“Russian question” by the end of the 20th century. Third-party materials: “Russia at the end of the 20th century - the beginning of the 21st century - briefly. conclusions

MODERN MEDICINE

1. Characteristics of the era of the 20th century, the beginning of the 21st century.

2. Specialization and integrity of medicine.

3. Technologization and humanization of medicine.

Medicine during the Second World War.

5. 6. Discoveries in the field of medicine and related sciences, awarded the Nobel Prize.

7. International cooperation in the field of health care in the 20th – early 21st centuries. History of the creation of WHO.

8. Bioethics: history, problems, prospects.

Characteristics of the era of the 20th century.

The development of medicine in the twentieth century was determined by geopolitical events: two world wars and their consequences, national liberation movement, the collapse of colonialism, the formation of new independent states, the collapse of the socialist system. At the turn of the 19th-20th centuries. influenced by achievements natural sciences and technological progress, the most important discoveries in medicine were made.

The historical changes that occurred in 1917 as a result of the February and October revolutions had a negative impact on the state of political and economic life of the country.

In the early years Soviet power Epidemics of typhus, cholera, typhoid fever and other infectious diseases raged in Russia. Everywhere there was an extreme shortage of qualified medical personnel, medical institutions, and medicines. The civil war and military operations throughout the country increased the devastation in industry and agriculture. The population of the country was starving. There was not enough fuel. Transport, water supply and cleaning systems in cities and villages were in a very disrepair, which created a dangerous epidemiological situation.

The fight against epidemics and diseases on the scale of such a huge country as Russia required the organizational unity of the healthcare system and the elimination of departmental disunity, the creation of a network of public hospitals and pharmacies, and overcoming the acute shortage of medical personnel.

The All-Russian Congress of Medical and Sanitary Departments of the Soviets, which took place in Moscow on June 16-19, 1918, discussed a number of important issues for that period: “On the organization and tasks of Soviet medicine at the local level” (report by N.A. Semashko).

The main provisions of the report by N.A. Semashko:

1. The urgent organizational task of Soviet local medicine is to eliminate the previous interdepartmental framework and unify it;

2. Curative medicine should be built on a sequence of principles: a) universal accessibility and b) free;

3. There is an immediate need to improve the quality of medical care (special appointments, special outpatient clinics, special hospitals)...

4. The next medical and sanitary tasks of Soviet medicine, in addition to general and ordinary ones, are the fight against social diseases (tuberculosis, venereal diseases), the fight against infant mortality, etc.;

5. Only Soviet sanitation is capable of combating radically and effectively the housing needs of the poorest population;

6. In view of the insufficiently conscious attitude of the masses of the population, especially in the provinces, to health issues, it is necessary to immediately develop the widest possible sanitary educational activities (conversations, lectures, exhibitions, etc.);

7. It is necessary to involve workers’ organizations in cities and the rural poor in villages in the current activities.”

The resolution of the congress noted: “Based on the underlying structure Soviet republic unity of state power, it should be recognized as necessary to create a single central body - the Commissariat of Health, in charge of all medical and sanitary matters."

The implementation of these tasks over such a vast territory in conditions of war, famine and devastation was possible only with the presence of a state health care system.

On July 11, 1918, the decree “On the establishment of the People's Commissariat of Health of the RSFSR” was adopted. N.A. Semashko was appointed the first People's Commissar of Health of the RSFSR (in 1946, the People's Commissariat of Health of the USSR was transformed into the Ministry of Health of the USSR).

Nikolai Alexandrovich Semashko (1874-1949) headed the People's Commissariat of Health until 1930. He participated in the creation of the USSR Academy of Medical Sciences (1944). Under his leadership, the Institute of Health Organization and History of Medicine of the USSR Academy of Medical Sciences was created (now the National Research Institute of Public Health of the Russian Academy of Medical Sciences).

First Deputy people's commissar health care of the RSFSR was Zinovy ​​Petrovich Soloviev (1876-1928). In 1919, Z.P. Solovyov was elected chairman of the Executive Committee of the Russian Red Cross Society. In 1923, Z.P. Solovyov organized and headed the second department of social hygiene in the country at Faculty of Medicine 2nd Moscow State University.

In order to ensure continuity in the provision of medical care to the population and improve its quality, hospitals began to be combined with outpatient clinic complexes (the negative aspects of this merger were insufficient funding and some organizational failures). The dispensary method (systematic observation of patients with chronic diseases) is being introduced into outpatient practice.

Introduced into medical practice new therapeutic agents : sulfonamides, antibiotics, vitamins (in particular B2), hormones (cortisone, insulin), anticoagulants, cytostatic agents, etc. Wide introduction of electrocardiography significantly increased the diagnostic capabilities of clinicians.

Expanded specialized medical care . Due to the increase in post-war years To reduce the incidence of tuberculosis, preventive anti-tuberculosis vaccination was carried out, and in 1948 mandatory vaccination of children against tuberculosis was established. In 1946, fluorographic examination of the population began in Moscow. With all the republican and regional dispensaries Mobile X-ray fluorographic stations were deployed. New effective antibacterial drugs (streptomycin, ftivazide, tibon, etc.) were introduced into the practice of treating tuberculosis.

In the 1950s the network of anti-tuberculosis dispensaries was steadily expanding (in 1950 - 709, in 1955 - 1104). By the end of the 1950s. the number of anti-tuberculosis institutions in the country as a whole has more than doubled compared to 1940, and in rural areas - seven times.

During these years, work was completed to eliminate malaria as a mass disease.

By the beginning of the second half of the 20th century. highly qualified medical care has become available to every citizen of our country, regardless of social status, place and time of seeking this help.

Academy of Medical Sciences in the 1950s. strengthened as the country's highest scientific medical institution. Its scientific centers expanded, new research institutes were opened: Research Institute of Virology (1946), Research Institute of Experimental Pathology and Cancer Therapy (1951), Research Institute of Poliomyelitis and Viral Encephalitis (1955).

In the early 1960s. The construction of large hospitals with 300 - 600 or more beds began. The construction of large multidisciplinary specialized centers contributed to the development specialized medical care. Rural health care was increasingly moving closer to urban health care.

In the pediatric service, new multidisciplinary hospitals for children, ambulances for children and children's sanatoriums were created. Health care practice included new effective drugs and vaccines (against polio, measles, etc.).

Independent specialties were distinguished from the therapeutic service (cardiology, pulmonology, nephrology, gastoenterology, rheumatology). One of the founders of cardiology in the USSR was an academician of the Academy of Medical Sciences Alexander Leonidovich Myasnikov (1899-1965) . In 1965, A. L. Myasnikov was awarded the “Golden Stethoscope” prize from the International Society of Cardiology for his work on atherosclerosis research.

Quality in the field of surgery new stage opened with the development of microsurgery (operation techniques using a microscope, special optics and specially created instruments). This technique has opened up broad opportunities for the development of transplantology. The first successful kidney transplant in Russia (from a living donor) was performed in 1965 by academician Boris Vasilievich Petrovsky (1908-2004).

Since 1966, research has been intensively carried out on the “Artificial Heart” problem (under the leadership of V.I. Shumakov, USSR State Prize 1971).

Intensive development of specialized medical care in the mid-1960s. required a major restructuring of higher education medical education- from the training of general practitioners to the training of specialists in certain branches of medicine.

At the end of the 1960s. The text of the “Oath of the Doctor of the Soviet Union” was prepared, which was to be taken by citizens of the USSR who graduated from medical universities.

Insufficient funding and excessive centralization of management created significant problems for the development of the medical industry as a whole.

In the 1970s Specialized medical care continued to improve, and the construction of large outpatient clinic complexes for 500 or more visits per shift began. Well-equipped diagnostic centers (oncology, cardiology, obstetrics and gynecology, allergy, gastroenterology, pulmonology, chronic hemodialysis, etc.) were created on the basis of large multidisciplinary hospitals.

In 1975, the All-Union Cardiology Research Center was opened.

Priority direction protection of motherhood and childhood remained, pediatric surgery, orthopedics, traumatology, otolaryngology, ophthalmology, nephrology, etc. actively developed; Specialized maternity hospitals were opened to treat pregnant women with various pathologies.

Began in the mid-1970s. The worsening health indicators of the population became a clear signal of the need for reform of the health care system.

In the 1980s the priority of developing specialized care remained. The country developed and implemented state targeted programs to combat cardiovascular diseases, malignant neoplasms, leukemia, and maternal and child diseases; methods of reconstructive plastic surgery were developed and introduced into clinical practice; devices were created that performed the functions of individual organs.

The system of organizing ambulance and emergency medical care has successfully developed and improved. Automated control systems were introduced - automated control system "Ambulance", automated control system "hospital".

In 1983, the national healthcare system was faced with a grandiose medical and social task: to cover the entire population of the country with dispensary observation (with an emphasis on specialized care).

1990s were a period of radical socio-economic transformations, accompanied by a decline in living standards and basic health indicators for large groups of the population. Health care has undergone a dramatic shift from over-centralization to a liberal federal system. The role of federal government bodies in ensuring state guarantees for the provision of preventive and curative care to all categories of the population has unjustifiably decreased.

Healthcare is in a deep crisis. Financing on a “residual principle” led to a deterioration in the material and technical base of healthcare. The quality of medical care has declined. Preventive work was weakened. Scientific and medical research was reduced.

The crisis of public confidence in medical care, the discrepancy between the population's needs for medical care and the ability to meet them urgently required reform of the health care system.

Health care reform of the 1990s declared the following principles: decentralization of management, demonopolization of the public health sector, multistructure of the health care system, multichannel financing, introduction of market mechanisms.

The negative phenomena of this period include: a decrease in the volume and quality of medical care, an actual decrease in guarantees for accessible and free medical care, the development of curative medicine to the detriment of preventive tasks, the commercialization of medical care and corruption. Detailed central planning lost its importance and was replaced by the development of public health policies with an emphasis on government regulation of health care.

On modern stage The development of medical science and health care practice is more than ever based on the activities of all sectors of the national economy and is in close connection with the achievements of technical and natural sciences.

Scientific and technological progress has enormously expanded the possibilities of diagnosing, treating and preventing diseases. New technologies for functional diagnostics (endoscopy, angiocardiography, ultrasound, computed magnetic resonance imaging, radiopharmacological methods, etc.) are being introduced into medical practice, and new technologies for treating diseases are being developed. The 20th century was truly the “golden age” of surgery, which has made a fantastic journey from the first vascular suture to endoscopic surgery and complex reconstructive plastic surgeries.

Modern technology and above all, computer science not only ensured the development of a number of technologies in medicine, but also created the necessary conditions for the unprecedented development of computer science in our industry. The 20th century is rightly called the century information technologies, which made it possible to collect, process, and concentrate almost 80% of all information known in medicine. The introduction of computer science based on personal computers has made it possible to create and widely use medical Internet sites, programs “Intermed”, “Med-line”, etc., which read and automatically reproduce information from more than 17 thousand medical periodicals and thousands of medical books.

The achievements of the 20th century in the field of life sciences and related areas of knowledge. It is no coincidence that the vast majority of the most prestigious prizes, including the Nobel Prizes, are awarded for discoveries in this field (almost 300 prizes). It was in the 20th century that I.P. Pavlov’s conviction in the correctness of the doctrine of a single, integral organism in the totality of its connections with the outside world was confirmed.

The 20th century made it possible to materialize ideas coming from the past about the so-called protective forces of the body.

Advances in microbiology, virology, immunology and other branches of medicine of the 20th century made it possible to reveal the nature of many, including new, mainly infectious and parasitic diseases (AIDS, various fevers, especially tropical ones), as well as a number of non-epidemic diseases, for example, peptic ulcer of the stomach and duodenum , the bacterial nature of which is no longer a sensation today.

The discoveries of protective forces are directly related to the achievements of hygiene and sanitation. The main one is the establishment of a whole world of substances in the external environment that adversely affect human health and entire populations. According to rough estimates, there are at least 7 million of them, and another 6-7 thousand are identified annually. Rules and methods have been developed to prevent their impact on humans. Sanitary methods and appropriate protective structures are aimed at this.

The largest discovery of the 20th century, of course, is deciphering the gene-chromosomal structure of organisms and determining the chemical composition of their elements (DNA, RNA), establishing the triplet code. This discovery was a breakthrough in the study of heredity, defects of which are present in almost a third of all diseases. It became possible to materialize and see abnormalities in the structure of chromosomes and the order of genes. Most importantly, it was possible to establish the nature of many previously unexplained lesions and pathological processes and thereby open the way to their treatment and prevention. This also made it possible to differentiate the concept of “hereditary predisposition”, which is inherent in many, mainly chronic, diseases.

The apogee of the development of genetics was the possibility of creating genetic engineering, i.e., technology for directed, targeted changes in the hereditary properties of organisms, including microorganisms, which created conditions for the production of genetically engineered therapeutic and preventive drugs, primarily to combat infectious diseases.

We owe to new technologies the development of a whole world of medicines - natural and artificially synthesized, organic, inorganic, genetically engineered, chemical, physical and many others, affecting almost all conditions of the body, including those that are especially difficult to cure - malignant tumors, mental illnesses (psychopharmacology), diseases of the blood, endocrine system, etc.

The 20th century brought unconditional achievements and discoveries in the field of public health and healthcare, social medicine and hygiene in the broad sense of the word. Computer technology has made it possible to quickly and on an unprecedented scale study and evaluate changes in the health of the population, in particular to substantiate the concept of the evolution of types or profiles of pathology in various countries depending on the socio-economic conditions and lifestyle of the population.

An important discovery was the definition of a health model. The leading factor in health and, accordingly, pathology is lifestyle, which affects 50-55% of diseases, especially chronic non-epidemic ones. On the 20th by pollution; it depends 15-20% on genetic factors (genetic risk factors) and only 8-10% on the state of health services.

A. SOLZHENITSYN

“RUSSIAN QUESTION” AT THE END OF THE XX CENTURY

Today, if I want to read anything, I want to read it briefly, as briefly as possible, and about today. But every moment of our history, and today’s too, is only a point on its axis. And if we want to find possible and correct directions for getting out of the current terrible trouble, we must not lose sight of the many mistakes of our previous history that also pushed us towards the present.

I am aware that this article does not elaborate the immediate specific practical steps, but I don’t consider myself entitled to offer them before my imminent return to my homeland.

N It is impossible to do without a historical overview, and even start from afar. However, we will highlight only two lines: how were they related in our history internal state country and its external efforts.

The Existing Myth of Heyday Novgorod democracy in the 15th - 16th centuries, academician refuted S. F. Platonov 1. He writes that it was an oligarchy of a small circle of the richest families, that the dominance of the Novgorod nobility grew to the level of a political dictatorship; and in the civil strife of the warring parties, which had never developed methods of compromise, the popular crowd was used - and to the point of anarchy; that in its rapid development, the social and political order of Novgorod had become dilapidated before it was broken by Moscow.

However, the reserved region of a democratic environment, an abundant free peasantry, was formed precisely after liberation from Novgorod - in Pomorie. (Moscow did not install its landowners there, because it did not see enemies from the north.) In Pomerania, the Russian character developed freely, not in the compression of the Moscow order and without inclinations towards robbery, which was noticeably adopted by the Cossacks southern rivers. (It is no coincidence that Lomonosov’s light came to us from Pomerania.)

IN Troubles of the 17th century, after all the devastation of Rus' and the depravity of souls, it was the Russian North, with support in Pomerania, that at first was a reliable rear for the troops of Skopin-Shuisky, then for the Pozharsky militia, which brought final liberation and reconciliation to Rus'.

And Platonov notes that the painful and soul-destroying period of the Time of Troubles also brought a beneficial revolution in the political concepts of the Russian people: in an atmosphere of tsardom, when Rus' ceased to be the “patrimony” of the Sovereign, and people - his “servants” and “slaves” - the state should not perish and without the Sovereign, we must save and build it ourselves. Local power strengthened everywhere, resolutions of local “worlds” were passed, ambassadors and messages were “sent” from city to city, all-class councils were created in cities, they united into the “council of the whole earth.” (The 16-month stay of the Trinity Lavra and the 20-month stay of Smolensk were similar amateur activities.) All of these are examples of instructive Russian popular organization for us, descendants.

So, next to the usual “sovereign business,” the “great zemstvo business” became. AND Michael from the very first steps he sought the help of the Zemsky Sobor - and the Sobor willingly helped the Sovereign. There was no formal limitation on the power of the Sovereign, but there was a close connection between the king and “the whole earth.” And for the first 10 years of Michael’s reign, the Council met continuously, later periodically. (And all this Russian statehood was not created under Western influence and without copying anyone.)

Without touching here on the last reigns of the Rurik dynasty, let us recall that there, along with the omnipotent royal power, there were local viable administrative institutions (albeit in the most ignorant state of legal consciousness), elected authorities: provincial elder (in criminal cases), zemstvo head elder, “Zemstvo hut” (allocation of taxes, allocation of land, needs of the townspeople). True, the landowner peasants had almost no influence there (although they had community elders and sotskie) 2 . So the local administrations, which had such a saving influence during the Troubles, did not grow out of nowhere. However, the military needs of the state increasingly consolidated the peasants on the lands of service people, and the peasants, in search of freedom, fled to the uninhabited outskirts, which is why at the same time the center of the state became impoverished in people and labor, and the rebellious freemen intensified on the outskirts - both of these had a ruinous effect in the Time of Troubles and not only then: the four-three-century process of serfdom disastrously revealed the New Russian history.

The “conciliar” period after the Troubles, however, quickly ended with Alexey Mikhailovich, according to a historical misunderstanding, perpetuated by “The Quietest.” Under him, the “mandatory” principle over the “zemskiy” began to increasingly prevail in public administration, instead of healthy zemstvo forces - a poorly organized bureaucracy - and this, too, for 300 years to come. The reign of A.M. was filled with riots - popular protest against the management of the governor and clerks. The Code of 1649 not only left slaves and serfs in the same enslavement, but even strengthened it 3. (The answer was a series of riots, ending with Razin’s.) The war that Alexei waged was necessary and fair, because he was recapturing the original Russian lands captured by the Poles. At the same time, the military conflict revealed to Alexei the extent of our backwardness from the West, and the urgent need to adopt knowledge and technology from there, but it also inspired the “fashion” not to lag behind Western influences in anything, to hasten to please even in correcting liturgical books. And this led him to the cruelest crime of anathema to his own people and the war against them for the “Nikonian reform” (when Nikon himself had already moved away from the “Greek project”) 4. 40 years after the people barely survived the Troubles, the entire country, which had not yet recovered, to its very foundation, spiritual and vital, was shaken by the Church Schism. And never again - again 300 years in the future - Orthodoxy in Rus' was restored to its high vitality, which held the spirit of the Russian people for more than half a thousand years. The split reflected our weakness in the 20th century.

And Peter’s violent tornado fell upon this shaken people and unrecovered country.

As a “servant of progress” Peter an ordinary, if not savage, mind. He did not rise to the understanding that it is impossible to transfer (from the West) individual results of civilization and culture, missing the psychic atmosphere in which they (there) matured. Yes, Russia needed to technically catch up with the West, and to open access to the seas, especially to the Black Sea (where Peter acted most incompetently, and in order to redeem his army surrounded on the Prut, he already ordered Shafirov to donate Pskov: through the Turks to the Swedes. About Peter’s military leadership actions We find apt critical remarks in I. Solonevich 5). Needed - but not at the cost of, for the sake of accelerated industrial development and military power- to trample (quite Bolshevik style and with an excess of extremes) the historical spirit, people's faith, soul, customs. (From the current experience of mankind, we can see that no material and economic “leaps” compensate for losses incurred in the spirit.) Peter also destroyed the Zemsky Councils, even “beating off the memory of them” (Klyuchevsky). He bridled the Orthodox Church and broke its back. Taxes and duties grew without correlation to the means of payment of the population. As a result of the mobilizations, entire regions were stripped of their best craftsmen and grain growers, the fields were overgrown with forests, roads were not built, small towns froze, the northern lands became deserted - the development of our agriculture froze for a long time. This ruler did not feel the peasant needs at all. If, according to the Code of 1649, the peasant, although he could not leave the land, had the rights of property, inheritance, personal freedom, property contracts, then by the decree of 1714 on the sole inheritance of the nobility, the peasants became the direct property of the nobles. Peter created - 200 years in advance - a layer of managers, alien to the people, if not always by blood, then always by worldview. And also this crazy idea of ​​dividing the capital - to move (what it is forbidden tear it out and transfer it) to the ghostly swamps and erect a “paradise” there - to the surprise of all of Europe - but with sticks, but on that fantastic construction of palaces, canals and shipyards, driving to death the masses of the people, already so in need of a respite. From 1719 to 1727 alone, the population of Russia decreased by almost 1 million people, dead and fugitives, 6 that is, almost every tenth! (It is no coincidence that a persistent legend was created among the people that Peter was an impostor and the Antichrist. His reign was shaken by riots.) All the great and small affairs of Peter were carried out with a reckless waste of the people’s energy and the people’s flesh. It is difficult to retain Peter's title reformer: a reformer is one who reckons with the past and softens transitions in preparing for the future. As Klyuchevsky writes: “Peter suffered the most failures” in management reforms. The failures and mistakes inherited from him “will later be recognized sacred covenants the great transformer,” the decrees of his last years were “wordy, vague teachings” 7. Klyuchevsky pronounces a devastating verdict on Peter’s civil actions. Peter was not a reformer, but - revolutionary(and mostly unnecessarily).

