destroyers in the South Atlantic. On December 13, 1939, three British cruisers - Exeter, Achilles and Ajax - blocked the Graf Spee off the coast of Uruguay. On board the German battleship were about sixty English sailors captured from previously sunk British merchant ships. During the fifteen-hour battle, the largest English cruiser, Exeter, was seriously damaged. The crew of the Graf Spee also suffered significant losses: 30 people were killed and about 60 were wounded. Despite the pursuit, Captain Langsdorff managed to escape from the battle and take refuge in Montevideo Bay. The wounded and dead were transported to shore, and the rest of the crew began repairing the badly damaged ship. Langsdorff asked for fifteen days to restore the battleship, but the Uruguayan authorities demanded that the Graf Spee leave Uruguay's territorial waters no later than two days later, threatening to arrest the crew otherwise. Meanwhile, British cruisers stood guard at the exit of Montevideo Bay, awaiting reinforcements. At 6 pm on Sunday, December 17, the Graf Spee raised anchor and left the bay in tow. Thousands of spectators on the shore waited at dusk for the battle to begin. Suddenly huge ship stopped, and the accompanying tugboats left. A huge column of smoke burst out of the ship's hold and clouded the sky. It was the artillery magazines that were exploding. Three minutes later the Graf Spee sank. Captain Langsdorff, his entire crew and captured English sailors reached the shore and were interned by the authorities. Three days later, Captain Langsdorff, having wrapped himself in imperial naval ensign, shot himself. As it turned out later, Hitler personally gave the captain the order to scuttle the Graf Spee so that it would not fall into enemy hands.

"Admiral Graf Spee": history of service (chapter from the book by V.L. Kofman "Pocket battleship "Admiral Graf Spee"")

The last and most powerful of the “pocket battleships” had the shortest but most colorful career. It was named in honor of Vice Admiral Count Maximilian von Spee, who commanded the German overseas cruiser squadron in the first world war, who defeated the British in the battle of Coronel and died on December 8, 1914 on board the armored cruiser Scharnhorst in the battle of the Falkland Islands. The Mackensen-class battle cruiser laid down in 1915 was supposed to be named after him, but the defeat of Germany in 1918 did not allow the plan to come true. And so on June 30, 1934, von Spee's daughter, Countess Huberta, broke the traditional bottle of champagne on the side of the launching ship bearing her father's name. In memory of the admiral’s victorious battle off the coast of Chile, the Gothic inscription “CORONEL” appeared on the tower-like superstructure.

For a year and a half, the ship was completed afloat, on December 5, 1935, factory tests began at the wall, and on January 6, 1936, “Battleship C” was accepted into service in the Kriegsmarine. Captain zur See Patzig took command of it. Trials at sea followed, ending only in May, when the Admiral Graf Spee was finally commissioned. At the measured mile in Neukrug, she developed 28.5 knots with a displacement of 14,100 tons and a power of 53,650 hp. The tilting showed insufficient stability: with a full supply of fuel, the metacentric height was 0.67 m - smallest value from all units in the series. A number of shortcomings were identified in the diesel installation, which, however, were quickly eliminated. It was confirmed that the location of the auxiliary boiler above the armored deck and the layout of some other elements of equipment were unsuccessful. The vibration remained strong, but the noise was overcome: in this regard, the Spee turned out to be the most successful of all the “pocket battleships.” It turned out that for a long run above 18 knots, additional mechanic personnel should be taken on board. The commission made several more comments, but there was no time left for their immediate implementation. The tense situation in the world and in Europe required the fastest possible connection of the most powerful and modern unit of the fleet, so already during the tests the battleship made several training voyages. "Spee" was immediately destined for a high role: on May 29, she became the flagship of the Kriegsmarine at a large naval parade with the participation of Hitler and others senior officials third reich.

The parade gave way to everyday life. Since May 20, comprehensive tests of navigation equipment and electronics were carried out, and on June 6, the “pocket battleship” set out on its first long voyage to the Atlantic, to the island of Santa Cruz. During the 20-day voyage, exercises and testing of equipment and devices, in particular artillery, continued (formally, the Spee was listed as an experimental artillery vessel on this voyage). Upon his return to Wilhelmshaven on June 26 training sessions continued. In the fall, the ship took part in maneuvers, but soon more serious tasks faced it. On December 16, 1936, Rear Admiral von Fischel, appointed commander of the German fleet in Spanish waters, raised the flag on the Spee.

The Kriegsmarine took an active part in civil war in Spain. In accordance with the decisions of the international “non-intervention committee,” the coastal waters of the Iberian Peninsula were divided into zones of responsibility between its members: England, France, Germany and Italy, where the navies of these countries were supposed to prevent the supply of military cargo to both sides. The Germans got the area from the northern border of Portugal to Gijon, the middle of the eastern (Mediterranean) coast and the African coast of the Strait of Gibraltar in Spanish Morocco. Almost all combat-ready ships of the German fleet took part in the patrols, but “pocket battleships” were given priority special role. While other countries limited themselves to sending minor warships, they seemed to represent Germany’s new naval power. "Deutschland" and "Scheer" visited there; then it was the turn of "Graf Spee". Having completed final preparations in Kiel on February 14, 1937, he set course for the Bay of Biscay on March 2. The two-month voyage, visiting many Spanish ports, ended in Kiel on May 6 of that year. On May 15, the most modern German ship represented Germany at the Spithead roadstead, where a parade was held in honor of the British King George VI with the participation of warships from all countries. At the end of Spithead week, Spee returned to his homeland. After resupplying supplies and a short rest, Spee set sail for Spain again on June 23. This time the trip was short: on August 7, 1937, the battleship returned to Kiel. In the autumn of the same year, small trips to northern waters took place - to Sweden (from September 18 to 20) and Norway (November 1-2). The exit to warm Spanish waters at the beginning of 1938 was also short-lived. Having left Kiel on February 7, the ship returned on the 18th. On the same day, the commander of the “battleships” raised the flag on it. The increase in status coincided with the beginning of the last great rest: until the summer, the Admiral Graf Spee mainly stayed in the port, making only short trips to coastal waters. After winter “hibernation” (very conditional, since exercises in the port continued), the “pocket battleship” made another trip to the North, to the Norwegian fiords (late June - early July 1938). On August 22, the flagship took part in a large naval parade, which was hosted by Reichsführer Hitler and the Regent of Hungary, Admiral Horthy. During this event, the heavy cruiser Prinz Eugen was launched. The Spee spent the autumn on long voyages, making two trips to the Atlantic (October 6 - 23 and November 10 - 24), visiting the Spanish port of Vigo, Portuguese ports and Tangier.

From January 1939, the ship underwent its first scheduled refit in Wilhelmshaven, completing it by March. And again the flag of the fleet commander fluttered on it. The Kriegsmarine command was planning a large overseas campaign under the leadership of Admiral Böhm, in which all 3 pocket battleships, the cruisers Leipzig and Cologne, as well as destroyers and submarines were to take part. For the purpose of “showing the flag,” the “Admiral Graf Spee” stood in the roadstead in Ceuta for several days. He had just managed to return to his homeland and replenish supplies when another escalation of the situation occurred. This time it didn’t work out - Germany’s attack on Poland caused a chain reaction. A world war has begun.

