Why did Hetman Mazepa betray the Russians? Destruction of cities and villages of Ukraine by the troops of Charles XII

At the end of the summer of 1709, in the small village of Varnitsa near Bendery, the former hetman of Ukraine Ivan Mazepa (Koledinsky) was dying in terrible agony. He constantly lost his mind from unbearable, hellish pain stemming from dozens of incurable diseases. And, regaining consciousness, after a long, absurd muttering, he whined heart-rendingly: “Otroot mani - torn off!” (“I’m poisoned, I’m poisoned!”)…

But since poisoning an Orthodox Christian even before a grave death was always considered an unforgivable sin, the elders and servants decided to act according to the old custom - to drill a hole in the ceiling of a peasant hut. In order, therefore, to make it easier for the sinful soul of a dying person to part with his mortal body.

How can one not remember the old belief: than more people sins during life, the more painful death awaits him. Indeed, in the foreseeable past and present of the then Little Russia, it was difficult to find a more insidious, evil and vengeful person than Mazepa. He was an example of a classic and complete villain for all times and for all peoples.

Even though the general morals of the Little Russian politicians of that time did not suffer from special gentry (nobility). This is understandable: people living surrounded by stronger and more powerful neighbors were constantly forced to solve a painful but inevitable dilemma - who would be more profitable to “follow”. Mazepa achieved unprecedented success in solving such problems.

By the hour of his death, he had managed to commit a dozen major betrayals and an immeasurable number of minor atrocities.

“In the moral rules of Ivan Stepanovich,” writes historian N.I. Kostomarov, whom one would never suspect of Russophileism, had a trait ingrained from his youth that, noticing the decline of the strength on which he had previously relied, he did not bother with any sensations or impulses, so as not to contribute to the harm of the declining strength that was previously beneficial to him. Betrayal of his benefactors had already been demonstrated more than once in his life.

So he betrayed Poland, going over to her sworn enemy Doroshenko; So he left Doroshenko as soon as he saw that his power was wavering; So, and even more shamelessly, he did with Samoilovich, who warmed him up and raised him to the height of the senior rank.

He now did the same with his greatest benefactor (Peter I. - M.Z),” before whom he had recently flattered and humiliated himself... Hetman Mazepa, as a historical figure, was not represented by any national idea. He was an egoist in the full sense of the word. A Pole by upbringing and methods of life, he moved to Little Russia and there made a career for himself, forging the Moscow authorities and not stopping at any immoral paths.”

“He lied to everyone, deceived everyone - the Poles, the Little Russians, the Tsar, and Charles, he was ready to do evil to everyone as soon as the opportunity presented itself to him to benefit himself.”

The historian Bantysh-Kamensky characterizes Mazepa this way: “He had the gift of words and the art of persuasion. But with the cunning and caution of Vygovsky, he combined in himself the malice, vindictiveness and covetousness of Bryukhovetsky, and surpassed Doroshenko in love of fame; but all of them are in ingratitude."

As always, A.S. exhaustively accurately defined the essence of Mazepa. Pushkin: “Some writers wanted to make him a hero of freedom, a new Bogdan Khmelnitsky. History presents him as an ambitious man, inveterate in treachery and atrocities, a slanderer of Samoilovich, his benefactor, a destroyer of the father of his unfortunate mistress, a traitor to Peter before his victory, a traitor to Charles after his defeat: his memory, anathematized by the church, cannot escape the curse of mankind.”

And in “Poltava” he continued: “That he does not know what is sacred, / That he does not remember goodness, / That he does not love anything, / That he is ready to shed blood like water, / That he despises freedom, / That there is no homeland for him "

Finally, an extremely accurate assessment of the villain belongs to the Ukrainian people themselves.
The expression “Damn Mazepa!” for centuries it applied not only to bad person, but also to any evil in general. (In Ukraine and Belarus, Mazepa is a slob, a rude person, an evil boor - outdated.)

A very remarkable detail. More than a dozen portraits of this historical figure and even several artistic canvases with his image. Surprisingly, however, there is no elementary similarity among them! It seems that this man had many mutually exclusive faces. And he had at least five birthdays - from 1629 to 1644 (it’s such a treat for the hetman’s political fans to celebrate his “round” anniversaries!). However, Mazepa has... three dates of death. It's so slippery. Everything about him was not like people...

I deliberately omit Mazepa’s childhood, adolescence and youth. For the devil himself will break his leg in that segment of his flawed biography. Although I will quote the following excerpt solely out of respect for the authority of the authors: “The one who held this post at that time was a Polish nobleman named Mazepa, born in the Podolsk palatinate; he was the page of Jan Casimir and at his court acquired a certain European luster. In his youth, he had an affair with the wife of a Polish nobleman, and the husband of his beloved, having learned about this, ordered Mazepa to be tied naked to a wild horse and set free.

The horse was from Ukraine and ran away there, dragging with it Mazepa, half dead from fatigue and hunger. He was sheltered by local peasants; he lived among them for a long time and distinguished himself in several raids against the Tatars. Thanks to the superiority of his intelligence and education, he enjoyed great honor among the Cossacks, his fame grew more and more, so that the tsar was forced to declare him Ukrainian hetman.” This is a quote from Byron, given in French, taken from Voltaire.

True, it’s hard not to marvel at how two outstanding European creators fell for a simple idea. Because this could not really happen by definition. And involuntarily you still think: it’s not in vain that such outstanding Europeans began to wax poetic about the “Khokhlatsky Judas” so long ago. They even claimed that “the king was forced.” That is, they put the upstart nobleman and the greatest monarch in the history of mankind on equal terms.

All Mazepa’s contemporaries unanimously claim that he was a “sorcerer.” This is probably why they thought so because it was difficult for them to explain in any other way the incredible ability of this talented rogue to impress people and inspire them to trust him.
Meanwhile, it was precisely such insidious abilities (he was a master of hypnosis!) that elevated Mazepa to the pinnacle of power

When hetman Right Bank Ukraine There was Pavlo Teterya, Mazepa entered his service. Hetmans at that time changed like the gloves of a capricious lady. And Teterya was replaced by Petro Doroshenko. Naturally “charmed” by the young nobleman, he appoints him general clerk - personal secretary and the head of his office. At the same time, Hetman Doroshenko played a complex, triple game. Remaining a subject of the Polish king, he sent his secretary to the hetman of Left Bank Ukraine Ivan Samoilovich with assurances that he wanted to serve the Russian Tsar.

But a few months later he sent the same Mazepa to the Turkish Sultan to ask for help from the eternal enemy of the Orthodox. And as a gift to the Turks he presented “yasyk” - fifteen slaves from the Cossacks captured on the left side of the Dnieper. On the way, Mazepa and the “goodies” were captured by the Zaporozhye Cossacks, led by the Kosh chieftain Ivan Sirko.

The same thing that he wrote with his Cossacks the famous letter to the Turkish Sultan Mohammed IV: “You are a pig’s face, a mare’s ass, a biting dog, an unbaptized forehead, mother…. You will not herd Christian pigs either. Now it’s over, because we don’t know the date, we don’t know the calendar, but the day is the same as yours, so kiss us on the ass!”

And now I’m asking myself a question that no one will ever be able to answer. Well, why didn’t Ataman Sirko, devoted to Samoilovich (and therefore to the Russian Tsar!), this frantic defender of the Orthodox, the sworn enemy of the Tatars and Turks, cut off Mazepa’s head on the spot for the fact that he, the bastard, was taking fifteen Russian souls into slavery? After all, Ivan Dmitrievich always mercilessly exterminated the busurman’s accomplices. And then he took and sent the “vile enemy” to Hetman Samoilovich. It was only Providence that intended to make sure how low and vile Mazepa’s soul was still capable of falling.

Here, on the Left Bank, something else is happening, almost incredible, at least difficult to explain - it is Mazepa, as his confidant, that Samoilovich sends to Moscow for negotiations. There, his broken envoy meets... Tsar Alexei Mikhailovich himself! And then he travels to the Russian capital many more times, now strengthening his own authority. Omitting the countless tactical and strategic moves of Mazepa, between which he successfully “merged” Samoilovich and his entire family, where he was almost a relative, we only note that on July 25, 1687, the cunning courtier received, by bribing the Russian bureaucratic elite, “kleinota” (symbols) hetman's power - a mace and a horsetail.
During the reign of Mazepa, the enslavement of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth (as the peasants were then called) took on a particularly wide scale.

And the hetman became the largest serf owner on both sides of the Dnieper. In Ukraine (the Hetmanate at that time), he took control of about 20 thousand households. In Russia - many more than 5 thousand. In total, Mazepa had over 100 thousand serf souls. Not a single hetman before or after him could boast of such fabulous wealth.

And at this time, very serious tectonic shifts of the empire were taking place in Russia, as a result of which Peter I ascended the throne. You will laugh, but Mazepa almost immediately ingratiated himself into incredible trust in the young Tsar. Even now it’s hard to believe, but in 1700 Mazepa received the Order of St. Andrew the First-Called - the highest Russian award for No. 2! (Prince Ivan Golovin was the first to be awarded). Apparently, the Russian Tsar really liked the cunning hetman, although the age difference separating them was 33 years.
And it is not by chance that Mazepa wrote to Peter: “Our people are stupid and fickle. Let the great sovereign not give too much faith to the Little Russian people, let him deign, without delay, to send a good army of soldiers to Ukraine in order to keep the Little Russian people in obedience and faithful citizenship.”

This, by the way, is about the delight of some historians about the longest Hetman rule of Mazepa - twenty-one years - and about his allegedly passionate desire for the independence of Ukraine at any cost. Not to mention the so-called Kolomatsky Articles, signed personally by the hetman upon his assumption of office. It states in black and white that Ukraine is prohibited from any foreign policy relations. It was forbidden for the hetman and elders to be appointed without the consent of the tsar. But they all received Russian nobility and the inviolability of estates.

And, excuse me, where is the “struggle for the independence of Ukraine”? Yes, for two decades Mazepa strictly carried out the will of Peter I. And he did the right thing. Only he did this solely for his own benefit. There’s not even a hint of “independence” here. It smelled later, when the hetman, flawed in all moral respects, for some reason believed that the invincible Swedish army would defeat the troops of the nascent Russian Empire.

It was then for the first time that Mazepa’s bestial, wolf instinct failed him. We know how long the rope can twist... But before we remind you of the final fall of the hetman as a politician, let us dwell on his ugliest human meanness...

The first song of Pushkin’s “Poltava,” who hasn’t forgotten, begins like this: “Rich and glorious is Kochubey.”

For many years they were almost the same age (Mazepa is a year older than Kochubey), they were friends - water is inseparable. And they even became related: the hetman’s nephew, Obidovsky, married Kochubey’s eldest daughter, Anna, and the youngest Kochubeevna, Matryona, Mazepa became his godfather.

Here in Ukraine, nepotism has been revered since ancient times as a spiritual kinship. Godparents look after the godchildren until they get back on their feet, and then the godchildren must take care of the godparents as if they were their own. In 1702, Mazepa buried his wife and was widowed for two years.

At that time he was well over sixty, and Matryona Kochubey was sixteen (in “Poltava” she is Maria). The difference, according to the most conservative estimates, is half a century.

And the old man decided to marry the young goddaughter, although he had previously seduced her mother. The “sorcerer” used all the techniques of his seduction: “My heart,” “my heartfelt kohana,” “I kiss all the penises of your little white body,” “remember your words, sworn to me, at the hour when you left my chambers." “With great heartfelt anguish I am waiting for news from Your Grace, but in what matter, you yourself know well.”

From Mazepa’s letters it is clear that Matryona, who responded to his feelings, is angry that the hetman sent her home, that her parents scold her. Mazepa is indignant and calls her mother a “katuvka” - an executioner, and advises her to go to a monastery as a last resort. Naturally, the parents resolutely opposed the possible marriage. The official reason for the refusal was the church ban on marriages between godfather and goddaughter.

However, the resourceful Mazepa would not have sent matchmakers if he had not hoped that the church authorities, superbly lured by him, would lift the ban for him. Most likely, the Kochubeys were well aware of the kind of “halepa” (attack) that an insidious and evil groom could lead their entire family into. Yes, over time, Matryona got rid of her misconceptions:

“I see that Your Grace has completely changed with your former love for me. As you know, your will, do what you want! You will regret it later." And Mazepa fulfilled his threats in full.

According to the direct (and this has been established for sure!) slander of Mazepa, Kochubey and Colonel Zakhar Iskra, the tsar’s subjects were sentenced to death and handed over to the hetman for an exemplary execution. Before his execution, Mazepa ordered Kochubey to be brutally tortured again so that he would reveal where his money and valuable property were hidden. Kochubey was burned with a hot iron all night before his execution, and he told everything.

This “blood money” entered the hetman’s treasury. On July 14, 1708, the heads of innocent sufferers were cut off. The headless bodies of Kochubey and Iskra were handed over to relatives and buried in the Kiev Pechersk Lavra. An inscription was carved on the coffin stone: “Since death commanded us to remain silent, / This stone should tell people about us: / For loyalty to the Monarch and our devotion / We drank the cup of suffering and death.”

... And a couple of months after this execution, Mazepa betrayed Peter I

From the first steps of the Swedish troops on Ukrainian soil, the population offered them strong resistance. It was not easy for Mazepa to justify himself to Karl for the “unreasonableness of his people.” They both realized that they were mistaken - both in each other and in strategic calculations - each. However, Mazepa’s deceit, meanness and extreme lowliness had not yet been completely exhausted. He sent Colonel Apostol to the Tsar with a proposal, no more and no less, to betray the Swedish king and his generals into the hands of Peter!

In return, he boorishly asked for even more: complete forgiveness and the return of his former hetman dignity. The proposal was more than extraordinary. After consulting with the ministers, the king gave his consent. For the bleziru. He understood perfectly well: Mazepa was bluffing to death. He did not have the strength to capture Karl. Colonel Apostol and many of his comrades joined the ranks of the army of Peter I.

Order of Judas - Odessa Politicum As is known, after the historical Battle of Poltava Mazepa fled with Charles and the remnants of his army. The Tsar really wanted to get the hetman and offered the Turks a lot of money for his extradition. But Mazepa paid three times more and thus paid off.

Then the angry Pyotr Alekseevich ordered the production of a special order “to commemorate the hetman’s betrayal.” The outlandish “reward” was a circle weighing 5 kg, made of silver. The circle depicted Judas Iscariot hanging himself from an aspen tree. Below is a pile of 30 pieces of silver.

The inscription read: “The pernicious son Judas is cursed if he chokes for the love of money.” The church anathematized Mazepa's name. And again from Pushkin’s “Poltava”: “Mazepa has been forgotten for a long time; / Only in the triumphant shrine / Once a year anathema to this day, / The cathedral thunders about him with thunder.”

For several centuries, the name of the despicable traitor was even considered indecent to mention in serious works

Only a few Ukrainian Russophobes, such as A. Ogloblin, tried to whitewash the “damned dog” (the expression of Taras Grigorievich Shevchenko). This, if I may say so, historian became the burgomaster of Kyiv during the period of fascist occupation. His reign was marked by mass executions at Babi Yar. After the war, Ogloblin fled to the United States. The fascist burgomaster wrote his main book, the monograph “Hetman Ivan Mazepa and His Reign,” on the 250th anniversary of the traitor’s death (how, however, all vile people tenaciously stick to each other!) In his opinion, the goals of the traitor hetman were noble, the plans bold. Just in case: “He wanted to restore the powerful autocratic hetman’s power and build a European-type power, while preserving the Cossack system.” I just wonder who would have allowed him to do this in those days?
And yet, in reality, on a statewide, so to speak, scale, the memory of the “Khokhlatsky Judas” was reanimated by another Judas - first the main ideologist of Leninism-communism in Ukraine, and then the first cooperator of market lawlessness, President Leonid Kravchuk

The nickname, by the way, was taken from his personal youthful poetic exercises: “I am Judas. Iscariot!

...I will never forget the summer of 1991. Then the largest part came under the jurisdiction of Ukraine Soviet army: 14 motorized rifle, 4 tank, 3 artillery divisions and 8 artillery brigades, 4 special forces brigades, 2 airborne brigades, 9 air defense brigades, 7 combat helicopter regiments, three air armies (about 1,100 combat aircraft) and a separate air defense army. The general centrifugal euphoric force of the collapse of everything and everyone also captured me, the then Soviet colonel. I’m a sinner, sporadic thoughts flashed through my fevered brain, why shouldn’t I, a Ukrainian, go serve in Ukraine?

I thank God that I did not succumb to a spontaneous feeling.

But the philosophizing of the director of the Kyiv Center for Ukrainian Studies national university named after T.G. Shevchenko, academician of the Academy of Sciences of Ukraine, doctor historical sciences Vladimir Sergiychuk. IN Soviet times This learned man was modestly and quietly engaged in farming. And in Nezalezhnaya he became one of the first researchers of the activities of the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists (OUN) and the exploits of the Ukrainian Insurgent Army (UPA): “Yes, Mazepa betrayed the Russian Tsar, but he did it in the name of the Ukrainian people, in the name of Ukraine.

The condition that Charles XII would be the protector of our country, that is, would take Ukraine under his guardianship, was quite beneficial for Ukraine at that time. Mazepa was the real father of the Ukrainian nation! And nothing will help those downtrodden people who don’t want to be interested in their own history.”

Kiev political scientist Dmitry Vydrin became an even more “progressive” ideologist in this direction: “Our country was born from the totality of thousands of betrayals. We betrayed everything! We took the same oath and kissed the same banner. Then they betrayed this oath and banner and began to kiss another banner. Almost all of our leaders are former communists who swore by one ideal, and then cursed the ideals to which they swore. From all this cumulative action, where there were thousands of small, large and medium-sized betrayals, this country was actually born.

This is how Ukrainian politics, our worldview and morality were formed. Betrayal is the foundation on which we stand, on which we have built our biographies, careers, destinies and everything else.”

And we are still surprised: how can the brothers and sisters of Ukraine put up with the revelry of openly fascist Benderists; how the blood in their veins does not run cold from the Odessa Katyn; why do many Ukrainian mothers, instead of unitedly and sacrificially speaking out against the fratricidal war, complain to the president: our sons do not have body armor, they have little ammunition and they are poorly fed. Yes, this is all a direct consequence of the current “national Ukrainian idea: we, Ukrainians, are traitors, and this is our strength!”
It’s time for the long-decayed bones of Pan Mazepa to start dancing: “she ne vmerla” Ukraine in his understanding

She - not all of her, of course, but a significant part of her - honors and prays for him, despite all his outrageous atrocities. Truly, the Mazepia plague is now raging in Ukraine.

Woe to the people whose national heroes include such flawed individuals as Mazepa, Petlyura, Bandera, Shukhevych, etc. Their examples are good for growing maidanut gopniks.