And behind Peter, the rest of the 18th century rolled along, no less wasteful than Peter on popular strength (and with the capricious twitching of the broken line of succession, again through the fault of Peter). After Peter’s feverish activity, an “abyss” opened up, according to Klyuchevsky, “an extreme exhaustion of the country’s strength due to unbearable hardships imposed on the people’s labor” 8 . There is no way to agree with the widespread opinion that the “standards” presented by the aristocrats from the Supreme Privy Council to Anna Ioannovna would be a step towards the liberalization of Russia: this princely plowing was too shallow, and it would never have reached the masses of the people. And under Anna, German influence and even power sharply increased, the national Russian spirit was violated in everything, noble land ownership, serfdom, including factory law, strengthened (the factories created could buy peasants without land), the people surrendered to heavy extortions and expenses manpower for clumsily led wars.

Through unreasonable and unsuccessful wars and foreign policy, the kingdom Anna Ioannovna very noticeable. True, even Peter, in his rash scope, could have ensured that Prussia acquired Pomerania and Stettin; now his heirs were busy with Schleswig for Denmark, and Minich offered to serve France by keeping a 50,000-strong Russian corps ready for its interests, just to receive a subsidy. Showing no concern for the vast Russian, Belarusian and Little Russian population lost under Poland, Anna’s government, however, was very interested in how to place a Saxon elector on the Polish throne. At that time (1731) the Crimean Khan threatened “that he could sweep Russia away with whips” 9 (and Tatar raids from the south had already been experienced by both Russia and Little Russia, and could always be repeated); at a time (1732) when Russia was barely stretching its legs from the distant Persian war, it gave up not only Baku and Derbent with the entire region, where Peter rolled without support and without calculating his strength, but even the Holy Cross; when famine broke out in Russia (1733 - 34) and the uprising of the Bashkir people began (1735), - at this very time (1733 - 34) Anna began a war with Poland for placing the Saxon elector on the Polish throne. (And how is this better than the Polish invasion of Russia during the Time of Troubles and Sigismund’s plans to seize the Moscow throne?) “The meaning of the Polish war was completely incomprehensible to the Russians” (S. Solovyov). And with this intervention, Russia created a front against itself from France, Sweden, Turkey and the Tatars - and with one unfaithful ally, Austria. Immediately (1734) the Tatars began to attack the Russian borders - meanwhile Russia (under the agreement of Catherine I) was forced to send a 20,000-strong Russian corps to Silesia to help Austria. In 1735, a difficult war with Turkey inevitably broke out. Strategically, she was the only one on the line of Russian interests, since Russia was suffocating without access to the Black and Azov Seas. But how it was conducted! The leadership of the Russian army by Minikh was poor, exhausting for the soldiers and incompetent in tactics. Having not yet encountered the Turks, he had already lost half of the available personnel with which he had left against the Tatars. Shamefully and ineptly stormed Ochakov (1737) - from the most difficult and disadvantageous side (missing an easily passable one), took it with huge losses, and then abandoned it, changing direction to the southwest, to help the Austrians. Here he finally acted successfully - but Austria betrayed Russia with a sudden separate peace with the Turks, and Russia was forced to end the war by razing all the captured fortresses: Ochakov, Perekop, Taganrog and Azov. But our heaviest loss was in people: the war cost us 100 thousand killed. The population of all of Russia at that time was 11 million (less than a century earlier, under Alexei Mikhailovich, so Peter thinned it out!). And let’s imagine the fate of the recruits of that time: there was no term of service for soldiers; they were hired, in fact, for life; The solution was either death or desertion.

As for the spiritual state of the Russian people at that time, by the time of Anna S. Solovyov’s conclusion was also expressed: “The lower, white clergy, depressed by poverty, and in the villages by hard field work, which did not allow the priest to stand out from the flock with his teaching abilities.” - this position of the clergy “was the cause of terrible moral harm for the mass of the population” 10.

He also calls Anna’s time the darkest - due to the undivided rule of foreigners in Russia, from whose oppression the Russian national spirit began to free itself only during the reign of Anna. Elizabeth. (However, contempt for the Russian feeling, for one’s native and for the faith of one’s men, permeated the ruling class in the 18th century.) But here we are interested in other events and lines of her reign.

Before ascending to the throne, Elizabeth played a very risky and morally dubious game with French and Swedish diplomats in St. Petersburg. France hoped that under Elizabeth there would be Russian reign, that she will return the capital to Moscow, will stop caring about naval forces, about Western tasks - and so will take Russia away from the European theater. Elizabeth dangerously negotiated with Sweden so that she would declare war on Russia (this happened in July 1741) and demand the restoration of Peter's dynastic line. (The Swedes, on the contrary, demanded that all Peter’s conquests be returned to them, which Elizabeth did not even think of agreeing to.) But the Elizabethan coup in St. Petersburg took place without the help of France and Sweden - and the new queen ascended the throne with her hands free.

True, the Russian national feeling was alive in her, and her Orthodoxy was not at all ostentatious (as was later the case with Catherine II). Before her accession to the throne, she made a vow in prayer not to execute anyone - and, indeed, not a single death sentence was carried out under her - a phenomenon still completely unusual for all of Europe at that time. She also commuted other punishments for many types of crimes. Forgave (1752) all arrears - from the death of Peter, for a quarter of a century. She “calmed the offended people’s feelings after the long-term rule of foreigners,” “Russia came to its senses.” She tried more than once (1744, 1749, 1753) to transfer the capital back to Moscow, and transported the entire court even for annual periods, led the restoration of the Kremlin - her Russian feeling demanded this, and her daughter’s feeling demanded that she not undermine her father’s plan. But she did not go consistently and far in alleviating the people’s plight. Even under her, the thoughtless and cruel persecution of the Old Believers continued (and they self-immolated) - the extermination of the very Russian root. But the peasants were exhausted from the new taxes, the Vyatkas fled to the forest to live in secret villages, and from the central provinces they fled, albeit to a miserable, humiliated life, across the Polish border, as well as the Old Believers, also across the Dniester, to save their faith - and everyone there have already been a number of such fugitives up to a million! There was a shortage of workers everywhere - and the authorities made intensified attempts to return fugitives from the Don. Peasant uprisings broke out in the Tambov, Kozlov, and Shatsky districts - and entire villages fled to the Lower Volga in search of freedom. And there were many uprisings of monastic peasants (and how indecent it is for monasteries to exploit peasant labor). - It is no coincidence that in 1754 P.I. Shuvalov proposed a “project for saving the people” (to get rid of those who pay the capitation salary from recruitment; in case of shortage of food, give the villagers assistance from grain warehouses, and in case of a large harvest, on the contrary, raise the price of bread so that they do not fall to the loss of the villagers; special commissioners will resolve disputes between landowners and peasants; stop official bribes, but also increase the salaries of officials; protect the villagers from robbery and oppression, including from their army; and even conduct “a free inquiry into the opinion of society that is useful to the state”). - However, Elizabeth ascended the throne with the power of the noble guard and invisibly remained dependent on the nobility, strengthening, as Klyuchevsky put it, “nobility.” (So, in 1758, the landowner was authorized to monitor the behavior of his serfs; in 1760, to exile the serfs to Siberia. On the other hand, the nobles, as already under Anna, received a number of reliefs in their official duties.)

And with such a difficult state of the state and already centuries of popular fatigue - Elizabeth, unstable in spirit, instead of “saving the people”, was preoccupied with “dangers for the European balance” - and unforgivably threw the Russian people’s strength into European discords that were alien to us and even into adventures. - Having quickly and crushingly won the Swedish war, she was then carried away by the absurd dynastic plan to establish one of the Holstein princes as the Swedish heir (however, which of the kings of that time did not build a big policy on dynastic marriages and settlements?) - and for those purposes, in 1743, she gave in to Sweden Finland, liberated from it (missing the opportunity for the free development of Finland, which already had its own diets in the 17th century, would be beneficial for Russia); and got involved further: in order to protect Sweden from Denmark, they sent the Russian fleet there, and Russian infantry to Stockholm, don’t mind... (And then two decades Russian government was intensely occupied with internal Swedish affairs, paid subsidies for the safety of our empty “alliance” with her, bribed deputies of the Swedish Diet, and Russian diplomats there were passionately engaged in the task of “preventing the restoration of autocracy” in Sweden - so that it would be weaker.) - They also longed to have a faithful an ally in Denmark - but such an alliance was contradicted by the Holstein pride of Peter Fedorovich, the heir to the Russian throne. - Elizabeth also recklessly took obligations that burdened us and were not at all beneficial to us to England, from which Russia had never seen any good or help - this was in 1741, and in 1743 a direct alliance, an obligation for Russia to act on the European continent in the interests of England ( according to the deepest calculation that that Holstein-Swedish prince would marry Queen of England, then we’ll create a coalition! In 1745, the insightful Austrian Chancellor Kaunitz reported to Maria Theresa: “Russia’s policy does not stem from its actual interests, but depends on the individual disposition of individuals.”) And in 1751 Russia gave a secret commitment to protect the personal possessions of the English king in the Principality of Hanover - in western Germany , the light is near! monstrous!

Next to us was Poland, which was weakening from internal strife among the gentry; in previous centuries, she captured and oppressed a large Orthodox population - but Elizabeth was not worried about their revenue, but: how to protect the integrity of weakened Poland (after all, our beloved Saxon Elector is the king there...), and at the same time, of course, constantly defend Saxony. (Why is all this our concern?) - At the beginning of her reign, Elizabeth understood well that an alliance with Austria was completely unprofitable for us. But then Prussia, the warlike and enterprising Frederick II, seized Silesia from Austria - and Elizabeth forgave Austria (for intrigues against herself) and resumed (1746) - for another 25 years! - an already outdated alliance agreement with her. And defending Austria and Saxony from Frederick, she sent Russian troops through independent Poland! - Yes, Friedrich acted rudely aggressively - but how far, far away there is from danger for Russia. Would Frederick, even having captured Poland, dare to invade the gigantic territory of Russia? - Russian finances by this time are completely undermined, there are not enough recruits, recruitment is meager - but we are sending troops to Frederick (and without garrisons on our roads and rivers there is direct robbery, it is dangerous to travel and sail), and meanwhile Frederick received from Austria what he wanted , and made peace. And we are walking in vain? No, in 1747 we sent a 30,000-strong corps across the Rhine, to the Netherlands, to help Austria, unnecessarily quarreling with France. (And we don’t hear the murmur of the soldiers and our own population: who can understand this campaign?..)

But in Europe there is a general pacification (only Russia was not invited to the congress in Aachen, and Russia received nothing at all). But, thank you, historians have written down: Russian intervention stopped the War of the Polish Succession, the War of the Austrian Succession and the daring Frederick.

But he was not stopped for long: he kept sneaking around Europe and capturing everything. And in 1756, Russia persistently encouraged Austria to quickly attack Prussia together (while England was clashing with France in America). Meanwhile, we “don’t have a single decent general” (S. Solovyov), because under Anna Ioannovna they did not raise Russian generals, everything was given into the hands of hired Germans. Austria hesitates, Frederick captures Saxony with lightning speed - and the Russian army goes abroad for the Seven Years' War (with obligations: what to return to Austria, what to Poland, and nothing to Russia). Elizabeth longed for “the gratitude of the allies and all of Europe for the security brought to them” and urged her four rotating, incompetent field marshals (one must admit: from St. Petersburg it is better to sweep them away from the situation, but by now the messengers will get home!). They fought like this: summer (not all summers) means fighting, and from early autumn they leave the enemy far back to their quiet winter quarters. (In Prussia, our troops paid residents for each loss.) The war revealed many shortcomings in the training and condition of the Russian armies. Our generals (Battle of Zorndorf) knew how to position their army in battle so that the sun and wind with sand hit him in the face. In all the main battles, Frederick was the first to attack - but the Russian troops either held out or won, and from 1757 they were already invading Prussia. After the battle of Kunnersdorf (August 1759), Frederick fled, considering not only the campaign, but his entire life lost. In 1760, Russian troops entered Berlin, but after 2 days they left without securing it for themselves. Now Elizabeth wanted to get a piece of Prussia, but not on its own, but to exchange it from Poland for Courland (however, both Austria and France strongly opposed this and prevented it). But all these years the Crimean Khan was inciting Turkey (England also incited it) to start a war with Russia (and how would Russia survive?); Türkiye hesitated, but after the Battle of Kunnersdorf it refused. - They languished in the Seven Years' War mostly in inactivity (and especially Austria) even in 1761. And there was less and less strength and means to support the Russian army on a long march; They had already asked England to mediate peace with Frederick, but he, already exhausted himself, but understanding the situation, did not make any concessions. And then Elizabeth died.

Her nephew ascended to the Russian throne - insignificant person, a meagerly small mind, arrested in development at a childish level, and a Holstein-trained soul - a madman Peter III. He secured “nobility” (1762) with a decree “on the freedom of the nobility,” after which - and for a century to come - Russia was now burdened with state-meaning serfdom. (As a result of this decree, in particular, the army lost many officers and had to replace them again with foreigners.) “He set out to change our religion, for which he had special contempt,” he ordered the removal of icons from churches, and the priests to shave their beards and wear clothes like foreign pastors . (The other positive side was the decree on freedom from restriction in the faith of Old Believers, Mohammedans and idolaters.) - But Peter III managed to make the most sensitive sharp turn in his six months in foreign policy: to Frederick II, who had lost the war and was already ready to cede East Prussia, he offered himself draw up an agreement in favor of Prussia, return all the lands occupied by the Russians, and even conclude a Prussian-Russian immediate alliance, help Prussia against Austria (for which he transferred the 16,000-strong corps of General Chernyshev to Frederick), and already sent Russian forces in Pomerania against Denmark - recapture Schleswig for his native Holstein. (The reluctance of the guard to act now against the Danes also served to accelerate Catherine’s coup.) “What Peter III did deeply offended the Russian people... echoed with mockery of the blood shed in the struggle” 11, not only Peter surrounded himself with Holsteins and Germans, but The entire Russian foreign policy began to be led by the Prussian envoy Goltz. The Russian people “looked with despair at the future of the fatherland, which was in the hands of untalented foreigners and ministers of a foreign sovereign” 12.

Catherine's revolution, unlike Elizabeth's, was still not a surge of Russian national feeling. On impulse Catherine to the Code that was not completed (her “Nakaz”, 1767, spoke so much and so boldly about rights, what was prohibited in pre-revolutionary France, with such audacity she “sowed the European seeds” of that century), one would have expected that she would do a lot to improve the people’s fortunes, to somehow protect the rights of the humiliated millions. But there were only small movements towards this: a weakening of pressure on the Old Believers, an instruction not to use unnecessary cruelty in pacifying peasant uprisings. (She treated the German colonists she invited more generously: allocating vast land, building houses for them and exemption from taxes and services for 30 years, and with interest-free loans.) Catherine further expanded, “so that the poor landowners would not be stingy,” the rights of the nobility , not quite satisfied with the “decree on liberties.” The right of every landowner to exile his peasant to Siberia (and then to hard labor) without explaining to the judge why he is being exiled was confirmed (but with a beneficial offset for the landowner against the recruit). “The landowner traded him [the serf] as a living commodity, not only selling him without land... but also tearing him away from his family” 13 . Wasn’t the situation of the peasants sent to work in factories even worse in defenselessness: often far from their place of residence, and they were left with few days a year to feed themselves. Moreover, Catherine also “granted” to her favorites or recipients up to a million living souls from among the peasants, hitherto free; and established serfdom in Little Russia, where until then the right of free movement of peasants still remained. The Commission that developed the Code was supposed to give the nobles unlimited power over the peasants (and, in fact, it already was like that, also for administrative reasons) - and not to accept complaints against the masters from serfs and slaves. In 1767, during Catherine’s Volga trip, she still received a number of peasant complaints, she ordered “not to submit such complaints in the future,” and, according to her instructions, the Senate sentenced: “so that peasants and courtyard people should not dare to hit their landowners with their foreheads.” , and those who dare should be punished with a whip. To the factory peasants: “enter into silent obedience under pain of cruel punishment” 14. And the empress sent military detachments beyond the Polish border to forcefully return the peasants who had fled there. - From the pages of Solovyov’s detailed “History” - we see many pictures of extortion on the ground. The deputies assembled by Catherine declared: “Whoever can, ruins him.” - But did Catherine delve into all that? She was surrounded by immoderate flattery and lies, pleasantly blocking the harsh existence of the people from her. - Our glorious poet Derzhavin, who served in major government posts under three emperors and closely observed court life, writes: “Catherine’s soul was more occupied with military glory and political plans... She ruled the state or justice more according to politics and her views than according to the sacred truth... She reigned politically, observing her own benefits or pleasing the nobles” 15.

She became even more embittered by the rebellion of Pugachev (1773 - 74). In response to Pushkin’s formula (uttered in passing, but since then uncontrollably worn out by repeaters and especially by the educated people of our day) “Russian rebellion, senseless and merciless,” I. Solonevich 16 rightly asks in return: why so “senseless”? 11 years after the decree on noble liberties (truly meaningless in the state) and with Catherine’s growing oppression - was there really no reason for the uprising? But from Pugachev’s manifesto: “to catch [the nobles], execute and hang them, and do the same as they, not having Christianity in themselves, did to their peasants... after the destruction of which the opponents and villains of the nobles, everyone can feel the silence, a calm life that will continue for centuries.” Did Pugachev himself believe so? - he represented “will” as the collective self-will of the majority, having no idea about organized, structured freedom (S. Levitsky). And “not having Christianity in you” is true! Moreover, it is characteristic that in the Pugachev revolt, as in all the revolts of the Time of Troubles, the masses of the people never sought anarchy, but were carried away by deception (as they were from the Decembrists later) that they were acting in favor of the legitimate sovereign. Isn’t that why Pugachev freely took cities, even Saratov, Samara (which greeted him with bells), the Irgiz Old Believers joined him. (By the way, Derzhavin, who served in the region of the rebellion, during the course of it notes the arrogance, stupidity and treachery of the nobles who crushed Pugachev’s uprising.)

But, feeling like a progressive European, Catherine was all the more keenly interested in European problems. Not yet secured on the throne, she had to accept the shameful peace of Peter III with Prussia, but immediately afterwards (1764) she entered into an alliance with her, which was completely unfavorable for Russia, and subordinated herself to Frederick’s policies. Together with him, they began to place Poniatowski on the Polish throne (a pointless effort; as Klyuchevsky finds, according to the properties of the Polish constitution, a Polish king friendly to us was useless, a hostile one was harmless; and Poniatowski, having barely been elected, began to betray his patrons and befriend French king). - Nikita Panin for many years enticed Catherine into the fruitless project of the “Northern Alliance”, beneficial only for England (it never took place, and no help could come to us from England, Sweden, Denmark. England did not hesitate, in 1775, to demand from Russia 20,000-strong corps to Canada; Catherine, after all, refused).

In relation to Poland, Catherine’s concern was reasonable so that the Orthodox people there would “come to a legal position in terms of rights and justice,” which they were completely deprived of, they were forcibly Polished (a complete omission of Peter I, he did not do this, and neither did Elizabeth), although in In 18th-century Poland, weakened by its unrest, Russia had great influence. And Catherine achieved some intercession for the Orthodox, although she was afraid: to achieve greater rights would intensify the flight of Russian people there. (As a reaction to the concessions given in Poland, Polish officials and the Uniate clergy began to unbridledly persecute the Orthodox in Ukraine, which led to the terrible uprising of the “Haydamaks”, 1768, with many cruel victims. His cry was “for the faith!”, and He also covered himself with the shadow of the monarch - a fake order from Catherine.) - The presence of Russian military detachments in Poland, in some places clashes with detachments of “Confederates” led to tension in Turkey, which was then neighboring Poland. And the attack of one Haidamak detachment on a Tatar village near Balta also served as a direct reason: in September 1768, Turkey (also pushed in every possible way by England and France) declared war on Russia (and found it unprepared). - And soon Khan Crimea-Girey with a 70,000-strong army plundered and burned the Elizavetgrad province (the last Tatar invasion in Russian history, 1769). In Poland, Turkey’s attack on Russia was received with enormous enthusiasm, and its consequence was the concession in favor of Turkey of the Kyiv region with peasants of the Orthodox faith.