By August 1939, the Admiral Graf Spee ceased to be the most powerful ship in the fleet, but its role in possible hostilities remained very significant. The plan, developed in complete secrecy by the Kriegsmarine leadership and personally approved by Hitler, provided for the sending of “pocket battleships” and supply ships to the sea long before the start of the Polish attack. Their enormous range and ability to replenish supplies made it possible to remain in the waiting areas for several months in order to either begin raiding operations or return home quietly and peacefully, depending on the development of events. On August 5, 1939, almost a month before the start of the war, the supply ship Altmark, designed to work in tandem with the Spee, sailed to the United States, where it was supposed to take diesel fuel and dissolve in the ocean before meeting with the “pocket battleship,” which, in turn, left Wilhelmshaven on the 21st under the command of Captain Zur See G. Langsdorff. On August 24, it was followed by the Deutschland, which “worked” together with the tanker Westerwald. Both sisterships became the advance detachment of the German fleet in the ocean, dividing the Atlantic between them: the Admiral Graf Spee headed to its southern part, and its partner to a position south of Greenland.

“Spee” was lucky - it managed to pass unnoticed, first to the shores of Norway, and then to the Atlantic south of Iceland. He became the only German raider to pass this route, which was subsequently so carefully covered by the British (their patrol cruisers took up positions only on September 6). Bad weather helped the Germans to pass undetected until the waiting area. The ship was in no hurry, and by September 1, the day the world war began, it was 1000 miles north of the Cape Verde Islands. On this day, he met with the Altmark, and the commander was in for an unpleasant surprise: a large tanker, brightly painted yellow and black, noticed and identified its “master” by its characteristic turret-superstructure long before it itself was discovered! "Spee" transferred a military command, light weapons and two 20-mm guns to "Altmark", at the same time handing over flammable cargo and taking on a full supply of fuel.

Almost the entire first month of the war passed for Spee and Altmark in silence - in the full sense of the word. The “pocket battleship” moved slowly towards the equator, dodging any smoke on the horizon and remaining undetected. Langsdorff received no orders from Berlin, and he was prohibited from using his radio stations. Hitler still hoped to part ways with the “mistress of the seas” and did not want to irritate her by starting a cruising war, while at the same time not wanting to recall the raider who had taken a successful position and was still in hiding. We had to be content with intercepted radiograms, of which the only useful information turned out to be information about the presence of the light cruiser Ajax off the Brazilian coast. On September 10, Spee crossed the equator; the crew put on an appropriate performance, however, a very modest one, since part of the team was at combat posts all the time. Langsdorff decided to move to the South Atlantic, to the conditional line of the English Channel - the mouth of La Plata, where one could count on a good “catch” with the least risk. For camouflage, a second tower made of plywood and canvas was installed on the ship above the bow tower, thus turning it into a semblance of a Scharnhorst-class battleship. Despite the primitiveness of the decoration, this measure subsequently made it possible to deceive inexperienced merchant sailors several times.

Finally, on September 25, the long-awaited order to begin operations came. Langsdorff chose the northeast of Brazil near the port of Recife as his first area of ​​action. On September 27, he released Altmark, and 3 days later his first victim turned up. True, the first pancake almost came out lumpy: the discovered British steamer Clement (5051 per.t) took off, radioing about the attack. When they managed to stop it, it turned out that the transport was making a coastal flight from Pernambuco to Bahia with unimportant cargo. The attempt to sink it turned into a real farce: despite the open kingstons and the charges laid by the Germans, the Clement stubbornly refused to sink. We had to fire 2 torpedoes at it, and both missed! In the end, the 150-mm cannons started working and the ship sank to the bottom. Langsdorff proved himself a true gentleman by contacting the Casta Luego radio station in Pernambuco and reporting the coordinates of the English boats, although in doing so he revealed his location. The captain and chief engineer of the Clement took the place of prisoners in the makeshift “chamber” on board the Spee, becoming the first, but not the last, of its inhabitants. However, on the same day the Germans stopped the Greek steamer Papalenos and, after inspection, transferred the prisoners to it. Thus, the desire to follow the rules of “soft” cruising warfare in everything led to the quick identification of the raider, since the English sailors immediately reported what had happened. The only thing Langsdorff managed to do for misinformation was to hang up a false board with the name “Admiral Scheer”, as a result of which the Allies for a long time, right up to La Plata, seemed to “swap places” of both “pocket battleships”. The benefit from such a hoax was more than doubtful. The reaction came very quickly. For operations against raiders (in mid-October the Allies learned that two German “battleships” were operating in the ocean), 8 tactical battle groups were allocated, which nominally included 3 battlecruisers - the English Rinaun, the French Dunkirk and Strasbourg. , aircraft carriers "Ark Royal", "Hermes" and "Béarn", 9 heavy and 5 light cruisers, not counting dozens of other combat units (up to battleships) guarding transatlantic convoys. However, not many ships actually operated against the Scheer. There were 3 British formations in the South Atlantic: a cruising squadron under the command of Commodore Harewood (Group G), covering South American waters (heavy cruisers Exeter and Cumberland), Group H, based in Cape Town (heavy cruisers Sussex and "Shropshire"), Group "K" under the command of Rear Admiral Wells, the most powerful of all (the battlecruiser "Renaun" and the aircraft carrier "Ark Royal").

The “pocket battleship” found its second victim on the Cape Town-Freetown line on October 5. The British steamer Newton Beach (4651 register tons), carrying 7200 tons of maize, barely had time to signal the attack before the prize party captured it. Here, the Germans were waiting for valuable booty: from the documents they received, they were able to form a fairly complete impression of the system of radio communications with merchant ships and even received in working order a standard English radio, removed from the ship and installed in the control room of the Graf Spee. It was a pity to sink the valuable trophy, and the Newton Beach, under the control of German sailors, was accompanied by a raider.

2 days later, new success followed. Another "British" - the steamer "Ashley" (4222 per.t), transporting raw sugar to England, went to the bottom, and its crew moved to "Newton Beach" - although not for long. Now Langsdorff was at the intersection of busy sea routes and did not want to be hampered by captured transport. The Newton Beach followed the Ashley, and the crews of both ships found themselves in much less comfortable conditions aboard the raider.

Meanwhile, the prisoners had a chance to go to the bottom along with their “floating prison.” The signal from Newton Beach was received by the merchant ship and relayed to the cruiser Cumberland. If the cruiser commander could have imagined that the signal would not reach a powerful radio station in Freetown - focal point hunting for raiders in the South Atlantic, he would, of course, break the prescribed radio silence. The fate of "Spee" and "Altmark" could become unenviable, since the powerful group "K" of Rear Admiral Wells was heading to Freetown. The likelihood of detecting German ships from the air in good weather conditions was high, and the Renown and Cumberland could easily cope with a “pocket battleship”.

However, on October 9, Spee almost lost its supply ship. In the area west of the Cape Verde Islands, an aircraft from the aircraft carrier Ark Royal spotted a large tanker lying adrift. When asked about its ownership, the answer was that it was the American transport Delmar. Admiral Wells doubted. However, with only the battlecruiser Rinaun and Ark Royal at his disposal, he could choose either a 30,000-ton giant or an even less suitable aircraft carrier to inspect a suspicious vessel, which in any case meant hundreds of tons of burned oil and the risk of distraction from other tasks for the sake of a most likely useless check. So "Altmark", posing as "Delmar", managed to miraculously escape, after which he went south, to more deserted areas. If the British had managed to sink it, the Spee raiding could have ended much earlier.