When the “glorious deeds” of the bastard Mazepa are given to a fighter as a role model, the fighter will act accordingly. Don't they understand this? But they really don’t understand.

...After the release of the film “Prayer for Hetman Mazepa” by the famous film director Yu. Ilyenko, I met with my old friend, the late artist Bogdan Stupka, who played the title role. Our long-standing relationship (we knew each other since 1970) allowed for a serious degree of mutual frankness. And I, without further ado, asked: “Bodya, why did you take on Mazepa?” "Well, you clever man and must understand that there are no forbidden roles for an actor. The meaner the hero, the more interesting it is to play him.”

“I agree with you if this is Richard S. He is always outside the ideological framework. But in this case, you understood perfectly well that the ardent nationalist Ilyenko used both you and your name to spoil Russia with his movie nightmare. Okay, let's leave out the fact that Yura (we also knew each other for a long time) is the author of the script, director, cameraman, actor, and his son played young Mazepa. But there are also rivers of blood, heads are chopped off like cabbage, and Kochubey’s wife, Lyubov Fedorovna, masturbates with her husband’s severed head. Peter I rapes his soldiers. Didn't that bother you? And this episode: Peter I stands over Mazepa’s grave, the hetman’s hand appears from under the ground and grabs the Tsar by the throat - didn’t it also?

Bogdan Silvestrovich was silent for a long time and painfully. Then he said: “As they say: don’t rub salt in my wound. Soon I will play Taras Bulba at Bortko's. So I’m rehabilitating myself in front of people.” A great, world-class actor, he, of course, understood that Yuri Gerasimovich simply “used” him as an old friend. And his role is a catastrophic failure. It couldn't have been any other way. Just like the film itself turned out to be a disastrous failure. It was sent to the Berlin Film Festival. However, there the film was shown only in the category of films... for people with non-traditional sexual orientation!

Then we continued talking about Mazepa. And we came to a common conclusion.

If the criminal Koledinsky had not been pulled by the ears by the current upstart Ukrainian politicians into the current ideology, then we would not remember him more often than other hetmans
And so his personality is unnecessarily demonized. Meanwhile, he was an elementary, albeit very evil, scoundrel. It’s a shame that the current Ukrainian authorities like him so much.

...You can talk, write and broadcast as much as you like about what an outstanding statesman Mazepa was, who left our mortal world 305 years ago. It’s enough to go to Ukrainian Wikipedia and see there a countless list of merits of the glorious patriot of “independent Ukraine” Ivan Stepanovich: he is a polyglot, and a philanthropist, and a temple builder, and a poet, and a lover, and a “sorcerer”, and...

But then you remember Pushkin: “However, what a disgusting object! Not a single kind, supportive feeling! Not a single consoling feature! Temptation, enmity, betrayal, deceit, cowardice, ferocity.” And everything falls into place.

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Ivan Stepanovich Mazepa - one of the most prominent Ukrainian hetmans, who remained in power the longest (more than 20 years) - was born on March 20, 1640 (according to some sources in 1639 or 1644) in the village of Kamentsy (later Mazepintsy) near Bila Tserkva. , in the Kiev region, in the family of the Ukrainian gentry. Mother - Mary Magdalene - was an educated, brave and great patriot of Ukraine. Until the end of her days (1707) she was the first adviser to her son-hetman, which testifies to her deep intellect. For the last 13 years of her life she was the abbess of the Kiev-Pechersk convent. From an early age, Ivan learned to ride a horse and use a saber, studied European sciences, and over time, at the insistence of his mother, he went to study at the Kiev-Mohyla Collegium, which he would turn into an academy during the years of his hetmanship. Mazepa’s favorite authors were Cicero, Titus Livius, Tacitus. After graduating from the college, Ivan Mazepa’s father Stepan-Adam (a rather businesslike figure in the retinue of Hetman Vyhovsky) sends his son to the court of the Polish king as a page, from where he, as a talented nobleman, is sent to Western Europe to complete his education. Holland, France, Germany, Italy expanded the young man’s worldview and enriched him spiritually and politically. He thoroughly studied the basics of fortification, cannon making and other sciences. Slender, incredibly attractive in appearance, Ivan was a very enlightened person for his time: in addition to Ukrainian, he spoke Russian, Polish, Latin and French languages, was well versed in philosophy and history, music and poetry, and wrote poetry. From a young age until late old age, Mazepa had the gift of charming people: kings and czars, warriors and Cossacks, even the clergy were swayed by his attractiveness, not to mention women.

The main goals of Hetman Mazepa.

The main goals of Mazepa's policy as the hetman of Ukraine were: the unification of the Ukrainian lands - the Hetmanate, Right Bank Ukraine, Zaporozhye, Sloboda Ukraine and Khan's Ukraine as part of a single Ukrainian state led by the hetman, as well as the creation of hetman power as the basis of a European-style state with the preservation of the system of Cossack self-government . During his time as Hetman, he managed to partially solve this problem by uniting the Hetmanate, Right Bank Ukraine and Zaporozhye. Hetman Mazepa twice raised the issue of annexing Sloboda Ukraine to Russian Tsar Peter I and was twice refused.

Political situation.

Ukraine in the second half of the 17th century experienced terrible times: Turks, Tatars, Poles and Muscovites attacked its lands. The chronicler of those times, Velichko, describes this region as follows: “Many cities and castles are empty, destroyed... The fields are devastated, forests, lakes and swamps are covered with moss... On all the roads there are white heaps of dried human skulls...”. The rich and fertile lands of Ukraine became a desert. In addition, one Ukrainian elite is reaching out to Moscow, another to Turkey, and a third to Poland.

The peace between Ukraine and Poland, as always, did not last long. The disgraced Mazepa is sent away with the Polish army, which has once again gone to war in Ukraine. But once at the White Church, Mazepa left the royal entourage and went to his homeland - Mazepintsy.
At that time, three powerful rivals were encroaching on Ukraine - Poland, Russia and Türkiye. Each of these states had its own hetman in Ukraine. The most famous of them, Petro Doroshenko, wanted to unite the torn Ukraine into a single state with the help of the Sultan. Mazepa came to him. Educated, with diplomatic abilities, he quickly becomes the commandant of the Hetman's Guard, and soon - an honorary general clerk, that is, the head of the diplomatic department of the Cossack state.
The Cossack “Minister of Foreign Affairs” of Right Bank Ukraine Ivan Stepanovich Mazepa is negotiating with Left Bank Hetman Samoilovich, with Turkish Sultan and the Crimean Khan, with the Moscow Tsar and the Polish King, even with the French - Louis XIV. Mazepa’s contemporaries were Corneille, La Fontaine, Boileau, Pascal, La Rochefoucauld - all of them could not help but influence the worldview of the future hetman. La Rochefoucauld in one of his maxims said: “A far-sighted person must determine a place for each of his desires, and then implement them one by one.” . Guided by this principle, young Ivan Mazepa marries a rich widow, who soon dies, leaving him a large inheritance. Mazepa becomes one of the richest landowners in Ukraine. There were more than 100 thousand peasants on his estates.

Ivan Mazepa - Hetman of Left Bank Ukraine.

In 1687, the Cossack elite chose Mazepa as hetman of Ukraine, when he was already in his fifties. The election of the Hetman of Left Bank Ukraine took place on July 25 (August 4, new style) at the Cossack Rada in the regimental village of Kolomak (now a village in the Valkivsky district of the Kharkov region). At the same time, the historically famous Kolomak Articles were signed, limiting the rights of the hetman, but strengthening the power of Russian tsarism in Ukraine. And although under these articles it was forbidden to elect a hetman and appoint Cossack elders without the permission of the tsar, the elders nevertheless received a number of privileges - the inviolability of ownership of estates, the granting of the rank of nobility and broad powers to fight the anti-feudal movement, suppress the uprisings of the “Siromi”, etc.
During the elections of Hetman Mazepa, according to tradition, an agreement was read out, signed at one time by Bohdan Khmelnytsky and ratified by Moscow, which set out the main provisions of relations between Ukraine and the Moscow region. True, this agreement was somewhat distorted and differed from the original, stored only in Moscow, since the Kiev copy burned in the Kiev Pechersk Lavra under rather mysterious circumstances. As is known, the Russian-Ukrainian treaty of 1654 first of all proclaimed a military alliance of the autonomy of Ukraine and Russia against Poland. And two years later (1656) after the signing of this agreement, the Russians and the Poles signed a separate truce in Vilna without the participation of Ukraine, which meant the actual termination of the Russian-Ukrainian agreement. They say that Bogdan Khmelnitsky, shortly before his death, spoke about the need to officially break the agreement. But the death of the hetman in 1657 did not allow this to be done. And his successor, son Yuri (narrow-minded and weak-willed), was given a forgery, which over time became the only official text of the agreement, which was signed by all the hetmans.

Achievements in the development of science and culture.

At the beginning of the 18th century, at the end of the Mazepa period, there was one school per 1,000 inhabitants in Ukraine (a century later, in 1875, there was already one school for almost 7,000 inhabitants). During the time of Mazepa (1708), the Kiev-Mohyla Academy numbered 2,000 students, but already in 1709 there were 161 of them, and almost a century later this number increased, but only to 800-1,000 people. Today the resurrected academy has over 2,000 students. During Mazepa’s time, there were many Ukrainians among the students at the universities of the Sorbonne and Prague. Almost all Cossack elders in Ukraine had higher education.
Perhaps the most important component of the hetman’s multifaceted activities was church construction. After the crash Kievan Rus The construction of monumental religious buildings in Ukraine, in particular in the Dnieper region and the Left Bank, was practically not carried out. In the conditions of Horde domination, Tatar invasions during the era of the Principality of Lithuania, persecution of the Orthodox Church under Poland, popular uprisings and the times of Ruins, the population was only able to maintain the surviving ancient Russian churches in more or less satisfactory condition and build new (minor) ones. The turning point occurred under Hetman Ivan Samoilovich. With his funds, the construction of the majestic Trinity Cathedral in Chernigov and the cathedral church of the Mgar monastery near Lubny began. At this time, an architectural style began to take shape, called “Ukrainian Baroque.” It successfully combined the architectural features of ancient Russian monumental stone churches or wooden religious buildings with elements of the Baroque style, varieties of which spread throughout Europe.
The hetman's residence - the city of Baturyn - becomes the cultural and educational center of Ukraine and Europe. Mazepa corresponds with many European scientists and politicians, takes the Kiev-Mohyla College under his wing, turning it into an academy, raises it to the level of a European university, and builds a new three-story building for the academy. He turns the Chernigov Collegium into a higher school-lyceum, and in many cities and villages he builds schools, printing houses, and churches at his own expense. Mazepa restores the monastery of the Kiev Pechersk Lavra, surrounding it with a monumental wall with a wonderfully decorated gate in the form of a church.
As the head of state, Mazepa was not distinguished by meekness; he brutally dealt with his enemies and those who encroached on his power, the power of the aristocratic elite. He wanted Ukraine to be independent, but he was not very concerned about the fate of the poor and peasantry. Therefore, the “siroma”, which rebelled against the Moscow yoke, against the Polish gentry and Ukrainian masters, was mercilessly suppressed. And Peter I approved of this. The uprising led by Petrik, the leader of the poor, was suppressed. Fastovsky colonel Semyon Paliy, who fought against Polish oppression in Ukraine, was exiled to Siberia.

Mazepa's betrayal.

In the third decade of his hetmanship, Mazepa became convinced that neither faithful service to the tsar nor the fulfillment of treaty obligations ensured free existence for Ukraine. The growing empire is one way or another tightening its nets more and more, interfering in Ukrainian statehood both politically and economically, considering Ukraine only a source for enriching the empire, pumping it natural resources, work force, brains and talents.
In 1708 Russian army, strengthened quantitatively and qualitatively, is located on Ukrainian lands, robbing peasants, there are cases of violence, rape, causing discontent of the entire Ukrainian people, Cossack elders. Mazepa's appeals to the king on this matter remain unanswered or are met with irresponsible promises.
Menshikov, this illiterate tsar's henchman, a talented ignoramus, being on the territory of Ukraine, in Kyiv, treats the educated Cossack elite, including the hetman, with contempt, constantly emphasizing the superiority of strength rather than intelligence. He gives orders to the Cossack colonels, bypassing the hetman.
Regarding the moral side of Mazepa’s corresponding behavior, it should be noted that violation of agreements by those in power in those days was the same norm as the conclusion of these agreements. More than once, Poles and Russians, Turks and Tatars betrayed Ukrainians, and Ukrainians were often forced to commit similar treason. Among many Western authors, Mazepa’s favorite was Machiavelli, an Italian politician and writer of the late 15th and early 16th centuries, who believed that any means, even immoral ones, were acceptable to strengthen the state.
Realizing that the victory of Peter I will only speed up the process of destroying Ukrainian statehood, but will not stop it, Mazepa makes a historic decision to go over to the side of the Swedes. The latter promise Ukraine complete independence.

The defeat of the Swedes near Poltava.

The secret negotiations that Mazepa conducted with the Poles and Swedes back in 1705-1706 ended in an agreement between Ukraine and Sweden. Here is one of the articles of this agreement: “Everything that was conquered in the old Moscow possessions will belong, in accordance with military law, to the one who takes it as the winner. And everything that will be recognized as the former property of the Ukrainian people will be transferred or preserved for the Ukrainian principality.”
Therefore, the Swedish army, upon entering the territory of Ukraine, behaved friendly, respected the inhabitants, paid for food and fodder. And in November 1708, Mazepa with a 4,000-strong army united with the Swedish king. They were also joined by part of the Cossacks (8 thousand Cossacks), led by the Kosh chieftain Kostya Gordienko.
Peter and Menshikov launched a great terror in Ukraine against Mazepa’s supporters. The tsar forced the Ukrainian clergy to proclaim anathema to Mazepa.
The severe cold winter of 1708-1709 began. Terrible times have begun for Ukraine. And in the summer of 1709, fortune turned its back on Mazepa.
The youth of 27-year-old Charles XII and the experience of 70-year-old Mazepa were defeated by the maturity and perseverance of 37-year-old Tsar Peter I. I’m not talking about the talent of these figures - it was inherent in all three. The defeat of Charles and Mazepa can be explained by several reasons - the wounding of the king, and the weakening of the Swedish army (30 thousand Swedes and Cossacks against almost 60 thousand Russian soldiers), an underestimation high level enemy preparations, non-support of Mazepa by the majority of Cossack colonels, for whom the hetman’s change in pro-Russian orientation was unexpected and, finally, the Ukrainian people’s misunderstanding of the strategy of the aristocratic hetman’s elite. Churchmen also played an important role. After all, it was believed that Muscovites, Orthodox, are brothers in spirit, and Poles and Swedes - Catholics and Protestants - are especially sworn enemies of Orthodoxy.
After the defeat, Karl and Mazepa fled south to the Dnieper, crossed at Perevolochna, where they were almost captured by Russian troops, and arrived in Bendery.
The Ottoman Empire refused to hand Mazepa over to the Russian authorities. Although the royal envoy in Constantinople, Peter Tolstoy, was ready to spend 300,000 efimki for these purposes, which he offered to the great Turkish vizier for assistance in extraditing the former hetman.
Mazepa died on September 22, 1709 in Bendery. By order of his nephew, Voinarovsky, his body was transported to Galati and buried there.
Subsequent events confirmed the correctness of the conclusions made by Mazepa on the eve of the Poltava battle.
After Mazepa, science and culture in Ukraine decline, the majority of Ukrainians become illiterate. Russia strives to create a strong state with fire and sword as the legal successor of Kievan Rus - therefore Kyiv must submit to it. Moscow saw Ukraine only as a bridge to Western Europe.
Recognizing the superiority of Ukrainian culture, the Muscovite kingdom, turning into the Russian Empire, purposefully subjugates Kyiv politically and economically through various prohibitions and infringements. Peter I did this most actively, and Catherine II completed it. Therefore, we can say that history justified Hetman Mazepa’s last act.
List of references used when writing the work: 1. Stanislavsky AL. Civil War V Russia XVII V. M., 1990. , 2. Bagdasarov R. Zaporozhye knighthood of the XV-XVIII centuries // Social sciences and modernity. 1996., 3. Yakovenko I. Civilization and barbarism in the history of Russia. Article 3. Cossacks // Social sciences and modernity. 1996. No. 3., 4. “People of old Ukraine”, Kiev, 2000

Tsar Peter and Hetman Mazepa.

As we remember, Hetman Samoilovich was removed in 1687 and sent into exile after an unsuccessful Crimean campaign. According to a number of historians, General Captain Ivan Mazepa, who was a close friend of Prince Golitsyn, Princess Sophia’s favorite and had long wanted to become hetman, played an important role in accusing the hetman. Mazepa, with the assistance of Golitsyn and a fairly significant amount of money (though confiscated from the same Samoilovich), became hetman.

At the beginning of 1689, Princess Sophia, yielding to the new requests of her favorite, agreed to undertake a second campaign against the Crimea, which turned out to be no more successful than the first. The new hetman Mazepa, who was always with the prince, also took part in this campaign. Returning to Moscow, Golitsyn, with the approval of Sophia, tried to present the Crimean campaign in a light favorable to both, however, young Peter was angry at the results of this enterprise. It was at this time, in August 1689, at the very climax of the battle between Peter and Sophia, who were claiming absolute power, that Hetman Mazepa, accompanied by elders, arrived in Moscow. At the beginning of his visit, he showered pleasantries in front of Sophia, praising Golitsyn’s military merits in every possible way. But after the defeat of the princess, Mazepa sharply changed the tone of his statements about his former favorite. The Little Russian delegation had to wait more than two months for an audience with the 17-year-old Tsar, who was in Trinity-Sergius Posad (100 km from Moscow). At this reception, Mazepa demonstrated to the king his ability to get into the soul and adapt to circumstances. Now the Little Russian hetman did not spare color in denigrating Prince Golitsyn - the enthusiastic tone at the princess’s reception gave way to almost a direct denunciation of his former patron. By this, the hetman made a pleasant impression on the tsar, and anger at Sophia and Golitsyn did not cause Mazepa’s resignation.

Ivan Stepanovich Mazepa.

Mazepa was a very educated man; in his youth he studied in Europe and served under the Polish king John Casimir. The king noticed a capable young man and gave him diplomatic assignments. In particular, it was he who was sent to Hetman Vygovsky as a royal representative, and it was he, on the instructions of the king, who presented Hetman Tetere with the hetman's insignia. After returning to right-bank Ukraine, Mazepa served with Hetman Doroshenko, carrying out diplomatic assignments. After his capture by the Cossacks, Mazepa ends up with Hetman Samoilovich, but even there he becomes a prominent figure.