And here Catherine made important diplomatic mistakes: she hoped that Prussia was an ally, that Austria, in the face of Muslim Turkey, would favor Christian Russia, and took the goal of not just making her way to the Black Sea, which was the only thing vital for Russia, but she set out to “set fire to Turkey from four sides,” conceived an impossible “Greek project”: to restore the Byzantine empire on the ruins of the Turkish (by the way, Voltaire also gave her such advice; she already planned to place her grandson, Konstantin Pavlovich, on the Byzantine throne), sent squadrons to Greece around the whole of Europe and sent disturbing agents to Balkan Christians. This chimerical plan could not even be carried out, and it was impossible to rally the Greeks to do so - but, for the first time, Europe loomed the threatening shadow of Russian interference in the affairs of the Balkans.

Alas, this false, exaggerated and cursed idea drove both the Russian rulers and then Russian society throughout the 19th century and naturally turned all of Europe against us, and most of all Austria, neighboring the Balkans, and so on point-blank until the 1st World War.

The course of military operations was very successful for Russia: Azov, Taganrog, and Bucharest were taken by the fall of 1769, Izmail in 1770, major victories were won near Focsani, on the Cahul River, in the Chesme naval battle, Beirut was even taken from the sea; In the summer of 1771, Russian troops entered the Crimea and Kerch was captured. But with continuous Russian successes, no result was achieved. Russian victories were undermined diplomatically - once again European diplomacy turned out to be unpredictable or unsolved for Russian diplomacy. Russia’s “ally” Friedrich, who had not forgotten the cruel lesson of the Seven Years’ War, was now looking for how to disrupt a peace beneficial to Russia. The Russian-Turkish War brought Prussia much closer to Austria. Austria did not want to put up with the independence of Moldavia and Wallachia (what Russia wanted for the sake of weakening Turkey: to separate it by land from the Tatars), but willingly outlined them for itself; in the event of a successful Russian advance towards Constantinople, she was preparing to strike in the back (a situation that would repeat itself in the 19th century). - Meanwhile, Russia was experiencing a depletion of funds. In addition, in the Turkish regions, Russian troops became infected with the plague; the plague spread to Moscow, where it brought great devastation, due to the fact that the residents did not understand and neglected quarantine requirements. - Peace negotiations with Turkey began in 1772, but there was still no peace (Turkey hesitated), it was concluded (Kuchuk-Kainardzhiysky) only in 1774, when the new sultan took over, and the advancing Suvorov won new victories. Around the world, the Crimean Tatars maintained their independence, but remained under the recognized spiritual subordination of Turkey. Russia received the steppe - first to the Dniester, then only to the Bug, the shores of the Azov Sea, Taman and Kerch; Moldavia, Wallachia and Zabuzhie remained to Turkey. Russia also received the right to patronize the Orthodox faith throughout the Ottoman Empire. (This was understood sincerely in a religious sense at the time - but it already cast a formidable political shadow on the future. The European powers, from which they once launched crusades in Asia Minor, now began to unitely protect Turkey from Christian Russia.) - But this is also a war, in fact, it did not end; Turkey, feeling the support of Europe, hesitated to implement the agreement - and by 1779 Russia made more concessions: it left Taman and Crimea.

Meanwhile, the quick-witted Friedrich realized that against the backdrop of the bloody Russian-Turkish war it was very convenient to divide Poland. (He had this idea before. To the credit of Maria Theresa, it should be noted that she found the partition contrary to Christian conscience and argued for a long time with her crown son Joseph. Then “the Viennese court, in order to reduce the injustice of the partition, considered it its duty to take part in it ".) However, Austria also received the largest piece of Poland, and also a piece of northern Bukovina from Turkey (which would also not mind taking part in the division). “ Red Rus'”(Galicia and Transcarpathia), the legacy of Kievan Rus, also passed to Austria. Russia, according to that 1st partition (1772), regained its native Belarus, and Frederick took the Polish land itself. However, the shortened Polish state still survived then.

In 1787 - 90 there was another war with Turkey; Russia was again in an unfaithful alliance with Austria, which again concluded a truce unexpectedly for Russia. Here the Russian troops again won major victories - all under the same unyielding Ochakov, Bendery, Ackerman, and especially the decisive capture of Izmail by Suvorov. And as these victories progressed, Russia again felt that European powers they will not allow her to benefit from their fruits. England stated that it would not allow changes to the Turkish borders (this was when the Turks stood on the Bug and the lower Dnieper!). Prussia entered into a secret treaty with Turkey in preparation for war. The powers convened a congress (Reichenbach, 1790), which alone undertook to work out a Russian-Turkish peace. (Holland, Spain, and Sicily also agreed to help in this matter.) But here, paradoxically, the French Revolution intervened: it frightened all of Europe and, meanwhile, made it possible for Russia to conclude a victorious peace in Iasi in 1791. (Klyuchevsky writes that this is how the previous Turkish war should have ended, if not for the intervention of Europe.)

Thus, Russia gained access to its natural southern borders: the Black Sea, including Crimea, and the Dniester. (Just as both the Arctic Ocean and the Pacific Ocean had already been reached.) And it was necessary to understand that from now on we would stop there - after four Russian-Turkish wars XVIII century. Alas, Russia fought four more wars with Turkey in the next century, which were no longer justified national meaning and state interests.

Behind the prominences of the same French Revolution There were two more divisions of weakened Poland (1792 and 1795). Russia received Volyn, Podolia, the western part of Belarus (which, in addition to Galicia, ended the unification of the Eastern Slavs or, as they understood then - Russian tribe heritage of Kievan Rus). “Russia did not appropriate anything originally Polish, it took away its ancient lands, and part of Lithuania” 17. Prussia took purely Polish regions, including Warsaw.

Kaunitz noted here that Catherine was passionate about having influence in the West and had a mania for being involved in other people’s affairs. (This can also include the “most chaotic”, according to Klyuchevsky, agreement with Austria in 1782: to create a non-existent “Dacia” from Moldavia, Wallachia and Bessarabia, to give Serbia and Bosnia to Austria, and to give the Morea, Crete and Cyprus to Venice.) Derzhavin writes , that “at the end of her life she did not think about anything else but the conquest of new kingdoms.” Its intervention in the Franco-Austrian conflict was not only a fruitless idea, but a harmful one. Catherine fought six wars (one of the bloodiest of our reigns) and before her death she was preparing for the seventh - against revolutionary France.

I unfortunately took over this war Paul. And Suvorov’s heroic campaigns in Italy and Switzerland, which so delight us (and the Swiss too, to this day) - were, after all, absolutely not needed Russia, only the loss of Russian blood, strength and resources. As well as the reverse breakthrough: in alliance with Napoleon to fight against England, the delusional sending of the Don Cossacks to India (for which they spent, Derzhavin testifies, 6 million rubles 18; and there is a more than solid suspicion that the conspiracy to eliminate Paul was fed from England) .

There are conflicting assessments about the short reign of Paul and about his very personality. Klyuchevsky calls him an “anti-noble tsar,” prof. Trefilov writes that Pavel “took the needs of the serf peasantry to heart.” Indeed, how can one not appreciate that on the day of his coronation (1797) he limited corvee to three days a week and ordered “no compulsion to work on Sunday,” and in 1798 he banned the sale of serfs without land - this was an important turning point in serfdom, from growth to decline. He also canceled Catherine’s decree prohibiting peasants from filing petitions against their masters, and introduced complaint boxes. - And a close witness, Derzhavin (not without a personal grudge against Pavel) writes about his eccentricity, often lack of understanding of the matter (on controversial projects with two opinions - the resolution “to be according to this”); that under Paul the previous institutions of Peter and Catherine were unnecessarily distorted, and “due to slander, many suffered misfortunes”; that upon his accession to the throne and coronation, Paul distributed “quickly and recklessly, to anyone, the palace state-owned peasants” and took away the best state-owned lands from them, “even from arable land and vegetable gardens.” Around Paul, he writes, “no one cared about anything regarding the common good of the fatherland, except for their own benefits and luxury.” (But for this we can reproach the nobles of different countries and times, and not only monarchical ones, but also undemocratic ones, to the very latest.)

Coming to the end of the 18th century, how can one not be amazed by the chain of mistakes of our rulers, their focus on something other than what is essential for the life of the people. But Lomonosov also warned: “We can have only one war against Western Europe - a defensive one.” By the end of the 17th century, the people needed a long rest - but the entire 18th century was spent on it. Now, it seems, all external national tasks have been completed? - so stop and turn entirely to the internal structure? No! and this was far from the end of the external provocations of the Russian rulers. - It would seem, in the words of S. Solovyov, the vastness of the Russian state “not only did not allow development in the Russian people... the desire of others” - among the people, yes, but among the rulers? - but “the reluctance of someone else could turn into inattention to one’s own” 19 - and it did... - A similar observation was made by D.S. Pasmanik: thanks to its open spaces, the Russian people easily developed in a horizontal direction, but for the same reason they did not grow in vertical; “violent heads” and “critical personalities” went to the Cossacks (while in Western Europe they crowded into cities and built a culture); Russian rulers experienced the itch of colonization, not the tenacity of concentration.

To our grief, this continued in the same way for a long time in the 19th century. And our 18th - 19th centuries and in meaning merged into a single Petersburg period.

Contemporaries and historians agree on the assessment of character Alexandra I: romantically dreamy, loved “beautiful ideas”, then got tired of them, “prematurely tired will”, inconsistent, indecisive, uncertain, many-sided. Under the influence of his teacher La Harpe, a Swiss revolutionary, he attached “exaggerated importance to forms of government” (Klyuchevsky), willingly thought about and participated in the development of a liberal constitution for Russia - for a society half of which was in slavery, then donated the constitution to the Kingdom of Poland, a century ahead of Russia. He freed priests from corporal punishment (still monstrously persisting!), allowed peasants to marry outside the will of the landowner and vaguely inclined to free them, but without any land at all (as did the Decembrists), however, he did nothing except (1803) “ the law on free cultivators” - release with the voluntary consent of the landowner, and a ban on the new distribution of state-owned peasants to landowners. Alexander showed lack of will in his activities secret societies, from a young age and himself an accomplice in the fatal conspiracy. “Indiscriminately criticizing the reign of Emperor Paul, they began to indiscriminately distort everything that he had done,” writes Derzhavin, “those around the tsar “were filled with the constitutional French and Polish spirit,” meanwhile, “by allowing the young nobility into idleness, indolence and willfulness, the enemies were undermined fatherland under the main protection of the state.” By 1812, he testifies, the highest dignitaries “had brought the state into a disastrous state” 20 . Under Alexander I, the bureaucracy developed further and further.

Yes, Western Europe in these years was staggering and breaking, Napoleon was destroying and creating states - but this did not apply to Russia with its external location, with its spaces that frighten any conqueror, and a population so in need of peace and a reasonable, caring administration. Why did we need to interfere in European affairs? But Alexander I went into them, forgetting about the Russians (being captured by Western ideas, he was very similar to Catherine). - French historians write this: Alexander I was surrounded by pro-English advisers and began an unnecessary war against Napoleon, imposed by England: a coalition with Austria (1805) and with Prussia (1806). How many losses we gave up to these unnecessary battles, that “desperate courage of the Russian soldiers, which the French had no idea about.” Now Alexander I could not forgive Napoleon Austerlitz and recruited new troops against France. War with Turkey and Persia was threatening - no, Alexander was preparing for a long campaign: pushing Napoleon over the Rhine. Here Napoleon's agent persuaded the Sultan to declare war on the Tsar 21.

Then, offended by England for its indifference, Alexander rushed into friendship with Napoleon - the Peace of Tilsit (1807). It is impossible not to recognize this step as the most beneficial for Russia at that time - and would adhere to this line of neutral-favorable relations, disdaining the grumbling of the St. Petersburg high salons (however, capable of a new pro-English conspiracy) and landowners who were deprived of grain exports due to the continental blockade (more would remain for Russia). - But even here Alexander did not want to remain inactive. No, the Peace of Tilsit and the outbreak of the Turkish war were not enough for Alexander: in the same 1807 he declared war on England; Napoleon “offered to take Finland” from Sweden - and Alexander entered (1808) Finland and took it away from Sweden - but why? another unbearable burden on Russian shoulders. And he did not want a truce with Turkey at the cost of withdrawing troops from Moldova and Wallachia, again Russian troops in Bucharest. (Napoleon “offered” Russia and Moldavia-Wallachia, and indeed Turkey, to divide together with France, to open the way for Napoleon to India), and after the coup in Constantinople he was even more eager to attack Turkey. - But without all these heated takeovers, why not stick to the Tilsit Peace, which was so beneficial for Russia, stay away from the European dump and become stronger and healthier internally? No matter how Napoleon expanded in Europe (however, he got stuck in Spain), he did not take aim at Russia (he just pulled him into annoying active alliances); until 1811 he tried to avoid a collision with Russia. There might not have been a Patriotic War!- all her glory, but also all her victims - if not for Alexander’s mistakes. (From the Turkish war, which was not extinguished in 1809 due to the fact that Alexander demanded the independence of Serbia - the Pan-Slavist idea had already been ignited! - we almost miraculously, through the efforts of Kutuzov, pulled out already in 1812, a month before Napoleon’s invasion, and the Persian - and still lasted a year...)

But now, with the greatest tension and with Moscow burned (little is known that 15 thousand Russians were burned in Moscow hospitals, wounded at Borodino 22), we won the Patriotic War. So - should we stay on our borders (such voices were heard among the generals)? No, Russia must help restore order in Europe (and create two powerful empires against itself in the future - Austrian and German). After the battle of Lutzen, “Alexander could have achieved everything from Napoleon with a separate treaty,” but “in the idea of ​​this self-imposed mission of world pacification, the thought of Russian interests was drowned out” and “we laid down an entire army on the fields of Lutzen and Bautzen, Dresden, Leipzig, etc. , owed hundreds of millions, dropped the ruble... even to 25 kopecks. silver, hampered their development for decades” 23 . (And back in the “Hundred Days” they generously sent their 225 thousand soldiers; now Alexander, in anger, was ready to wage war “to the last soldier and to last ruble".) - Did Alexander drive Russian troops to Paris for monarchical reasons, for the sake of restoring the Bourbons? - no, he hesitated until the last moment (this was arranged by Talleyrand), and forced the Bourbons to swear allegiance to the constitution 24, conveyed liberal sentiments to Louis XVIII. Was he looking for territorial rewards for Russia after such a bloody and victorious war? No, he did not set any preconditions for his assistance to Austria and Prussia in 1813. The only reasonable thing he could do was to return Galicia to Russian possessions, ending the unification of the Eastern Slavs (and what destructive problems he would have saved our history for the future!). Austria did not particularly hold on to Galicia at that time; it was more in need of returning Silesia, annexing Belgrade, Moldavia-Wallachia, stretching from the Adriatic to the Black Sea. But Alexander did not take advantage of the opportunity that was so real for Russia in that situation. No, ineradicably infected with “beautiful ideas” and, using the example of Austria, not seeing what harm it would be for the leading nation in the state to create a multinational empire, he demanded that the central part of divided Poland, the Duchy of Warsaw, be annexed to Russia, in order to make him happy with the addition of Russians provinces into the “Kingdom of Poland”, with their personal merciful guardianship and an advanced constitution; and received for Russia for a century another poisoned gift, another nest of uprisings, another burden on Russian shoulders and another reason for Polish hostility towards Russia.

And the wars with Persia already had a long history, and their main meaning was the defense of Georgia, this began with Boris Godunov, to whom the Georgian Tsar Alexander asked for his hand. According to religious concepts, it seemed necessary and natural to help the Christian people pinched on the other side of the Caucasus ridge, but the interests of the Russian people and the Russian state were relegated to the background. In 1783, the Georgian king Irakli made the same plea. In her last year, Catherine sent a 43,000-strong army to Azerbaijan, Pavel recalled her back. Under Alexander, hostilities resumed, Dagestan was conquered - for what Russian need? for sailing in the locked Caspian Sea? Before Tilsit, Napoleon pushed the Persian Shah to invade Georgia; after Tilsit, it was no longer he, but England. According to the peace of 1813, all of Georgia and Dagestan were recognized as Russia - a dangerous climb into increasingly new and unnecessary traps for Russia.

In the 2nd half of his reign, Alexander I fell into conservatism. Soul Holy Alliance, he went so far as to insist in 1817 to satisfy the request of the Spanish king - to send troops to suppress the rebellious South American colonies - that’s where Russian troops had not yet arrived! (Metternich dissuaded him.) In 1822, Alexander fervently proposed crushing the revolution in Spain itself. But he was ready to support the uprising of Christians (Greeks) against the Turks with Russian forces, negotiated with England about joint actions - and then came what is called his death.

Nicholas I believed that he, first of all, Russian sovereign, and put Russian interests above the general interests of European monarchs, so he moved away from the Holy Alliance. But, an adamant enemy of revolutions, he could not stand it: in 1830 he was ready and was already conspiring with the German monarchs to jointly crush the July revolution in France, then in Belgium (the Polish uprising interfered here); also in 1848 he offered the Prussian king Russian troops to suppress the Berlin revolution; in 1848 - 49 he sent abundant Russian troops for an alien and harmful task: to save the Habsburgs from the Hungarian revolution. And once again he supported the Habsburgs against Prussia (1850) - with what benefit for Russia? impossible to explain; if we write about many more details, then our constant liberation of Austria looks even more ridiculous. (And in gratitude, Nicholas received a stab in the back from Austria in the Crimean War.) And in 1848, Nicholas sent troops to Moldavia-Wallachia to suppress the unrest there - and together with Turkey - this is against the Christian population... We cared about everything that was foreign to us . Russian diplomacy, even in the long century of Nesselrode, remained mediocre, short-sighted and not in the interests of Russia itself.

The end-to-end persistent malice towards Nicholas I of the entire Russian liberal society throughout the entire 19th century (alas, without passing by Tolstoy) and which was further developed many times under the Bolsheviks - stems mainly from the fact that Nicholas suppressed the Decembrist uprising (without difficulty they blamed the death of Pushkin on him) . Now no one worries that some features of the Decembrist programs promised revolutionary tyranny to Russia; other Decembrists insisted during the investigation that freedom can only be based on corpses. (We will not miss such details. Nikolai came out of Zimny ​​to an excited crowd, they shot at him, and his brother Mikhail was killed, General Miloradovich was killed - Nikolai still did not give the order for accelerating shots. It would seem that we, with Soviet experience, should evaluate : all lower ranks were forgiven after 4 days; during the interrogations of the 121 arrested officers there was no pressure or distortion; of those sentenced to death by the court, 36 were pardoned by Nicholas. And on the day of the execution of five, a manifesto was announced about the relatives of all those convicted: “The union of kinship is passed on to posterity.” the glory of the deeds acquired by our ancestors, but not overshadowed by dishonor for personal vices or crimes. Let no one dare to impute them to anyone as a reproach.” his law pardoned the Decembrist Poles, then the angry Nicholas, respecting law, approved.)

From the outside, French historians of the 19th century write about Nicholas: “Diligent, precise, hardworking... thrifty” 25 (our emperors after Peter and including Catherine sorely lacked the latter quality). What distinguished him from many of his predecessors was his persistent search for national meaning and awareness of Russian interests. But many years of boundless power over the vast empire strengthened in him an increased assessment of the capabilities of his will- and this was further coarsened by his inflexible straightforwardness. They led to the troubles of the end of his reign.

Meanwhile, serfdom, which had lost all state meaning for the 7th decade since Peter III, developed, Klyuchevsky notes, to cruel and stupid limits, and slowed down the development Agriculture as such, the productivity of the entire country has slowed down both social and mental development. “From the beginning of his reign, the new emperor had the courage to approach the peasant question,” “the thought of liberating the peasants occupied the emperor in the first years of his reign,” but “changes were pondered carefully and silently,” “secretly from society” (in fact, in fear of strong noble resistance). Yes, “difficult in themselves, individually, these reforms in their totality formed a revolution that was hardly feasible for any generation.” The Emperor hesitated at the warnings of those around him. But “reform that is too slow loses many of the conditions for its success.” Nikolai “carefully looked out for people who could accomplish this important task” - and settled on Count P. D. Kiselyov, “the best administrator of that time” 26. Kiselyov (and he gathered the most enlightened employees) received management state peasants, of which there were 17 - 18 million (with 25 million private serfs and the total population of the country 52 million); he received the right to ransom peasants from landowners, as well as to select for cruel treatment - and energetically got down to business. This was followed by: a ban on selling peasants at retail (1841), a ban on acquiring peasants for landless nobles (1843) and other laws to ease the lot of peasants - in the redemption and acquisition of real estate (1842, 1847). “The totality of these laws... was supposed to radically change the view” of serfs: “that a serf is not the mere property of a private individual, but first of all a subject of the state,” and that “personal freedom is acquired by the peasant as a gift, without ransom” 27 .