As a result, instead of success, the British came to another trouble. On October 10, the “pocket battleship” stopped the large transport “Huntsman” (8196 per.t), transporting various food cargo, including one and a half thousand tons of tea. There was not enough space on board the raider for its crew of 84 people, and the prize had to be left afloat. However, in order to confuse the enemy's cards, Langsdorff ordered a message to be transmitted from the radio transmitter captured on Newton Beach that he was attacked by a submarine: this explained his disappearance, without revealing the presence of a surface ship. “Spee” moved south, towards the “Altmark”, which had happily escaped destruction. On October 14, the prisoners and food captured on the Huntsman were loaded onto the supply ship. For the next 4 days, the “battleship” and the tanker followed side by side. Langsdorff waited, analyzing intercepted and partially deciphered radio messages reporting the presence of two German battleships in the ocean and precautions for ships when approaching unknown warships. The radio exchange gave the Spee commander and his officers a lot of useful information- in particular, he suggested repainting his plane in the colors of English camouflage.

On October 22, the onboard Arado discovered a large transport and brought a raider to it. After warning salvos, attempts to radio from the ship about the attack were interrupted, and the prize party landed on the brand new Trivanian (8835 per.t), transporting zinc ore from Australia to England. But the radio operator did his job: after some time, the radio interception service (“B-Dienst”) reported that the British base in Simon’s Town already knew about the capture. The distress signal was also received by the Lanseven Castle transport, which was located near the scene of action.

For the second time, Langsdorff took his ship out of harm's way. Taking a course to the west and giving full speed, the Spee then turned sharply to the southeast. The commander for the first time risked contacting headquarters in Germany, warning that he was going to complete his cruising in January 1940.

The Indian Ocean, to which the Graf Spee was now heading, also represented a rich field for raiding. All trade routes that passed through it ran either to the Suez Canal or rounded the Cape of Good Hope. Langsdorff chose the area south of the island of Madagascar because he did not want to drag the Altmark with him, exposing it to the risk of being discovered at the southern tip of Africa. A convenient position in the southeastern corner of the Indian Ocean would leave room for a quick return to the Atlantic and at the same time would cause a severe headache for the “mistress of the seas,” forcing her to expand the search area to the entire ocean!

On October 28, the Altmark was released, and on November 4, the Spee, still unnoticed by anyone, rounded the Cape of Good Hope. The first week of cruising in a new place turned out to be fruitless: the ocean remained deserted. The weather began to deteriorate, which led to an event that had major consequences. On November 9, the Arado-196 seaplane, which had served the raider well, suffered an accident and was out of action for a long time. The “pocket battleship” crossed the southern entrance to the Mozambique Channel twice, approaching the very coast of Africa - and all without success. Only on November 14 did he stop the small but new motor ship Africa Shell, which was traveling in ballast and became the only victim of the raider in the Indian Ocean. True, the very fact that a German raider was there continued to affect shipping (primarily British) for a long time.

On November 20, Spee circled the southern tip of Africa in the opposite direction. Bad weather and fruitless cruising in dangerous waters greatly exhausted the crew, so the return to tropical latitudes and the meeting with the Altmark, which took place on November 26, were pleasant events. The raider replenished its supply of fuel and food, gaining the opportunity to remain at sea until the end of February 1940. True, after three months of sailing in the tropics, the bottom required cleaning, and the diesel engines required preventative repairs. I had to start rebuilding the engines one by one, which took several days. At the end of the work, Langsdorf, after much deliberation, decided to return to the “lucky” area between Freetown and Rio de Janeiro, where the sea routes leading to Cape Town from the USA and Europe intersected. The aircraft mechanics finally managed to somehow adjust the operation of the ship’s Arado engine, and the raider regained its “eyes,” but, as it turned out, not for long.

At first things went well. On December 2, "Spee" stopped the large turbo ship "Doric Star" (10,086 per.t), traveling from New Zealand with a cargo of grain, wool and frozen meat. The prize turned out to be very valuable, but Langsdorff gave the order to immediately scuttle it, limiting the production to 19 silver bars. There were good reasons for this: the newly repaired plane radioed that it attempted an emergency landing and damaged the left float. Realizing the importance of the Arado for further actions, the commander rushed to the rescue, firing a torpedo at the Doric Star and firing several salvos. The plane was saved, but the British could obtain valuable information about the location of the raider by intercepting the attack signal from the transport and negotiations between the ship and the seaplane. It was necessary to change the area of ​​action. The Spee turned southwest and the next day sank another English steamer, the 7983-ton Tairoa, carrying frozen meat and wool from Australia. Thus, Britain lost 2 ships in one area within 24 hours. Realizing that “hunters” would rush here, Langsdorff decided to once again change the area of ​​action. He chose the mouth of La Plata, since Buenos Aires was visited by up to 60 English ships a month. On December 6, the Graf Spee met with the Altmark for the last time, again replenishing its supply of diesel fuel and provisions and handing over the Doric Star crew to it. As if anticipating a possible battle, the commander conducted artillery and rangefinding exercises, using his own supply ship as a target. The senior gunner, frigate-captain Asher, was dissatisfied with their result, since after more than three months of forced idleness, the main fire control system personnel were noticeably disqualified. The next day, the Altmark parted with its “master” forever, carrying in its hold about four hundred captured sailors from sunken merchant ships.

In the morning, the tanker disappeared over the horizon, and in the evening, lookouts noticed the steamer "Streonshal", loaded with wheat. After the team was withdrawn, the prize was sunk. The commander and officers of the Spee looked through the latest newspapers with interest, in one of which they found extremely valuable information - a photograph of the heavy cruiser Cumberland in camouflage. Langsdorff decided to paint his ship in the same style and install additional “pipes”, imitating the “British”. He intended to go to the mouth of La Plata, then turn north to Rio de Janeiro, and after sinking possible victims, head east, without hiding from neutral ships, to simulate leaving for the Indian Ocean. In fact, he intended to move to the north Atlantic and finish his cruising by returning to Germany. But plans remained plans. A different fate awaited Spee.

Let us now turn to the actions of the other side. Harewood's cruisers patrolled their area without success until 27 October, when Exeter sailed to Port Stanley (Falkland Islands) for maintenance. It was replaced by the light cruiser Ajax, which was part of the Naval Forces of New Zealand, of the same type as the Achilles. The detachment's service conditions were perhaps the most difficult of all search groups, since it had to operate in international waters, strictly adhering to international maritime law, which prohibited the use of third-party ports as bases, in particular for refueling. Of the British bases in the area, there was only the completely unequipped Port Stanley, and even that was more than 1,000 miles from the main shipping routes, and the cruisers often had to take on fuel at sea. A three-month search yielded no results.

Following the enemy's signals from the attacked ships turned out to be a clearly unsuccessful technique, since it is unlikely that the Germans would have expected the enemy if they remained in the same area. It was necessary to predict the next move of the raider commander. Commodore Harewood made such an attempt. Having received a message about the sinking of the Doric Star, he assumed that the enemy would rush from the African ocean coast to the South American coast, trying to hit the sea route nodes in the Buenos Aires - Montevideo or Rio de Janeiro area. It was possible to parry such an attack only by concentrating one's strength.