At the same Rada at which Mazepa was elected, the so-called “Kolomatsky Articles” were signed as an addition to previous agreements, aimed at strengthening Russian power in Little Russia. During the first years of his hetmanship, Mazepa showed himself to be an ardent supporter of Peter, causing discontent from, first of all, the Zaporozhye Cossacks. In 1692, there was a strong movement in Ukraine against the hetman, which was led by the former military clerk Petro Ivanenko (Petryk), calling on the Crimean Tatars for help. For three years, Petrik “disturbed” Ukraine, but Mazepa dealt with the rebel with decisive actions, who, however, failed to win popular recognition.

In 1695, Tsar Peter undertook (not without the influence of Mazepa) new campaigns against the Crimea and Turkey. The first campaign near Azov ended in failure, but the next one was marked by a brilliant success: the Azov fortress was taken. In this campaign, almost the decisive role was played by 15 thousand Cossacks under the command of Chernigov Colonel Yakov Lizogub. Mazepa himself, together with Field Marshal Sheremetyev, defended the southern borders, preventing the Turks and Tatars from coming to the aid of the besieged Azov. The tsar's trust and gratitude were so great that Hetman Mazepa was the third to receive the newly established Order of St. Andrew the First-Called. (After the Battle of Poltava, the image of this order will be torn from the effigy of the former hetman, who was burned).

A mature politician, Mazepa knew how to please the king without causing hostility among his elders. The Tsar generously paid him for his loyalty: Mazepa became one of the richest people in the Russian Empire, he owned 100 thousand peasants in Ukraine and 20 thousand in Russian counties. In turn, Mazepa presented the general foreman and colonels with estates, turning a blind eye to their greed.

We must pay tribute, Mazepa did a lot for comprehensive cultural development Ukraine. He built many Orthodox churches; during his hetmanship, the Kiev-Mohyla Academy built new buildings, where the number of students studied reached 2 thousand, and many schools and printing houses were built. In a word, compared to the previous hetmans, Mazepa seemed to the tsar an ideal governor. But the events of the early 18th century radically changed Russian-Ukrainian relations, testing their reliability and strength.

North War.

In 1700, the Northern War with the Swedes began. The 18-year-old Swedish king Charles XII entered Russian borders. Peter moved against him a hastily assembled 35,000-strong army, consisting of recruits under the command of foreigners. Near Narva, the 8,000-strong Swedish corps completely defeated the Russian army and took the generals prisoner. By royal decree, Mazepa sent up to 10 thousand Cossack troops to Narva, who never managed to make contact with the enemy. They only witnessed the flight of the Russian army, and returned home in tatters and without horses. Eight months later, Charles XII defeated the Russian army near Riga. During these two battles alone, the Russians lost almost all their artillery. It was after this that Peter confiscated a quarter of the church and monastery bells for casting cannons. A long seven-year confrontation began at the theater of military operations, during which Peter actually re-created and prepared the army for military action.

Russia's main ally in this war was Poland, or rather the Polish king Augustus II. At the very beginning of the Northern War, Peter I, wanting to enlist the support of the Polish king, promised him to transfer several Ukrainian cities to his administration. At the same time, he sent clerk Mikhailov to Mazepa in order to find out Mazepa’s attitude to such a diplomatic deal. Mazepa, as an experienced diplomat, partially agreed with some articles of the draft treaty, but categorically disagreed with others.

In April 1704, Tsar Peter ordered Mazepa to go to the aid of the Polish king. There was an incident here that deserves to be discussed in more detail. After the conclusion of the Peace of Bakhchisarai in 1681, Poland began to pursue a policy of settling the right bank of Ukraine, relying on the Cossacks, subject to the recognition of the Polish protégé, who became the Bohuslav Colonel Samus, as hetman. Quite quickly, new regiments were formed, among which the Fastov regiment with Colonel Semyon Paliy at its head stood out. After the accession of Augustus II to the throne, the Sejm decided to disband the Cossack army, which had become dangerous. But the Cossacks, sensing power, began to drive the Polish gentry out of the estates. A Cossack uprising began, because of which the Polish king could not provide proper assistance to Tsar Peter. The Tsar's governor in Warsaw, Prince Dolgoruky, wrote to Mazepa not to help the right bank Cossacks. At the beginning of 1704, the Right Bank Hetman Samus came to Pereyaslavl and handed over to Mazepa the hetman’s insignia sent by the Polish king. Colonel Paliy, who enjoyed popular love, continued to operate on the Right Bank. In July, Mazepa personally met with Paly and began to reproach him for not following the tsar’s order and attacking the Polish gentry, thereby damaging the tsar’s cause. Paliy intended to leave, but Mazepa actually arrested him and sent him to Moscow, where Paliy was tortured and exiled to Siberia.

Meanwhile, turbulent events were taking place in Poland itself: some of the Poles stood for Augustus II, some for Charles XII, who managed to conquer Warsaw, Krakow and Lvov. The confrontation between the right-bank Cossacks and Poland was a serious obstacle to the intentions of Tsar Peter, so he persuaded Mazepa to influence the Cossacks. In the spring of 1705, Mazepa, on the orders of the tsar, went against the Polish gentry, who had gone over to the side of the Swedes. In September of the same year, Charles XII installed Stanislav Leszczynski as king, and Poland became two kings.

The first attempt to persuade Mazepa to betray the Russian Tsar occurred in the fall of 1705 by the newly elected Polish King Stanislav Leshchinsky. Mazepa informed the king about this, sending him instructions taken from the royal envoy and oral testimony taken from him under torture as proof of his devotion. A month or two later, the hetman met with the beautiful widow Princess Dolskaya, a supporter and even relative of Leshchinsky, and had long conversations with her, which resulted in secret correspondence. The winter of 1705-1706 was in all respects difficult for Tsar Peter and King Augustus II and favorable for their rivals Charles XII and Stanislav Leszczynski. More and more Poles went over to the side of the new Polish king. Secret correspondence with Princess Dulskaya continued. Mazepa was forced to talk about one of her regular letters to his general clerk Pilip Orlik in such colors that Orlik did not suspect a change in the hetman’s mood. Mazepa read the next letter again in the presence of Orlik, and was indignant at Dulskaya’s impudence, who openly called on Mazepa to take Leshchinsky’s side. This correspondence, which, as will become known from denunciations to the tsar, was not a secret for the hetman’s closest circle. But the king not only deeply believed in his old friend, but also punished the informers. But at that time, Mazepa was only looking closely at the capabilities of his rivals and secretly wondering who and when to approach in the event of victory or defeat of the warring parties.

But there were other reasons that forced the hetman to be dissatisfied with the Russian presence in Ukraine. Firstly, this reason was Prince Alexander Danilovich Menshikov, who was outwardly disposed towards Mazepa, but was jealous of him towards Peter. Menshikov's behavior towards Mazepa repeatedly infuriated the old hetman. It is also necessary to take into account the fact that at that time Peter carried out drastic government reforms that could have affected Ukraine. Prince Menshikov saw his own benefit at the same time, dreaming of becoming a Ukrainian hetman. Princess Dulskaya also wrote to the hetman about this, drawing information from conversations with senior royal officials.

The events of 1706 became decisive for the hetman's intentions to lean toward the Swedes. In the fall of this year, Charles XII forced the Polish king Augustus II to abdicate his crown. This step forced even his supporters to go over to the side of King Leszczynski. For Mazepa, such a turn of events could not but become personally dangerous. And if earlier the complaints of the Little Russians about the rude and cruel treatment of the Great Russians towards them had little effect on the hetman, then at the end of 1706 he began to write about these atrocities to the tsar and the highest tsarist officials. At this time, many Cossacks were in the royal service, where they actually suffered beatings and humiliation. Ukrainian colonels began to reproach Mazepa for inaction and neglect of the interests of his people.

At a banquet in Kyiv in honor of the Tsar, Menshikov began to persuade the hetman to deal with the Cossack foreman, making hints of treason. The hetman also knew that the tsar was taking measures to obtain for him the title of prince of the Roman Empire. In April 1707, upon the Tsar’s arrival in Ukraine, another skirmish occurred between Mazepa and Menshikov. And in the fall of the same year, after receiving another letter from Princess Dulskaya and King Stanislav, Mazepa finally decided to transfer to Charles. At first, only the clerk general Philipp Orlik knew about this, to whom the old hetman confessed his intentions not for self-interest, but out of love for his fatherland, to achieve complete independence of Ukraine. But then gradually the circle of initiates expanded, and soon the entire Hetman’s government was on his side. One of Mazepa’s closest associates, Judge General Vasily Kochubey, and his brother-in-law, Poltava Colonel Iskra, reported to Tsar Peter about the hetman’s intentions. (this tragic story well known to every cultured person, thanks to the genius of Pushkin). But there were so many denunciations against Mazepa during the twenty years of Mazepa’s reign that Tsar Peter no longer believed them for a long time; moreover, he punished the informers. The tsar did not believe Kochubey and Iskra either, ordering their arrest and investigation. During the investigation, Kochubey and Iskra retracted their testimony and “admitted” the falsehood of the accusations. The king ordered their heads to be cut off.

Mazepa's betrayal.

In 1708, Charles XII, having defeated the army of Agust II, led his 44,000-strong army to Moscow; another 30,000 troops under the command of General Levengaupt were ready to come to his aid from the north. But at this time, popular uprisings broke out in Russia: in the Urals of the Bashkirs. and on the Don - Kondratiya Bulavin. At the same time, the Polish king Stanislav Leszczynski, an ally of the Swedes, threatened to attack the hetman's territories. Mazepa turned to the tsar for help, but he, preparing to repel the Swedish attack and fearing the events on the Don, answered Mazepa that he could not give him even ten people and advised him to defend himself.

It became obvious to Mazepa that Peter’s star was setting, that the tsar remained in complete isolation and was unable to restore order even in his own house. At the same time, the successes of Charles XII and Stanislav Leshchinsky tempted Mazepa to treason. The complex, subtle and dangerous game of the Little Russian hetman had begun. Fearing the discovery of his plans and being unable to make a decision without the approval of the general foreman, Mazepa conducted the matter in such a way that his inner circle themselves pushed the old hetman to oppose the tsar. He could only pretend that he was inferior to the foreman. But here too he remained true to himself. Gradually opening up in the circle of his entourage, the hetman spoke of his ardent desire to see Ukraine independent neither from the Russian Tsar, nor from the Polish or Swedish king. However, a number of historians claim that the talk was specifically about Ukraine’s entry into the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, for which Mazepa was promised the title of Prince of Chernigov.

Everything went according to the hetman's plans. And if Charles XII had marched on Moscow, Russia would have been brought to the brink of political disaster. But, on his way to Smolensk, the Swedish king unexpectedly turned to Ukraine, apparently hoping for the help of the Ukrainian and Zaporozhye Cossacks before the decisive push on the Russian capital. This mediocre move allowed Tsar Peter to defeat General Levengaupt, who was carrying artillery and provisions to Charles XII, near the village of Lesnoy on the Sozhi River. After the Swedish maneuver, the tsarist army entered Ukraine, and the tsar demanded the hetman. The hetman, having learned about Karl’s decision, became furious, realizing that it was now impossible to avoid the appearance of the tsarist army in Ukraine. And the decisive hour has come. On October 23, Mazepa, together with part of the Cossack regiments with a total number of no more than 12 thousand people, left Baturin and crossed the Desna, heading to Karl. And only then Mazepa turned to his army outlining his intentions. The hetman's speech produced the impression of a bomb exploding on the army, but not everyone shared the hetman's fate. On October 29, 1708, the Ukrainian hetman Ivan Mazepa was received by the Swedish king.

The king's reaction.

The news of Mazepa's betrayal shocked the king, and decisive measures were not long in coming. Prince Menshikov was sent to the Cossack capital of Baturin with the task of its complete destruction. At the beginning of November 1708, Baturin was taken, destroyed to the ground, all residents, including old people, women and children, were killed. The tragedy of Baturin is not only on the conscience of Menshikov - the Baturinites did not know about Mazepa’s intentions to surrender to the Swedes, they simply followed the hetman’s order: “... do not let the Russian army into the city...”. Nevertheless, Baturin’s fate made a grave impression on everyone. By the way, one of the regimental sergeants of the Prilutsky regiment, Ivan Nos, helped to take possession of the Baturin castle, who pointed out a secret entrance in the castle wall. The Swedes moved to help the besieged Baturin, but Mazepa, instead of taking the shortcut, made a detour through Novgorod-Seversky. Having reached the now former Cossack capital, the old hetman, seeing the destroyed Baturyn and thousands of rotting bodies, said with bitterness to his clerk: “Oh, our evil and unfortunate cobs. I see that God did not bless my intention.”

A week later, on November 6, 1708, a council was convened in Glukhov, to which several colonels arrived, and a new hetman, Ivan Skoropadsky, was elected there. The colonels were more inclined to another candidate - the Chernigov Colonel Polubotk, who initially did not bother Mazepa. But the tsar, whose word was decisive, especially in such a situation, actually expressed distrust of the young colonel, he said: “Polubotok is very cunning, another Mazepa could come out of him. Let them choose Skoropadsky better.” A few days later, Metropolitan Joseph of Kiev, after a prayer service attended by the king, declared “anathema” and “eternal damnation” to Mazepa. Once again, Ukraine was divided into warring parties and began, to put it modern language, information war. Both Peter and Mazepa sent station wagons throughout Ukraine. Mazepa, explaining the reasons why he left Moscow, wrote: “Moscow wants to devastate our cities, imprison all the elders in captivity, convert the Cossacks into dragoons and soldiers, drive the people beyond the Volga, and populate our region with its own people.” The tsar sent out two station wagons: in one he called on Ukrainians not to believe Mazepa’s propaganda, and in the other he promised not to punish apostates and called on them to return to their estates, but not later than within one month. Meanwhile, the Swedish king, having camped near Romen, also sent station wagons to the Ukrainians, urging them to free themselves from the Moscow yoke and come under his hand. It must be said that the king’s propaganda worked more effectively, and many colonels left Mazepa, including those who were with him with the Swedes. Things got to the point that Karl stopped trusting the Little Russians and placed a guard next to every colonel; a guard was even assigned to Mazepa himself. Convinced that the Little Russian people did not heed his calls, the hetman fell into despair and, through the escaped Mirgorod colonel Apostol, tried to ask for forgiveness from the tsar. But Mazepa’s intercepted letter to King Leshchinsky with a request to speed up the arrival Polish troops against the Moscow Tsar once again showed the Tsar the true face of a traitor and double-dealer.

The common people treated the generals of the tsar and the new hetman Skoropadsky with greater confidence than the Mazepa and Swedish ones. So, upon the arrival of Mazepa with the king in Romny, the former hetman called several centurions of the Lubensky regiment and ordered oxen and provisions to be delivered to the army. But this could not be done, so the Swedes themselves began to take what they needed, causing anger among the Little Russians. At the same time, many centurions simply refused to Mazepa. Moreover, the men even attacked the Swedes. According to the Swedish historian Arthur Stille, the army of Charles XII “had to deal with rebellious rural gangs at every step.” In right-bank Ukraine, Mazepa was treated even worse. And this is natural, since the trump card of the Tsar and Hetman Skoropadsky was the accusation of Mazepa in a secret conspiracy with the Poles. Economic measures were also applied. The Tsar, in his station wagon, announced that half of Mazepa’s property would be given to those who found it. Quite quickly, a significant treasury was discovered in the Belotserkov fortress, which Mazepa had previously transported for storage. These regrettable and apparently unexpected facts upset Mazepa and made him doubt the correctness of his choice. Thus, Mazepa was not supported by Ukrainian society, with the exception of the Zaporozhye Cossacks, to the history of whose relationship with the Russian authorities we now move on.

Status of Zaporozhye in relations with Russia.

Before the national-religious uprising of 1648, the Zaporozhye Sich, naturally, no official relations between Russia and Zaporozhye existed, since the Sich was not a state. However, some signs government system still took place. This is the election of the administration, the Cossack court, the participation of all Cossack layers in resolving the most important issues. But these initial signs of statehood were enough for the Cossack freemen to consider such a social system ideal and defended it for many decades. According to the Greek classification, this type of government is called ochlocratic (and its bearers are called ochlomons). The year 1648 forced Cossack leaders to take a different look at seemingly unshakable values.

At the initial stage of the revolution, the Sich device contributed to Khmelnitsky in his desire to lead the uprising and achieve military success. But the rapidly changing situation required immediate decisions, as a result of which the question of the undesirability of frequent convening of “black rads”, that is, rads with the participation of ordinary Cossacks, was put on the agenda. Apparently, the last straw of Khmelnytsky’s patience was the general council in June 1648, at which the prospects for Ukrainian-Polish relations were discussed for seven hours to no avail. Increasingly, the hetman limited himself to inviting only Cossack elders to the Rada, and as military successes progressed, he generally made do with authoritarian decisions. But new policy Khmelnitsky aroused sharp rejection from ordinary Cossacks.

The need for quick decision-making in the process of conducting combat operations and conducting diplomatic negotiations forced the hetman to come to grips with the creation of an effective hetman government (convoy officer, clerk, judges, treasurer, military captain, military cornet, bunchuzhny). It is clear that ordinary Cossacks could rarely apply for these positions, so the demand for educated Ukrainian gentry increased significantly. So Bogdan Khmelnitsky’s general clerk became the nobleman Ivan Vygovsky, whom Bogdan even had to rescue from Turkish captivity. Very soon between ordinary Cossacks, who gravitated towards the same liberties, and new administration contradictions arose. Conflicts arose, as a rule, on social grounds, since the elders, taking advantage of the circumstances, took over what previously belonged to the Poles. But as the importance of Zaporozhye grew, its special status and military force, conflicts began to acquire a political character.

According to the Treaty of Pereyaslavl in 1654, the Zaporozhye Cossacks became subjects of the Russian Tsar, and the very fact of this citizenship was used by them in sorting out relations with the hetman. It was very difficult for the Russian government to understand why the Little Russian hetman, whose title included the word “Zaporozhian,” spoke so sharply negatively about the Zaporozhye freemen, complaining about her willfulness. After the death of Khmelnytsky, tensions between the Cossack elders and ordinary Cossacks (especially Zaporozhye) grew. The tsarist government benefited from the hostile relationship between the Zaporozhye Kosh and the hetman. Tsar Alexei Mikhailovich, during the most intense confrontation between Vygovsky on the one hand and the Cossacks and Poltava Colonel Pushkar on the other, sent a royal charter to Koshevoy Barabash, which actually made the Sich a legitimate political entity recognized by Moscow. Let us recall that the very election of Vyhovsky as hetman took place without the participation of the Cossacks, which made it, in the eyes of the lower Cossacks, not entirely legal. In general, the tsarist government willingly provided the opportunity to complain about the hetman, wanting to have complete information about his actions and intentions. This point was written down in the article of the new 1659 Second Treaty of Pereyaslavl, signed by Yuri Khmelnitsky: “... about all controversial matters to write to the great sovereign, to his royal majesty.”