No, our sworn serfdom, with which the nobility had so comfortably come to terms in their poetic estates, and into which millions of peasants had already grown spiritually, weighed heavily over Russia for another decade and a half.

Continuing the attempts of Alexander I to support the Greeks who rebelled against Turkey, Nicholas I, soon after his accession to the throne, in 1826, sent an ultimatum note to Turkey, and maintained this tone, despite the war with Persia that began (in the same 1826), achieved (under the Akkerman Treaty , 1826) further consolidation of Russian rights, and Russian trade in Turkish ports, and promises for Serbia (our “Balkan idea” was strengthened... Nicholas I’s carelessness led to many mistakes). After England and France assisted Russia in 1827 (the battle in the Bay of Navarino) - both they and all of Europe listened to the Sultan’s appeal that “Russia is the eternal, indomitable enemy of Islam, plotting to destroy the Ottoman Empire” (very weakened in 1826 by the destruction Janissary corps). And the Russian emperor would have been sober - to stop. But, under unimportant pretexts and increasingly turning Europe against himself by declaring “Russian interests” in Moldova, Wallachia and Serbia, Nicholas began a war with Turkey in 1828. It was a great success on the Caucasian coast (from Anapa to Poti), in Transcaucasia (Akhaltsykh, Kars, Erzurum and almost to Trebizond, already on the indigenous Turkish territory), but in the Balkans it was unsuccessful (the viewing qualities of our troops outweighed the combat ones; due to the poverty of Russia, it was not there were rifled guns, weak reconnaissance, although Moltke the elder, in his analysis of this war, highly praises the Russian soldier who endured everything). True, in 1829 they already passed through Bulgaria (where, to our Slavic surprise, they met a completely unfriendly attitude from the Bulgarians), took Adrianople (Turkey was shaken) - but then they ran out of steam. We achieved the independence of Greece and the vassal status of Serbia (from Turkey), again alien interests, for Russia - free passage of ships through the Bosphorus. In this Turkish war (the 6th in a row!) Russia achieved the greatest external success, but for itself it had nothing more to realize.

Moreover: after 4 years, Nicholas already undertook to save Turkey from the successfully rebelling Egyptian pasha: the Russian fleet hurried to Constantinople to the rescue of the Sultan. Also Russian interests...

Meanwhile, Armenia was liberated by the Persian War.

And responsibility for Georgia and Armenia forced Russia to a new long one - 60 years! with many losses - war: the conquest of the Caucasus. If Russia had not touched at all the Transcaucasus, which is alien to us, the conquest of the Caucasus would not have been necessary either: just to maintain a strong defensive Cossack line in the northern foothills in front of the Caucasus Range from the constant predatory raids of the mountaineers, that’s all: the Caucasus was not a single state, but many contradictory tribes and in itself did not pose a national threat to Russia, especially after the weakening of Turkey. (Yes, there was a moment - Nikolai was already ready to recognize Shamil's state - so Shamil, a Caucasian character, declared that he would reach Moscow and St. Petersburg.) However, even in the 19th century, we continued and continued to pay and pay other people's bills... And the expenses for maintenance of the Caucasus and Transcaucasia - and until the revolution itself exceeded the income from it: Russian Empire paid for the happiness of having these territories. And, we note, nowhere did she “break other people’s customs” (Klyuchevsky).

There was a similar problem with Khiva and Bukhara, which regularly attacked the southern borders of Russia back in the 30s and 40s: far in the depths of the deserts, two strong states kept many captives as slaves, including Russians, brought to them by the raids of the Turkmen and “Kyrgyz” ” (Kazakhs), who reached the Lower Volga. These taken away were sold in Khiva and Bukhara at slave markets 28 . It was necessary either to establish a strong defensive line against those raids, or to begin the conquest. (But the path to India also loomed? But also a clash with England?) In 1839 - 40, Perovsky’s campaign of conquest was carried out - through the deserts, for a thousand miles - but unsuccessful.

In 1831, and then in 1863, Russia paid twice for Alexander I’s dreamy and absurd idea of ​​keeping Poland under its “guardianship.” How it was necessary not to feel the time, so that such a developed, cultural and intensive people as the Polish were kept in a subordinate role under the Empire! (Both of these Polish uprisings aroused great sympathy in Western Europe and resulted in new hostility and isolation for Russia.)

For decades, Nikolai’s Nesselrodian diplomacy floundered in confusion: then (1833) an agreement with Austria and Prussia on the fight against the revolutionary movement; then (1833) a defensive alliance with Turkey, to protect it from any internal and external danger (irritation of the Western powers, the first impetus for the future Crimean War); then (1840) a secret agreement with England: Russia regarding Turkey will act only under the authority of Europe (why these shackles of obligations?); then (1841) Russia refuses to guarantee the integrity and independence of the Ottoman Empire to the Western powers; then (since 1851) Russia heatedly intervened in a superficial dispute between Catholics and Orthodox Christians about priority in holy places in Palestine (aggravated by the personal quarrel of Nicholas I with Napoleon III), which quickly turned into an all-European political clash. - Nikolai revealed to the English ambassador: “Türkiye is a sick person,” he could suddenly die; in the event of the division of Turkey, let England take Egypt and Crete, and Moldavia, Wallachia, Serbia and Bulgaria will find independence under the auspices of Russia - not as part of it, because it would be dangerous to expand the already vast Russian Empire further. (He understood this, but pan-Orthodox and pan-Slavist ideas disastrously pushed him to expand in another form.) And the Russian ambassador in Constantinople demanded: to resolve the issue of holy places and provide Russia with a protectorate over the entire Orthodox population of the Ottoman Empire. When the English ambassador in Constantinople began to skillfully resolve the issue of holy places, to everyone’s satisfaction, the Russian ambassador demanded “inviolable guarantees within 5 days” for the protection of the Orthodox, and then left Constantinople with threats.

The Russian government clearly did not understand that from the rise of Russia over Europe after the victory of 1814, England became Russia's enemy for a century. Now Russia has turned all of Europe against itself. Meanwhile, Türkiye has guaranteed us free passage through the straits since 1829 - what else? (And in the event of a European war, anyone will block the Dardanelles from the outside.) But for half a century since reaching the Black Sea, Russia has not built a strong modern (at least partially propeller-driven) fleet there, only sailing ships. (Not to mention that we did not know how to develop the Black Sea coast agriculturally, there was not enough culture. Yes, throughout the vastness of Russia, unresolved, intricate or unstarted internal affairs were screaming and groaning.) Nicholas I did not even realize the degree of technical and tactical backwardness of our army: there was no loose formation , no trench training, the cavalry is accustomed to riding in the dressage, and not to attacks. And he neglected the anger of Russian society against his administration already at that time (so that for the first time a gaping desire for defeat to your government). But he had no doubt about support from Austria and Prussia... (Meanwhile: Austria was threatened by Russian envelopment from a third party; England was additionally alarmed by Russia’s assertion in the Syr Darya; Napoleon III was looking to prove himself as a newly-minted emperor; Victor Emmanuel II - to elevate Sardinia among the European powers; in Turkey there is a patriotic upsurge, Egypt and Tunisia support it; and Prussia actually joined the demands of the coalition.) And Nicholas I was rushing his neck into the noose, what was this arrogant self-confidence! He rejected several offers of negotiations. (But already by 1790 he should have learned this most dangerous configuration of all European powers against Russia.)

The course of the war is known. After a major Russian naval victory near Sinop, above the Turks, the Anglo-French fleet entered the Black Sea. We did not try to prevent the landing of the Allies at Yevpatoria (although it was already predicted by the English press) and, even before the siege of Sevastopol (not fortified by land), we did not use our huge superiority in cavalry and significant number of bayonets, we marched in battalion columns under heavy rifle fire French. (However, here is the French assessment of the Russian “enemy, gifted with the rarest military qualities, fearless, stubborn, not despondent, on the contrary, after each defeat he rushed into battle with new energy” 29.) The Austrian threat forced the Russian command to clear all its conquests in the Balkans and Wallachia-Moldova. Sevastopol fortified itself (Totleben) and withstood 11 months of siege, until August 1855.

But six months earlier, in February 1855, Nicholas I died (not without mystery). A change of reign is always a turn in politics, a sharp change of advisers, and Alexander II after a stupid battle at the Black River (where our losses were four times greater), he began to succumb to relaxing advice about surrender.

From our historical distance it is clear: it was self-confident madness to start the Crimean War. But after two years of war, and such steadfastness of Sevastopol, and so many dead victims - was it necessary to relax so much? The garrison of Sevastopol occupied the heavily fortified northern side in perfect order; He was numerically inferior to the allies, but was formidably hardened by standing in a long siege. The Crimean army had no shortage of ammunition or provisions (a pound of meat per day for a soldier), and was not cut off from the mass of Russian territory, and could endure the second winter campaign. There were no good roads from Russia, but this would have made it even more difficult for the Allies to attack off-road (despite the fact that their sea communications already stretched over 4000 km). In addition, “for reasons of national pride, during the entire war the allied forces did not have a common command; the three armies had three separate general staffs,” which, like diplomats, coordinated each operation. In addition, “the British, accustomed to great comfort, turned out to be completely unprepared for the harsh climate and lost their enterprise and vigor... the mortality rate among them was terrifying: out of 53,000 who arrived from England, only 12,000 remained combat-ready” 30 - by the spring of 1855 Austria, after the Russians left the Balkans, no longer threatened to move out - and large reserve Russian armies stood on the Austrian border, in Poland, in the Caucasus, and near the Gulf of Finland (and the Baltic fleet successfully repelled the attacks of the allied fleet). By spring 1856 armed forces Russia was up to 1 million 900 thousand, larger than at the beginning of the war. According to S. Solovyov (who, by the way, was banned from giving public lectures on Russian history in 1851): “A terrible peace, such as the Russian sovereigns did not conclude after the Prut” (the humiliating peace of Peter). Solovyov believes: “it was then that it was necessary to announce that the war was not ending, but was just beginning, in order to force the allies to end it” 31. The struggle for Russian land (if the allies were still able to advance deeper) could renew the spirit of 1812 in the Russians, and the spirit of the allies would fall.

This hasty peace (1856, according to which Russia lost the right to maintain a navy in the Black Sea and the Danube Delta) was a bad beginning of the reign of Alexander II, but also the first victory public opinion. (Russian liberals were afraid of the success of Russian weapons: after all, this would give the government even more strength and self-confidence; and they were relieved by the fall of Sevastopol.) All together was a precise and fatal foreshadowing of 1904. (Subsequently, Alexander said: “I did something mean when I went against the world.” 32)

But Alexander II carried out the peasant reform with energy unusual for himself (given his “cautious suspiciousness”), relying against the resistance of the nobility on the unlimited nature of his autocracy. Since 1857, a secret committee for peasant affairs began operating, which at first had neither information about the state of affairs nor a plan: whether to liberate with land or without land. In the summer of 1858, quitrent was removed from state-owned and appanage peasants - thereby they received economic freedom, but they had personal freedom. In the editorial commissions on the reform there were long debates about who should own the land and whether to preserve the peasant community, they worked in great uncertainty - finally Alexander demanded that the manifesto be ready by the 6th anniversary of his accession to the throne. And the decisive step was taken (1861), but with undoubted mistakes; as Klyuchevsky defined thirty years later, “the emergence [or] other principles of life. We know these beginnings... but we do not know their consequences” 33. And, indeed, all the consequences hit us only in the 20th century.

Only farmsteads remained in the personal property of the peasants (the ghost of Stalin's collectivization is emerging?..). The land was partly left with the landowners, due to their opposition, and partly was transferred to the communities (according to the Slavophile faith in them...). The allocation of land to peasants (different in different localities) was both insufficient and expensive: peasants had to pay for “noble” (this is precisely what they could not accept) land - redemption payments. They had nowhere to get this money; until now they had paid for everything either with their labor or its products; Moreover, these prescribed payments in some places significantly exceeded the profitability of the land and were unsustainable. Now, to pay the ransoms, the state gave the peasants loan(4/5 of the required amount), with installments for 49 years, but at 6% - and this interest accumulated over the years and was added to taxes. (And only the events of the beginning of the 20th century interrupted the accumulation of those debts and the counting of those 49 years.) In some places, temporary obligations remained for the peasants to work off their labor. In many places, peasants from liberation lost rights to forest and pasture. The February 19 Manifesto bestowed personal freedom - but for the Russian peasant, ownership of land and its gifts was more important than personal freedom. From the Manifesto, bewilderment spread throughout the peasantry, unrest arose here and there, and they waited for another manifesto, more generous. (However, Western historians give, by comparison, the following comment: “Despite all the restrictions, the Russian reform turned out to be infinitely more generous than a similar reform in neighboring countries, Prussia and Austria, where the serfs were given “completely naked” freedom, without the slightest piece of land” 34.)

Because of the communal system, the reform left the peasants, in fact, without complete personal freedom, the entire peasant class was alienated from other classes ( Not general court Not general legality). The institute was temporarily introduced global mediators from among the local nobles, to practically contribute to the implementation of the reform - but this was not enough: the reform did not create another important administrative and guardianship link that would, over the course of many years, help the peasants make a difficult psychological turn from a complete change in life and adapt to a new way of life . Not only was the stunned peasant thrown into market- His hands were also tied by the community. The main burden of state taxes remained on the peasantry, and there was nowhere to get money from, and so the peasant fell into the hands of an unscrupulous buyer and moneylender. - No wonder Dostoevsky wrote anxiously about the post-reform era: “We are experiencing the most transitional and most fatal moment, perhaps, in the entire history of the Russian people.” (Today, with even greater reason, we will add the current time.) He wrote: “The reform of 1861 required the greatest caution. But what the people met was the alienation of the upper strata and the innkeeper.” In addition: “the dark moral aspects of the previous order - slavery, disunity, cynicism, venality - have intensified. And nothing remains of the good moral aspects of the old way of life.”

The greatly underestimated, deeply sincere Gleb Uspensky, a close observer of post-reform peasant life, presents us with the same picture (“The Power of the Land”, “The Peasant and Peasant Labor”, 1880s). His thought: that after 1861 “there is no attention to the masses”, “there is no organization of peasant life”, and predation has already taken root in the village so much that it may be too late to correct it. But administrative-bureaucratic untruth has also not gone anywhere and, of course, puts pressure on the peasant (the glaring chapter “The Bonds of Untruth”). Uspensky cites a long quotation from Herzen about the mysterious power preserved in the Russian people, which, however, Herzen does not undertake to express in words. And Uspensky takes it: this power of the earth, it was she who gave our people patience, meekness, strength and youth; take it away from the people - and this people is gone, there is no national worldview, spiritual emptiness sets in. The people endured 200 years of Tatarism and 300 years of serfdom only because they retained their agricultural type. It was the power of the land that kept the peasant in obedience, developed strict family and social discipline in him, preserved him from pernicious false teachings - the despotic power of the “loving” peasant mother earth, which also facilitated this work, making it the interest of his whole life. “But this mysterious and wonderful power did not save the people under the blow of the ruble.” (And even, in the honesty of his view and contrary to his revolutionary-democratic consciousness and even party affiliation, Gleb Uspensky could not resist saying: under serfdom, our peasantry was put under earth in a more correct attitude than at present. The landowners had twice as much land as they have now; the landowner had to support in his peasants everything that makes them farmers. Even military service under serfdom was more correct: first of all, those with large families went, and even earlier - all the unfit and drunken people, so there was no proletariat in the village, and it did not prevent the peasant from being a farmer. The old economic system was more truthful when it came to taxes: the rich always paid more than the poor. “Our ancestors knew their people, wanted good for them - and gave them Christianity, the best that humanity has lived through through centuries of suffering. And now we are rummaging through some old national and European trash, in garbage pits.” So - “the basis of the church folk school was to turn the egoistic heart into an all-sorrowful heart. The education of the heart was persistent: the study was tyrant, but it was not about profit, not about unnecessary knowledge, but preached severity towards oneself and one’s neighbors.”)

And then the era broke out: ruble blow!- and considerations benefits and only benefits! And our patriarchal peasantry - even with all the injustices of the reform - could not withstand this drastic change. Many writers of the post-reform era have left us descriptions of this mental oppression, loss, drunkenness, dashing mischief, and disrespect for elders. (On March 16, 1908, fifty members of the State Duma, peasants, unanimously declared: “Let vodka be taken to the cities if they need it, but in the villages it is completely ruining our youth.”) Added to all this was the humiliation of the Orthodox clergy, the decline of the Orthodox faith. (And the Old Believers retained it! This is what we could have been if not for Nikon’s reform; in Leskov’s “Councils” we will read about the wild ways of fighting the Old Believers even in the 19th century.) By 1905 and 1917, all these qualities organically turned into rebellion and revolutionism.

By the end of the 19th century, the peasant population declined in labor. Available forests thinned out, and manure and straw were used for fuel, to the detriment of agriculture. (Historians note: much less money was spent on agricultural education in our country at that time than on Latin and Ancient Greek.) In 1883, the poll tax was abolished, but zemstvo taxes increased. By the beginning of the 20th century, there was a decline in agricultural activity in central Russia (everything is a plow, and a harrow is often wooden, and the wind from a shovel, and bad seeds, and three-fields, forcibly compressed by a communal strip, and the products of labor are given cheaply to buyers and intermediaries, horseless farms have become more frequent , arrears accumulated). During these years, an alarming expression appeared: “impoverishment of the Center.” (It is this term with great fidelity, although with a different content, that S. F. Platonov applies to the period before the Troubles of the 17th century...) Alexander’s unfinished land reform demanded Stolypin’s reform, which met united resistance from the right, cadets, socialists and poorly working parts of the village; and then covered by the same Revolution...

The dangerous class divide in Russia that remained after the reforms also affected the incompleteness of the judicial reform. For peasants (when both parties are peasants) there remained a lower volost court according to village customs; above - justices of the peace for civil actions and minor criminal cases; then - the adversarial process, known from the reform, entirely taken from Western experience, with the irremovability of judges, independent organization of lawyers and jurors. - A jury trial is generally a dubious acquisition, because it detracts from the professionalism of the court (in contradiction with the modern value of any professionalism), and sometimes leads to paradoxical incompetence (one can cite examples from the current English court, which has become quite decrepit). In post-reform Russia, in an atmosphere of public ecstasy with lawyer speeches (which were uncensored in print), it was accompanied by arguments and ended in sometimes tragicomic decisions (this was clearly highlighted by Dostoevsky, “a brilliant establishment of the legal profession, but for some reason also sad,” - if we don’t even mention the ominous the justification of the terrorist Vera Zasulich is a strip of pink dawn for the greedily desired revolution). From these lawyer speeches arose a convenient tradition of shifting responsibility from the personality of the criminal to the “damned Russian reality.”

Alexander III, trying to guess the administrative link missed by his father’s reforms, introduced the institution of zemstvo chiefs (1889), “strong power close to the people” - as if those very (but very late) trustees of peasant life who would make it easier for the peasants to face such a difficult situation for them. the transition from the old tradition to the new would contribute to the streamlining of activities and undertakings. But recruited from the reserve of unemployed nobles (who was there to recruit from?), often not at all devoted to their task, and three decades after an unfinished reform, these zemstvo bosses often turned out to be just another burdensome layer of power over the peasant (thus, dissolved there were elected peasant courts, the court was administered individually by the zemstvo chief). - A serious mistake of Alexander III was (1883) the abolition of the article of the Manifesto of 1861, which gave the right to leave the community to those peasants who paid full redemption payments: for the sake of the idol of the community, which fettered the Russian consciousness, from the emperor to the Narodnaya Volya, looking for how to kill this emperor, the path was blocked free development for the most energetic, healthy, able-bodied part of the peasantry.