On December 9, Exeter was hastily withdrawn from the base. At seven in the morning on December 12, all three of Harewood's cruisers linked up at a designated location off the Uruguayan coast. The commodore signaled his plan, which was that when a “pocket battleship” appeared during the day, the forces should be divided into the 1st division (Ajax and Achilles) and Exeter to fire at the enemy from both sides, and at night all 3 ships must attack together, in open formation. He demanded from the commanders persistence in approaching the effective fire range of 6-inch guns. Even when he was a teacher at the courses for senior naval officers in Greenwich in 1936, Harewood proposed precisely this method of fighting cruisers against pickpockets. On the evening of the 12th, the detachment rehearsed the planned maneuvers several times.

At this time, the Spee was following a 20-knot course to almost the same point. On December 11, his Arado crashed again - this time the plane was beyond repair. So, at a critical moment, the “pocket battleship” lost the ability to conduct aerial reconnaissance, which played, perhaps, a fatal role in subsequent events. The commander decided to place a fake pipe instead of the plane; work was supposed to begin on the morning of December 13. At 6.00 it was planned to turn to course 335° and search for merchant ships. However, at 5.52, observers reported that the tops of the masts were visible straight ahead. Having not yet identified the target, Langsdorff ordered full speed ahead. Turning diesel engines to maximum speed always caused wild noise and the emission of a column of exhaust gases from the pipe, comparable in appearance to the plume of smoke from some coal-fired cruiser. Now the British have discovered their enemy...

The Battle of La Plata on December 13, 1939 - the first classic battle of the Second World War and one of the few purely artillery battles of large surface ships - is generally well known. Filmed about him Feature Film, many books have been written. However, some of them cover events very one-sidedly, tendentiously, and sometimes not entirely reliably. In particular, in the translation of A. Devine’s book “In the Footsteps of “Pocket Battleships,” recently published in St. Petersburg, there is a vivid description of the battle made during the war years, in some places simply fantastic. In reality, things are not so simple. It would seem that a battle that took place in excellent visibility, as a result of which all participants remained afloat, should not have “dark spots.” But after the sinking of the Spee, most of the documents were destroyed, so that subsequently German officers had to restore the picture of the battle from memory, and some moments forever sunk into oblivion along with its commander. On the English side, Harwood compiled a detailed but very general report, containing mainly conclusions rather than descriptions. A huge amount of work was carried out in the 60s by the former British consul in Montevideo, Eugene Millington-Drake, who personally and in writing interviewed many participants on both sides. However, information about the course of the battle remains largely contradictory: one only needs to compare the course plots given by various German and English sources. We will try to give as much as possible full picture, mainly reflecting the participation of the German “pocket battleship” in this battle, noting disputed places and established legends.

The first of them refers to the time when opponents discover each other. It is generally believed that the British noticed the “battleship” much later than it noticed them. In reality, the difference was most likely one or two minutes. Observers on the cruisers saw a column of smoke on the horizon and reported it, but for the officers, tired from days of cruising, the message did not cause much alarm. Despite expecting a possible meeting with a raider in the La Plata area, they believed that another merchant ship had appeared on the horizon. The cruisers (in order: Ajax, Achilles and Exeter) continued to follow a large zigzag at a speed of 14 knots, keeping a general course of 60°. The weather was almost perfect - calm sea, cloudless sky; visibility was virtually unlimited.

Meanwhile, on the Spee, which was approaching the British at a total speed of 50 km/h, one of the three ships that appeared on the horizon was quickly identified as the Exeter. Two light cruisers were mistaken for destroyers (their low superstructures played a role here). Langsdorff had only a few minutes to think. The presence of destroyers could, in his opinion, mean only one thing - presence near the convoy. Since the period of raiding was clearly coming to an end, and his “battleship” had full ammunition and fuel reserves, the commander of “Spee” considered it possible to enter into battle, hoping to easily deal with the only cruiser, evade a torpedo attack and, if successful, secure abundant booty for himself. Another consideration was that the only way to get rid of the three pursuers, who had great speed, was to decisively attack them before they gained momentum.

18 minutes passed from the moment of discovery when the signalmen figured out that they had to deal not only with the Exeter, but also with two light cruisers. The opponents got so close that the signals rising on the masts of the British were visible through binoculars. On the Spee they realized that they had been discovered.

A number of sources criticize Langsdorff's decision to close so decisively with the enemy rather than take advantage of the range and accuracy of his heavy guns. In a naval battle one can almost always find something to criticize in the actions of either side; To understand the actions of the Spee commander, it is enough to remember that he was going to launch a surprise attack, and, having noticed the separation of the enemy ships, to destroy the strongest of them as soon as possible. To do this, it was necessary to get closer: at long distances, the consumption of shells could be too great, and the result could not be achieved quickly enough. The 30-knot cruisers, which had gained speed, could pursue the “battleship” for as long as desired, “leading” it until the proper reinforcements arrived. The actual speed of the "Graf Spee" at this time, according to its chief mechanic, did not exceed 25 knots, mainly due to the bottom being overgrown during the raid. In addition, one had to be aware of the danger when 8-inch shells hit deck armor from long distances. So in Langsdorff’s determination one should see not the ardor of a former torpedo officer (in the 30s he commanded destroyers), but rather a sober calculation. Likewise, Harewood's much-praised courage in dividing his forces to attack from both sides could easily have turned into tragedy, and almost did.

"Spee" at 6.18 opened fire with semi-armor-piercing shells from main caliber guns from a distance of over 90 kbt at the newly separated "Exeter". The enemy did the same a little later: Exeter responded at 6.20, firing first from the forward turrets, which were joined by the rear turret 2.5 minutes later. Ajax fired a salvo at 6.21, and Achilles joined it 2 minutes later. The distance to the light cruisers that separated and followed in a ledge (“Achilles” a little behind and closer to the enemy) was also about 90 kbt. From 6.25, stable radio communication was established between them, and both ships were soon conducting common centralized fire. “Spee” responded by bringing in 150-mm guns on the left side. The German fire from the side looked unhurried; according to English observers, they waited for the previous salvo to fall and only after that fired the next one, and they fired with only one turret. The Germans deny this fact, claiming that they used their traditional “ladder”, that is, they fired the next salvo without waiting for the previous one to fall, with some deviation in range. Since the “pocket battleships” had only 6 main battery guns, during zeroing the Spee’s chief gunner, frigate-captain Paul Ascher, alternated firing from both turrets, firing three-gun salvoes, switching to full 6-gun salvoes after covering. From the outside it might look like “uncertain shooting with separate control from different towers for different purposes” (from Harewood’s report). At the same time, the British claim that the dispersion in both range and direction was very insignificant.

German artillery officers faced the difficult question of choosing the type of ammunition. The use of armor-piercing or semi-armor-piercing projectiles with deceleration could give decisive success in successfully hitting vehicles or cellars of a weakly armored enemy, but bottom fuses could hardly be armed by thin plating or superstructures, and many hits would remain almost useless. Asher chose a different path: after the first salvos at the Exeter with semi-armor-piercing grenades with a delay, he switched to high-explosive grenades with an instantaneous head fuse. Now any shell exploded, but the vital parts of the cruisers located deep in the hull remained relatively safe. Asher relied on the powerful fragmentation effect of 300 kg grenades (as we will see, not in vain). Subsequently, the choice of ammunition type was repeatedly criticized by the Germans themselves. They believed that if armor-piercing shells were used, the Exeter would be sunk to the bottom. This can be argued by looking at specific hits. During the battle on the Spee, the type of ammunition used was repeatedly changed; The British even note that shells of different types were used in one salvo, which is unlikely. (Perhaps when the target changed, shells of some type that had accumulated in the reloading compartment of one of the towers were “finished.”