Perhaps the most acute conflict arose in 1663 with the election of I. Bryukhovetsky as hetman at the famous “Black Rada”. Let us recall that the opponent of Bryukhovetsky, for whom the Sich stood, was Yakim Somko, who considered the Zaporozhye Sich, who left Zaporozhye, to be simple Cossacks assigned to some city regiment, as a result of which they cannot take part in the Rada as lower-ranking Cossacks. The Cossacks, in their desire to limit the hetman's power, were more likely to agree to be under the tsarist governors than under the hetman's hand. Bryukhovetsky then also insisted on limiting the hetman’s power up to the transfer of power to the tsar’s governor. This was not surprising for the gentry, since local power had not previously been established without the consent of the Polish king. The confrontation between the two candidates ended with Bryukhovetsky arriving at the “Black Rada” not only accompanied by the Sich, but also by the royal warriors of Prince Romodanovsky and, naturally, was elected hetman. However, as we already know, Bryukhovetsky did not have political sympathies for the lower-ranking Cossacks for long. Having received the hetman's mace, he tried to distance himself from those who helped him in Nizhyn. And he himself already asked the tsar not to allow the Cossacks to approach the royal majesty without his, the hetman’s, knowledge.

The Andrusovo peace radically changed the situation. According to this agreement, Zaporozhye was to be governed jointly by the Russian and Polish governments. However, the lower-ranking Cossacks, led by the famous Kosh chieftain Ivan Sirko, repeatedly emphasized their devotion to the Moscow sovereign. But this situation, in which the Left Bank was subordinate to Moscow, and Zaporozhye had a strange dual status, did not contribute to the rapprochement of the lower Cossacks and the Little Russian hetman. Thus, even that part of Ukraine that gravitated towards Russia did not represent something whole either politically or militarily, not to mention the Right Bank.

The “Eternal Peace” between Russia and Poland, concluded in 1686, put an end to the double subordination of Zaporozhye. This time the tsarist and hetman governments acted together, limiting the rights and liberties of the lower Cossacks. The state interests of Russia and the interests of the Little Russian hetmans, the very logic of the historical process made even the relative independence of the Zaporozhye Sich problematic. The Cossacks were prohibited from any contacts with the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth and the Crimean Khanate; Moscow built military fortresses on their lands. In a word, Zaporozhye was considered as an outpost in the military confrontation with Turkey. Remembering past liberties and military glory, the Sichs always treated the hetmans and their entourage with suspicion and hostility. They were irritated by the fact that the Ukrainian Cossack elders received from the Moscow tsars lands on which ordinary Cossacks lived, who became flops in the eyes of the elders.

The Cossacks were especially furious at the destruction by Prince Golitsyn of the Samaro-Mikhailovsky Zaporozhye Monastery, in which the monks, the old Cossacks, lived out their lives. The monks were dissatisfied with the construction of a military fortress near the monastery with a Moscow governor appointed. Prince Golitsyn, returning from the Crimea after a second unsuccessful campaign, literally destroyed the monastery, not sparing the elderly monks. After this shameful deed, the Cossacks began to openly oppose Hetman Mazepa, who was considered the main accomplice of Moscow, and even began negotiations with the Crimean Khan. In 1692, military clerk Petro Ivanenko (Petryk) appeared in Zaporozhye, who became the general clerk and led the opposition movement against Hetman Mazepa. However, his intentions were not supported by the Ukrainian Cossacks and three years of attempts to rouse the Ukrainian Cossacks to rebel against the hetman were unsuccessful.

1708 was the year of revival of political recognition for the Zaporozhye Kosh by Hetman Mazepa, who, having decided to submit to the Swedish king, turned to the Cossacks for help. At first, the Cossacks doubted the hetman's intentions and asked what to expect from the new union. Political moods in Zaporozhye were always changeable and depended on the strength of one party or another. The old men insisted on remaining faithful to the king and even sent Mazepa a notice about this. But the chieftain at that time was Kost Gordienko, an ardent enemy of the Moscow authorities. The Cossacks gathered at the Rada and listened to Mazepa’s universal, in which he especially emphasized that he himself heard the tsar say: “We must eradicate these thieves and villains of the Cossacks.” The Rada took Mazepa’s side, after which Kosche Ataman Kost Gordienko and his comrades went to Dikanka, where they met with the former hetman. Having now explained themselves face to face, the Sichists the next day were presented to King Charles, before whom Gordienko made a speech. The Cossacks spent several days visiting with the Ukrainian Cossacks and swore allegiance to each other. At the same time, the Cossacks and Karl drew up and approved an agreement, according to which Karl agreed not to make peace with the tsar without the condition of the withdrawal of Ukraine and Zaporozhye from Russia.

In April 1709, the Cossacks, to whose aid the Swedes came, defeated the army of General Ren. Then Field Marshal Sheremetyev sent Colonel Yakovlev to Zaporozhye, who, together with Colonel Galagan, who had gone over to the Tsar’s side, destroyed the Sich. Moreover, the irritation and anger of the attackers was so great that they not only killed every single Cossack who were in the Sich, but even tore up Cossack graves and cut off the heads of the dead.

Now, after such a retreat, which was necessary to explain the participation of the Zaporozhye Cossacks in Mazepa’s enterprise, let us move on to a description of the events that followed the hetman’s betrayal.

Battle of Poltava.

At the beginning of June 1709, the opposing forces met near Poltava, which was surrounded by the Swedes. At this time, there was a Russian garrison in Poltava itself. Charles tried unsuccessfully to take possession of the city. But the Swedish army, especially after a terrible winter, was a rather pitiful sight. Peter brought fresh forces. Karl tried to avoid the battle, but this could no longer be done: he was surrounded on all sides by Russian troops, Ukrainian regiments of Hetman Skoropadsky, Polish troops - opponents of King Stanislav, and even Kalmyks and Volokhs. On June 27, the Battle of Poltava began. Self-confident Karl had no doubt about his success. A day earlier, wounded in the leg, the king confidently declared to his generals: “Tomorrow we will dine in the tents of the Moscow Tsar, there is no need to worry about food for the soldiers, there is a lot of everything prepared for us in the Moscow convoy.” The start of the battle was with the Swedes, but after a short time, thanks to the efforts of the Russian generals and disagreements in the enemy camp, the course of the battle changed, and by noon the matter was decided. The Swedish army was defeated, Karl, Mazepa and the survivors, including the Cossacks (who, by the way, did not actually take part in the battle) fled. Broken Mazepa, with the last of his strength, urged Karl to escape as quickly as possible; he saw captivity and the very possibility of meeting with someone who had trusted him for 20 years worse than death.

Peter joyfully began to celebrate the victory, forgetting about the enemy. The subsequent pursuit of Karl and Mazepa lasted almost a month. Only by miracle, thanks to the Cossacks’ knowledge of the area and methods of crossing rivers, did the fugitives manage to escape. But the old hetman could no longer bear the severe stress of the last months and died on August 2, 1709. He was buried in Iasi in the presence of the Cossacks and the Swedish king. The foreman who remained with him, with the help of Charles XII, elected Philip Orlyk as hetman, who became the first Ukrainian hetman in exile.

The attitude of the Orthodox Church towards Mazepa.

From the very first days of the betrayal, the Orthodox Church took a position of loudly condemning Mazepa. It is also important that the highest official in the church hierarchy of Russia at that time was Stefan Yavorsky, a Ukrainian by birth. The story of this church leader is as follows. In his youth, he studied at a Polish Jesuit school, became a Catholic, but then, returning to Ukraine, converted to Orthodoxy. Before moving to Russia, he was the abbot of one of the Kyiv monasteries, but, thanks to a bright speech at the funeral of one noble boyar, he was noticed by the tsar and made a dizzying career, becoming the Ryazan metropolitan. In Moscow circles he was considered an upstart and was not accepted as one of their own, but this was exactly the kind of person the reformer tsar needed. Patriarch Adrian died in October 1700. Two months later, Peter, without destroying the patriarchate (he did this later), appointed Stefan Yavorsky “exarch, administrator and viceroy of the patriarchal throne.”

On November 12, 1709, after the election and confirmation of Hetman Skoropadsky, simultaneously in the Trinity Church in Glukhov and in the Moscow Assumption Cathedral, the spiritual authorities proclaimed “anathema and eternal damnation to the thief and traitor Mazepa.” Kiev Metropolitan Joseph Krokovsky and Pereyaslavl Bishop Zacharias Kornilovich came to Glukhov. In Moscow, the locum tenens of the patriarchal throne, Stefan Yavorsky, at the beginning of the sermon, noted Mazepa’s previous merits, but ended with the following words: “We, gathered in the name of the Lord God Jesus Christ and the holy apostles, have been given by God himself to knit and decide, and whatever we bind on earth will be bound and in heaven! To the traitor Ivan Mazepa for perjury and for treason against the great sovereign, anathema.” The Metropolitan pronounced the curse three times, and after him all the bishops present chanted “anathema” three times. After this, throughout Little Russia, the bishops sent pastoral messages about the curse of Mazepa and about obedience to Skoropadsky.

Since then, for more than two hundred years, in the first week of Lent, “anathema” was proclaimed from the pulpits of all churches and cathedrals of the Russian Empire to the former hetman Ivan Mazepa.

Characteristics of Mazepa.

In history and literature, there are two opposing points of view on the personality of this man: according to some (mostly Russian), Mazepa is a self-lover and a traitor, according to others (mostly Ukrainian, but not all) - a national hero. Without wishing to freely present the evidence of both, we present detailed excerpts from the most authoritative authors: Russian historian Nikolai Ivanovich Kostomarov (by the way, Ukrainian by origin) and the Ukrainian historian Gnat Khotkevich.

Nikolai Ivanovich Kostomarov (1882).– Hetman Mazepa as a historical figure was not a representative of any national idea. He was an egoist in the full sense of the word. A Pole by upbringing and methods of life, he moved to Little Russia and there made a career for himself, forging, as we have seen, with the Moscow authorities and not at all stopping at any immoral paths. The truest definition of this personality would be to say that it was a lie incarnate. He lied to everyone, deceived everyone, the Poles, the Little Russians, the Tsar, and Charles; he was ready to do evil to everyone as soon as he had the opportunity to gain benefit or get out of danger. He took advantage of the desire that existed among Little Russians to preserve the autonomy of their country and their nationality and deceived the elders that he had a plan to acquire independence for Ukraine. But in fact, as his secret agreement with Leszczynski shows, he was thinking of giving Ukraine under Polish rule, in other words, in his old age he did what he did in his youth, when King Jan Casimir sent him as an agent to Ukraine to carry out a plan for the return of this fallen away from Poland's edge to its former dominance. He could not seek the independence of Ukraine before the Swedish and Polish kings: Stanislav, as a Polish king, could not and should not renounce the hereditary rights of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth to Ukraine; Moreover, Mazepa himself knew well that the people who hated him would not obey the new dynasty, which was supposed to begin with him, Mazepa. He prudently negotiated for himself possession in the Belarusian region, and gave Little Russia to the victim of an internecine war, which would inevitably break out if Ukraine came under Polish rule - Mazepa knew this from the experience that took place in Right-Bank Ukraine. (Kostomarov means the uprising led by Colonel Paliya - author). But he did not feel sorry for the people from whom he could not acquire love during the 20 years of his reign. That he was only deceiving his Russian accomplices with the specter of independence, but in fact was going to plunge them and the entire country into slavery - there can be no doubt about it, and Peter, who denounced Mazepa for this before the entire Little Russian people, was absolutely right...

It is clear that Mazepa would not have betrayed Tsar Peter if it had not seemed to him that, so to speak, the Tsar’s shares were falling, and Karl’s shares were rising... And less than a month passed, Mazepa saw that he was mistaken. And the majority of the Cossacks, and the entire Little Russian people - everything went not for him, but against him. ... He did not even think of betraying his fresh ally, he was planning, as we saw, to buy his reconciliation with the offended king with his death. Never in his entire life has this man shown himself in all its fullness, as in this new plan...

If the Little Russian people had been seduced by the seductions of their hetman and the glory of the northern winner, Peter would never have been able to get along with his rival. And if anyone was the true culprit for the salvation of the Russian state, then it was the Little Russian people...

It cannot be said that in those days the Little Russian people had any attachment to the Russian state and to uniting with the “Muscovites”; on the contrary, at every step we come across, so to speak, facts of mutual unfriendliness and even enmity between the two Russian nationalities. It also cannot be said that the Little Russian people are not aware of their national identity and do not desire national independence. There were many conditions that made it possible for the Little Russians to fall away from allegiance to the Russian Tsar. And, however, it didn’t turn out that way... The people instinctively saw that they were being dragged to death, and did not go there. The people remained faithful to the king, not even out of some kind of attachment, not out of a reverent attitude towards the monarch, but simply because one had to choose the lesser of two evils. No matter how hard it was for him under the yoke of the Moscow authorities, he knew from experience that the yoke of the Polish lords would have become harder for him. Under Russian rule, at least, there was always spiritual consolation for him - the faith of his fathers, which the “Muscovites” could no longer trample, no matter how they treated all other people’s rights. This alone was enough.

Gnat Khotkevich (1917).-... Only by hushing up the facts and twisting them have historians managed so far to show the hetman in a negative light. But in reality, what else was Mazepa missing? Honors? But he was the first person in a vast region, neither the king nor the king could have rewarded him with anything else. Wealth? But he had plenty of money, estates, and everything. Finally, he was already a 70-year-old man - what else did he need for himself? And could a person of that religious time kiss the life-giving cross while telling a deliberate lie? Only these psychological circumstances indicate that the only impulse for his actions could be a feeling of desire for good for his native land. As for undoubted circumstances, political conditions speak of this even more clearly. Mazepa is not Rodzianko, or Tereshchenko, or Skoropadsky, who would never have said “we are a free, unconquered people”... Then a living person worried about the fate of his native land, he felt that he had sold himself into bondage for no reason and was thinking about how to escape from there, and he was sick and suffering for the fate of his people...

And for us, Mazepa is not a traitor and not a self-lover - but a hero outside of time, a man who, in the last days of Ukrainian freedom, Ukrainian autonomy, before the growing onslaught of the tsars - still went, obeying the voice of the people's conscience, went with the last sword in his hands, with the last guard near you. And the Mazepa colonels are not wretched egoists, but death knights who gave their prosperous existence, peace, and soul for the idea, for the bright ideal of national independence.

Some conclusions.

What can I say here? The events of the early 18th century were dramatic for both Russia and Ukraine; they determined the nature of their relationship for centuries. Let the reader draw his own conclusions about the role and significance of Mazepa. The author stands in the position of a responsible politician who studies history not to find the guilty or for mutual accusations, but with the aim of drawing historical lessons. Ukrainian national dream - to be independent state- should be respected or at least taken into account. It is so simple. But how hard this lesson is for some Moscow politicians, including those whose surnames betray their Ukrainian origin.

Many Ukrainian sources, analyzing the behavior of the Moscow authorities in Ukraine, base their conclusions on the presentation of the Russian people as a traditional slave, and their king as a cruel and uncivilized despot. It should be recalled that in the era of Tsar Peter the idea of ​​​​concentrating power in the hands of the monarch was a generally accepted theory of government. Everyone is familiar with Louis XIV’s phrase “I am the State.” It was not by chance that a tyrant ruler emerged; it was a system of views, according to which the power of the monarch should not be limited in any way due to its divine origin. The German lawyer of the late 17th century Pufendorf proposed to the reigning persons a formula according to which the sovereign is irresponsible in his actions, stands above human laws and is not subordinate to any other authority. He has the undivided right to lead the spiritual life of people. This formula permeated all the activities of Peter, who highly valued the German lawyer. This formula was reflected in the military regulations of that time: “His Majesty is an autocratic monarch who should not give an answer to anyone in the world about his affairs, but has the strength and power, like a Christian sovereign, to rule according to his will and good will.” The theory of absolutism was preached and defended by the Pskov Metropolitan Feofan Prokopovich, by the way, a Ukrainian by birth, who had a huge influence on Peter.

This theory contributed to the development of such traits inherent in Tsar Peter as independence, desire for innovation and perseverance in achieving set goals. He felt like the father of the nation, a teacher and commander, who was obliged to teach his subjects how to live in new conditions, and in case of resistance, to force them. For, according to Peter’s statements, even the actions of a doctor who causes pain to a patient during treatment ultimately lead to his salvation. Peter's critics quite rightly condemn him for introducing a system of police surveillance in the state, for excessive regulation, and for the state's invasion of private life. Wanting to speed up the process of transition of the slowly developing Russian society into a developed European state, Peter considered it his fatherly duty to instruct his subjects, telling them how to lay stoves, how to make ceilings, ordered not to take off their hats in front of the palace in order to avoid colds, not to build fences in front of the house and many others prohibitions and restrictions.

It was for this reason that Peter treated the Little Russians this way, whom he considered his subjects, since half a century ago the generally recognized people's leader, Hetman Bogdan Khmelnitsky, himself expressed a desire to stand under the high hand of his father, Tsar Alexei Mikhailovich. Therefore, he considered himself to have the right to allow the hetman and his elders to go directly to him when filing complaints. Therefore, during the extraordinary tension of the forces of the entire state, in June 1707, Peter directly prohibited violence against his subjects - the Ukrainian Commonwealth: “No offenses or devastation should be caused to the Little Russian region, under fear of our cruel wrath and execution.” He, as an autocrat who considered himself the father of the nation, simply could not behave differently, even for the reason that there would be restlessness in his rear during hostilities. What is written above is not an excuse for cruelty towards Ukrainians by the Russian authorities, just a reminder that when analyzing such subtle matters as the analysis of historical phenomena, one cannot ignore the spirit and experience of a particular historical period.

And one last thing. From the point of view of the development of industry and trade, state regulation could not ensure forward movement along the path of European progress. Moreover, the theory of absolutism showed its inconsistency after some time and for a long time was a brake on the development of both Russia and Ukraine.

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T.G.

Yakovleva Yakovleva Tatyana Gennadievna
- Candidate of Historical Sciences,
Researcher at the Department of History of Slavic and Balkan Countries Faculty of History

St. Petersburg State University. Period history of Ukraine

, known as the “Hetmanate”, despite the past two and a half centuries, still remains one of the most politicized. Until now, almost all events and activities of historical figures of that era are the subject of ideological speculation and endless debate. Among them, the most painful topic (along with the Pereyaslav Treaty of 1654) is the activities of Ivan Mazepa.

“A portrait of Mazepa hung between the hetmans, so hateful to every Russian; in the house they did not bow to him, as the Ukrainians do now, seeing in him a symbol of Ukrainian independence, but silently treated him with sympathy, and they were only indignant that ... in Kyiv at the same time in Sofia "In the cathedral, Mazepa is anathematized, and in the St. Michael's Monastery, prayers are offered for him, as the creator of the temple, for the reassurance of his soul." .