In 1856, Gorchakov, who replaced Nesselrode, who had been muddling our foreign policy for 40 years, said at first very soberly that Russia should focus on itself to “gather strength.” We should have understood and implemented this a long time ago. But this slogan did not last even a year: Russia again plunged into European diplomatic games. Military enmity with Napoleon III, which has not yet dried with blood Alexander II suddenly (1857) changed to warm friendship. Gorchakov's demarche (1859) Russia did not allow the German Confederation to stand up for Austria in the Italian War, and France helped Russia oust Austria from captured positions in Moldavia-Wallachia (they soon merged into Romania) and reinforce Russian influence in the Balkans - how important is it for us? - However, due to the Polish uprising (1863), France turned, on the contrary, into an enemy of Russia and, together with England and Austria (repetition of the Crimean War coalition?) came out in favor of the rebels, and again the threat of war seemed likely. But then Prussia declared itself our friend, and having received the benevolent neutrality of Russia in return - Bismarck successively took Schleswig-Holstein from Denmark (1864), stunningly defeated Austria (1866) - and even without being afraid of this strengthening of Prussia, in 1870 - 71 Russia friendly neutrality ensured Bismarck and the defeat of France. (For which soon, in 1878, at the Berlin Congress they received a sly retribution from Bismarck: he joined the European rally to take away from Russia the fruits of victories in the Turkish war.) Russia's foreign policy steps under Alexander II continued to be short-sighted and losing. In 1874 we find Dostoevsky (“Teenager”, Chapter 3) exclamation: “For almost a century now, Russia has been living decidedly not for itself, but for Europe alone.” (It would be more accurate to say: by that time it had already been a century and a half.) But what about Europe? in 1863, Russia did not fail to support the American North with its fleet against the South - and why should we go there (just to take revenge on England?)?

Two unfortunate ideas relentlessly tormented and pulled all our rulers in a row: to help-save the Christians of Transcaucasia and to help-save the Orthodox Christians in the Balkans. One can recognize the height of these moral principles, but not to the point of complete loss of state meaning and not to the point of forgetting the needs of one’s own, also Christian, people. We all wanted to rescue the Bulgarians, Serbs and Montenegrins - we would have thought earlier about the Belarusians and Ukrainians: under the hand of the Power, we deprived them of cultural and spiritual development in their tradition, we wanted to “cancel” our hardly abolishable difference that arose between the 13th and 17th centuries. - There is, after all, truth when the Russian government and thinking leaders are reproached for messianism and belief in Russian exceptionalism. And Dostoevsky, with his incomparable insight, did not escape this captivating influence: here is the dream of Constantinople, and “peace from the East will defeat the West,” even to the point of contempt for Europe, which has long been embarrassing to read. What can we say about the unfortunate “all-Slavic” and “Tsargrad” development of N. Ya. Danilevsky - in his book “Russia and Europe” (in itself interesting in many ways), when it appeared (1869) it was almost unnoticed, but had a great resonance in Russian society since 1888.

With the growing fatigue of the people for the third century, with our internal economic and social troubles, with the “impoverishment of the Center”, with the threatening growth of bureaucratic self-will, incapable of high efficiency, but suppressing popular initiative (they wrote: “The Russian personality, bold and broad-minded natures, have also shriveled abilities began to be found less and less often,” - and really, how many of them are there in Russian literature of the 19th century?) - at the same time, the tireless wars for the Balkan Christians were a crime against the Russian people. Protecting the Balkan Slavs from pan-Germanism was not our task; and any forced inclusion of more and more Slavs into Austria only weakened this patchwork empire and its position against Russia.

Such another war for the Balkans was the difficult war with Turkey in 1877-78 - Russia rushed into it, not caring to have allies or loyal well-wishers, impatiently ahead of the sluggish protests of the European powers against Turkish atrocities (this is how Disraeli played, and this is how Bismarck instigated). On the combat side, the war was carried out sensationally, with successes that impressed the whole of Europe, a winter crossing of the Balkan ridge (and with many casualties and soldier suffering). It was also unique that Russian society, already strongly at odds with the authorities, now united with it in a patriotic upsurge (the frenzy of Pan-Slavism also gripped society). But this time the Russian offensive was not brought to Constantinople and was voluntarily abandoned. According to the Peace of San Stefano, it seems that they achieved everything they wanted for the Balkans: independence of Serbia and Montenegro (in an expanded territory), Romania, expansion of Bulgaria, self-government in Bosnia and Herzegovina and relief for all other Christians who remained under Turkish rule. A celebration of a hundred-year dream and a triumph? Now England directly threatened war (the fleet at the Princes' Islands), Austria - mobilization, all European powers demanded a conference in order to take away what had been achieved from Russia and profit from it themselves. And so it happened. At the Berlin Congress, England received Cyprus for no reason, Austria received the right to occupy Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria was again fragmented, Serbia and Montenegro were cut off, and Russia only regained Bessarabia, lost after the Crimean War. (Gorchakov conducted the entire congress with insignificant weakness of will, while Disraeli was greeted in England with triumph.)

Such a “won” war is worth losing, and it would be cheaper not to start it at all. Russia's military and financial forces were undermined, the public mood was depressed - and it was from here that the era of revolution and terror began, which soon led to the assassination of Alexander II.

In the long line of our emperors Alexander III, without the disease of his father’s indecision, perhaps the first, in a century and a half, well understood the disastrousness of Russian service to foreign interests and new conquests, understood that the main attention should be paid to the internal health of the nation (“Russia’s duty is to take care first of all of itself ”, from manifesto 4.3.81). The commander of the army himself during the Turkish war, he, however, did not wage a single war since his accession (he only ended his father’s conquest in Central Asia, near the border of Afghanistan, with the peaceful capture of Merv, which, however, almost caused a clash with England). But it was during this warless reign that Russia’s foreign policy weight greatly strengthened. Alexander III swallowed the bitterness of Bulgarian “ungratefulness”: educated Bulgarians did not at all appreciate the enormous Russian sacrifices in the just past war and hastened to free themselves from Russian influence and interference. He swallowed the bitterness of Bismarck’s betrayal - and went (1881) to a very balanced and reasonable “agreement on mutual guarantees” with Germany: if Wilhelm had not terminated it a few years later, it would have excluded a war between Russia and Germany at the beginning of the 20th century. After the cancellation of the agreement, Alexander III had no choice but to continue rapprochement with France, and then only after careful waiting.

In domestic policy The successful terror of the Narodnaya Volya in itself closed the way for Alexander III to make any concessions, because they would now look like capitulation. Given the steadfast nature of Alexander III, the murder of his father on March 1 already doomed Russia to firm conservative measures in the coming years, and even the “regulation of enhanced security” (1882). The soon-to-be-formed council of ministers remained almost unchanged during the years of his reign, but, for the purposes of state frugality, unnecessary court positions were reduced and all “Caucasian governorships” were abolished. Peasant taxes were reduced and deferments were given for redemption payments; With the beginning of the export of Russian grain abroad, grain prices increased, to the benefit of the peasants. As already said, Alexander III introduced zemstvo chiefs (with a dual result), but weakened the role of peasants in the zemstvo (a big mistake) and strengthened state control over the zemstvo. Years passed, the state of the country stabilized - and now, obviously, instead of exclusively delaying measures, it was necessary to propose our own multilateral version of active development - for example, a long-overdue measure, to expand the legal system to the peasantry. But neither the tsar himself nor his closest advisers proposed such a project and, therefore, did not feel the unstoppable rhythm of the century. - So in the state of the Orthodox Church, which was weakening throughout the entire St. Petersburg period, Alexander III did not see an alarming deadening, did not give an impulse to revive the church body, did not extend help to the humiliated rural priests in their plight, left the church - and with it popular Orthodoxy - in a serious crisis, although it was not yet clear to everyone then. - As for Muslims, in Russia they “continued to enjoy the same tolerance... Russia was confident in its Muslim subjects in the Caucasus” 36. (And in the First World War, selected regiments of Caucasian volunteers, the “native division”, perfectly confirmed this.)

However, the reign of Alexander III was much shorter than all the others, tragically interrupted at the peak of his age and in the fullness of his spiritual strength, and one cannot guess how he would have behaved in the coming acutely critical years of Russia or even would not have allowed them. (According to L. Tikhomirov, Nicholas II “simply from the first day began, without even a suspicion of it, the complete collapse of everything, all the foundations of his father’s work” 37.)

By the end of the 19th century, the Russian Empire had reached its intended or, as they said then, “natural” (for an unprotected huge plain) territorial volume: in many places to the geographical boundaries set by nature itself. But it was a strange empire. In all other empires known at that time, the metropolis profited richly at the expense of the colonies, and nowhere was there such an order that the residents of which colony had more rights and advantages than the residents of the metropolis. But in Russia it was just the opposite. Not to mention Poland, which had a much more liberal constitution and way of life (which still did not enjoy subordination), one cannot fail to note the widest benefits for Finland. Even from Alexander I, the Finns had broader rights than they enjoyed under Swedish rule; until the end of the 19th century. national income increased 6-7 times, Finland achieved prosperity, largely because it did not pay its proportional share of general government expenses. Likewise, the recruitment from Finland was taken three times less than the Russian average, so that “in Europe, armed to the teeth, Finland did less for its defense than Switzerland” (and under Nicholas II it was completely exempted from military recruitment; the World War did not burden it). Then: “the highest Russian government institutions were crowded with Finns, they occupied the most important military positions in the Russian army and the Russian navy, and Russians could hold any positions in Finland and acquire real estate there only if they transferred to Finnish citizenship,” “in several kilometers from their capital, Russians had to undergo inspection at Finnish customs... communicate in Finnish with officials who stubbornly did not want to speak Russian” 38 - and why was Finland kept in the Empire? (Thanks to such amazing extraterritoriality, and in the neighborhood of St. Petersburg, Finland became an invaluable refuge and settling tank for all Russian revolutionaries, including Socialist Revolutionary militants and Leninist Bolsheviks; this greatly served not only terrorism and the underground in Russia, but also the unleashing of the revolutions themselves of 1905 and 1917.) - Not in such a striking form, but the Asian national outskirts of Russia also received enormous financial assistance from the center, all of them cost more than they brought in revenue to the state. And many of them (“Kyrgyz”, i.e. Kazakhs, and Central Asians) were exempted from conscription duty - moreover, without replacing it with a war tax. (Revolutionary propaganda jubilantly played up the Turgai-Semirechensk uprising in 1916, meanwhile it happened during the World War! - arose in response to an attempt to just labor mobilization of native residents.) But the artificial flow of funds from the center to the outskirts aggravated the “impoverishment of the Center.” The population that created and maintained Russia was increasingly weakened. We do not observe a similar phenomenon in any of the European countries. D.I. Mendeleev (“Towards the Knowledge of Russia”) pointed out how much has been done in Russia for the native nationalities - and that the time has come to take closer care of the Russian tribe. But even if this call had been accepted by the ruling elite, we no longer had historical time left for that.

This picture was uniquely complemented by the strong presence of foreign industrialists in Russia (the British in the Lena gold mines, the Belgians in the iron industry of the South, the foreign platinum syndicate, Nobel in Baku oil, the French in the salt business in the Crimea, the Norwegians in the fishing industry of the Murmansk coast, the Japanese - in Kamchatka and the mouth of the Amur, and much, much more, and in St. Petersburg itself - two thirds of the breeders are foreigners, and their names, the names of the factories, fill the revolutionary chronicle of 1917). And in Semenov-Tyan-Shansky’s “Geographical Description of Our Fatherland,” the county-level lists of qualified landowners are filled with many foreign names.

The dense influx of foreign industrialists and capitalists can be explained especially by the fact that in Russia - one cannot help but be amazed at this! - and by the beginning of the 20th century there was still no strictly implemented income tax: a disproportionate share for Europe was paid from huge profits, and both the rich class in Russia and foreigners took advantage of this, exporting their income in a slightly damaged form. For Russia, this turned into a gross failure in its finances: incomparably rich Russia continually begged for foreign loans (often receiving demonstrative refusals); from 1888, Russia systematically fell into debt on French loans, and this made it dependent on France in foreign policy, which also influenced the fateful events of the summer of 1914.

It was during the reign of the meek Nicholas II, who was so uncertainly settling into her first years on the throne, Russia - morally unacceptable and unacceptable even from practical calculations - surpassed in its expansion the immense borders that it owned. Starting in 1895 in the Far East to act in concert with European countries, the Russian government could not resist (1900) the shameful sending of the Russian corps to Beijing for complicity in the suppression of the Chinese uprising: for many decades China had been extremely weak, in rift, and all the predatory powers vied with each other to take advantage of this. In 1898, Russia forced China to lease Port Arthur and Dalianwan to it, and the concession (1896) for the railway through Manchuria largely placed this area under Russian influence. According to the Russo-Japanese Protocol of 1898, Korea was recognized as independent, however, as Japan penetrated into Korea from the south, the selfless advisers of Nicholas II convinced him that Russia should penetrate into Korea from the north. It was here that Russian-Japanese interests collided mortally: there was still a way to accept a compromise: the Japanese proposal that Russia limit itself to influence in northern Manchuria; but the enemy seemed so unserious, such arrogance grew from the previous easy Russian conquests, and Nicholas II did not feel all the vulnerabilities of the still unsettled, still underdeveloped Russia, of which the government’s enmity with society and the revolutionary movement were far from the only weaknesses of the state - and within itself, and in external relations. Thus began the war with Japan, disastrous only because we had only just finished the Great Siberian Railway; and while continuing to compete with Austria over the Balkans, Russia could not remove its best troops from the western border, but sent second-class corps and reserve troops to the Far East. In 1904 in Japan, not only students, but even teenagers sought to join the army, and our capital students sent telegrams to the Mikado wishing them victory... Russian society was swept by lust for defeat in this distant, unpopular and even inexplicable war - in the sure hope of political success from the Russian defeat, and it flared up even more strongly than from the Crimean War. In the fall of 1905, during the days of the greatest intensity of the revolution, exactly half of the reign of Nicholas II ended - and during these 11 years he had almost lost all power from his hands - but this time Stolypin returned it. (After the next 11 years there was no one to return.)

Foreign policy blunders continued. Wilhelm II, who pointedly, even theatrically played the role of Nicholas II’s dear friend (“who blessed” him to fight in the Far East, but also helped him with friendly neutrality), on a date in Björk at the end of 1905, not without guile, proposed to Nicholas together sign a triple friendly treaty with France, and she will “join later.” And Nikolai signed (without the knowledge of the Council of Ministers, and later took the signature back). Of course, there was no small game here to push France into the background; Of course, Germany had already imposed an oppressive trade treaty on Russia in 1904, and it was difficult to consider it a friend of Russia. However, the system of a strong union And with Prussia, And with France - it was the proven system of Peter I; and yet, the edge of the agreement in Bjork was directed against England - a country that for 90 years in a row has been a persistent ill-wisher of Russia and has always and everywhere been looking for how to cause harm to Russia, and often it has succeeded magnificently, and just now, in the Japanese war, England was an ally of Japan. Wilhelm, foreseeing a brutal war with England, still looked for a way not to fight with Russia, both in our land neighborhood and large numbers both armies - from what bloody massacre we would have been spared in 1914 (and therefore from the revolution of 1917)! It seems impossible, inexplicable, that Nicholas II would still prefer an alliance with the hater of Russia, with whom interests clashed so many times and in so many places. But Nicholas took exactly this step: the Anglo-Russian alliance of 1907, from here the Entente was formed, and the balance of power in the First World War was fatally determined.

Soon (1909), in response, Austria annexed Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Wilhelm, in the form of an ultimatum, forced Russia to humiliate admit legality of seizure. True, this seizure was already predetermined by the Berlin Congress (1878) - but in 1909 in Russia it was painfully perceived by both the government and society: our fatal pan-Slavist passion almost called for an immediate war (impossible under Stolypin, but extremely beneficial for England ).

And of course, with our pan-Slavist intensity, we could not bear the rude Austrian ultimatum to Serbia in 1914 (and this was the German-Austrian calculation). And that’s why they attacked us so boldly in 1914 that they stopped respecting Russian military strength in 1904. And our troops in East Prussia were abandoned as a hasty, unprepared victim for the sake of saving Paris.

Up to this point, we have one-sidedly traced the three-hundred-year period of Russian history: along the lines of missed opportunities for internal development and the ruthless waste of people’s forces on external goals unnecessary to Russia: they cared about European “interests” more than about their people.

However, despite all this, you will be amazed at the wealth of people’s energy, not to mention Pomorie or the Don - and the example of Siberia. (“The conquest of Siberia” incorrectly expands from the West Siberian episode of Ermak’s struggle with Chinggisid Kuchum, who conquered the Tobolsk Tatars, and in 1573, even before Ermak, raided the Solikamsk region. The 17th century is not noted in Siberia a large number serious military clashes - in comparison with the previous history of the continent, the wave of Mongol and Turkic conquests, or in comparison with the brutal destruction of the Mayans, North American Indians, Patagonians, Tasmanians; on the contrary, with the arrival of the Russians, numerous civil strife among the Yakuts, Buryats, Chukchis with the Yukaghirs, etc. ceased; among the Yakuts, the time before the arrival of the Russians is called “the time of bloody battles” 39, moreover: the Russians did not violate the internal organization of the aboriginal peoples; there were major clashes only with the Manchus and Mongols, who stopped the Russian advance on the upper Amur.) During the 17th century, a small number of enterprising Russian people mastered the vast Siberian continent - up to the Sea of ​​Okhotsk, the mouths of the Yana, Indigirka and Bering (Dezhnev) Straits, and founded arable farming in the open spaces who never knew him (except in small areas); By the end of the 17th century, all of Siberia was eating its own rye. The arable lands reached north to Pelym, Narym, Yakutsk, and at the beginning of the 18th century they were already in Kamchatka; and everywhere the indigenous peoples exchanged economic and hunting experience with the Russians. In 1701 all Siberia there were 25 thousand Russian families, one family per 400 km 2, in Eastern Siberia there were villages of 1-2 households. (According to the revision of 1719, there were 72 thousand aborigines in Siberia, 169 thousand 40 Russians, by the 80s - more than a million.) And with such a weak population (free resettlement; runaway peasants who were not returned to the Urals; exiled settlers) - The 18th century in Siberia amazes us what peaceful popular efforts aimed at internal rather than external tasks can produce: the gigantic scope of Russian labor, crafts, significant factory and metallurgical production and Russian trade - from the Urals through all of Siberia to Kyakhta, Chukotka, the Aleutian Islands and Alaska (in 1787 the American Trade and Trade Company was founded by the tradesman Shelikhov) 41. Already in the 18th century, geodetic, navigation, mining, and medical schools operated in Siberia, libraries and printing houses arose; A thorough cartography of the Arctic and Pacific coasts was carried out 42.

Such was the wealth of national energy that half a century after the fall of serfdom, Russia entered a period of rapid industrial development (5th place in the world in industrial output), railway construction, and became the largest exporter of grain and butter (Siberian) butter. In Russia there was complete freedom of private economic activity (“the market”, which today we are all going to achieve or adopt from someone), freedom of choice of occupation and place of residence (except for the Jewish Pale of Settlement, but this was also heading towards abolition). The large bureaucratic apparatus, however, was not closed either nationally (we see representatives of many nationalities in prominent positions in it), or socially (the assistant driver Khilkov, the peasant Rukhlov, the station manager Witte, the assistant attorney at law Krivoshein became ministers, and the military leaders ascended from the very bottom generals Alekseev, Kornilov). According to the testimony of the last Secretary of State of Russia S.E. Kryzhanovsky, in the sense of the rise of individuals, Russia was a very democratic country: the highest bureaucrats were not made up of people of high birth; according to the testimony of the Minister of Railways Krieger-Voinovsky: apart from the special position of the peasantry, by the 20th century there were no longer class barriers; “rights were determined by education, official position and type of occupation” 43. The independence and openness of the court, the strict legality of the investigation have been established since the 60s of the 19th century, as well as the press without prior censorship, and since 1906 - a true parliament and a multi-party system (which is coveted today as the latest achievement). Let us also note that free high-quality zemstvo medicine was available to the people. Work insurance was introduced. Russia had the highest population growth in Europe. And higher education for women in Russia was one of the first in Europe.

And all this has collapsed since 1917, and is still presented in the world in an extremely distorted way.

But even in this short prosperous period of 1906 - 1913, perspicacious people saw the neglect of the state disease, the dangerous fragmentation of society and government, and the decline of Russian national consciousness. Lev Tikhomirov, in the past a prominent Narodnaya Volya member, later a statesman-theorist who turned to patriotism, wrote in his diary in 1909-10: “You can’t do anything in modern Russia, there’s nothing to do. We are apparently moving towards a new revolution and, it seems, inevitably... everything, even all private measures of power, randomly lead to revolution”; “With Russia, I am completely perplexed. I stand on my bastions, I don’t lower the banner, I fire from my guns... but my native army is moving further and further from you and - according to human reason - it is unthinkable to expect anything from it...” About youth: “They are no longer our descendants, but something new”; “The Russian people!.. And they have already lost their old soul, their old feelings” 44 - here Tikhomirov meant the loss of Orthodox and national consciousness, “the mental and moral humiliation of the nation in general” 45.