Throughout the battle, the British used only armor-piercing projectiles with a delay of the SRVS type (Common Pointed, Ballistic Cap - semi-armor-piercing, with a light tip to improve ballistics), with the exception of several high-explosive (NOT). If for an 8-inch caliber there was a certain sense in such a choice (which was confirmed by one of the hits), then in the case of a 6-inch caliber it would be much better to use 51-kg high-explosive shells without slowing down. Most of the shells, having passed through the voluminous “tower” and superstructure in the middle of the hull without significant damage, would have caused fires, failure of practically unarmored 150-mm and 105-mm guns and, most importantly, numerous communication cables. As will be noted, even a slight shock from unexploded shells led to quite unpleasant consequences; in the event of a full-fledged explosion, the situation for the Germans could have been much worse. The answer to the irrational behavior of the British lies in the fact that at the beginning of the war they practically did not have high-explosive instant-action shells in the ammunition of their cruisers, which turned out to be to the advantage of the raider.

The shooting of both sides at first turned out to be very accurate. As usual, the Germans took aim first. The third salvo of 11-inch guns hit the Exeter. Fragments of one of the shells literally mowed down the servants of the starboard torpedo tube, riddled the aircraft standing on the catapult and the entire side and superstructure, from the waterline to the top chimneys. The signaling circuits indicating the readiness of the guns turned out to be broken, so the senior artilleryman had to fire blindly, not knowing whether all his guns could fire a salvo. At the same time, fragments broke the spotlights and started a fire. (In general, the fragmentation effect of the 300-kg shells turned out to be very strong, and in the future some undershots caused no less damage to the cruisers than direct hits.) The decelerated shell from the next salvo passed through the bow of the cruiser’s hull without an explosion, without causing significant damage. Another hit in the forecastle was also relatively harmless. But a couple of minutes later a fatal blow for the British followed. The 280mm high-explosive shell detonated as it hit the elevated 8-inch turret. At this point, turret “B” had fired only 8 salvos. Due to the terrible shaking, the tower was out of action until the end of the battle, and its personnel also suffered. A fan of fragments covered the entire main superstructure. The consequences were terrible: all the officers on the bridge, except for the commander, Captain Bell, were killed or seriously wounded. The speaking pipes and cables leading from the director and rangefinders to the computer center were broken. The cruiser lost its navigation aids and did not obey the rudder, yawing to the right and leaving the firing angle of the remaining bow turret. Fortunately, the commander quickly mastered the situation and transferred control to a reserve point in the stern, which, however, for the thrifty British, was an open bridge without any significant equipment. The ship lost only a third of its artillery, but its actual combat power fell to a much greater extent. In particular, the Exeter did not even have time to launch its seaplane into the air, which could have helped in adjusting the fire, and the transmission of orders to the steering compartment and the car was carried out by voice through a chain of sailors! In this case, the 280-mm guns of the “pocket battleship” fully confirmed their effectiveness against cruisers.

True, the return fire from the Exeter also made a strong impression on the Spee officers, who described it as “fast and accurate.” One 8-inch shell penetrated the tower-like superstructure and exited without exploding. But the other one, who came a little later, surprised the Germans with his action. Having pierced the top of the 100-mm belt, it also pierced the 40-mm longitudinal bulkhead and hit the armored deck, making a dent in it “the size of a washbasin,” and then exploded. The fragments damaged the cables and caused a fire that engulfed the dry chemical fire extinguishing agent storage facility. People fighting the flames received severe burns and poisoning. (At the Montevideo parking lot, the Germans even called in Uruguayan doctors, because they assumed, or pretended to assume, that the British were using chemical shells.) If the 203 mm shell had hit a meter below, it would have exploded right in the engine compartment, and the consequences for the "Count" Spee" could be even more severe. Unfortunately for the British, this was Exeter's last success. The fire from the damaged cruiser became less and less effective. There were no more direct hits from him throughout the entire battle.

But little by little the fire from the light cruisers began to take its toll. Several semi-armor-piercing shells hit the tower-like superstructure, and although most of them did not explode, some effect was achieved. Captain "Spee" Langsdorff, calmly clutching his pipe in the corner of his mouth, commanded his ship in the manner of Togo or Beatty from the open bridge. Unlike the admirals of the past, he paid for his excessive bravery. Two small fragments struck the captain in the shoulder and hand, and the blast wave threw him to the floor of the bridge with such force that he lost consciousness, and the senior officer was forced to temporarily take command. Although the wounds turned out to be minor, according to the officers who were with the commander all the time, the shell shock affected his further behavior. Langsdorff lost his iron confidence in victory, often ordered changes in course, which negatively affected his own shooting, and made “insufficiently aggressive decisions.”

It is difficult to judge how true this is almost 60 years later, but at approximately the same time (from 6.22 to 6.24) the Graf Spee began turning to the left, turning starboard towards the light cruisers going around it from the bow, which had already gained a speed of 25 knots. In fact, the maneuvering of the “pocket battleship” in the initial period of the battle is the subject of the greatest discrepancies in the descriptions. In accordance with a rough diagram sketched by German officers from memory after the sinking of their ship, the ship very smoothly turned 90° to the left within 10 minutes and headed north. At the beginning of the turn (at about 6.25, that is, immediately after hitting Exeter’s B turret), he transferred the main battery fire to the light cruisers (distance about 85 kbt). Eyewitnesses from the “pocket battleship” and German staff officers, including Admiral Kranke, strongly assert that he did not make any sudden maneuvers at this time. The English diagram shows two turns: one in the interval from 6.22 to 6.25 by 90° to the left, then the second, almost the same amount, to the other side (completed by 6.28). Harewood notes that the fire of the Spee main gun was divided at that time: the aft turret fired at the Exeter, and the bow turret fired at the light cruisers that had closed down, which is denied by the gunners of the battleship, who claim that the 280-mm cannons always fired centrally at one goals. Contemporary German sources show an even more profound reversal; in the book by Koop and Schmolke it is depicted as a figure eight, that is, for some time the ship allegedly took the opposite course. In any case, the English diagram (generally more detailed) is very poorly consistent with the heading angles: it follows from it that from the moment the fire opened until the turn at 6.22, the Spee could only fire at the Exeter from the bow turret, which does not correspond to the facts. The successful shooting of the Germans at 6.20 - 6.25 can hardly indicate any significant reversals at this time. The apparent division of main battery fire is most likely explained by the alternation of volleys of turrets to zero in on a new target.

At about 6.31 "Graf Spee" quickly gave 3 covers to "Ajax". The British used individual maneuvering, changing course each time in the direction of the fall of the previous enemy salvo. The method of “hunting for volleys” gave good results at long distances with a high evasion speed, since in 30 seconds of a projectile’s flight the target could move to the side by 2 - 3 kbt, and the “correct” correction of fire led to a miss.