In fact, this state of affairs is extremely dangerous, in particular for modern Russian-Ukrainian relations.

We cannot avoid sensitive topics, we cannot turn a blind eye to existing disagreements and problems. By rewriting history in a “rosy” manner that pleases someone, we are deceiving ourselves and causing harm to future generations. The article offered to the reader does not at all pretend to be the ultimate truth. This is an attempt to restore the course of events and objectively analyze documents and materials, facts from

different points

vision. It seems to us that one of the main principles when studying the period of Mazepa’s Hetmanate is to consider events taking into account the entire previous history of the Hetmanate. It is impossible to understand Mazepa’s treaty with the Swedes without knowledge of the treaties of B. Khmelnitsky or I. Vygovsky, just as it is impossible to understand Petrik’s uprising - without referring to the uprisings of Barabash, Bryukhovetsky, etc. Mazepa’s hetmanship was, in fact, the last (or more precisely, the penultimate) an act of the history of the Hetmanate, the origins and essence of which date back to the times of the Khmelnytsky region, the period of the hetmanship of B. Khmelnytsky in 1648-1657. Serious scientific works There are very few dedicated to Mazepa. The most detailed so far is the monograph by N.M. Kostomarov "Mazepa" and information about him in "History of Russia" S.M. Solovyova. Individual subjects of Mazepa's hetmanship were examined in detail in the works of N. Andrusyak, A. Ogloblin and others. From

In general, Mazepa’s biography is thoroughly saturated with persistent cliches, the main one of which, for Russian historiography, is “Mazepa the traitor.”

Of course, treason is a terrible sin, but when it comes to a politician, a leader of a state, everything is not at all so simple and unambiguous. Some historians call I. Vygovsky, Yu. Khmelnytsky (son of B. Khmelnytsky) and other hetmans “traitors”, completely disregarding the circumstances or reasons that pushed them to take one step or another. By the way, the Andrusovo Treaty (1667) or the Eternal Peace (1686), concluded by Russia with the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, can also be called “treason” or “betrayal” in relation to Ukraine and a clear violation of all treaty articles starting with the Pereyaslav Treaty of 1654 .

* * *

Within the framework of this article, we will dwell on those moments that we consider the starting points of the eventful twenty-year period of Mazepa’s hetmanship.

Accusing Mazepa of “pro-Polish” sympathies, many historians forget that both B. Khmelnitsky and I. Vygovsky had a “Polish” education. They, too, at the beginning of their careers served the Polish king, while Bogdan Khmelnitsky was even on very friendly relations with Vladislav IV.

One should not confuse passion for “Polish” or, more precisely, for Western culture, for Polish gentry liberties (or for gentry democracy) with a “pro-Polish” political course, which, for example, was adhered to by P. Teterya, hetman of Right-Bank Ukraine (1663-1665). ). By the way, in a conversation with Jean Baluz, the French envoy in Moscow, in 1704, Mazepa, with the brilliant insight of a politician, said about the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth that it, like Ancient Rome, was heading towards its destruction.

Mazepa has a lot in common with his predecessor Vygovsky.

Ordinary Cossacks also did not like him, sometimes calling him a “Polye,” and many historians stubbornly attributed to him “pro-Polish” sympathies, completely forgetting that it was I. Vygovsky who was the closest confidant of B. Khmelnytsky, with whom they smashed the Poles and created their Hetmanate . Thus, we can agree with the Ukrainian historian of the early 20th century. A. Efimenko, who very accurately noted that Mazepa was a man of “Polish culture”, forced to adapt to the rough, low-lying environment of the Left Bank Cossacks.

In 1663, Mazepa was sent to the hetman of Right Bank Ukraine (1663-1665) P. Teter, who had just been elected hetman, with kleinods (insignia of hetman insignia) from the king.

He was not greeted very kindly, but he never returned to Poland, remained on the Right Bank, then served the hetman of Ukraine P. Doroshenko (1665-1676) - he was a participant in a number of embassies. In 1674, during a trip to Crimea, he was captured by the Cossacks, and the Koshevoy of the Zaporozhye Sich I. Sirko sent him to Hetman Samoilovich. There he taught the hetman's children and traveled as ambassador to Moscow, after which he received the rank of captain general.

A number of historians consider Mazepa one of the authors of the denunciation of Samoilovich, as a result of which he was removed from the hetmanship. In fact, Samoilovich most likely became a victim of Moscow intrigues: the failure of the Crimean campaign of Princess Sophia’s favorite V.V. was blamed on him. Golitsina.

Many historians, with the exception of the “jingoists” who make Mazepa an angel, even M.S. Grushevsky, based on the circumstances under which Mazepa received the mace, was considered the hetman to be an inveterate ambitious and careerist. However, which politician lacks ambition? Which of the figures of the same Hetmanate cannot be suspected of selfish motives? Perhaps Bogdan Khmelnitsky - but even then only from the moment of a terrible family tragedy, when he lost his beloved woman and son-heir.

Where does this fine line lie: for oneself or for the state - and who will dare to draw it? With a sinking heart, with shaking hands, I. Vygovsky rushed to the mace, and then, risking his wealth and his head, rushed into the “pool” of the elders’ conspiracy about a single Hetmanate. Walking over corpses and not disdaining lies, P. Doroshenko received his hetmanship, and how much effort he made to overcome civil strife and war in Ukraine in 1657-1681, the so-called Ruins!

So, Mazepa became hetman. Everything seemed to be against him. First of all, he was surrounded by a left-bank elder, alien to him, embittered by the fact that power over her was in the hands of a stranger. Educated in Poland, served by Doroshenko and found himself on the Left Bank against his will, Mazepa was indeed alien to the clan of elders that had developed there during the years of the Hetmanate, intertwined with family ties - Samoilovichi, Kochubei, Lizoguby, Iskra, Polubotki, Zhuchenki, etc.

They probably hated this "rascal" who stole the mace from their hands.

The terms of the new Russian-Ukrainian treaty imposed on Mazepa at the parliament by Golitsyn were also extremely difficult and unpopular. In addition to the complete ban on foreign relations, the ban on peasants becoming Cossacks, the legalization of denunciations against the hetman, and the ban on the hetman changing senior officers, a rifle regiment was introduced to the Left Bank. .

In 1688, Mazepa launched a successful raid on Ochakov, but then fate turned away from him again: a grandiose one followed - 100 thousand people took part in it on the Russian side and 50 thousand on Mazepa's side - and an extremely unsuccessful Crimean campaign (March-June 1689 G.). On August 10, Mazepa arrives in Moscow to meet with his patron, and before his eyes a coup d’état takes place: the Naryshkins and young Peter I come to power. Now no one doubts that the hetman will fall after Golitsyn.

On the Left Bank they were already rubbing their hands and sharing the mace. However, completely unexpectedly for all Ukrainians, especially for Mazepa himself, who probably experienced the most terrible days of his life while waiting to be called to the Tsar, on Trinity Sunday, the reception provided by Peter I was the warmest and most merciful. Many historians, following the colorful presentation of N.M. Kostomarov, explain what happened with the amazing courtesy of Mazepa, to whom "managed to charm young Peter." Let us make another assumption. When the “gracious word” was spoken to the hetman, neither Peter nor his entourage knew Mazepa yet, but the Naryshkin party, which was in a very precarious position, needed peace and constancy in Little Russia, so create a precedent for unrest by removing the hetman, even the favorite of the disgraced Golitsyn , in Moscow they didn’t dare. Most likely, having already made such a decision and announced it, Peter had the opportunity to be convinced of the correctness of his choice - during a personal meeting with the hetman.

The most surprising thing about the persistent myth about the traitor Mazepa that exists in Russia is that everyone forgets (or brushes aside) the fact of almost 20 years of faithful service and close trusting relationships that existed between the hetman and the tsar from 1689 to 1708. About 20 (!) years of constant military campaigns, battles, defeats and victories are forgotten. Although this fact in itself so shatters the cliché “hetman-traitor” that Ukrainian “jingo-patriots” are trying to challenge it, attributing all sorts of secret plans to Mazepa, and Russian traditionalists, contrary to all logic and facts, call the hetman “two-faced”, about which we will talk below.

The main question that for some reason has never been asked and, accordingly, no answer has been sought: what became the key to such a long and successful union?

In fact, what is surprising is not the fact of the hetman’s “treason,” but, on the contrary, his loyalty to the Russian Tsar for such a long time. If we take Mazepa’s predecessors, then

B. Khmelnitsky concluded an agreement with the Swedes two years after the oath to the Tsar,

I. Vygovsky, a year after taking the oath, signed the Galyach Agreement with Poland, and just a month later - with Sweden,

Yu. Khmelnitsky doomed Russian troops to death at Chudnov a year after his oath.

Even the tsar’s devoted “servant,” elevated to the rank of “boyar” I. Bryukhovetsky, lasted only five years and then went over to the Polish side.

In each of these cases, the circumstances were different, but the reason was the same: the conditions for which the contract was concluded ceased to be fulfilled. If B. Khmelnitsky concluded the Treaty of Pereyaslav in the hope of finding a military ally against Poland, then the hetmans, starting with I. Vyhovsky, due to the internal ruin of the Hetmanate, were forced to look for allies against home opposition and unrest. It was Moscow’s desire to weaken the hetman’s power, and hence the support of “informers” and “rebels”, that pushed I. Vygovsky and Yu. Khmelnitsky to Poland.

The most terrible legacy of the "Khmelnytsky region" - the appearance of a huge number of declassed "disguised" people who had no other source of income other than war - became excellent material for the manipulation of any adventurers and elders striving for the mace.

The apogee of this destructive movement was the Black Rada of 1663. But when the protege of these demagogues, who swore allegiance to the Tsar, I. Bryukhovetsky, betrayed the Russians, Moscow woke up and realized that an agreement must be sought with the hetman’s power, and not with the mass of anarchists. Peter

I

For Mazepa, surrounded by hostile elders and eternally dissatisfied Cossacks and Cossacks, Peter’s support was vital, as were military campaigns, which made it possible to feed and occupy the rebels.

For the young tsar, who had to carry out his global reforms in conditions of severe opposition and political isolation, who was eager for the seas and forced to fight, the hetman, in turn, was a reliable, loyal ally who provided a calm rear in Ukraine and successfully carried out all diplomatic tasks. In our opinion, it would be a clear exaggeration to consider the relationship between Mazepa and Peter to be friendly. Despite the numerous gifts they exchanged (fruit from the hetman’s garden and game to the Tsar, fish from the north of Russia to Mazepa, etc.), judging by their correspondence, they never crossed a certain line, maintaining a distance (Mazepa is not Menshikov, Naryshkin or Lefort). Peter I called Mazepa “Mr. Hetman”, he called him exclusively “sovereign”, and not familiarly “Mr. Colonel”, “bombardier”, “min Herz”, etc. True, as researchers of the epistolary heritage of Peter I note, the tsar saw Mazepa person,"capable of understanding and appreciating the most subtle thoughts and humor"

and in this sense, the hetman in the eyes of Peter was equal only to the Dutchman A. Vinius. It seems that, most likely, the distance in relations with the king was maintained thanks to Mazepa. It seems that he never got close to anyone at all, had almost no friends (perhaps due to the sad experience of betrayal) and was a kind of lonely intellectual, proud and ambitious, even a romantic, but only deep down in his soul. The same Jean Baluz wrote about Mazepa:“His speech is refined and beautiful, however, in conversation he prefers to remain silent and listen to others... He belongs to those people who prefer either to be completely silent, or to speak, but not to say.”

In 1690, active Russian actions against Crimea began. The Crimean campaign was beneficial for the hetman. In the event of successful campaigns, Mazepa had the opportunity to establish very difficult relations for him with the Cossacks, who over the past decades had turned into a powder keg for the Hetmanate. The Cossacks criticized the hetman for everything: for distributing property (possessions) to the elders, for oppressing their long-standing rights, for not increasing salaries, etc. Raids on the Tatars were the original source of income for Zaporozhye. The war started by Peter I was supposed to bring, in addition to the usual booty, a generous salary. In July-August 1690, the Cossacks under the leadership of I. Novitsky and S. Paliya made a successful raid near Ochakov and Kazikermen.

The entire operation plan was developed in great detail by Mazepa personally. The next decade for Russia was marked by the struggle for access to the Black Sea. Mazepa sent his assigned hetmans, personally led many campaigns and, knowing the tsar’s passion for the fleet, used Zaporozhye canoes for the campaign against Ochakov. On July 19, 1696, Mazepa’s Cossacks, led by Chernigov Colonel Y. Lizogub, took Azov. Peter's dream came true. In 1700, the Treaty of Constantinople between Russia and Turkey was concluded. On February 8 of the same year, Mazepa, second after F.A. Golovin, during a trip to Moscow, received personally from Peter the newly established Order of St. Andrew the First-Called, thus being ahead of this very one in the list of cavaliers honorary award Russia even the Tsar himself and A.D. Menshikov. The decree stated:

“For his many noble and diligently faithful service in military labors... after 13 years”

. The rewards and favors were not limited to this. However, knowing the interrogation methods in Moscow and the entire terrible punitive machine, Mazepa could not feel calm.

Petrik's uprising also caused him many unpleasant moments. In 1691, a certain Petro Ivanenko (Petryk), Kochubey’s brother-in-law and senior clerk of the General Military Chancellery, fled to Zaporozhye, where he was elected clerk and began campaigning against the hetman and Moscow.

A. Ogloblin considered him the grandson of the Poltava colonel F. Zhuchenko, the son of his daughter, the sister of the wives of Kochubey and Iskra. It was already noted above that all the left bank foreman had very close family ties. Almost all historians who seriously studied Mazepa's hetmanship considered it impossible that the hetman was behind Petrik's plan.

Only A. Ogloblin, in his later emigrant work, stated that he had found evidence in the Moscow archive:

Petrik stated that he had the hetman's letters. The technique is well-known: B. Khmelnitsky, having fled to Zaporozhye in 1647, also referred to the legendary “letters of Barabash” - it was this fact that allowed N.M. Kostomarov to compare Petrik with the great Bogdan. In our opinion, this comparison does not stand up to criticism. Petrik had much more in common with Y. Barabash, an ally of Poltava Colonel M. Pushkar, who rebelled against I. Vygovsky. He also shouted about the “letter”, according to which the tsar allegedly ordered Vygovsky to be beaten. Of course, all this was a lie, aimed at convincing the Cossacks of Moscow’s support. Petrik also wanted to give weight to his words. But when the Cossacks “They persistently tried to show them those sheets... Petrik with the last word refused them that he didn’t have any such sheets and didn’t tell him anything about that matter....”On this occasion, the Koshevoy Ataman very reasonably stated: “If only the hetman and the policeman’s army had some kind of tax from Moscow, and he would write to our grassroots army... and not to that fool.”).

(emphasis added - T.Ya. Many historians suspect that in fact the left bank foreman stood behind Petrik. There is a lot of indirect evidence of this. Thus, Mazepa’s informant Rutkovsky, who was in Zaporozhye, wrote to the hetman:“So that your nobleness should be careful in relation to some of his loved ones.” “If only the hetman and the policeman’s army had some kind of tax from Moscow, and he would write to our grassroots army... and not to that fool.”) And in July 1692, the same Rutkovsky expressed doubts to Mazepa,"his (i.e. Petrik. - Is this the meaning and intent of the head? “If only the hetman and the policeman’s army had some kind of tax from Moscow, and he would write to our grassroots army... and not to that fool.”), Koshevoy ataman I. Gusak told Mazepa’s envoy:“Tell Mr. Hetman from me... how he won’t cut off the heads of the three people there: the first - Polubotok, the other - Mikhail (To Samoilovich. - to the third - that he always lives with him; "Whoever comes up with this idea himself, then he will never have peace in the hetmanate, and there will be no good in Ukraine."

. Subsequently, in 1708, Mazepa reproached V. Kochubey for“we forgiven and apologized for your great and many offenses worthy of death, but, as I see, my patience and kindness could not lead to anything good” . This can also be seen as indirect evidence of Mazepa’s suspicion of Kochubey’s involvement in the Petrik uprising. In any case, Mazepa, whose relationship with the tsar was still far from the most reliable, was nervous, and in letters to Peter I called Petrik’s idea"by the devil's instigation" , the clerk himself This can also be seen as indirect evidence of Mazepa’s suspicion of Kochubey’s involvement in the Petrik uprising. "a wicked lie... for some of my sins."

While in Crimea, Petrik entered into an agreement with the khan, and in August 1692, 15 thousand Tatars came to the Poltava regiment with Kalga-Sultan and Petrik, who had 12 Cossacks. Only 500 people arrived from Zaporozhye, and at the "rad" "they were sentenced to call Petrushka hetman." Petrik’s plans were very fantastic: when Ukraine succumbed to them (which he had no doubt about), they “The lords and tenants will be beaten... and all sorts of disturbances in the Zaporozhye army will be the same as they were under Bogdan Khmelnitsky.” He also intended to drive the inhabitants of the Sloboda regiments to the other side and "to settle them near Chigirin and other deserted places". It is not surprising that M.S. Grushevsky called Petrik"demagogue" And .

"the enemy of autonomist elders"

Petrik's hopes were not justified. The majority of the Cossacks did not support him, the population of the Left Bank met the Tatars with hostility, and Mazepa, in conjunction with Russian troops, managed to repel their advance.

In Moscow, Petrik’s tales were not believed, and the hetman’s suppression of the anti-Russian uprising only strengthened the hetman’s position in the eyes of Peter I.

Thus, by 1700 Mazepa was at the height of his fame. In Moscow he was unconditionally trusted and respected. His wealth grew, internal discontent was suppressed. Getman was already 61 years old. Most likely, the endless military campaigns were not easy for him: he was often sick and complained about his health, gouty pain. Mazepa must have dreamed of resting on his laurels after a victorious war and enjoying the fruits of his power and glory, but that was not the case. The young and energetic Peter was eager to reshape Russia, and at the same time the political map of Europe. .

Without any respite, the Northern War began in 1700. Already at the end of 1700, Mazepa received an order to send 18 thousand troops to Pskov for protection from the Swedes. Europe turns out to be beyond their strength. In this, the author shares the opinion of O. Subtelny.

Hence the drill, the transfer of Cossacks under the command of foreign officers, and as a result, an increase in discontent among the Cossacks. And the Northern War, unlike the Azov campaigns, did not bring them any military spoils or glory. The murmur of the Cossacks begins again. They attack new factories for the production of saltpeter, and in 1701 they rob Greek merchants, subjects of Turkey, which almost led to a clash with the Silistrian Pasha. In 1703, “shakyness” began among the Cossacks. Mazepa suggested that Moscow try to resolve them “kindly”:“And if he doesn’t do it anyway, then throw a few ten bombs.”

In 1708, part of the Cossacks took part in the Bulavin uprising.