Tikhomirov correctly noted the spiritual essence of the crisis. In 1909, the question of Russian national consciousness suddenly became the center of discussion in the liberal press. “When non-power nationalities began to self-determinate, the need for self-determination arose for the Russian people.” What is happening “in the progressive Russian press is something impossible even so recently: the question of Great Russian nationalism is being debated,” “the first appearance of that consciousness that awakens, like the instinct of self-preservation, among peoples at the moment of danger threatening them.” “It’s not a joke and a disgrace to the very word └Russian,” which has been turned into └truly Russian.” - “Just as we should not engage in the “Russification” of those who do not want to “Russify”, just as we ourselves should not “Russianize” ourselves, drown and become depersonalized in Russian multinationality” (P. B. Struve). - “The attempt to de-Great Russia... turned out to be disastrous for the living national traits not only of all non-power imperial nations, but also, first of all, for the Great Russian people... For the Great Russian nationality, only intensive development in depth, normal blood circulation is useful.” Russian society in previous years, “I was ashamed not only of false anti-national policies, but also of true nationalism, without which national creativity is unthinkable. The people must have their own face.” - “Like 300 years ago, history demands us to answer, in order to answer in the terrible days of trials” whether “we, as an original people, have the right to independent existence” 46.

However, this discussion, instructive for our time, read today as the most modern, in the remaining space before the World War no longer had fruitful development. A dynamic era was overtaking leisurely Russia. The revival of Russian national consciousness did not happen in Russian society. And V.V. Rozanov (in 1911) expressed it this way: “My soul is crying, where have all the Russians gone?.. I cry terribly for the Russians, because I think that the tribe itself is perishing, that in general everything Russian is being trampled underfoot” 47 .

Likewise, the attempts of the Orthodox community around 1905 through the Pre-Conciliar Conference to reach the Local Council and the election of the Patriarch were stopped by the tsar’s stalling resolution. The Russian Orthodox Church remained unchanged for the remaining historical period that had already been measured out. And Berdyaev’s fair reproach, addressed to the intelligentsia, democrats and socialists: “You hated the church and persecuted it. You thought that a people could exist without spiritual foundations, without shrines, enough material interests and enlightenment” 48 - another heavy end falls on the dormant government tops. The Orthodox Church met the 1917 revolution unprepared and in complete confusion. Only a few years later, under the ferocious persecution of the Bolsheviks, popular riots arose in defense of the churches (1918), and with the determination of the ancient early Christians, tens of thousands of clergy flowed to the Gulag and to their death. (But the Bolshevik calculation was unmistakable: after all, they were materially deducted from living resistance.)

In the First World War it somehow took its toll - the accumulated, inexhaustible people's fatigue from all the previous, previous, previous Russian wars, from which the people always remained unrewarded - and to that fatigue was added the same distrust accumulated over generations and generations ruling class. And all this echoed in the soldiers of the two-thousand-mile front when news arrived about the coup in Petrograd, the sudden pliable abdication of the Tsar, and soon the tempting slogans of the Bolsheviks.

Since 1917, we began to pay again and again and heavily for all the mistakes of our previous history.

I have already outlined the entire prehistory of February, the February Revolution itself and its inexorable consequences in the “Red Wheel”, and here I completely skip it. The Bolshevik coup was the logical and steady conclusion of February.

But since in the previous review we touched a lot on Russia’s disinterested and senseless interventions in European affairs, it is appropriate here to briefly speak about the role of the Western allies in the civil war in Russia. While Germany was still resisting, the Allies naturally made efforts - either to rescue the Czechoslovak corps through Siberia in order to have time to use it against Germany; then landing in Arkhangelsk and Murmansk to prevent the Germans from doing this. But the World War ended - and the allies lost interest in the whites - in the Russian generals, their direct and personal allies from the last war. In the North, the British sank ammunition and army supplies into the sea, so as not to leave them to the whites. White governments were not recognized (Wrangel - only de facto and briefly, while he could alleviate the situation of Poland), but any nation that broke away from Russia was immediately recognized (and Lloyd George demanded the same from Kolchak). For military supplies they demanded Russian raw materials, grain, gold, and confirmation of the payment of Russian debts. The French (remember the salvation of Paris in 1914 by the victims of the Russian armies in Prussia) from the general. Krasnov was demanded to compensate for all losses of French enterprises in Russia, “which occurred as a result of the lack of order in the country,” and to compensate with interest for their lost profitability since 1914; in April 1920, the allies sent an ultimatum to Denikin-Wrangel: stop the fight, “Lenin promised amnesty”; for assistance in the evacuation of Crimea, the French took Russian military and merchant ships for themselves, and from the Wrangelites evacuated to Gallipoli they took military property, including army linen, as payment for food. - The defeat of Russia by the Bolsheviks was very beneficial for the allies: there was no need to share a share of the victory. That's how realistic language of international relations.

Due to the primordial underdevelopment of legal consciousness, national consciousness and the fadedness of religious foundations in the last decades before that, our people fell to the high-ranking Bolshevik burnouts - experimental molded material, convenient for molding into their forms.

These ideological internationalists began with the reckless squandering of Russian lands and wealth. At the Brest-Litovsk negotiations, they showed their readiness to give up any coverage of Russian lands in order to remain in power themselves. - In the diary of the American diplomat William Bullitt, you can read about the higher price that Lenin offered to the American delegation in 1919: the Soviet government is ready to give up western Belarus, half of Ukraine, the entire Caucasus, Crimea, the entire Urals, Siberia and Murmansk: “Lenin proposed to limit the communist government to Moscow and a small adjacent territory, plus the city now known as Leningrad” 49. (This cry from Lenin would be important to understand for all those who today still admire how the Bolsheviks “recreated the Power.”) - So Lenin proposed in panic when he feared a completely natural “campaign of the Entente” against his rebellious group, in defense of his ally Russia. But he soon became convinced that this was not a threat, and ceded Russian land on a smaller scale. In February 1920, Estonia, in exchange for the first international recognition of the Soviet government, a breakthrough in isolation, ceded the Russian population near Ivangorod-Narva and some “shrines” of Pechora and Izborsk; soon after that, he gave Latvia a large Russian population. - According to international plans, seeking the friendship of Turkey (which occupied almost all of Armenia in December 1920), the Soviet government from the winter of 1920 to the beginning of 1921, seemingly barely getting up from the civil war in its devastated country, began widespread assistance to Turkey with all types of weapons, as well as “free financial assistance” in the amount of 13 million rubles in gold (3.5 million were added in 1922) 50.

These examples can be multiplied and multiplied. And the direct theft by the Bolshevik gang of the treasures of the Russian diamond fund and everything they looted from state, tsarist and private property is hardly taken into account by anyone, only in rare memoirs you will see how in the Kremlin storeroom, villains and swindlers simply collected handfuls of jewelry for the next Comintern operations abroad. (Treasures from state museums were also secretly sold for the same purposes.) - Probably a whole book could be written about predatory acquisitions concessions on the territory of Russia: negotiations were held with Vanderlip on the lease for 50 years (!) of oil-bearing areas, coal mines and fishing in the Primorsky and Kamchatka regions 51; the notorious “anti-Soviet” Leslie Urquhart - a long-term concession for his former enterprises for the extraction of non-ferrous metals and coal (Kyshtym, Ridder, Ekibastuz) 52; to the British - for 25 years (until 1945!..) an oil concession in Baku and Grozny; to the beginning brat of the business world Armand Hammer - the Alapaevsk asbestos mines (and then the cordial mutual assistance and friendship with him lasted until his death, already in Gorbachev’s time). - Not all the concessions planned at that time took place due to the fact that the establishment of the Leninist group in power still seemed flimsy to Western eyes.

The history of the 70-year communist domination in the USSR, sung by so many bards, voluntary and purchased, a domination that broke the organic flow of people's life, is already today finally visible to many in all its ugliness and abomination. As the archives open (if they open, and many have already been promptly destroyed), volumes and volumes will be written about this 70th anniversary, and such a review has no place in this article. Here we present only the most general estimates and considerations.

All the losses that our people suffered over the 300 years since the Troubles of the 17th century cannot be compared even remotely with the losses and fall during the communist 70th anniversary.

The first place here is the physical destruction of people. According to indirect calculations by various statisticians - from constant internal war, which was waged by the Soviet government against its people, the population of the USSR lost at least 45 - 50 million people. (Prof. I.A. Kurganov came up with a figure of 66 million.) Moreover, the peculiarity of this destruction was that they did not just mow down whoever they had to in a row, or in individual territories, but always - optionally: those who stood out either for protest, resistance, or critical thinking, or talent, authority among others. Through this counter-selection The most morally or mentally valuable people were cut from the population. As a result, the overall average level of those remaining fell irreparably, and the people as a whole were degraded. By the end of the Stalin era, it was no longer possible to recognize among the people those who were caught up in the revolution: other people, other morals, other customs and concepts.

And what else, if not the physical destruction of one’s own people, can be called the reckless, merciless, reckless laying of Red Army corpses along the paths of Stalin’s victories in the Soviet-German war? (“Clearing” minefields with the feet of persecuted infantry is not yet the most striking example.) After Stalin’s “7 million losses,” after Khrushchev’s “20 million,” now, finally, the actual figure has been published in the Russian press: 31 million. A mind-numbing figure - a fifth of the population! When and what people laid down so much in the war? Our “Victory” of 1945 was embodied in the strengthening of the Stalinist dictatorship - and in the complete depopulation of villages. The country lay as if dead, and millions of single women could not continue the life of the people.

But physical mass destruction is also not the highest achievement of communist power. All those who escaped destruction were irradiated for decades with mind-numbing and soul-corrupting propaganda, and constantly renewed signs of submission were demanded from everyone. (And from the obedient intelligentsia - and weave this propaganda in detail.) From this thundering, triumphant ideological indoctrination, the moral and mental level of the people continued to decline. (This is the only way those today’s old people and elderly could be brought up, who remember the era of happiness and prosperity, when they gave up their labor for a penny salary, but on November 7th they received half a kilo of cookies tied with a colored ribbon.)

But in foreign policy - oh! here the communists did not repeat a single mistake or blunder of tsarist diplomacy, of which we have already noted many in this article. The communist leaders always knew exactly what they needed, and every action was directed always and only towards this useful goal - never a single step that was magnanimous or selfless; and every step is accurately taken, with all the cynicism, cruelty and insight in assessing opponents. For the first time in the long course of Russian history, Soviet diplomacy was resourceful, relentless, tenacious, unscrupulous - and always surpassed and beat Western diplomacy. (The communists also completely took the Balkans, without much effort; they seized half of Europe; they penetrated Central America without resistance, South Africa, South Asia.) And Soviet diplomacy was equipped with such an attractive ideological plumage, which aroused enthusiastic sympathy among the Western advanced society, which is why Western diplomats also looked down, having difficulty drawing up arguments. (But note: Soviet diplomacy did not serve the interests of its own people, but those of others, the “world revolution.”)

And these brilliant successes continued to fool and fool the weakened heads of the Soviet people - with the newly invented, nationalless Soviet patriotism. (This is how the current, aged, guardians and fans of the Great Soviet Union were brought up.)

We do not repeat here the now well-known assessment of the “industrial successes” of the USSR: a lifeless economy, ugly production of unasked for and low-quality goods, desecration of vast natural spaces and predatory depletion of natural resources.

But even in all the sucking of vital juices from the population, the Soviet system was not uniform. According to the solid inheritance of Lenin’s thought, it was necessary (and so it was done): the main oppression should be imposed on the large, strong, i.e. Slavic republics, and especially on the “Great Russian trash” (Lenin), the main taxes should be taken from it, and, moreover, initially rely on national minorities, union and autonomous republics. Today, too, it is no longer news, it has been published many times that the main burden of the Soviet economic system was borne by the RSFSR, disproportionately large contributions were taken from its budget, it received the least investment, and its peasants sold the product of their labor twenty times cheaper than, say, Georgian ones ( potatoes - oranges). To cut down the Russian people and to deplete their strength was one of Lenin’s undisguised tasks. And Stalin continued to follow this policy, even when he made his famous sentimental toast about the “Russian people.”

The “counter-selection” that the communists carried out methodically and vigilantly in all layers of the people from the very first weeks of their power, from the very first days of the Cheka, prudently weakened possible popular resistance in advance. It could still break through in the first years - the Kronstadt uprising with simultaneous strikes of the Petrograd proletariat, the Tambov, West Siberian and other peasant uprisings - but they were all drowned in deaths with such a thrifty redundancy that they no longer rose. And when small hillocks arose (like the strike of Ivanovo weavers in 1930), then not only the world, but even the Soviet space itself did not know about them; everything was reliably muffled. A breakthrough in the real feelings of the people towards power could manifest itself - and how visibly it manifested itself! - only during the years of the Soviet-German war: only in the summer of 1941 more than three million prisoners easily surrendered, in 1943 - 44 whole caravans of residents voluntarily retreating behind German troops - as if they were their own... In the first months During the war, the Soviet government could easily have collapsed and freed us from itself - if not for the racial stupidity and arrogance of the Nazis, who showed our suffering people that our people had nothing good to expect from the German invasion - and only Stalin held on to this. I already wrote about attempts to form Russian volunteer detachments on the German side, and then about the beginnings of creating the Vlasov army in “Archipelago”. It is characteristic that even in the very last months(winter 1944-45), when it was already clear to everyone that Hitler had lost the war, - in these very months, Russian people who found themselves abroad - many tens of thousands applied to join the Russian Liberation Army! - this was the voice of the Russian people. And although the history of the ROA was neglected by both Bolshevik ideologists (and the timid Soviet educationist) and from the West (where they could not imagine that the Russians could have their own goal of liberation), it will nevertheless go down as a remarkable and courageous page in Russian history - in the longitude and future of which we believe even today. (General Vlasov is accused that for Russian purposes he did not disdain to enter into an ostentatious alliance with an external enemy of the state. But, by the way, as we have seen, Elizabeth also concluded the same ostentatious alliance with Sweden and France when she went to overthrow the Bironovism: the enemy was too dangerous and rooted.) - In the post-Stalin era, there were also short outbreaks of Russian resistance - in Murom, Aleksandrov, Krasnodar and especially in Novocherkassk, but they, thanks to the unsurpassed Bolshevik stub, remained unknown to the world for decades.

After all the bloody losses of the Soviet-German war, the new rise of the Stalinist dictatorship, a continuous wave of imprisonment of everyone who at least somehow came into contact with the European population during the war, then the cruelest post-war collective farm legislation (for failure to work days - link!), it seems that and came the end of the Russian people and those peoples who shared Soviet history with them?

No. And yet it was not the end.

We have come to the end - paradoxically - from Gorbachev’s hypocritical and irresponsible “perestroika”.

There were many reasonable ways to gradually and carefully emerge from under the Bolshevik blocks. Gorbachev chose the path - the most insincere and the most chaotic. Insincere, because he was looking for how to preserve communism in a slightly modified form and all the benefits of the party nomenklatura. And chaotic - because, with the usual Bolshevik stupidity, he put forward the slogan of “acceleration”, impossible and disastrous given the wear and tear of the driven equipment; when the “acceleration” did not work, he invented the unthinkable “socialist market”, the consequence of which was the collapse of production ties and the beginning of the theft of production. - And Gorbachev accompanied this kind of “perestroika” with “glasnost”, in the short-sighted calculation of the only consequence: to gain the intelligentsia as allies against the extreme bison of communism, who do not want to understand their own benefits from perestroika (another feeding system). He could never have imagined that this glasnost would simultaneously open the gates to all rabid nationalisms. (In 1974, in the collection “From Under the Blocks,” we predicted that it would be very easy to set the USSR on fire with national hatred. At the same time, in Stockholm, I warned: in the USSR “if we suddenly declare democracy, then we will begin a destructive interethnic war that will wash away this democracy in general in an instant.” But this was inaccessible to the leaders of the CPSU.) - In 1990, I wrote with confidence (in “Establishment”): “As everything has gone wrong with us now, “Soviet Socialist” will still collapse, no matter what. !” (Gorbachev became angry and aptly called me for that... “monarchist.” I wouldn’t be surprised: a leading American newspaper commented on my phrase like this: “Solzhenitsyn still cannot part with imperial illusions,” - this is when they themselves were even most afraid collapse of the USSR.) Then and there I warned: “Lest we, instead of liberation, be crushed under its [communism’s] ruins.” And - that’s exactly what happened: in August 1991, concrete blocks began to fall and fall on unprepared heads, and the agile Fuhrers of some national republics, for decades, until the last day, diligently and successfully pulled out their communist service, here - at once, in 48 hours, and some in 24, declared themselves to be original ardent nationalists, patriots of their now sovereign republic, and without any communist birthmark! (Their names still sparkle on the world horizon; they are greeted with respect in Western capitals as the first democrats.)

Blocks and boulders, in different areas of people's life, slammed in the following months with great density, crushing the masses of caught people. But let’s introduce it into the discussion - it’s time.

First consequence. The communist Soviet Union was historically doomed, because it was based on false ideas(most of all they relied on the “economic basis”, and it was this that ruined it). The USSR held on for 70 years with hoops of an unprecedented dictatorship - but when it has become decrepit from the inside, even hoops will no longer help.

Today, not only the bosses, entrenched in communist ideas, but also many ordinary ordinary people, deceived by the heated “Soviet patriotism,” sincerely regret the collapse of the USSR: after all, “the USSR was the heir to the greatness and glory of Russia,” “Soviet history was not a dead end, and natural development”...

As for “greatness and glory,” we have seen in the historical review at what cost and for what extraneous purposes we have often strained ourselves beyond strength in the past 300 years. But Soviet history was precisely a dead end. And even though in these 20s - 30s... the 60s - 70s ruled not you and me- and who gets to answer for all the atrocities committed in front of the whole world? Yes, only for us, and, let us note: only for Russians! - Here here everyone willingly gives us exclusive and first place. Yes, if a faceless, self-interested pack did what they wanted, most often in our name, then we will never be able to wash ourselves off as quickly as others did.

That the Soviet empire is not only unnecessary for us, it is destructive - I came to this conclusion in the first post-war years, in the camps. I’ve been thinking this way for a long time, for half a century, not today. And in “Letter to the Leaders of the Soviet Union” (1973) I wrote: “The goals of a great empire and the moral health of the people are incompatible. And we do not dare invent international tasks and pay for them while our people are in such moral ruin.” And in “Establishment”: “To maintain a great Empire means to exterminate your own people. Why this multi-colored alloy? - for Russians to lose their unique face? We should not strive for the breadth of the Power, but for the clarity of our spirit in its remainder.” We do not need to be a world arbiter, nor compete in international leadership (there will be hunters there who have more strength) - our all efforts should be directed inside, to hardworking internal development. Restoring the USSR is the surest way to kill and drown out the Russian people forever.

We must, finally, clearly understand: Transcaucasia has its own path, not ours, Moldova has its own, the Baltic states have its own, and even more so Central Asia. Almost all Central Asian leaders have already announced the orientation of their states towards Turkey. (Not everyone noticed the promising conference in Alma-Ata in December 1991 on the creation of the “Great Turan” - from the Anatolian Peninsula to the Dzungarian Altai. In the 21st century, the Muslim world, rapidly growing in numbers, will undoubtedly take on ambitious tasks - and should we really get in the way? )

The trouble is not that the USSR collapsed - it was inevitable. The huge problem - and confusion for the long future - is that the disintegration automatically occurred along the false Leninist borders, snatching entire Russian regions from Russia. In a few days we lost 25 million ethnic Russians, 18% of total number Russians - and the Russian government did not find the courage to at least note this terrible event, the colossal historical defeat of Russia, and declare its political disagreement with it - at least to reserve the right to some kind of negotiations in the future. No... In the heat of the August (1991) “victory” all this was missed. (And even - the day when the RSFSR proclaimed its “independence” was chosen as a national holiday in Russia - and, therefore, separation from those 25 million too...)

Here it is necessary to say about today's Ukraine. Not to mention the Ukrainian communist leaders who quickly changed their faces - Ukrainian nationalists, who in the past fought so staunchly against communism, seemed to curse Lenin in everything - were initially seduced by his poisoned gift: they joyfully accepted Lenin’s false borders of Ukraine (and even with the Crimean border from the tyrant Khrushchev). Ukraine (like Kazakhstan) immediately took the wrong imperial path.