Harewood's 1st Division and the “pocket battleship” were quickly approaching: by 6.33 they were separated by a distance of 65 kbt. At the same time, Langsdorff, a former torpedo officer, decided that the time had come to take action against torpedoes that the enemy could fire on converging courses. (Indeed, at 6.31 the Exeter fired a three-torpedo salvo from the starboard apparatus, which, due to an evasive maneuver, was not even noticed by the Germans.) In addition, one should not get too close to the 6-inch cruisers, whose rapid-fire guns could cause significant damage at short distances . At 6.34 the commander of the “battleship” gave the order to turn left. According to German information, the damaged Exeter completely disappeared behind a smoke screen, from which it did not emerge until approximately 6.40. As a result of the turn, “Spee” lay down on a course approximately parallel to it (NW) and covered itself with a curtain, which did not interfere with its own fire. Here follows another difficult to resolve discrepancy. At 6.40 a main-caliber shell exploded short of the Achilles' side. Once again the fragments reached the bridge and control room. Four people were killed and three more were wounded, including an artillery officer. However, almost at the same moment, two 280-mm shells hit the Exeter, and again with dire consequences. One of them disabled the remaining bow turret, and the second, which ended up in the senior non-commissioned officers' quarters, destroyed the radio room, killing five radio operators, traveled 18 m in the ship's hull and exploded near the right front 102 mm gun, putting out all the servants. Immediately the cartridges in the fenders of the first shots caught fire. It remains unclear how the Spee, which had just completed a turn, could so quickly and successfully shoot at both targets, very distant from each other. It is likely that time recording on English units was not accurate.

Noticing the Spee's turn to the north-west at 6.37, Harewood immediately gave the order to take the same course, although the maneuver temporarily put half of his artillery, located in the aft towers, out of action. At the same minutes, a Sea Fox seaplane took off from the flagship cruiser to adjust the artillery fire. Unfortunately for the British, his radio station had been tuned early in the morning to the frequency corresponding to radio communications during reconnaissance. For correction, another frequency was specially used, on which the radio operators of Ajax and Achilles waited in vain for messages from the spotter. The breakdown of the radio station on the Achilles forced separate fire control, and when Ajax finally established contact with the aircraft, it took the constant signals about underflights personally, although they related to the “deaf” Achilles. The result was an almost twenty-minute “failure” in the effectiveness of the fire of Harewood’s ships.

Meanwhile, the damaged Exeter turned sharply to the right at 6.40, set on an eastern course and at 6.42 fired 3 torpedoes from the port side apparatus, just like the first time, aiming “by eye”. Immediately another shell hit the cruiser, and it turned 180° to the left. One of the results of the German fire was the complete failure of all navigational instruments and instruments, so that the effectiveness of the fire remained close to zero. However, the shooting, controlled by the senior artilleryman first from the searchlight platform and then directly from the roof of the tower, continued for another half hour; 177 shells were fired from the two guns, almost 90 per barrel. Only at about 7.30, when water penetrating through fragmentation holes in the side and broken hoses of the fire mains short-circuited the power supply to the aft tower drive, Captain Bell ordered to leave the battlefield. "Exeter" was in a difficult situation: a meter trim on the bow forced her to slow down to 17 knots, although the turbines and boilers remained intact. The cruiser had to travel more than 1,000 miles to the Falklands, guided by the only surviving compass from the lifeboat. One way or another, his participation in the battle ended at 7.40, although in fact he could practically not threaten the Spee an hour earlier. After the Exeter disappeared into the smoke, Harewood's light cruisers were left alone against the "pocket battleship", which was now firing at them with both calibers. Having completed a wide turn to the east at about 6.52, Achilles and Ajax were now following directly behind Spee, reaching a speed of 31 knots and gradually catching up with the enemy. Fire from both sides from a distance of 85 - 90 kbt became ineffective, partly due to the fact that only half of the guns were firing (the bow turrets of the British and the stern turret of the “pocket battleship”). At 6.55 Harewood ordered a 30° turn to port, bringing all artillery into action. After 2 minutes, British shells covered the enemy. Langsdorff used the same technique of “hunting for volleys,” changing course by 15°-20° every minute, and at about 7.00 he set up a smoke screen. Shortly after 7.10, the Exeter again appeared from the south, to which the main caliber fire had to be transferred. Constant shifts of the sight and maneuvers could not but affect the results of the shooting: in 40 minutes of battle, from 6.45 to 7.25, not a single German shell hit. Meanwhile, the 6-inch shells of the light cruisers began to cause significant damage to the Graf Spee. One of them pierced the thin 10-mm hull of the 150-mm installation No. 3 on the starboard side, destroying almost all the servants and putting the gun out of action. A training shell fired from the Achilles in the heat of battle (a blank without an explosive charge) hit the forecastle fracture area, killed two sailors, pierced through several cabins and got stuck in the non-commissioned officers' quarters. Several hits occurred in the tower-like superstructure. One of the shells exploded under the upper fire control station, killing two sailors and mortally wounding Lieutenant Grigat, the only German officer killed in the battle of La Plata. It was literally a miracle that the wiring survived, and the Spee managed to avoid the fate of the Exeter. Another shell casually demolished the right rangefinder on the bridge, scattered the ammunition of the 37-mm mount and exploded directly on the gyroscope of the anti-aircraft artillery fire control devices. The weakly armored feed of the bow group of the 150-mm guns failed, finally reducing their firing to nothing. However, the most serious consequences were the cessation of communication with the director and the rangefinder post on the bow superstructure. According to the memoirs of Art. Lieutenant Razenak, the order to transfer fire to another light cruiser simply did not reach the rangefinder personnel, who continued to display the distance to the Ajax. Naturally, all the data for adjusting the fire turned out to be incorrect. “Spee” found itself in the same situation as “Ajax” and “Achilles” when they had a communication mismatch with the spotter aircraft.

Noticing a decrease in the effectiveness of enemy fire, Harewood turned left at 7.10, again limiting the angles of fire with the bow turrets. According to British data, “Spee” set up smoke screens twice over the course of 8 minutes and continuously maneuvered. At 7.22 the distance according to the Ajax rangefinder was only 54 kbt. The 1st Division turned slightly to the right as 11-inch salvoes began to cover the cruisers (after 7.16 at least 9 shells fell in the immediate vicinity of the flagship). And at 7.25 came the reckoning for courage: a 280-mm shell pierced the barbette of the Ajax’s elevated aft turret, completely disabling it, and hit the next barbette, jamming it too. The ship lost its stern artillery group; in addition, one of the feeds in turret “B” (the elevated bow) failed. “Ajax” was left with 3 combat-ready guns, and the commander of the detachment ordered to turn 4 points to the north. At 7.31 a report was received from the plane about torpedo tracks ahead of us. Indeed, the Spee was in an excellent situation to use its torpedo tubes, conveniently located in the stern, however, according to German data, it only managed to fire one torpedo, since at that moment (7.17) Langsdorff made a sharp “turn” to the left, evading the mythical British torpedo salvo. In fact, Ajax fired 4 torpedoes from the left tube only at 7.27. Avoiding torpedoes (or a single torpedo?), both cruisers turned to port almost 90° between 7.32 and 7.34.