Mazepa’s relationship with another “folk hero”, Semyon Paliy, developed no less complicated. Paliy's main merit was the restoration of the Cossacks on the devastated Right Bank, the creation of "Paliivshchyna" (1686), a territory governed by Cossack laws, where the authority of the Polish king was not recognized. At the beginning, Mazepa patronized the Right Bank colonel and repeatedly supported his appeals to Moscow with a request to move to the Left Bank. However, Peter was afraid of ruining relations with the allied Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth and constantly refused. During 1690-1694. Paliy, under the command of Mazepa, took part in joint campaigns with the left bank Cossacks in the Crimea. Because of the Turkish-Tatar threat, Poland at first turned a blind eye to Palia, but in 1699 the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth concluded the Peace of Karlowitz with Turkey, and the Sejm decided to disband the Cossacks as unnecessary. Paliy raised an uprising on the Right Bank and took the White Church.. Mazepa could not help but fear the growing popularity of Paliya on the Left Bank. In addition, a mass exodus of dissatisfied people began to the Right Bank, as they once did to Sloboda Ukraine. This weakened the position of the Hetmanate, and in particular Mazepa himself, who pursued a tough policy towards the peasantry, for example, in 1701, for the first time in the history of Ukraine, he introduced a two-day panshchina. The hetman and the foreman had long ago become the richest landowners with the right of hereditary ownership. Mazepa himself had estates, partly purchased, partly donated by Peter, not only in Ukraine, but also in Rylsky district, Krupnitsa region, etc. It is no coincidence that Mazepa said:“The Cossacks are not so terrible as the fact that almost all of Ukraine breathes the same Zaporozhye spirit.” There was a hint of undisguised irritation in his statements; So, he said to the clerk I. Nikiforov: .

“The Little Russian people (especially the Cossacks... like a cane in a field, bent by the wind, they lean in one direction or the other) are free, and stupid, and fickle.” Peter I, primarily because of relations with Poland, took a tough position towards Paly. Strict orders were sent to Mazepa"to place strong and frequent guards near the Dnieper",

so that no one goes to the Right Bank. The Poles demanded to stop supporting the Right Bank Cossacks. Finally, in February 1704, Peter issued an ultimatum to Palia to release Bila Tserkva..

There is no evidence that Mazepa thought about a single Hetmanate until the moment when, by the will of fate, or rather Peter, he found himself on the Right Bank, but there is no doubt that from that time on the thought of reuniting Bogdan’s brainchild did not leave him.

In January 1705, Mazepa again visited the Tsar in Moscow. He was showered with further favors. In June, he was given an order to march with 30 thousand Cossacks to Lvov and further to Poland in order to “displace with noble indemnities” the estates of the Pototskys and other magnates unfaithful to Augustus. The task was completed brilliantly by Mazepa. In early August, his troops, following the path of Bohdan Khmelnytsky, reached Lvov, and in early October they took Zamosc. After this, the hetman settled in winter quarters in Dubno. He was tasked with collecting collections in the Right Bank for future military operations. This was the apogee of Mazepa's glory.

However, this is where all the troubles began. A letter arrived in Dubno from the punishable hetman D. Gorlenko about the oppression of the Cossacks by the Russians during their stay near Grodno. At the same time, the royal decree was sent to send the Kyiv and Chernigov regiments to Prussia for their reorganization into regular dragoons. Considering the structure of the Hetmanate, this, in essence, meant the beginning of the liquidation of the senior administration. .

Mazepa was furious and said: “What kind of good can we now expect for our service?”. But even in Lithuania, luck turned away from the Cossacks and their hetman. The Swedes attacked the Starodub regiment stationed in Nesvizh, destroyed several hundred Cossacks and killed Colonel Miklashevsky. Then the Swedes besieged Pereyaslavl Colonel I. Mirovich in Lyakhovichi, as a result he was never released, he was captured, where he died. Only the remnants of the Cossacks went to Slutsk. This was a very difficult blow for Mazepa, causing pain and disappointment in Ukraine. In May 1706, the hetman wrote to Peter: “Turning from Lithuania to their homes in your Tsar’s Majesty’s special service, barely alive from many labors, turbulations, sadness and from the illness that happened.

". At this time, he again rejected Dolskaya’s offer to accept the guarantees of the Swedish king, demanded that she stop this correspondence and “do not imagine that, having served faithfully three sovereigns, in his old age he would inflict on himself the stain of treason” In the summer, Peter expressed a desire to come to Kyiv in person. This was the tsar's first visit to Ukraine, and Mazepa considered it a great honor for himself. However, everything turned out differently. First of all, on the way to Kyiv, the hetman’s old comrade-in-arms and friend, Field Marshal F.A., died. Golovin. Then Peter, who was already in Kyiv, received alarming military news and gave an order for A.D. to speak. Menshikov to Volyn against the Swedes, and Mazepa, if necessary, was ordered to assist. The campaign did not take place, but the hetman took this as a blood insult:

“This is the reward I will receive in my old age for many years of service!” What hurt Mazepa most was that he was given command to a rootless upstart. It was Menshikov who was destined to become a fatal figure for Mazepa.

In July 1706, while staying in Kyiv, Menshikov organized a dinner party, which, in addition to the tsar, was attended by Mazepa and the foreman. At this dinner, a tipsy Menshikov told the hetman about the need to transform the Hetmanate and about the liquidation of the foreman. The irritated Mazepa conveyed these words of the royal favorite to his elder:“They always sing that song to me, both in Moscow and everywhere!” Colonels D. Apostol and D. Gorlenko perceived them especially sharply. .

The latter exclaimed: “Just as we always pray to God for the soul of Khmelnytsky and bless His name for freeing Ukraine from the yoke of Lyatsky, so in the opposite way we and our children will curse your soul and bones forever, if you force us into such captivity for your hetmanship after death "

Around the same time, Princess Dolskaya conveyed B.P.’s words to Mazepa. Sheremetev and General Ren that Menshikov intends to become a hetman or prince of Chernigov and is “digging a hole” for Mazepa. We will probably never know how truthful they were, but they certainly added fuel to the fire, and the hetman exclaimed in his hearts: "Lord! Free me from their panic!" Mazepa was irritated and depressed. Another reason for the growth of discontent against the Russians was the construction of fortifications in Kyiv. The conditions were extremely difficult, the work was supervised by Russian officers who beat the Cossacks, cut off their ears and committed all sorts of oppression. There was a terrible murmur, including among the foreman. In addition, the king decided that the Kiev fortress "has a very bad situation" and ordered a new one to be made in the Pechersk Monastery. The elders demanded that the hetman talk with the tsar, but Mazepa did not dare. Only at the end of September did he finally write to Peter that .

“seeing your royal majesty in Kyiv... with many... things difficult and burdened, we do not dare to ask my commander... for your decree about the troops.” And further, without complaints or comments, he reported that his troops demanded that the Cossack troops be better armed, ordered Mazepa to buy horses at his own expense - until the money came from Moscow, etc. In June 1707, Peter sent a letter to Ukraine, in which he expressed regret about the hard service of the Little Russians and the disasters , accompanying the crossings of Russian troops through Ukraine, but stated that in “This is how it is now with our enemy. The King of Sweden, in a military case, it’s not really possible to get around him, and for that you must... demolish him,” A "at the end of this war, those difficulties and losses suffered... will be rewarded" .

In March 1707, Peter summoned Mazepa to a military council in Zhovkva - since "very necessary". The council took place on April 20, Good Friday. Orlik wrote that at the end of the council, Mazepa did not go to dinner with the king, returned to his place upset and did not eat anything all day. He only said to the elders:“If I had served God so faithfully and diligently, I would have received greater rewards, but here, even if I changed into an angel, I would not be able to receive any thanks for my service and faithfulness!”

All historians, following N.M. Kostomarov, were at a loss as to what happened there. They believed that it only spoke of a plan to create “companies”, i.e. selecting a fifth of the Cossacks to form a new army and leaving the rest at home. In fact, we were talking about larger-scale transformations. The author managed to find documents that shed light on this secret, which, of course, became one of the last reasons that pushed Mazepa to the Swedes. At the end of March, decrees were given to the Little Russian and Ambassadorial orders on the transfer from the Little Russian order to the Discharge "the city of Kyiv and other Little Russian cities." This decree was finally postponed, however "until the arrival of Hetman and Cavalier Ivan Stepanovich Mazepa in Zhovkva" .

Personal grievances were added to the fundamental disputes. Immediately after the council in Zholkva, Menshikov sent an order to the convivial colonel (commander of the Hetman Guard regiment) Galagin to go on a campaign with him. Mazepa shouted in rage:

“Prince Alexander Danilovich sees me every day, always talks to me and has not said a single word to me about it, and without my knowledge and consent he sends out orders to the people of my regiment!... And how can Tansky go without my will with my regiment , to whom I pay? Yes, if he had gone, I would have ordered him to be shot like a dog!” As for the decree on companies, i.e. on the transformation of the Cossack army, N.M. Kostomarov believed that it did not take place. In fact, on August 10, the Tsar wrote to Mazepa to “about the campaigns, in all the Little Russian regiments, of course, this fall and winter they made a determination and were immediately ready for the future campaign.” The unsuccessful campaign of Mazepa’s nephew Voinarovsky (more than 500 Cossacks escaped from him) only spurred Peter on in this decision: “For of the non-Kumpanei sent today, there is nothing good, unless there is a bad thing, since they don’t have a certain salary, they will just go for robbery and immediately go home.” Mazepa promised in a letter to Peter that “I will strive with all diligence to establish a company in all my regiments.” However, on the same day, in a message to G.I. He noted to Golovkin that the colonels about the decree on companies “They don’t deny it, they just see it as a difficulty.” So for the whole autumn the regiments will be at the construction of the Pechersk fortress, and “in the cold and snow” - “sort out the army, who will be fit and who will not be fit for company service,” .

difficult, so “It would have been better if everything ordered had been done in the spring”(taxes) abolished by the Kalamak Articles - the hetman reintroduced them without any resistance from the Russian authorities. He also hoped that the terrible point about the transformation of the Hetmanate from "Hetman Reyment"(governance) into a single Russian state.

But by mid-1707 it became clear that all hopes were dashed. In September 1707, Mazepa, at the request of Peter I, received the title of Prince of the Holy Roman Empire. Unlike Menshikov, he was not at all happy about this honor: “They want to satisfy me with the principality of the Roman Empire and take away the hetmanship” .

For some time, Mazepa also hoped to realize his title of hetman. "both banks" especially after Peter himself brought the hetman to the Right Bank and literally forced him to give orders there. The question of the Right Bank is another of the reasons that pushed Mazepa to the Swedes.

As already noted, in the fall of 1705, under the pretext of arresting Paliy, Mazepa entered the Right Bank and received an order to settle there. However, already in December, at negotiations in Grodno, the Russian side accepted the memorial imposed by the Poles:"The Emperor agrees to give up these fortresses, although to the extreme loss of Little Russia"

. “If the Poles are in the Belotserkovsky district, then it will never be possible that an internecine fight will not break out between the Cossacks of the regiment of Belotserkovsky, Korsunsky, Umansky, Boguslavsky, Chigirinsky, Cherkasky and Kanevsky and between the Poles, and a truly new war and bloodshed will grow from there ". However, in May, Peter promised the Poles that the return of Ukraine would be accomplished immediately after the return of the king, and ordered “to write now to Hetman Mazepa that if he sees that there can be no such danger and confusion in the Little Russian people, then he would give this Belotserkovskaya district ... to the Pole ... for their pleasure.” .

It is quite obvious that Russian diplomacy was not based on the interests of the Ukrainian hetman, elders, “brotherly” people or the Orthodox faith. The military situation and political plans were at the forefront. Mazepa understood this, as well as the fact that Peter’s games did not guarantee him the Right Bank. In fact, Russia gave it to the Poles back in 1705, and it is possible that the role of Menshikov, so hated by Mazepa, was especially important here. It was he who was at the negotiations in Grodno, and it was for him that those same Polish magnates in 1706 concocted a noble family tree that confirmed his princely title. It is likely that consent to the return of the Right Bank was obtained at the cost of the nobility.

A. D. Menshikov

G.P. Georgievsky, who studied Mazepa’s correspondence with Menshikov, noted that at the beginning of 1708 the hetman’s tone changed dramatically. If before he addressed that "My lord and dear brother" then now "The Most Serene and Excellent Prince of Izhera of the Roman and Russian State, my dear sir, my brother and special benefactor".

Georgievsky explained this by Mazepa’s duplicity and his plans for treason. It seems to us that such a tone is a mockery and testifies to the hetman’s secret hatred and contempt for the upstart plebeian Menshikov. At the same military council in Zholkva, fatal for the history of Russia and Ukraine, Mazepa asked the tsar to send at least 10 thousand regular troops to protect Ukraine from the Swedes, to which Peter replied:.

This was the last straw that broke Mazepa’s patience, since it was essentially a violation of the articles of the Kalamak Rada, which obliged Russia to defend Ukraine. Most of the Cossack troops were scattered along the fronts of the Northern War. O. Subtelny believes that this was a blow for Mazepa and that the hetman saw in this a betrayal of vassal relations, which obliged the sovereign to protect his vassal.

When you consider this series of events of 1706-1707, you wonder not why Mazepa “changed”, i.e., calling a spade a spade, broke the treaty with Russia and concluded a new one with Poland, but why he didn’t do this earlier, until October 1708?

If not explicitly, then at least secretly. On the contrary, Mazepa delayed until the last minute, did not sign anything definitively and did not decide anything. Why? After all, the Russian side completely violated the terms of the Kalamak Articles and went to liquidate the Hetmanate and the Hetman’s administration. Apparently, the answer is simple: Mazepa did not believe in the possibility of an alliance with the dying Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, which still remained arrogant and intractable, and even less believed in an alliance with the “heretic Swedes”, so far from the realities of Eastern Europe. He knew too well the mood of his own foreman - here the very well-fed, prosperous life of the foreman in the prosperous Left Bank, which he created for her during the 20 years of his reign, played against him. He also knew how his own Cossacks and Cossacks hated him - for his “too” great loyalty to the tsar, uncompromising fulfillment of all Peter’s demands for sending troops on endless campaigns, strict discipline, etc. And Mazepa’s sober mind did not let him down - further events showed that he was right, stubbornly not wanting to break with the Russian Tsar. .

In the face of the Swedish offensive and Russian military failures, the situation in Ukraine was extremely difficult. Discontent grew among the Cossacks, many of them took part in the uprising of K. Bulavin. Mazepa, obeying the royal decree, sent a 10,000-strong corps to Poland, thereby exposing his own borders. He rightly wrote that “The Little Russian people have some fear that a significant part of the Little Russian troops has been taken from Ukraine... and there will be no one to defend Ukraine.” True, Peter promised to expel Sheremetev "to rush to the defense of Ukraine with haste" and assured that the Little Russian people "We will not abandon any enemy attacks". To this Mazepa wrote on October 6 in a letter to G.I. Golovkin objected that "there is little hope for the Great Russian infantry... everyone is barefoot and naked." He reported that the Swedes entered the territory of the Starodub regiment, and with it "a small number of troops, which are powerless, have such a great potential for enemy resistance." However, he saw the greatest difficulty in the confusion engulfing the people caused by the advance of enemy troops and rumors of the defeat of the Russians.

Under these conditions, Mazepa decided that there was nothing more to wait for. At first he said he was dying and avoided meeting with Menshikov, and on October 25 he crossed the Desna and united with Charles XII. Peter learned about this from Menshikov and was amazed by what happened. “We received your letter about the unexpected, never-evil case of treason against the Hetman with great surprise.”.

This only indicates that Peter did not know the hetman at all, did not understand his true aspirations and aspirations.

Orlik two years later explained the hetman’s action this way: .

Subsequent events are well known. They developed according to the worst-case scenario, which Mazepa foresaw. Most of the Cossacks fled from him, most of the foreman did not go with him. Menshikov managed to take Baturin, which he burned, completely exterminating all the inhabitants, including women and children, and immediately discouraging the desire to follow Mazepa. As M.S. wrote Grushevsky, the collapse was inevitable, primarily due to the terrible division that existed between the autonomist elders and the masses. Mazepa and his supporters did not take any steps to use any populist methods to win over ordinary Cossacks, exhausted by constant wars, or peasants groaning under the weight of taxes and panshchina.

And Peter, on the contrary, the very next day abolished the rands, as stated in the royal universal, imposed by Mazepa "for the sake of enriching oneself".

Mazepa, whom many historians accuse almost of the original plans of treason, turned out to be so unprepared for this step that he did not even publish an official universal explaining and justifying his act, like the “Manifesto to the European Powers”, which was published by I. Vyhovsky after the Gadyach Treaty. As O. Subtelny proved, Mazepa never had an agreement with Charles XII, at least until 1709, when a purely formal agreement was concluded after the fact. There was not even an agreement between Mazepa and Leshchinsky - only references to about the hetman's plan to extradite Charles XII to Peter. Mirgorod Colonel D. Apostol, one of the people closest to Mazepa, reported him. At the end of November he arrived at the headquarters of the Russian troops in Sorochintsy, from where he was sent to the Tsar and Menshikov. He stayed there for almost a month. As the Apostle himself wrote to the hetman,

“By the command of Your Lordship, I accepted this dangerous path... although at first they didn’t give me faith, and they kept me on guard.” . He left Mazepa no earlier than mid-November, i.e. obviously after the burning of Baturin. The very fact of sending the Apostle to the Tsar testifies to the seriousness of the hetman’s intentions: after all, he sent one of the people closest to him. Let us recall that during the Kochubey case, the Russian government insistently sought from Mazepa the extradition of the Apostle, but he defended and defended him in every possible way. Peter listened to the Apostle“It’s very secret; and although I deigned to accept it very desirable and cheerfully, I still doubted whether I would tell the truth from Your Excellency.” However, when Shishkevich, the barber of his beloved nephew Voinarovsky, and the eagerly sociable Colonel Galagan arrived after the Apostle from Mazepa with his personal letters - again, all people from his inner circle -"On the part of the Tsar's Majesty, my proposal and your Serene Majesty's intentions are believed." Some points were signed and security guarantees were agreed upon. G.I. Golovkin wrote a letter to Mazepa on December 22, in which he confirmed that the king,“Seeing your good intention and appeal, I accepted it graciously and ordered me to write to you with the strongest hope that if you... work to bring your begun intention to fulfillment, then not only will you accept your mercy in the same order and your mercy, but He will deign to multiply it to you." And further -" .

"not daring to believe the pen any more"

- there was a secret code that, before the transition to the Swedes, was used in Mazepa’s correspondence with the tsarist government: “Your Lordship must try, so that about the famous most important person, at your suggestion This amazing agreement had no consequences. Peter's entourage convinced him not to trust the hetman. He was an unnecessary rival for Menshikov. Mazepa either failed to carry out his plan, or he was afraid of inevitable reprisals from Peter. “How serious Mazepa’s proposal was, we may never know”.