The burden of being a great power - I don’t wish it on Russia, and I don’t wish it on Ukraine either. I express my best wishes for the development of Ukrainian culture and identity and love them heartily, but why start not with the healing and spiritual strengthening of the national core, not with cultural work in the scope of the Ukrainian population and Ukrainian land itself, but with the impulse towards a “great Power” ? I proposed (1990) to solve all national, economic and cultural problems in a single Union of East Slavic peoples - and I still consider this solution the best, because I see no justification for cutting off millions of family and friendly ties by state borders. But, in the same article, I stipulated that, of course, no one would dare to keep the Ukrainian people from secession by force - however, with full provision for the rights of minorities. Do the current leaders of Ukraine and its public opinion fully understand the enormity of the cultural task that lies before them? Even the ethnically Ukrainian population largely does not speak or use the Ukrainian language. (For 63% of the population, the main language is Russian, while only 22% are Russians, that is: in Ukraine, for every Russian there are two “non-Russians” who, however, consider Russian their native language!) This means that it is necessary to find measures to translate into Ukrainian language everyone nominal Ukrainians. Then, obviously, the task will be to translate Russians into Ukrainian (and this is not without violence)? Then: the Ukrainian language has not yet grown vertically into the higher layers of science, technology, and culture - this task must also be completed. But more than that: it is necessary to make the Ukrainian language necessary in international communication. Perhaps all these cultural tasks will require more than one century? (In the meantime, we are reading reports - about the oppression of Russian schools and even kindergartens in Galicia, even hooligan attacks on Russian schools, about the suppression of the broadcast of Russian television in some places, and even the ban on librarians speaking with readers in Russian - is this really the path for the development of Ukrainian culture? And there are slogans “Russians out of Ukraine!”, “Ukraine for Ukrainians!” - although there are many nationalities in Ukraine and with practical measures: those who have not accepted Ukrainian citizenship experience difficulties in work, pensions, ownership of real estate, all the more deprived of participation in privatization - and after all, people did not come from abroad, they lived here... But it’s even worse that, due to an incomprehensible intensity, anti-Russian propaganda is being conducted; officers taking the oath are asked a separate question: “what?” are you ready to fight against Russia?”; the army’s Social-Psychological Directorate creates the image of an enemy from Russia, the theme of a “military threat” from Russia is intensified, and for every political disagreement voiced from Russia with the withdrawal of Russian territories to Ukraine, Ukrainian officials react hysterically. : “This is war!”, “This is a shot in Sarajevo!”. Why is the desire for negotiations already a war? Why invite a war where there is none and never will be?)

Nazarbayev made an even more vulnerable blunder, intending to rework with the help of the Kazakh minority majority- other, completely foreign nations. (And so: Russians are removed from responsible positions, the initiative of the Ural and Siberian Cossacks is suppressed, Orthodox churches and Russian settlements are attacked - and now big cities- renamed in Kazakh, given 5 years to study the Kazakh language, even in areas where 90% are Russian. Local television is almost entirely transferred to Kazakh language, although Kazakhs make up only 43% of the population. What awaits the rest was clearly demonstrated by the perverted “elections” of 1994. I also receive complaints from the Germans about violence on the part of the Kazakhs, which is impenetrably covered up by the local authorities.) Adherence to the idea of ​​“Great Turan,” which is very easy for Central Asia, will turn out to be very, very difficult for Kazakhstan. (Now announced verbal the program of the supranational Euro-Asian Union - with a monstrous bureaucratic supranational superstructure - is in complete contradiction with the national suppression that is steadily progressing in Kazakhstan practice.)

As I wrote in “Establishment”: the best solution to the issue is the state Union of the three Slavic republics and Kazakhstan. And in the Belovezhskaya Agreement, judging by the press, Kravchuk promised his colleagues a real inextricable union, “transparent” borders, a single army and currency. But all this turned out to be just a short-term deception. None of this happened, and after a while Kravchuk directly stated: “We need to end the myth of “transparent” borders.” However, with a significant amendment: the transition to world oil prices is “overt blackmail on the part of Russia” (Prime Minister Kuchma), even “approximation to world oil prices is economic war"(Ukrainian ambassador in Moscow; and here again there is “war”. But what about everyone in the world and trading at world prices - and no one calls it “war”?).

However, Russia found itself in a torn state: 25 million ended up “abroad”, not moving anywhere, remaining in the places of their fathers and grandfathers. 25 million is the largest diaspora in the world; no one has one, and - how dare we turn away from it?? Moreover, local nationalisms (as we are used to - very understandable, forgivable and “progressive”) - everywhere go towards oppressing and oppressing our breakaway compatriots. (And those who want to leave Central Asia are not allowed to export personal property: they do not recognize such a concept.)

Fundamentally rejecting the methods of force and war, we can see only the following three paths:

1) from Asian countries (Transcaucasian and Central Asian), where it is unlikely that anything good awaits us, we must methodically, albeit over a considerable period of time, take away willing Russians and settle them soundly in Russia; and for those who remain, seek protection either in dual citizenship, or, or... through the UN? bad hope;

2) demand from the Baltic countries strict and full implementation of pan-European norms on the rights of national minorities;

3) with Belarus, Ukraine and Kazakhstan it is necessary to look for possible degrees of unification in different areas and achieve at least “transparent” borders; and for regions with a significant preponderance of the Russian population, to achieve real local self-government that guarantees their national development.

And we? Over these years, we have hospitably found a place in Russia for 40 thousand Meskhs, scorched out of Central Asia and rejected by the Georgians, where the Meskhs originally lived; and for Armenians from Azerbaijan; and, of course, everywhere for the Chechens, although they declared their secession; and even for the Tajiks, who have their own country, but not for the Russians from Tajikistan - and although there are more than 120 thousand of them there, if we realized it in time, we would have already accepted many of them into Russia - and there would be no need to send Russian troops to protect Tajikistan from Afghanistan, this is someone else’s business, it is not for the Russians to shed blood there. (Question of protected borders, which immediately ceased to exist in Russia, is separate, complex. And yet the direction of his decision: not the Russian military presence in those republics, but - we need to squeeze ourselves into Russian territory.) But weren’t we supposed to manage to take all the Russians from Chechnya, where they are mocked, where they are threatened with robbery every minute, violence and death? And how many did we take from Tuva when Russians began to survive from there?

No, we have no place in Russia for Russians, no funds, refusal.

This is both a betrayal of one’s own and humiliation in front of the whole world: who else in the world does this? Look how Western countries worry and fuss about two or three of their citizens who are stuck somewhere in danger. And we threw away 25 million and forgot.

We can also feel the extent of our humiliation and weakness by the unyielding sentences that are passed on us from the West. The Helsinki Agreement, which interpreted (by forcing the USSR to defend its conquests in Europe) the inviolability of state borders, western statesmen thoughtlessly and irresponsibly transferred to the borders internal, administrative- yes, with such reckless haste that they set fire to a long-term war of extermination in Yugoslavia (where Tito piled up false borders), and in the disintegrating USSR - in Sumgait, Dushanbe, Bishkek, Osh, Fergana, Mangyshlak, Karabakh, Ossetia, Georgia (however, we note : those massacres were not caused in Russia and not by the Russians). But in fact: it is not the borders that should be inviolable, but the will of the nations inhabiting the territories. - President Bush may have tactlessly intervened before Ukrainian referendum: to express sympathy for the separation of Ukraine, with Leninist borders. (Would he say something like that, for example, about Northern Ireland?..) - The American ambassador in Kyiv Popadiuk had the prestige of declaring that Sevastopol is truly Ukrainian territory. By what historical erudition or on what legal grounds did he make this scientific judgment? - didn’t explain. And no need: the State Department immediately confirmed Mr. Popadiuk’s opinion. This is about Sevastopol, which even the extravagant Khrushchev did not think of “giving” to Ukraine, because it was excluded from Crimea as a city of central subordination. (And the question arises: what business does the State Department have to speak out about Sevastopol?)

And at the same time, the empty-headed Zhirinovsky, far overwhelmed by all the worst that has ever been said about Russian politics in condemnation of it, in his extravagant, loud and insane statements calls either to turn Central Asia into a desert, then to the Indian Ocean, or to swallow Poland or the Baltic states, then reign in the Balkans. It is impossible to construct a worse caricature of Russian patriotism and it is impossible to propose a more direct way to drown Russia in blood.

There is no doubt that many Western politicians are keenly interested in the weakness of Russia and its desirable further fragmentation (the American Radio Liberty has been bringing such persistent encouragement to our listeners for many years now). But I will say with confidence: these politicians have a poor understanding of the long-term perspective of the 21st century. There will also be situations in it when all of Europe and the United States will need Russia as an ally.

The second consequence of the collapse of communism in the USSR was supposed to be, as heatedly announced in those August days, the immediate establishment of democracy. But on 70 years of totalitarian soil, what kind of democracy can grow instantly? In the outlying republics, we see all too clearly what has grown there. But in Russia? Only in the form of caustic ridicule can we call our government since 1991 democratic, that is, the power of the people. We don’t have democracy already because a living, unfettered local self-government has not been created: it remains under the pressure of the same local bosses from local communists, and you can’t even shout to Moscow. Our people are not the master of their destiny, but its toy. On the ground there is a mood of despair: “nobody thinks about us,” “nobody needs us,” and that’s true. Only new, unprecedented forms of hardship fell on the people - and the communist nomenklatura, even from Gorbachev’s training, wriggled out, perfectly adapted to become “democrats” and did not suffer as much as the vital foundation of the country. (And the “golden sons” of the nomenklatura, fosterlings of privileged communist institutions, either directly went to govern the country, or, willingly, flowed to America, which their fathers cursed, even knocking with their boots; and others are preparing landing sites for themselves in the West.) The executive and the so-called legislative power fought each other for a grueling year and a half, to the point of mutual impotence - to the shame of the entire country. (And here we will not fail to note the paradoxical situation: the Supreme Council, supporters of totalitarian power, for tactical reasons were forced to defend the “principles of democracy” with all their might; and the “democrats”, for the same tactical reasons, stood with their breasts for the authoritarianism of power. They were so firm the principles of both.) Both fighting sides irresponsibly, vying with each other, flirted with the separatism of the autonomous republics, pushed the indignant regions and territories to declare themselves republics, what was the only way out for them? And if this farce of dual power had not ended, Russia would have already fallen into pieces. (“With the Federal Treaty” Lenin bites us out of the mausoleum once again. But Russia has never been a federation and was not created like that.)

And when this crisis was resolved - with blood, the beating of strangers and again to the shame of the country - democracy flowed not from below, but above, from the central parliament, and in the worst way - through “party lists”, where the party will decide who exactly will be the guardian of your constituency; and this despite the luxurious privileges of parliamentary deputies and, again, the poverty of the country. Our inveterate unfortunate Russian property: from below we still haven’t learned to organize ourselves - but are inclined to wait for instructions from the monarch, or the leader, or the spiritual or political authority - and they, behold, are not there, just a mere fuss at the top.

The third consequence of the fall of communism was supposed to be a return to the longed-for (lost from old Russia) market(according to our communist custom they called it that way - to the future bright market!). But Gorbachev also lost and trampled 7 years, during which it was possible to begin this transition with reasonable gradualism - revitalizing the economic organism from the very bottom, from the smallest household business, so that the people would first feed themselves and become self-sufficient, and only then move higher and higher. No, since January 1992 they hastily brought down on the country a cabinet project (of the International Monetary Fund and Gaidar’s) (“they decided on the fly,” “there was no time to choose the best option,” the President later recalled) - a project not of “saving the people,” but of a cruel “shock.” ” according to him; the project is ignorant, even for a simple amateur eye: to announce “free prices” without the presence of a competitive environment for producers in the country, that is, the freedom of monopoly producers to raise prices as high as they wish and for as long as they wish. (The author of the reform at first expressed the rash hope that prices would stabilize “here, in two months,” “here, in six months” - but there was no reason why they should stop. And no one found the courage to announce their short-sighted mistake.) That’s when We have fully regurgitated all the consequences of communism. Production was not stimulated by anything, it fell sharply, prices rose sharply, the people were plunged into the deepest poverty - and over the past two years this is so far the main effect of the reform.

No, and that’s not the main thing. The most terrible consequence of this insane “reform” is not even economic, but psychological. The defenseless horror and loss that gripped our masses from the Gaidar reform and the visible triumph of the frisky sharks of unproductive commerce (in the madness of complacency they do not hesitate to show their jubilation on television) can only be compared with what, according to Gleb Uspensky, “the blow of the ruble” which the post-reform man could not stand - and from then on Russia crawled into Catastrophe.

The most clear reflection and assessment of the current reforms is in our demography. Here are the data that are now known to world statistics. In 1993, deaths in Russia exceeded the birth rate by 800 thousand. In 1993, per 1000 people. there were 14.6 deaths - 20% higher than in 1992 (“reform”!), 9.2 births - 15% lower than in 1992. It was in the last two years (“reform”!) that the number of suicides increased sharply - up to a third of all unnatural deaths. Desperate people do not see: why live? and why give birth? If in 1875 in Russia there were on average 7 children per woman, before the Second World War in the USSR - 3, 5 years ago - 2.17 children, then today - a little more than 1.4. We are dying out. The probable life expectancy of an adult male has dropped to 60 years, i.e., the same as in Bangladesh, Indonesia and partly in Africa 53 . We hear from demographers: “it’s hard to believe this, even seeing the real numbers”; “such a phenomenon is observed for the first time in an industrial country outside of war and epidemics,” “such a dramatic decline in life expectancy has never occurred in the post-war world. This is truly amazing”; “Russia is facing an unprecedented demographic crisis” 54.

The current “blow of the dollar” is one more, one more (and is it the last?) retribution for our frenzy and the collapse of the seventeenth year. We are now creating a cruel, brutal, criminal society - much worse than the models we are trying to copy from the West. Is it even possible to copy a way of life? - it must organically merge with the traditions of the country; Japan did not copy, it entered world civilization without losing its originality. As Gustav Le Bon defined: the national soul is made up of a combination of traditions, thoughts, feelings and prejudices; All this cannot be thrown away, and it is not necessary. This is the third year we have heard about anything else but the economy. But the crisis in our country now is much deeper than just economic, it is a crisis of consciousness and morality, so deep that it is impossible to count how many decades - or centuries - we need to rise.

However, let’s narrow it down to our topic - the “Russian question” (because I put it in quotes because they are often used that way).

Russian - or Russian?

In our multinational state, both terms have their own meaning and must be respected. Alexander III said: “Russia must belong to the Russians.” But since then, the historical era has matured by a century - and it would be inappropriate to say so (or, copying the Ukrainian chauvinists, “Russia for Russians”). Contrary to the predictions of many sages of humanism and internationalism, the 20th century passed with a sharp increase in national feelings throughout the world, and this process is still intensifying; nations are resisting attempts at the worldwide leveling of their cultures. And national consciousness must be respected always and everywhere, without exception. (I wrote in “Establishment”: in Russia “to establish the fruitful community of nations, and the integrity of each culture in it, and the preservation of each language in it.”) - Both “Russian” and “Russian” - each has its own volume of understanding. (Only the word “Russian,” which may be inevitable in official use, sounds thin. Neither a Mordvinian nor a Chuvash will call themselves that, but they will say: “I am a Mordvinian,” “I am a Chuvash.”)

They rightly remind that in the vastness of the Russian plain, open to all movements for centuries, many tribes mixed with the Russian ethnic group. But when we say “nationality”, we don’t mean blood, and always - spirit, consciousness, direction of preferences in a person. Mixed blood does not determine anything. The Russian spirit and Russian culture have existed for centuries, and everyone who is committed to this inheritance with soul, consciousness, heartache - these are the essence Russians.

Nowadays, patriotism in every former outlying republic is considered “progressive,” and no one dares to call the fierce militant nationalism there either “chauvinism” or, God forbid, “fascism.” However, the definition of “reactionary” has stuck and remains with Russian patriotism, dating back to the revolutionary democrats of the early 20th century. And now every manifestation of Russian national consciousness is sharply condemned and even hastily lumped in with “fascism” (which has never happened in Russia and which is generally impossible without a racial basis, a monoracial state.)

I had to define patriotism in the article “Repentance and Self-restraint” (1973). Even two decades later, I do not undertake to correct him: “Patriotism is an integral and persistent feeling of love for one’s homeland and one’s nation, serving it not by obsequiousness, not by supporting its unfair claims, but by being frank in its assessment of vices and sins.” On such patriotism is the right of any nation, and Russians are no less than others. It’s another matter that after the bloodletting the Russians experienced, losses from “counter-selection”, suppression and fainting of consciousness - today patriotism in Russia is fragmented in disparate units, does not exist as a single, self-realized movement, and many of those who call themselves “patriots” - leaned towards communism for reinforcements and smeared themselves in it. (And then they raise, with weak hands, again the ghost of Pan-Slavism, which has already ruined Russia so many times, and is completely beyond our strength now.)

S. N. Bulgakov once wrote this: “Those whose hearts bled from pain for the Motherland were at the same time its unhypocritical denouncers. But only suffering love gives the right to this national self-destruction; where it is not there... defamation of the homeland, mockery of the mother... evokes a feeling of disgust...” 55

It is in this consciousness and in this right that I am writing here now.

A brief and personal review of Russian history of the last four centuries, made above in this article, could seem monstrously pessimistic, and the “St. Petersburg period” unfairly debunked, if not for the current deep decline and fallen state of the Russian people. (Under the charm of this splendor of the “St. Petersburg period” - and even in comparison with the Bolshevik period, three years ago the residents of the city on the Neva with great enthusiasm restored - not at all in tune with the 20th century, and with our torn country in rags - like white starchy frill name “St. Petersburg”...) How could Russia, once powerful and overflowing with health, fall like this? Three such great painful Troubles - the Seventeenth Century, the Seventeenth Year and the current one - after all, they cannot be an accident. Some fundamental state and spiritual defects led to them. If we spent four centuries wasting people’s strength on unnecessary external things, and in 1917 we could so blindly fall for cheap calls for robbery and desertion, then when did the time come to pay? Our current pitiful situation - has it somehow accumulated in our history?

And so, we came to the Great Russian Catastrophe of the 90s of the XX century. Over the course of a century, a lot has been intertwined here - the year 1917, and 70 years of Bolshevik corruption, and millions taken to the Gulag Archipelago, and millions laid waste carelessly in the war, so that men returned to a rare Russian village - and the current “blow” on the people Dollar”, in a halo of jubilant, laughing nouveau riche and thieves.

The Catastrophe includes, first of all, our extinction. And these losses will grow: in the current impenetrable poverty, how many women will decide to give birth? Defective and sick children will be no less included in the Catastrophe, and they multiply due to living conditions and from the immeasurable drunkenness of their fathers. And the complete failure of our school, which today is not capable of raising a moral and knowledgeable generation. And housing poverty is such as has long since passed in the civilized world. And swarming with bribe takers state apparatus- right down to those who sell our oil fields or rare metals to foreign concessions on the cheap. (What is there to lose if the ancestors shed blood in eight grueling wars, making their way to the Black Sea - and all this was licked off like a cow in one day?) The catastrophe also lies in the stratification of the Russians, as it were, into two different nations: a huge provincial-village massif - and The capital's small population with a Western culture is completely different from him, thinking differently. The catastrophe lies in the current amorphousness of Russian national consciousness, in the gray indifference to one’s nationality and even greater indifference to compatriots who are in trouble. The catastrophe lies in the mutilation of our intellect by the Soviet era: the deception and lies of communism are so layered on the consciousness that many do not even discern this veil before their eyes. - The catastrophe is that for state leadership we have too few people who would be wise, courageous and selfless at the same time - these three qualities will never be combined in the new Stolypin.

The Russian national character itself, so well known to our ancestors, so depicted by our writers and observed by thoughtful foreigners - this very character was oppressed, darkened and broken throughout the entire Soviet period. What was leaving, flowing away from our soul were our openness, straightforwardness, increased simplicity, natural ease, accommodating nature, trusting resignation to fate, long-suffering, endurance, non-pursuit of external success, readiness for self-condemnation, repentance, modesty in performing a feat, compassion and generosity. The Bolsheviks tore, twisted and burned our character - most of all they burned out compassion, willingness to help others, a sense of brotherhood, and in what they dynamized - in the bad and cruel, but without making up for our national life flaw: a small ability for initiative and self-organization, instead of us everything this was directed by the commissioners.

And the ruble-dollar blow of the 90s shook our character in a new way: those who still retained the same good traits turned out to be the most unprepared for a new type of life, helpless worthless losers, unable to earn enough to feed themselves (it’s scary when parents are in front of their own children !) - and only with wide eyes and gasping for breath did they roll around with a new breed and a new cry: “profit! profit at any cost! even by deception, even by debauchery, even by corruption, even by the sale of the mother’s (homeland’s) goods!” “Profit” has become a new (and what an insignificant) Ideology. The devastating, destructive alteration, which has not yet brought any good or success to our national economy and is not in sight, has breathed a thick breath of decay into the national character.

And God forbid the current collapse becomes irreversible.