"Graf Spee" at this time was performing another evasive maneuver. According to eyewitnesses, one of the torpedoes passed literally a few meters from the side. (This event dates back to approximately 7.15, when, according to English data, none of the torpedoes had yet left the vehicle. In order to “arrive” at this time from a distance of 70 - 85 kbt, they had to be fired at approximately 7.00 - directly at the stern " to the Germans." -12 kbt, followed by another curtain and a turn to the stop. As a result, the cruisers, which were on a much straighter course, at 7.34 approached the minimum distance in battle - 40 kbt, being directly behind the stern of the Spee. However, the confusion with targets for the main caliber was over, and the battleship’s fire became accurate again. At 7.34, fragments from a nearby explosion demolished the top of the Ajax mast with all the antennas. Harewood felt that he "smelled like something was cooking." The bridge received disappointing information: only 3 guns were in action, and no more than 20% of the ammunition remained for them. Although the Achilles was in a much more combat-ready state, the commander could not help but think that only 1 hour and 20 minutes had passed since the start of the battle, that it was only early morning, the enemy had “showed the stern” and would be there within the next 20 minutes invulnerable to torpedoes, of which, by the way, there are not so many left. Under these conditions, it is difficult to count on inflicting heavy damage on the “battleship,” which has retained good speed and the ability to shoot accurately. At 7.42 Harewood ordered a smoke screen and a westerly course.

But Langsdorff also showed no inclination to continue the battle. The reports he received from combat posts were also not optimistic. Ammunition consumption was approaching 70%, water penetrated into the hull through holes from three shells and many fragments, the speed had to be reduced to 22 knots. "Spee" continued to follow an eastern course, and under the cover of an English smoke screen, the opponents quickly dispersed. An observer from a British plane later recalled that from the air the picture looked somewhat fantastic: as if on command, the three ships turned around and ran away from each other in different directions!

Harewood quickly realized that the enemy would not pursue him, and at 7.54 he turned around and headed after him. He ordered Achilles to take a position astern of Spee in the right quarter, and Ajax in the left quarter. The “pocket battleship” was now escorted by light cruisers, who, however, kept at a considerable distance. A careless attempt by the Achilles to get closer to 10 miles at about 10.00 gave the Spee the opportunity to fire 3 salvos, the last of which landed just 50 m from the pursuer’s side. The cruiser was forced to turn sharply.

At this time, the captain of the zur see, Hans Langsdorff, made probably the most difficult decision in his life, and it turned out to be fatal for him and his ship. There was little choice: since the British were firmly on their tail, they had to either wait for darkness and try to break away from them, or go to a neutral port, repair the damage and, having broken the blockade, hide in the ocean. A former torpedo specialist, the Spee commander clearly did not want a night battle. Although the “pocket battleship” had a radar, its coverage area was limited to the bow corners; Moreover, it was impossible to say with certainty that the enemy did not have the same device. Artillery fire at short ranges could be effective on both sides. “Spee” had a chance to sink one of the enemies with just a couple of salvos, but at the same time it could receive a barrage of 6-inch shells, after which a safe return home became extremely problematic. The opportunity to hide in the dark was balanced by the probability of receiving an enemy torpedo from several cables, which also finally decided the fate of the raider. A night fight is always to a certain extent a lottery, which Langsdorff wanted to avoid.

There remained a neutral port. For the same reasons, it had to be reached before dark, so the Brazilian capital of Rio de Janeiro was no longer needed. Buenos Aires was preferable. German influence in the Argentine capital remained strong, and the “pocket battleship” could count on a favorable reception.

However, the raider commander chose the capital of Uruguay, Montevideo, instead of Buenos Aires. The final reasons for his decision will forever remain a mystery, as Langsdorff did not comment on his order. There were certain arguments against the Argentine capital.

The main one is the need to follow a narrow and shallow fairway late in the evening, risking being hit by English torpedoes at a critical moment or clogging the pump filters, completely putting the ship out of action.

And after repairs, the Spee would have to take a long time to get out the same way, which would allow the British to properly prepare for the meeting. The more open Montevideo seemed safer from this point of view. From time to time exchanging ineffective volleys with the British, the German ship dropped anchor shortly after midnight in the roadstead of the Uruguayan capital.

From a purely technical point of view, the battle of La Plata can be considered a victory for the “pocket battleship.” The two 203-mm and eighteen 152-mm shells that hit him did not cause fatal damage. The Spee's main artillery remained fully operational: despite three direct 6-inch hits on the turrets, the solid armor was so reliable that they did not even temporarily stop firing. Light artillery suffered more severely: one 150 mm gun was completely out of action, and the ammunition supply lifts to others were damaged. Of the three 105 mm installations, only one remains in operation. There were also minor floods through holes in the plating in the bow, but the ship had neither roll nor trim, and its energy was in in perfect order. Of the nearly 1,200 crew, 1 officer and 35 enlisted men were killed, and another 58 suffered wounds or poisoning, most of them minor. In general, those critics of Langsdorff who claimed that he took the ship to Montevideo only because an English shell destroyed the bread oven were not far from the truth.

The British suffered much more severely. The Exeter was completely out of action, losing only 5 officers and 56 sailors killed. Another 11 people died on light cruisers. By the end of the battle, the artillery power of Harewood’s detachment had more than halved, and the most combat-ready Achilles had only 360 shells left. The British only had 10 torpedoes left.

However, the vulnerable position of a lone raider, separated from his native shores by thousands of miles, surrounded by enemies, fell heavily on the shoulders of Hans Langsdorff. He was wary of sailing across the North Atlantic with an unfixed hole in the hull. In addition, the commander believed that he had too little ammunition left. (This is fundamentally incorrect, since only 414 main battery shells, 377 150 mm and 80 105 mm anti-aircraft shells were expended.) The artillerymen still had over a third of 280 mm and about half of 150 mm ammunition at their disposal. Harewood, whose cruisers took up positions in two possible passages from Montevideo, estimated his chances of delaying the “pocket battleship” if it went to sea the next day as 1:4.

But Langsdorff chose a different course. He tried to request 2 weeks from the Uruguayan government to “eliminate damage that threatens the seaworthiness of the ship.” The pretext was history English lung the cruiser Glasgow, which was repaired at the beginning of the First World War in a Brazilian port for about the same time. A two-week period meant not only the opportunity to seal the holes and fix the feed mechanisms (for which an elevator specialist from a German company was urgently called from Buenos Aires!), but also to bring several submarines to the La Plata area that would help lift the blockade. However, the British understood the situation perfectly, and in the diplomatic struggle they were much stronger. The British consul in Montevideo, Yu. Millington-Drake, had great influence in the country; the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Uruguay, Guani, was reputed to be his good friend. The British demands changed as information was received: at first they insisted on the standard 24-hour period for the enemy to remain in a neutral port, but after consultation with Harewood it became clear that it was better to delay the enemy until reinforcements arrived. There were 8 English merchant ships at the berths of Montevideo (the closest to the “battleship” was only 300 m away!), from which the naval attaché’s assistants immediately organized surveillance of the Spee. Representatives of British intelligence skillfully misinformed the Germans by organizing open negotiations with Buenos Aires on the “possibility of urgently receiving two large warships” (by which the Rinaun and Ark Royal were transparently meant). But the commander of “Graf Spee” received fatal misinformation from his own officers. The day after the battle, one of them saw a ship on the horizon, identified as the battlecruiser Rinaun. This, in fact, decided the fate of the “pocket battleship”, since the Rinaun belonged to those 5 ships in the world (3 British battle cruisers and the French Dunkirk and Strasbourg), a meeting with which did not leave the Germans any chance of salvation .