It seems to us that it fits completely into the picture of events. Most likely, the hetman was already convinced of his mistake and made a desperate attempt to correct the situation. In fact, for Russia, Mazepa’s transition to the side of the Swedes did not have negative consequences. And, for example, it cannot be compared with the Chudnovsky disaster of 1660 - the death of the entire Russian army as a result of the battle with the Poles, the capture of all officers and the loss of the Right Bank. Meanwhile, no one cursed Yuri Khmelnitsky for a very long time, they didn’t even dare to call him a traitor; on the contrary, Alexey Mikhailovich had been hoping for his “conversion” for more than a year. Mazepa was accused of all mortal sins, subjected to civil execution and church anathema. M.S. Grushevsky rightly wrote:

“Mazepa’s political step was inflated as an unprecedented and extraordinary act. But in reality, there was nothing extraordinary, nothing new in this act of Mazepa and his like-minded people.”

.

We must muster courage and admit that the interests and goals of the young Russian Empire and the weakened Hetmanate - created in the likeness of the dying Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, which in 1648, compared to Moscow, was a “European” power, and at the beginning of the 18th century. turned into an anachronism - they were very different. In some ways, Ukraine has become a hostage to Russia’s geopolitical plans. Peter sought to create new state, capable of competing both militarily and economically with European powers. This policy was possible only with the most severe centralization.

The military and economic situation made it possible to unify Ukraine and wrest the Ruins of the Right Bank from the terrible abyss. However, these plans were sacrificed to the diplomatic game.

In the face of the Swedish offensive, the Left Bank was to turn into a scorched buffer of military operations. It was these two factors, along with personal grievances, that forced Mazepa to attempt an alliance with Charles XII.

The most terrible tragedy of the Hetmanate was that it had no alternative. All attempts at agreements with Poland and Crimea ended in failure. Sweden was too far away. Therefore, all political leaders of the Hetmanate, even including Mazepa, sooner or later were forced to return to the idea of ​​an alliance with Russia, each time hoping for "

good conditions

1. " and the "mercy" of the king. Notes

2. Skoropadsky P. Good luck. Kiev - Philadelphia, 1995, p. 387-388.

3. Soloviev S.M. History of Russia since ancient times, book. VIII-IX. M., 1991; Kostomarov N. Mazepa. Kyiv, 1995, p. 409-436. Ogloblin A.

4. Treaty of Peter Ivanenko (Petryk) with Krim in 1692. - Jubilee 3birnik on poshan ak. D. Bagalia. Kiev, 1927, p. 720-744; Andrusyak N

. 3c "languages ​​of Mazepi with Stanislav Leshchinsky and Charles XII. - Notes of the Scientific Partnership named after T. Shevchenko, vol. CLII. Lviv, 1933, pp. 32-61.

Subtelny O.

7. Mazepintsi. Ukrainian separatism at the beginning of the 18th century. Kiev, 1994; SmolSH V. 1van Mazepa. Volodar Hetman's mace. - 3-book of scientific principles. Kiev, 1995, p. 385-401. 5. Letter from Jean Baluz about Mazepa. - Ivan Mazepa. Kiev, 1992, p. 76.

6. Ibid., p. 77.

Efimenko A.

10. History of the Ukrainian people. Kyiv, 1906, p. 263. 8. Leaves of Ivan Mazepi to Motroni Kochubeivny. - 1van Mazepa, p. 112-115. 9. We are talking about 10 thousand, which Mazepa allegedly gave to V.V. Golitsin from Samoilovich's property.

Velichko S.

12. Chronicle of events about the South Western Russia

XVII century, vol. III. Kyiv, 1855, p. 29-53.

14. 11. Ibid., p. 49. Dreike Yu.V.

Sayings, figurative expressions and humor of Peter the Great. SPb., 2002, p.

8-9.

17. 13. Letter from Jean Baluz about Mazepa, p. 76-77. Evarnitsky

18. D. Sources for the history of the Zaporozhye Cossacks. Vladimir, 1906, part 1, No. LVI, p. 297-302. Mazepa's response to the Zaporozhye Cossacks to their complaints.

19. Soloviev S.M. 15. For details about the Crimean campaigns, see: Zaruba V.N. Ukrainian Cossack army in the fight against Turkish-Tatar aggression. Kharkov, 1993. - 16. Acts of Western Russia, vol. V. St. Petersburg, 1853, No. 205, p. 233-236; No. 209, p. 238-239.

20. Bantysh-Kamensky D. Illustrated history of the Ukrainian people. St. Petersburg, 1913, p. 240; Borschok I. Mazepa. Orlik. Voinarovsky. Lviv, 1991, p. 22; Shevchuk V. Cossack state, studies before the history of the Ukrainian state. - Kiev, 1995, pp. 158-161; Ogloblin A.

21. Treaty of Peter Ivanenko (Petryk) with Krim 1692 rock, p. 724. Ogloblin O.

22. Hetman Ivan Mazepa i Moscow, Ivan Mazepa i Moscow. - Kshv, 1994, p. 32. Pavlenko S.

23. The myth about Mazepa. Chertiv, 1998. Evarnitsky D.

24. D. Sources for the history of the Zaporozhye Cossacks. Decree. cit., vol. 1, p. 413; No. LXXVIII, p. 394; No. LXIX, p.

25. The myth about Mazepa. Chertiv, 1998. 324, p. 435.

26. Sources, vol. 2, p. 131.

27. The myth about Mazepa. Chertiv, 1998. Decree. cit., vol. 1, no. LXXVIII, p. 390; No. LXXVII, p. 365, p. 367-368. Grushevski N

M.S. Vigovsky i Mazepa. - Literary and scientific journal, vol. 46. Kiev - Lviv, 1909, p. 423.

Decree. cit., vol. 1, p. 410-411; Zaruba V.N.

Ukrainian Cossack army, p. 115.

31. Treaty of Peter Ivanenko (Petryk) with Krim in 1692. - Jubilee 3birnik on poshan ak. D. Bagalia. Kiev, 1927, p. 720-744; 28. Letters and papers of Emperor Peter the Great, vol. 1. St. Petersburg, 1887, No. 296, p.

341; No. 346, No. 375.

29. For example, G.F. Dolgoruky wrote to F.A. Golovin: “Please write secretly to Hetman Mazepa so that he secretly has a correspondence or, through his faithful envoys, communicates with the Kyiv governor Potocki.”- Letters and papers of Emperor Peter the Great, vol. 2. St. Petersburg, 1889, p. 420.

34. D. Sources for the history of the Zaporozhye Cossacks. 30. Ibid., p. 589.

Decree. cit., p. 23.

36. D. Sources for the history of the Zaporozhye Cossacks. 32. Letters and papers of Emperor Peter the Great, vol. 3. St. Petersburg, 1893, p.

37. The myth about Mazepa. Chertiv, 1998. 364-365: vol. 2, no. 546, p.

213; vol. VII, no. 2. L., 1946, p. 697-698, etc.

33. B

people said

42. that Mazepa Palia"executed out of envy, because Palia was called the Cossack father."

43. D. Sources for the history of the Zaporozhye Cossacks.- Osnova, 1861, November-December, p. 31.

Sources, part 2, p.

44.

35. Letters and papers of Emperor Peter the Great, vol. 2, p. 437.

Sources, part 2, p.

41.

Decree. cit., vol. 1, p. 79;

Letters and papers of Emperor Peter the Great, vol. VIII, no. 1. M-L., 1948, No. 2603, p. Iв17, etc.

38. Letters and papers of Emperor Peter the Great, vol. 3, no. 839, p. 356.

52. D. Sources for the history of the Zaporozhye Cossacks. 40. Letter from Orlik to Yavorsky. - Basis, summer 1862, p. 2.

41. Ibid., p. 3.

Andrusyak; N.

55. Ibid., part 2, p. 173.

56. Letter from Orlik to Yavorsky, p. 8.

57. Kostomarov N. Decree. cit., p. 583.

58. Letters and papers of Emperor Peter the Great, vol. VI. SPb., 1912, No. 1901, p. 44, 287, 288, 289.

59. Letter from Orlik to Yavorsky, p. 162.

60. D. Sources for the history of the Zaporozhye Cossacks. Biographies of Russian generalissimos and field marshals, part 1. M., 1991, p. 23.

61. Letters and papers of Emperor Peter the Great, vol. V. St. Petersburg, 1907, p. 477, 496.

62. Materials from the Stockholm apxivy to the history of Ukraine, chapter XVII - rev. XVIII centuries - Ukrainian archaeographic collection, vol. III. Kiev, 1930, p. 28-29.

63. Letters and papers of Emperor Peter the Great, vol. VI, no. 2067, p. 158.

64. Materials from the Stockholm apxivy, p.

36.

66. 65. Letters and papers of Emperor Peter the Great, vol. VII, no. 2. L., 1946, p. 709, 772, 715. Georgievsky G.P. Mazepa and Menshikov. -

Historical magazine

68. Treaty of Peter Ivanenko (Petryk) with Krim in 1692. - Jubilee 3birnik on poshan ak. D. Bagalia. Kiev, 1927, p. 720-744;, 1940, No. 12, p. 74-75.

69. D. Sources for the history of the Zaporozhye Cossacks. 67. Letter from Orlik to Yavorsky, p. 16-17.

Decree cit., p. 31.

71. D. Sources for the history of the Zaporozhye Cossacks. Sources, part 2, p. 6 etc.

70. Letter from Orlik to Yavorsky, p. 17-20.

Sources, part 2, p.

88.

75. D. Sources for the history of the Zaporozhye Cossacks. 72. Letters and papers of Emperor Peter the Great, vol. VII, no. 2, p. 373, 780, etc.

73. Ibid., vol. VIII, no.

1, No. 2603, p. Iв17.

74. Ibid., vol. VII, no.

79. 2, p. 697-698; vol. VIII, no. 1, No. 2500, p. 43; No. 2654, p.

153-154.

81. Treaty of Peter Ivanenko (Petryk) with Krim in 1692. - Jubilee 3birnik on poshan ak. D. Bagalia. Kiev, 1927, p. 720-744; Sources, part 2, p.

82. D. Sources for the history of the Zaporozhye Cossacks. 164, 165.

76. Letters and papers of Emperor Peter the Great, vol. VIII, part 1, no. 2442, p. 65. Letters and papers of Emperor Peter the Great, vol. VII, no. 2. L., 1946, p. 227.

84. D. Sources for the history of the Zaporozhye Cossacks. 77. Ibid., No. 2759, p.

237.

86. D. Sources for the history of the Zaporozhye Cossacks. 78. Correspondence and other papers of the Swedish king Charles XII. - Readings of the Moscow Society of History and Russian Antiquities, 1847, No. 1, p. 2-3.

87. Kostomarov N. Grushevsky M.

88. Treaty of Peter Ivanenko (Petryk) with Krim in 1692. - Jubilee 3birnik on poshan ak. D. Bagalia. Kiev, 1927, p. 720-744; Vigovsky i Mazepa, p. 426.

89. Bantysh-Kamensky D. 80. Letters and papers of Emperor Peter the Great, vol. VIII, part 2, p. 875.

Decree. cit., p. 30-31.

Sources, part 2, p.

214.

83. Letter from G. Volkovnikov to A. Menshikov. -

Mazepa was born into a Ukrainian gentry Orthodox family. The first documented ancestor of the future hetman, the great-grandfather of Ivan Mazepa, is Nikolai Mazepa-Koledinsky, who was granted a farm on the Kamenitsa River, later the village of Mazepintsy, by the Polish king for his military service.

Ivan's grandfather, Mikhail Mazepa, was in the service of the Moscow Tsar: he guarded the southern borders of the Moscow state from Tatar raids.
The father, Adam-Stepan Mazepa, was one of Bohdan Khmelnytsky's associates. He took part in the Pereyaslav negotiations with the Moscow boyars. He did not support the Treaty of Pereyaslavl and subsequently took part, together with Hetman Vyhovsky, in the creation of the Grand Duchy of Russia as part of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, but did not achieve results. In 1662, the Polish king was appointed to the position of commander of Chernigov and held this position until his death in 1665.

Ivan Mazepa's mother, Marina Mokievskaya, came from an old noble Cossack family of Belotserkovshchina, who held leadership positions in the Kiev Cossack Regiment. The modern Russian researcher of Mazepa T. G. Tairova-Yakovleva in her monograph “Mazepa” provides data that Marina’s father and brother were foremen at Khmelnytsky and died in battles with the Poles - the father near Chortkov (1655), and the brother near Dryzhepol (1655) . After the death of her husband, she took monastic vows under the name Maria and was the abbess of the Kiev-Pechersk Ascension and abbess of the Glukhov convent.

At the age of 65, Mazepa fell in love with his own goddaughter Maria, daughter of Kochubey. However, according to canon law, such a relationship is forbidden and equates to incest, so they could not get married. Mazepa's correspondence with Maria has partially survived.

Education

Kostomarov retells the notes of Pask, a Polish courtier who served with Mazepa at the court of Jan Casimir. According to his news, in 1661 Mazepa slandered his comrade Pask before the king. Pask was arrested, the case was investigated, he was acquitted, and the king gave him 500 chervonets, and Mazepa was temporarily removed from the court. The following year, 1662, Pasek, forgetting the insult inflicted on him and being tipsy, hit Mazepa, Mazepa grabbed his weapon. The witnesses did not take Mazepa's side because they did not love or respect him. The king said: “Slander shows itself more painfully than a wound.” He called Pask and Mazepa to him, ordered them to embrace before his eyes and forgive each other for mutual insults.

The life of the Orthodox Mazepa at the Catholic court of John Casimir was difficult. This is how Kostomarov describes its ending: “His peers and comrades, courtiers of the Catholic faith, mocked him, teased him to the point that against one of them Mazepa in his ardor drew his sword, and drawing a weapon in the royal palace was considered a crime worthy of death. But King John Casimir decided that Mazepa had acted unintentionally, and did not execute him, but only removed him from the court. Mazepa went to his mother’s estate in Volyn.” . Pask, in his notes, claims that Mazepa finally left the court because of what happened there, in Volyn, with the wife of a master named Falbovsky, who, allegedly having discovered his wife’s connection with Mazepa, tied the naked Mazepa to a horse, frightened the horse with whips, screams and fired shots and set off at a gallop among the thickets of wild rose hips and thorns.

However, the Wieliczka Chronicle (also quoted by Kostomarov) reports that “Mazepa left court service when King Jan Casimir undertook a campaign with an army on the left side of Ukraine near Glukhov and stopped on the way in Bila Tserkva, therefore, at the end of 1663. Here Mazepa deviated from the king’s army and remained with his old father, who lived on his estate in the village of Mazepintsy.”

Career

Memorial stone at the site of Mazepa's election as hetman of Ukraine

In his book “Russian history in the biographies of its main figures,” N. I. Kostomarov writes: “We do not know the extent of Mazepa’s participation in the intrigue that was waged against Hetman Samoilovich, we must be content with only assumptions, and therefore have no right to pronounce a verdict on this issue. » It should be noted that in the book “Mazepa” (chapter 1) N.I. Kostomarov directly mentions “his intrigues, used by him before the all-powerful temporary worker Prince Vasily Vasilyevich Golitsyn to destroy Hetman Samoilovich,” and in the book “Ruin” he describes these intrigues in more detail.

In the role of hetman, Mazepa took part in Golitsyn's second Crimean campaign.

There is a widely held point of view that portrays both Mazepa and Golitsyn in an unseemly light: “He owed his election to bribing the prince. V.V. Golitsyn and the generous promises given to the foreman. Mazepa rewarded the latter with the distribution of estates and colonels and other positions. As a hetman-administrator, Mazepa did not stand out in any way.”

A curious note from Mazepa, preserved in the files State Archives together with letters from Princess Sofia, showing that Mazepa, after his election to hetman, paid Prince Golitsyn a bribe for assistance.

According to O. Kovalevskaya, the version of the bribe does not correspond to reality, since gifts for promoting the election were sent by Mazepa to Golitsin a year after the election. Nevertheless, the version of the bribe owes its origin to Mazepa himself. In 1689, after the fall of the power of Sophia and the temporary worker Golitsyn, Mazepa submitted a petition to the tsar. “He reported to the tsar that Leonty Neplyuev, by threats, forced him to give Prince Golitsyn partly from the belongings of the abdicated Hetman Samoilovich, and partly from his own “little name”, which, by the grace of the monarchs, he acquired in the hetman’s order, 11,000 rubles in chervonets and efimkas, more than three pounds silver dishes, 5,000 rubles worth of precious things and three Turkish horses with attire.”

N.I. Kostomarov sums up Mazepa’s career this way: “The moral rules of Ivan Stepanovich from a young age have a trait ingrained in them: noticing the decline of the strength on which they had previously relied, he did not bother with any sensations or impulses, so as not to contribute to the harm of the previously beneficial force his strength. Betrayal of his benefactors had already been demonstrated more than once in his life. So he betrayed Poland, going over to her sworn enemy Doroshenko; So he left Doroshenko as soon as he saw that his power was wavering; So, and even more shamelessly, he did with Samoilovich, who warmed him up and raised him to the height of the senior rank. He now did the same with his greatest benefactor, before whom he had recently flattered and humiliated himself.”

Ally of Peter

When the young and energetic Peter I ascended the throne in 1689, Mazepa once again used his gift of charming great people. The aging hetman constantly gave advice to the young monarch in Polish affairs, and over time a close personal friendship arose between them. . In the early 1690s, he had to work to pacify the uprising of the so-called Petrik in Ukraine. Clerk Petro Ivanenko (Petrik) was married to the niece of the general clerk Vasily Kochubey. In -1692, he raised the Sich Cossacks simultaneously against Hetman Mazepa and against the Moscow authorities. He was a true “independence activist” against any foreign rule, including the Poles. However, he was unable to win over the Zaporozhye Cossacks to his side, and entered Ukraine from Crimea only with the Tatars and small detachments of Cossack supporters. He was also approached by supporters from the common people, the “pospolitan rabble.” But having already approached the border cities of Ukraine, the Tatars fled back to the Crimea, frightened by Mazepa’s superior troops. Petrik also left with them. Petrik made several more attempts until he was killed by Mazepa’s troops in 1696.

Mazepa took part in both of Peter’s campaigns to Azov and gained even greater trust in Peter.

• B. Khmelnitsky concluded an agreement with the Swedes two years after swearing allegiance to the Tsar, masterfully maneuvered between Russia and Turkey and was not loyal to anyone.
• I. Vyhovsky, a year after taking the oath, signed the Gadyach Agreement with Poland, and just a month later - with Sweden.
• Yu. Khmelnitsky doomed Russian troops to death at Chudnov a year after his oath.
• I. Bryukhovetsky, the tsar’s devoted “servant” and “boyar” - and he lasted only five years, and then rebelled against him.