The confusion over the supposed identification of the battlecruiser is not entirely clear. In fact, Harewood received the only reinforcement - late in the evening of December 14, the light cruisers were joined by the Cumberland, which had arrived from the Falkland Islands. The three-tube heavy cruiser had nothing in common with the Rinaun in appearance. He traveled the entire route at 25 knots. With his arrival, the British seemed to restore the status quo. The balance of enemy forces became close to what it was at the beginning of the battle. Instead of six 203-mm Exeter guns, the British now had 8, but the combat effectiveness of Ajax and Achilles was significantly reduced due to the failure of half of the artillery on the first and the high consumption of ammunition on the second. Given the current situation, the Spee still had the opportunity to break into the Atlantic.

It took another 3 days for the outcome - that’s how much time was given by the Uruguayan commission that boarded the Spee and examined its damage. During this time, Langsdorff managed to contact Kriegsmarine headquarters several times, offering him a choice: interning in Argentina or sinking the ship. Interestingly, a breakthrough attempt or an honorable death in battle were not even considered, and Captain Zursee missed a real chance to bring glory to his fleet.

The issue of the Spee became the subject of a difficult discussion between the fleet commander, Admiral Raeder, and Hitler. They eventually came to the conclusion that it was preferable to scuttle the ship rather than allow it to be interned in unpredictable South American countries. Langsdorf received the management decision on the evening of December 16. He had 24 hours left at his disposal - the term of stay of the “pocket battleship” expired at 8 pm on December 17, 1939. The commander did not wait last moment and made a decision on a sleepless night. Early in the morning, he woke up the artillery officer and ordered an urgent start to destroy the fire control system. Precision instruments were destroyed with hand grenades and hammers, and the gun locks were taken to the main battery turrets, which were then supposed to be blown up more thoroughly. By evening, preparatory work was completed, which consisted of placing numerous charges throughout all rooms of the ship. The main part of the team (900 people) was transferred to the Tacoma ship. At about 18.00, huge flags with swastikas fluttered from the masts, and the Spee moved away from the pier. His last appearance on this warm summer Sunday evening from the Montevideo embankment was watched by a huge crowd, consisting, according to eyewitnesses, of 200 thousand people. The ship passed through the fairway and turned north, as if intending to go to Buenos Aires, but about 4 miles from the coast it dropped anchor. At about 20.00 there were 6 explosions of the main charges. Flames and smoke rose high above the masts; they were visible even from the city. The ship landed on the ground, strong fires started on it, but the strong structure resisted for quite a long time. Explosions and fires continued for 3 days.

Langsdorff did not survive his ship for long. All 1,100 people (with the exception of the sailors buried and remaining in hospitals in Montevideo) arrived safely in Buenos Aires, and the commander was simply obliged to take care of their fate. Futile attempts to avoid the crew's internment as "castaways" failed. Langsdorff called the team together for the last time and addressed them with a speech that hinted at his decision. On the morning of December 20, he shot himself in a hotel room in the capital of Argentina.

The favorable attitude of the Argentine authorities was reflected in the fact that they practically did not interfere with the escape of those released under arrest. honestly“officers, the vast majority of whom made their way to Germany in different, sometimes very difficult ways to take part in further hostilities. Thus, the chief artillery officer of the “pocket battleship” Paul Asher managed to occupy a similar post on the Bismarck. Its shells hit the battle cruiser Hood, and a day later Asher himself died along with his new ship.

The Spee sank in neutral waters in a shallow place, so that its charred superstructures rose above the waves. The British equipped a special expedition, intending to remove from it everything that had survived from the instruments, in particular, the radar, as well as weapons (105-mm anti-aircraft guns and machine guns). It was possible to complete only part of the program, since shortly after the start of work a storm broke out and the operation had to be stopped. The remaining pile of iron was gradually dismantled for scrap starting in 1942. True, working on the muddy bottom turned out to be extremely inconvenient, and some parts of the last “pocket battleship” are still rusting at the site of the sinking, at 34° 58" 25" south latitude and 56° 18" 01" west longitude.

“Laid down on October 1, 1932, launched on June 30, 1934, entered service on January 6, 1936. Built in the shipyards of Wilhelmshaven..
Death:
On the morning of December 13, 1939, at about 6 a.m., the Admiral Graf Spee collided with a squadron of British cruisers; the tops of the masts were discovered on the Spee at 5:52, at 6:16 a report was received from the cruiser Exeter: “I believe that this is a “pocket battleship”.” At first, the English light cruisers were mistaken for destroyers, that is, the commander of the Admiral Spee, Captain zur See Hans Langsdorff, believed that he was fighting with a cruiser and two destroyers.
At 6:18 a.m., the first salvo of the German raider fell between the English cruisers, and four minutes later the Exeter’s guns began to speak. Mistaking the light cruisers for destroyers, the commander of the ship Admiral Graf Spee ordered the main caliber artillery fire to be concentrated only on the heavy cruiser. Over the next twenty minutes, Exeter receives several hits, as a result of which its second bow turret was broken, the command bridge was destroyed, communications were disrupted, and the rudder control mechanisms were disabled. Moving to the aft conning tower, the commander of the English ship orders a torpedo salvo to be fired at the German battleship, and at that very moment the ship is rocked by two more heavy hits. Shrouded in smoke, settled on the bow and tilted to the side, Exeter leaves the battle at 7.40.
Meanwhile, the light cruisers, fired only by the battleship's auxiliary artillery, slipped through the danger zone and, according to Langsdorff, behaved with “incomprehensible impudence.” When at 7.16 the raider turned south, intending to finish off the Exeter, the light cruisers Ajax and Achilles, rushing to the aid of their fellow ship, fired so accurately and effectively that with two shells they disabled the artillery fire control system on the Admiral Count Spee." And although these actions did not go unpunished - one 280-mm German shell disabled the stern towers on the Ajax, and another demolished its mast - both Englishmen continued to follow the “pocket” battleship departing to the east like shadows. At midnight, when the Admiral Graf Spee anchored in the Montevideo roadstead, Ajax and Achilles, splitting up, hastened to block both exits from the mouth of La Plata. The next night they were joined by the heavy cruiser Cumberland - that was all Harwood could do to counter the German raider.
Although the damage to the Admiral Graf Spee was not very great, she needed repairs, which could not be done in the three days provided by the Uruguayan government according to international law, and moreover, her ammunition was running out. Understanding his predicament, British agents in Montevideo intensively spread rumors: a strong English squadron, which included the battle cruiser Rinaun and the aircraft carrier Ark Royal, was waiting for the “Admiral Count Spee” at the exit from La Plata. Believing in the inevitable death of his ship, Langsdorff sent a request to Berlin, from where he received almost a personal order from the Fuhrer: do not accept the battle, destroy the ship. On December 17, 1939, Langsdorff ordered the ship to be scuttled. The crew went ashore and were interned. The commander shot himself on December 20.
The Spee sank in neutral waters in a shallow place, so that its charred superstructures rose above the waves. The British equipped a special expedition, intending to remove from it everything that had survived from the instruments, in particular, the radar, as well as weapons (105-mm anti-aircraft guns and machine guns). It was possible to complete only part of the program, since shortly after the start of work a storm broke out and the operation had to be stopped. The remaining pile of iron was gradually dismantled for scrap starting in 1942. True, working on the muddy bottom turned out to be extremely inconvenient, and some parts of the last “pocket battleship” are still rusting at the site of the sinking, at 34° 58" 25" south latitude and 56° 18" 01" west longitude. In 2004, some remains of the ship were recovered from the water.

Before its death in the harbor of Montevideo, the “pocket battleship” seriously annoyed the British, having managed to sink eleven merchant ships.” (c) text from the Internet for reference

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After battle