For 20 years Mazepa became one of richest people not only Little Russia, but also Russia, the owner of 19,654 households in Ukraine and 4,117 households (a total of about 100,000 souls) in the south of Russia.

The phrase Mazepa uttered on September 17, 1707 has reached our times: “Without extreme, last need, I will not change my loyalty to the Tsar’s Majesty.” Then he explained what kind of “extreme need” this could be: “until I see that the Tsar’s Majesty will not be able to protect not only Ukraine, but his entire state from Swedish potency.” He was seriously offended by Peter after the military council in Zholkva in March 1707, at which a significant limitation of the autonomy of Little Russia and the independence of the hetman was discussed. But he was still ready to wait until the “extreme, last need” - until it became obvious that Peter was losing the war.

Switching to the side of Charles XII

In “his conversation with Orlik, Mazepa explained his negotiations with Leshchinsky exclusively as a military threat.” He said “that he would remain faithful to the Tsar’s Majesty, ‘until I see with what force Stanislav will march to the Ukrainian borders and what successes the Swedish troops will have in the Moscow state.’” Thus, already a year before going over to Karl’s side, Mazepa prepared the ground in order to go over to the side of the enemy in case of “extreme and last need” if he wins.

There is information that the first plan for treason was discussed by Mazepa and the widow Princess Dolskaya, after Vishnevetskaya’s first husband, at the end of 1705 (Dolskaya’s letters are known). Later, Mazepa entered into secret negotiations, first with Princess Dolskaya, then with King Stanislav Leszczynski, in particular, through the Jesuit Zalenski. To attract Mazepa to her side, in 1706, “Princess Dolskaya conveyed to Mazepa the words of B.P. Sheremetev and General Ren that Menshikov intended to become the hetman or prince of Chernigov and was “digging a hole” for Mazepa.”

Shortly before, Mazepa accused Fastov’s Colonel Paley of treason against Peter and in an effort to change the order of Ukrainian life in favor of the Cossacks and the rabble. Paley was sent to Moscow, and from there exiled to Tomsk.

In January 1708, Kochubey sent Pyotr Yantsenko (Yakovlev) with verbal news of Mazepa’s betrayal. Yakovlev appeared to the Blagoveshchensk archpriest (the tsar's confessor), who introduced him to Tsarevich Alexei Petrovich. The Tsar considered the new denunciation to be false again, entrusting the investigation to the hetman’s friends: Gavriil Ivanovich Golovkin and Pyotr Pavlovich Shafirov.

Frightened by this denunciation, Mazepa, after a favorable outcome for him in the investigative case (by order of Peter I, Kochubey and Poltava Colonel I. I. Iskra, who also denounced Mazepa, were tortured, after which, on July 14, 1708, they were beheaded) negotiated even more energetically with Stanislav Leszczynski and Charles XII, which ended with the conclusion of secret treaties with them. Mazepa provided the Swedes with fortified points in Severshchina for winter quarters, and pledged to deliver provisions and win over the Zaporozhye and Don Cossacks, even the Kalmyk Khan Ayuka, to Karl’s side. In 1708, Mazepa still enjoyed the tsar's trust.

Kostomarov describes the “triangle” of Peter-Mazepa-Sich this way: “Before the Tsar, praising his loyalty, he [Mazepa] lied about the Little Russian people and especially the black Cossacks, advised to eradicate and ruin the Zaporozhye Sich to the ground, and meanwhile in front of the Little Russians he groaned and complained about the harsh Moscow order, ambiguously frightened them with fear of something fatal, and informed the Cossacks in secret ways that the sovereign hated them and would have already eradicated them if the hetman had not stood for them and had not tamed the royal anger.” The Sich openly hated Hetman Mazepa. Mazepa wrote to Golovin about his longtime enemy Kostya Gordeenko: “The Cossacks show me neither obedience nor honor, what have I done with those dogs? And all this comes from the damned dog of the Koshevoy... To take revenge on him, I have already looked for various ways, so that I would not be not only in the Sich, but also in the world, but I can’t find it...”

But it so happened that the Sich was destroyed by Russian troops precisely when part of the Cossacks, under the leadership of Gordeenko, supported Mazepa. Back in 1703, when “unrest began among the Cossacks,” Mazepa suggested that Moscow “throw a few ten bombs” at the Cossacks. On this occasion, T. G. Tairova-Yakovleva expresses an interesting hypothesis about the role of discord with the Sich in Mazepa’s hopeless transition to the Swedes: “Who knows, maybe Mazepa, realizing that he was dying, intended to drag Zaporozhye, which he had always considered an enemy of the Hetmanate?”

Events in Baturin

Defeat, anathema and death

Charles XII and Hetman Mazepa after the Battle of Poltava

But, apparently, Charles XII continued to trust Mazepa and on April 8, 1709, concluded a formal agreement with him, apparently fixing previous agreements, partly already fulfilled, and partly no longer possible, in which, in particular, he granted Mazepa a lifelong title "legitimate prince of Ukraine." Mazepa, among other things, promised to transfer to Charles XII “for the duration of war and danger” the cities of Starodub, Malin, Baturin, Poltava, Gadyach. Already on the eve of the defeat, the “high contracting parties” divide Russia among themselves: “Everything that is conquered from the former territory of the Muscovite region will belong, on the basis of military law, to the one who takes possession of it.”

However, Mazepa realized his mistake almost immediately after his transfer to the Swedes. Abandoned by his colonels, foreseeing the defeat of the Swedes, he unsuccessfully tried to invite Peter I to betray the Swedish king and his generals into his hands. Already at the end of November 1708, less than a month after the transition, the Mirgorod colonel, the future hetman D. Apostol, one of the people closest to Mazepa, arrived with this proposal to Peter. Next came Shishkevich, Voinarovsky’s barber, and Colonel Galagan with Mazepa’s letters. An agreement was even concluded with guarantees of Mazepa’s security, but that was all. Mazepa was not needed by Peter's entourage. The king no longer trusted Mazepa. A number of authoritative historians noted that it is unknown how serious Mazepa’s intentions were. Moreover, doubts were also expressed about the very fact of Mazepa’s proposal. Ukrainian journalist Sergei Pavlenko claims that the entire operation to extradite Charles XII was a provocation by the Moscow government, aimed at causing a rift between Mazepa and the Swedes; among other things, he refers to the fact that on the draft letter of the Apostle to Mazepa, confirming the transfer of the hetman’s proposal to the tsar, there is a note from Chancellor G. Golovkin: “The letters that were written to Mazepa for treason are fake from the chancellor.” Strictly speaking, this does not indicate the unreliability of the proposal, but gives reason to doubt it. Historian V. A. Artamonov disputes S. Pavlenko’s statement and argues that the version of Mazepa’s proposal is trustworthy.

On the same day, a symbolic execution of the former hetman was carried out in Glukhov, which is described as follows: “they carried a stuffed effigy of Mazepa into the square. The verdict on the crime and his execution was read; Prince Menshikov and Count Golovkin tore up the letters of hetmanship granted to him, the rank of actual privy councilor and the Order of St. Andrew the First-Called Apostle and removed the ribbon from the effigy. Then they threw this image of the traitor to the executioner; Everyone trampled it underfoot, and the executioner dragged the stuffed animal on a rope through the streets and squares of the city to the place of execution, where he hanged it.”

Ideological assessments of Mazepa’s personality and actions are extremely different, often opposite. However, the objective result of his transition to Charles was the drawing of the Swedes’ troops into Little Russia, where they entered relying on provisions, winter quarters and 50 thousand promised by Mazepa. Cossack army: “Karl went to Ukraine with high hopes. The Little Russian hetman Ivan Mazepa entered into a secret treaty with him, and his secret sending to the king with a request to go quickly was, as they said, the reason for the sudden turn of the royal one.” But only 3 thousand stood under the banner of Mazepa, many of whom soon left him, taking advantage of the amnesty declared by Peter. Later, about 7 thousand more Cossacks joined the Swedes (according to Swedish data, the numbers are usually half that). These troops did not even take part in the decisive Battle of Poltava. At the same time, there were more Cossacks in the Russian army than Mazepa.

The Swedish troops near Poltava on June 27 (July 8), 1709 were crushed by Peter's forces twice as superior to them (60 thousand versus 27 thousand), Sweden's influence in Europe was significantly weakened, and Russia's influence increased. After the Battle of Poltava, Karl and Mazepa fled south to the Dnieper, crossed at Perevolochna, where they were nearly captured by Russian troops, and arrived in Bendery.

Treaty of Union between Hetman Mazepa, Charles XII and Zaporozhye Sich

It was an agreement on a joint struggle against the Moscow Tsar Peter I, signed on March 27 of the year by the hetman of Ukraine Ivan Mazepa, the king of Sweden Charles XII and the ataman of the Zaporozhye Army Konstantin Gordienko.

According to this treaty, Ukraine was proclaimed “forever free from any foreign encroachment,” Zaporozhye joined the Swedish-Ukrainian union, and the Swedish king Charles XII pledged not to make peace with Peter I without fulfilling allied obligations.

Question about lifting the anathema

The issue of anathema against Hetman Mazepa was brought up for discussion by the Holy Synod of the UOC of the Moscow Patriarchate, whose meeting took place on November 14 of this year. The Synod instructed the Theological Commission of the UOC and the Kyiv Theological Academy to study the issue regarding the canonical and historical circumstances of the excommunication of Hetman Ivan Mazepa and the facts of funeral services for him with the blessing of the church authorities.

On March 17, 2008, at the All-Ukrainian Cossack Rada of Ukraine, which took place in Kyiv, the President of Ukraine announced that he had issued a Decree on the installation of monuments to Hetman Mazepa in the Ukrainian capital of Kyiv, Poltava, and would do everything possible to lift the anathema on Hetman Mazepa.

Currently in a number of means mass media The question is being discussed that the anathema against Hetman Mazepa was lifted back in 1918.

The President's appeal was due to the fact that the canonical Ukrainian Orthodox Church in Canada (as part of the Patriarchate of Constantinople) and the Ukrainian Greek Catholic Church, as well as the non-canonical Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the Kyiv Patriarchate and the Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church do not recognize the anathema of Hetman Mazepa and hold services for rest his soul.

Appearance of Hetman Mazepa

According to the research staff of the Poltava Battlefield Museum-Reserve, L. K. Shendrik and A. V. Yanovich, Peter I and other Moscow kings set the task for government agencies and the church in Ukraine to destroy everything that could remind Ukrainians of Hetman Mazepa. To this end, the Moscow government in Ukraine, along with annual anathemas, destroyed all images of Hetman Mazepa in paintings, in churches, on icons and engravings. As a result of the actions of Russian tsarism, there is currently no accurate idea of ​​the hetman’s appearance and the authenticity of the images in all versions of his portraits.

The main goals of Hetman Mazepa's policy

According to T. Tairova-Yakovleva, Mazepa’s true intentions were different: “Mazepa considered the alliance with Leshchinsky solely as a last resort in the event of a Swedish invasion, and possibly in the event of a brewing rebellion among the elders in the conditions of reform of the Hetmanate. In Ukraine, people are “initial and subordinate, both spiritual and worldly, as different wheels“The essence of agreement is not in unanimous agreement.” Some favor Moscow, others are inclined towards Turkish patronage, others want twinning with the Tatars - solely out of “innate antipathy towards the Poles.” Samus and other residents of the Right Bank fear revenge from the Poles and are unlikely to want to submit to the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth. Therefore, Mazepa proposed to first achieve unity of opinion in Ukraine and the unification of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, and then think about a union. It is clear that such good wishes could only be a declaration designed to gain time.”

Hetman Mazepa twice raised the issue of annexing Sloboda Ukraine to the Russian Tsar Peter I and was twice refused.

Domestic policy of Hetman Mazepa

Cossacks

The internal policy of Hetman Mazepa was aimed at strengthening the influence of the Cossack elders, strengthening its economic base and social position, and turning it into the ruling class of the Hetmanate. The provision of estates to elders and clergy (mostly monasteries) by the hetman's authority or colonels increased significantly.

Already in the first days and months of his hetmanship, Mazepa issued a number of universals, which either confirmed old possessions or created new ones from the fund of so-called “free military” estates. During Mazepa's hetmanship, the purchase of land by elders and monasteries became very widespread.

But land ownership and Agriculture were not the only source of financial well-being for the Cossack elders. The foreman pays great attention to various commercial and industrial operations. Huge profits were given to the elder by various financial transactions, in particular “lease” - vodka, tobacco and tar. Both general and private sergeants, men, and even women took part in these operations. In those days, the foreman, especially its top, widely developed industrial entrepreneurship both in the south and in the north of the Hetmanate.

The process of concentration of senior estates was accompanied by concentration political power in the hands of the highest sergeant. The volume of colonel power increased. Previously elected by vote to his position, the colonel now became the hereditary master of his regiment.

A new name appeared that defined this category of foreman - “bunchuk partnership”, “noble military partnership”, exempt from all local (regimental or hundred) duties and jurisdiction, which was directly subject to the hetman’s power, was “under the hetman bunchuk” and “defense” , was tried only by the General Court.

Thus, Ivan Mazepa created the top of the Cossacks, whose position owed only to him and was only under his jurisdiction.

Peasantry

The concentration of land ownership and political power in the hands of the Cossack elders had as its main consequence an increase in the exploitation of the peasant masses. During Mazepa’s time, on the one hand, these duties increased, and on the other, their ratio changed. In particular, the monetary component is increasing, as well as corvee. But if monetary and in-kind duties predominate on the estates of “free military men” and especially those of rank (including the hetman), then the strengthening of corvée was more typical for estates, primarily monastic ones.

The increase in the duties of subjects at the end of the 17th century caused great discontent among the peasant masses, which often turned into open protests against the power of the elders. Mazepa's government in the interests of the state and social order was forced to intervene, limiting the abuse of rulers and the exploitation of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth.

At the end of the 17th century in Left Bank Ukraine, the usual amount of corvée increased to two days a week. But many rulers exceeded this norm, forcing their subjects to work much more as corvee labor.

Construction and restoration of churches

According to researchers of Mazepa’s hetmanship, Doctor of Historical Sciences Yuri Mitsik and Sergei Pavlenko, at his own expense, Ivan Mazepa built 26 cathedrals, churches and bell towers, including outside Ukraine.

An outstanding achievement of Mazepa's construction activities was the construction of new monumental churches. They are being built in Kyiv and other cities simultaneously with the renovation of ancient churches. The sights of that time in Kyiv - the Epiphany Cathedral in the Brotherly Monastery, the St. Nicholas Cathedral in the Pustynno-Nikolaevsky Monastery, the Church of All Saints at the Economic Gates of the Pechersk Monastery - served as examples of church construction for a long time.

Mazepa's policy regarding church building in Ukraine was highly appreciated by the highest church hierarchs, which they expressed in their works. In all the churches built by Mazepa, ceramic plates were laid with the hetman’s coat of arms and the inscription that the church was built on the initiative and at the expense of Ivan Mazepa. Metropolitan Stefan Yavorsky in his work “The Glorious Dawn” characterizes Ivan Mazepa as a leader “whom time leaves in the Books of Eternity.”

see also

Image in works of art

The fate of Ivan Mazepa interested many famous writers, poets, artists and composers from different countries: America, Canada, England, Germany, Russia, etc.

Bibliography

• Nikolai Markevich. History of Little Russia, in 2 volumes. Moscow. In the printing house of August Semyon, at the Imperial Medical and Surgical Academy. 1842
• N. Kostomarov, “Ruin” and “Mazepa and the Mazeppians”;
• Tairova-Yakovleva T. Mazepa. M: Young Guard, Life of Wonderful People, 2006;
• Articles and notes about Mazepa in "Kyiv Star." ;
• “Liste alphabet é tique des portraits russes”, par A. Wassiltschikoff (, I, 497, with portrait);
• Article by A. M. Lazarevsky in "Russian Architect" (, No. 12);
• Article by A. E. D, in "Kiev Telegram" (, Nos. 1, 2, 3 and 4);
• A. Tereshchenko in "Russian Architect" (, No. 9),
• About Mazepa and Palia in "Chernig. sheet." (, No. 4, 5, 6 and 8),
• About Mazepa and Gorlenki in "Western Europe" (vol. III, art. de Poulet).

Notes

1. Kostomarov N.I. Mazepa.// Chapter I. Moscow: "Terra Book Club". - 2004. - P. 3.
2. Pushkin: Research and materials. T. 13. - 1989
3. Although until 1704, in fact, he had power only in Left Bank Ukraine.
4. Domestic policy of Hetman Ivan Mazepi (O. Ogloblin)
5. Oleksander Ogloblin "Hetman Ivan Mazepa ta yogo doba"
6. Libretto by P. Burenin based on the poem by A. S. Pushkin “Poltava”
7. The Rise and Fall of Hetman Mazepa
8. Yakovleva T. G. Mazepa - Hetman: In search of historical objectivity. - M: “New and Contemporary History”, No. 4, 2003.
9. Kostomarov N. I. Mazepa, chapter 1.
10. Kostomarov N. I. Russian history in the biographies of its main figures. Second section: The dominance of the House of Romanov before the accession of Catherine II to the throne. Chapter 16. Hetman Ivan Stepanovich Mazepa
11. Mazepa Ivan Stepanovich Big Russian Biographical Dictionary, online version
12. Olga Kovalevskaya, “Mazepa”, Ed. "Tempora" 2008
13. New encyclopedic dictionary. Petrograd, T. 25, p. 366.
14. Kostomarov N.I., Mazepa, Chapter 2.
15. Kovalevskaya O., Ivan Mazepa in questions and answers, Kyiv: Publishing House. Tempora, 2008
16. Bantyzh - Kamensky D. Life of Mazepa. – M., 1834
17. “Then Petrik also came to an end. He tried to seduce the Little Russians in every possible way: he spread rumors that the hetman was secretly in league with him, and even made it up that he himself was a bastard, the son of Mazepa. No tricks and inventions multiplied the number of his accomplices, nowhere did the Little Russians incline to recognize him as the hetman and liberator from Moscow. On the contrary, there was a hunter who wanted to take advantage of the thousand rubles promised by the hetman<Мазепой>for the head of the troublemaker. It was a certain Yakim Vechirka, or Vechirchenko: he previously served in a regiment near Paley, on the right side of the Dnieper, then moved to the left side and was in one of the detachments chasing the fleeing Tatars. Near Kishenka he attacked Petrik and pierced him with a spear.” Kostomarov N.I., Mazepa, Chapter 5.
18. It follows from the fact that he then switched to another side
19. Plokhinsky M., Hetman Mazepa in the role of the Great Russian landowner // Collection of the Kharkov Historical and Philological Society. Kharkov, 1899. T. 4. P. 32.
20. Tairova-Yakovleva T. G., Mazepa. - M.: Young Guard, 2007.