(Everything was reflected in the language, the mirror folk character. Our compatriots invariably lost throughout the Soviet period, and now they have massively lost Russian language. I won’t talk about stockbrokers, nor about tired journalists, nor about the capital’s bedroom writers - but even writers from peasant children are repulsed with disgust: why do I dare to use native juicy Russian words that have existed in the Russian language for centuries? Even they understand it better now, they don’t call nobody's complaints about such marvelous novelties of the Russian language as briefing, pressing, marketing, rating, holding, voucher, establishment, consensus - and many dozens of them. Already completely deaf...)

The “Russian question” by the end of the 20th century stands very unambiguously: be our people or not to be? Yes, a wave of flat, vulgar leveling of cultures, traditions, nationalities, and characters is rolling across the globe. However, how many stand against it without shaking and even proudly! But - not us... And if things go on like this, then in another century the word “Russian” will no longer have to be deleted from dictionaries.

We must get out of the current humiliated, lost state - if not for ourselves, then in memory of our ancestors and for the sake of our children and grandchildren.

Today we only hear talk about the economy - and our driven economy is truly strangling us. However, economics is also suitable for impersonal ethnic material, but we need to save our character, our folk traditions, our national culture, our historical path.

Russian emigrant prof. N. S. Timashev once noted, correctly: “In any social state there are, as a rule, several possibilities, which, becoming probable, turn into trends social development. Which of these trends will come true and which will not can not be predicted with absolute certainty: it depends on the meeting of tendencies with each other. And therefore the human will has a much greater role than is allowed by the old evolutionary theory.” Materialistic.

And this is the Christian view.

Our history today is seen as lost - but with the faithful efforts of our will, perhaps now it will begin - quite healthy, focused on its own inner health, and within its own boundaries, without drifting into other people’s interests, as we saw enough of in the initial review . Let us once again recall Uspensky, as he wrote about the tasks of the school: “To transform an egoistic heart into an all-sorrowful heart.” We have to build such a school: the children of an already corrupt people will sit in the first grade, and so that they will come out of the last with a moral spirit.

We must build Russia moral- or none at all, then it doesn’t matter. All the good seeds that have not yet been miraculously trampled on in Rus' - we must preserve and grow. (Will the Orthodox Church help us? During the years of communism, it was more defeated than anyone else. It was also internally undermined by its three-century submission to state power, and lost the impulse of strong social action. And now, with the active expansion of foreign confessions and sects rich in cash into Russia, with the “principle of equal opportunities” and the poverty of the Russian church, Orthodoxy is generally being ousted from Russian life. However, a new explosion of materialism, this time “capitalist,” threatens all religions in general.)

But from numerous letters from the Russian province, from the expanses of Russia, these years I recognize spiritually healthy people scattered throughout these expanses, and often young people, only scattered, without spiritual nourishment. As I return home, I hope to see many of them. Hope lies precisely and only in this healthy core of living people. Perhaps they, growing, mutually influencing, joining forces, will gradually improve the health of our nation.

Two and a half centuries have passed - and the unfulfilled legacy still stands before us, inherited from P.I. Shuvalov Saving the People.

Nothing is more important for us today. And precisely this is the “Russian question” at the end of the 20th century.

World copyright ї1994 by Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn.

But reprinting in any Russian is permitted periodical with reference to " New world”.

1 S. F. Platonov. Time of Troubles. Prague. 1924.

2 L. A. Tikhomirov. Monarchical statehood. Ed. “ Russian word" Buenos Aires. 1968.

3 S. F. Platonov. Moscow and the West. Ed. "Obelisk". Berlin. 1926, ss. 111 - 114.

4 S. Zenkovsky. Russian Old Believers. Wilhelm Fink Verlag. München. 1970, pp. 290 - 339.

5 Ivan Solonevich. People's monarchy. Ed. "Our country". Buenos Aires. 1973.

6 S. M. Solovyov. History of Russia from ancient times. M. 1963, book. XI, p. 153.

7 V. O. Klyuchevsky. Essays. Russian history course. 1958, vol. 4, pp. 190, 198.

8 Ibid., p. 304.

9 S. Solovyov, uk. op., book. X, p. 282.

10 Ibid., p. 547.

11 S. Solovyov, book. XIII, p. 58.

12 Ibid., p. 66.

13 V. O. Klyuchevsky, uk. cit., vol. 4, p. 319.

14 S. Solovyov, book. XIV, ss. 54 - 56.

15 Essays G. R. Derzhavina, with explanatory notes J. Grota. 2nd Academic ed. St. Petersburg 1878, vol. VII, ss. 627 - 632.

16 I. Solonevich, uk. op.

17 V. O. Klyuchevsky, uk. cit., vol. 5, p. 60.

18 Derzhavin, uk. cit., vol. VII, p. 718.

19 S. Solovyov, book. XIII, p. 438.

20 Derzhavin, uk. cit., vol. VII, ss. 723 - 753.

21 “History of the 19th century.” Ed. Lavissa And Rambo. OGIZ. M. 1938, vol. 1, ss. 125 - 140.

22 Lavisse, Rambo, uk. soch., vol. 2, p. 269.

23 V. O. Klyuchevsky, vol. 5, pp. 454 - 455.

24 Lavisse, Rambaud, vol. 2, pp. 351 - 352.

25 Lavisse, Rambaud, vol. 3, p. 163.

26 V. O. Klyuchevsky, vol. 5, pp. 272, 275, 460 - 461.

27 Ibid., ss. 273, 278 - 279.

28 Lavisse, Rambaud, vol. 4, pp. 373 - 376.

29 Lavisse, Rambaud, vol. 5, p. 212.

30 Ibid., ss. 212, 220.

31 “Russian Bulletin”, May 1896.

32 Lavisse, Rambaud, vol. 5, p. 227, note. E. Tarle.

33 V. O. Klyuchevsky, vol. 5, pp. 283 - 290, 390.

34 Lavisse, Rambaud, vol. 6, p. 73.

35 Lavisse, Rambaud, vol. 6, p. 81.

36 Lavisse, Rambaud, vol. 8, p. 297.

37 Journal. “Red Archive”, vol. 74, p. 175.

38 Lavisse, Rambaud, vol. 7, pp. 417 - 418.

39 “History of Siberia from ancient times to the present day,” vol. II. Ed. "The science". L. 1968, p. 99.

40 Ibid., p. 55.

41 Ibid., ss. 181 - 282.

42 Ibid., ss. 323 - 331, 343 - 353.

43 From the collections of the All-Russian Memoir Library.

44 “Red Archive”, vol. 74, pp. 165 - 177.

45 Ibid., vol. 38.

47 “New World”, 1991, No. 3, p. 227.

48 N. A. Berdyaev. Philosophy of inequality. YMCA-press. Paris. 1923, p. 20.

49 Quoted. from “Time and We”, No. 116, p. 216.

50 “Documents of the foreign policy of the USSR.” M. 1959, vol. III, p. 675.

The period of transition from one century to another is always rich in historical events, and the junction of the 19th and 20th centuries is especially rich.

The world at the turn of the 20th century is, of course, an era of industrialization and progress. She gave humanity such necessary things as radio, telephone and communications.

If we imagine for a moment that we managed to get into the world of the early 20th century, we will see an amazing landscape: industrial Europe with smoking factories, important capitalists rushing to work in the morning, and socialist parties just beginning to emerge. Well, let's see how much the imagination corresponds to the official story...

Colonial world

The world at the beginning of the 20th century was largely determined by colonial relations. It was the contradictions arising from them that provoked serious economic and political changes that set a certain vector of development.

The major colonial countries were England, France and Italy. They began to be called metropolises, and dependent states - colonies.

The world at the beginning of the 20th century was characterized by a noticeable difference in the living standards of people: while Western European countries were experiencing an economic and cultural boom (often due to the deprivation of manufactured goods from the inhabitants of dependent countries), the majority of the population of the colonies was starving.

But the United States at that time was an inconspicuous and quiet country: it did not interfere anywhere except Latin America.

The result of colonial policy was the division of the world into zones of influence between the leading powers (mainly England and France). Of course, weaker Germany was dissatisfied with this course of events. This country began to look for allies, which led to the formation of two well-known associations.

Balance of power at the beginning of the 20th century: the Entente and the Triple Alliance

Germany began to unite around itself European states. As a result, the Entente arose, which included the following countries:

• Germany;
• Austria-Hungary;
• Italy.

The strong powers, in turn, also decided to create their own union. They united in the Triple Alliance, which included:

• England;
• France;
• Russia.

The world at the beginning of the 20th century was largely determined by famous historical events. The confrontation between the Entente and Triple Alliance led to the First World War (1914-1918).

The world at the beginning of the 20th century: and migration

The period of time we are considering is notable for two processes:

• increase in the world population;
• waves of migration.

The world population was 1.6 billion people. Most lived in Asia, Europe and Russia. But the population of the New World (USA and Canada) was small - only 82 million people.

Most people lived in villages. About 10% of the world's population lived in cities. Large cities there were few, only 360 of them had a population of over 100 thousand.

The world in the 19th and 20th centuries was a period of large-scale migrations of people from one country to another, and often to another part of the world. For example, an impressive part of European residents decided to emigrate to America (about 50 million people). This is due to the fact that people were looking for more economically profitable places and wanted to see a new continent.

The Asian continent was also not bypassed: the Chinese sought to move to Southeast Asia, and the Indians to South Africa. It is precisely because of this that such a motley, multifaceted and interesting world was formed.

The world at the end of the 20th century

The past century has turned out to be incredibly rich in various historical events, which some of us witnessed.

Its results were also of great importance - the disappearance of the bipolar world and the collapse of the USSR. Let's consider the changes that befell the world and our civilization at the end of the last century. Here are the main ones:

• globalization of the world;
• high development of communications;
• collapse of the USSR;
• US leadership;
• worsening relations between developed countries and third world countries;
• completely capitalist economy;
• world market;
• integration of the countries of the former socialist camp into the world economy;
• creation of the global Internet;
• demographic record (in 2000, the world's population reached 6 billion);
• the appearance of HIV infection;
• progress in medicine and science (for example, the emergence of cloning technology).

The end of the 20th century belongs to Recent history, and past historical events are already written (or written) in textbooks. We have a unique opportunity to form a personal opinion about this or that phenomenon that has happened, since we live in these controversial times.

Introduction

Chapter 1. Theoretical chapter

1The formation of theoretical parties. First stage

2Political crisis of 1993, Russia on the brink of civil war

3New Constitution Russian Federation

4Two Chechen wars: 1994 and 1999.

5Caucasian wars - a means of geopolitics

Conclusion

Bibliography

Introduction

This test examines the period of Russian history - the end of the 20th century - the beginning of the 21st century. It was considered in some detail by contemporaries of the period, and is also considered in our time. The consequences of certain times always leave their mark on the subsequent course of history.

IN last years 20th century, incredible efforts of the people, their moral uplift were invested in the construction of the Soviet Union and its unprecedented power. The people who carried out the revolution and won the greatest war against fascism lived with an irresistible thirst for creation. However, the political culture of the people, who dreamed of building a free and fair society, turned out to be incommensurate with the tasks set. The new ideology, penetrating the masses and inspiring them, often took on monstrously vulgarized forms, bringing to life the stereotypes of consciousness of medieval riots with their animal anger towards social enemies. In a country following an uncharted path, social tension and crisis situations constantly arose, accompanied by sharp clashes on the power Olympus, repression of the victors against the vanquished, and the shameless use of gross coercion and violence as a means of building a new life. Soviet society, which achieved relative prosperity, never managed to debug a system of self-government and effective control of the “lower classes” over the “tops”, without efficient work in which it found itself defenseless against the dictatorship of party leaders and the omnipotence of the party-state elite.

Reforms of the early 90s of the XX century. marked the beginning of profound social and political changes, carried out in the style of “shock therapy,” from which all segments of the population suffered enormous losses. Nowhere in the world have revolutions led to such a large-scale destruction of the material basis of industry and agriculture as in our country. A direct threat to the existence of the peasantry was created, which in such a vast and sparsely populated country seems very dangerous. The policy of the Russian state in recent years gives hope for Russia to emerge from this crisis.

Thus, the events of this period are relevant to this day.

The purpose of this work is to maximally reveal and study the events of the late 20th and early 21st centuries and their consequences.

The objectives of the work are:

studying the theoretical aspects of a certain period in the history of Russia;

analyze research objects that provide information about a given period of Russian history;

systematize information about the subject of research, lead to a general conclusion.

The object of the study is sources examining a given historical period: literature, textbooks, articles.

The subject of the research is the history of Russia at the end of the 20th - beginning of the 21st centuries.

Practical significance test work is revealed in its focus on solving practical problems. The opportunity to analyze a development problem, try to identify the causes, and propose ways to solve existing problems.

Chapter 1. Theoretical chapter

1 Formation of political parties: initial stage

Consideration of political parties must begin with a definition of their essence. Parties and party systems are political organizations and are created by social groups or intra-class strata to protect their interests by non-economic (political) means. They play a significant role in political life society and act not only as a means of political struggle, but also as an important factor in the development of democracy. Political parties and party systems have their own history, structure, functions and typology. Their study as subjects of politics in modern society has important theoretical and practical significance.

The presence of parties and movements is an indicator of the country’s development and, to some extent, democracy. A one-party political system and the absence of various political movements are characteristic indicators of a totalitarian or authoritarian regime.

There are three stages in the formation and development of political parties as social institutions. The first stage is associated with the formation of an aristocratic coterie (grouping) and is the initial stage of the formation of parties. The second is with the creation of a political club, which, unlike the aristocratic coterie, has strong ideological ties, a developed organization and a larger radius of social action. The third stage is associated with the formation of a mass political party. The first two stages can be considered the period of proto-parties, i.e. background of political parties. As practice shows, political parties are created by the most proactive and insightful representatives of the relevant social and national groups, aware of their immediate and long-term interests.

These representatives form an active minority, become the political vanguards of the groups and strata they represent and lead their struggle to satisfy political interests. As a rule, political parties strive to present themselves to the masses as genuine representatives of their common interests. However, only their practical behavior allows us to determine the truth of intentions, statements and programs. It is the consistent implementation of the social interest of a certain layer or group that expresses the social essence of the party. The multidimensionality and complexity of this phenomenon explains the existence of different definitions of the party.

The development of socialist parties in Russia occurred at the end of the 19th and beginning of the 20th centuries. During this period, parties of anarchists, social democrats, cadets, Octobrists, etc. emerged. Its peculiarity was that the first political party nationwide was the social democratic party, which took shape in 1898. Following it, the party of social revolutionaries took shape, which went down in history as a peasant party, although at first it included workers, and then small owners who did not exploit the labor of others, and a significant part of the peasantry, as well as townspeople, artisans, and small traders.

Parties representing the interests of the ruling strata of society arose during the years of the first Russian revolution of 1905-1907. The formation of political parties in Russia was determined by a number of factors that predetermined the socio-economic and political development of society. A characteristic trend in political life at this stage was the steady increase in the number of parties, that is, the formation of a multi-party system. It took shape in 1905-1908. During the revolution of 1905-1907. in Russia there were about 50 parties of various ideological and political orientations. In 1916, there were 244 political parties, in 1917 their number was still growing. In 1918, for a number of reasons, many parties ceased to exist, and only the Russian Communist Party of the Bolsheviks remained, which established a one-party regime. Thus, although the origins of political parties date back to ancient times, their true history as special political organizations characterized by a high degree of institutionalization begins in the 19th century.

It was during this period that millions of people received the right to vote within the framework of liberal democracy, which led to the creation of parties as specialized institutions for influencing public authorities to implement interests social groups. IN late XIX-beginning of the 20th century The development of political parties was influenced by many factors. The most important of them are the introduction of universal suffrage; awareness of their interests by the “third estate”; the spread of Marxism and revolutionary upheavals; awakening of national self-awareness of colonial peoples, etc.

In 1988-1991 There was a process of organizational formation of political parties and the development of political programs. The adoption of the Law “On Public Associations” in October 1990 stimulated the formation of parties. For the most part, new parties arose as anti-totalitarian and put forward the tasks of forming a rule of law, a multi-party system, a multi-structured economy, and organized democracy (constitutional democracy). After the CPSU lost its monopoly on political power and the liquidation of the administrative-command system during the reforms, a regrouping of political forces and the formation of new political blocs and associations took place. Elections to the Federal Assembly in December 1993 and December 1995 stimulated the further process of formalization and delimitation of political parties and blocs. As a result of the regular elections to the State Duma in December 1999, the following political parties and movements entered the lower house of the Russian parliament: Communist Party of the Russian Federation, Unity, Union of Right Forces, LDPR, Yabloko.

Currently, more than 300 parties, organizations, movements, foundations and other associations are registered in the Russian Federation. However, the transition from a single-party system to a multi-party system is extremely difficult and painful; a stable party-political structure and a clear demarcation of political forces have not been formed. Rather, on the contrary, the process of such demarcation is becoming more and more complex and confusing, new parties and political movements are emerging, and the outlines and appearance of previously existing ones are changing dramatically. It can be assumed that the following global trends will appear in the fate of the future Russian multi-party system. First, simplification of the party system. Through blocking elections, conditions are gradually being created for the development of a multi-party system into a two-party system. Secondly, the former importance of parties even in election campaigns is decreasing. The number of “firm” supporters of any party is decreasing. It is not party affiliation that plays an increasingly important role, but the perception of the candidate.

The main social expectations of the masses addressed to Russian political parties can be formulated as follows: This is the need to stabilize the socio-political situation and keep it within the framework of constitutional and legal development, to normalize the processes of building civil society, to overcome the slide into corporatism (one of the forms of authoritarianism) regional, local, departmental and other kinds, weakening criminal pressure on the authorities, in ensuring the transformation of private, group interests of the emerging civil society into the general interests of the state.

Freedom of political opinions and political actions, choice of ideological and spiritual values, a ban on the establishment of a single state or mandatory ideology in society. Created in Russia equal opportunities participation in the political process by all political parties and other public associations operating within the framework of the Constitution of the Russian Federation. The existence of a multi-party system is guaranteed, as well as the right of citizens to belong to any party or not to belong to any. An important condition for the implementation of the principle of political pluralism is the definition legal status political parties, other public associations and mass movements participating in the political process. These issues are regulated in the Russian Federation by the norms of the Federal laws “On public associations”, “On political parties”, “On trade unions, their rights and guarantees of activity”, “On state support for youth and children’s associations”, “On charitable activities and charitable organizations” "

Although the phenomenon of parties, strictly speaking, is conceptualized by their main function - political and state (the replacement of their members with certain posts and the exercise of state power), their influence on the political system is much wider and more complex, and therefore it is very risky to make any generalizations here . Let us pay attention to the political spectrum “from left to right” - this is a schematic representation of political ideas and beliefs, ideological positions of politicians, parties and movements. The idea dates back to the times of the French Revolution, reflecting how the deputies were “seated” at the first meeting of the States General in 1789. However, there is no exact meaning for the concepts of “left” and “right”. In general, the linear political spectrum illustrates differences in attitudes towards the economy and the role of the state: the left defends the principles of government intervention in social affairs and the ideal of collectivism, the right prefers the market and individualism.

Constitutional parties, which strictly adhere to the rules of the political game, are often portrayed as bastions of democracy: if a society has such parties, this is considered an indicator of its political health. On the contrary, parties that have monopolized the right to political power are seen as an instrument of manipulation and political control. Be that as it may, the main functions of parties can be defined as follows: representation, formation and replenishment of the elite, determination of the goals of state development, articulation of interests and their aggregation, socialization and mobilization of citizens, formation of the government.

2 Political crisis of 1993, Russia on the brink of civil war

Start political crisis 1993 is associated with the development of a new Constitution. The decision to develop it was made already at the First Congress of People's Deputies of the RSFSR in June 1990. The Congress created a Constitutional Commission headed by B. N. Yeltsin. However, before the signing of the Bialowieza Accords and the collapse of the USSR, opposition forces blocked all attempts to revise the 1977 Constitution.

In 1992, work on the Basic Law of Russia entered a new stage. Discussions revolved around the question of the foundations of the political system. The President advocated the creation of a presidential republic. The central figure of a presidential republic is the head of state. He has great powers and is the guarantor of compliance with the Constitution. The President ensures the implementation of the principle of separation of legislative, executive and judicial powers. A different point of view was expressed by the working commissions of the Supreme Council. They proposed maintaining the traditional position for the Soviet political system of the sovereignty of the Soviets as the source of all legislative, executive and judicial power. The project placed the Supreme Council at the center of the new political system.

The intense struggle between the President and the Supreme Council occupied the whole of 1992 and the first nine months of 1993. The confrontation over the draft Basic Law reached a dead end: neither the President nor the Supreme Council agreed to a compromise. In the summer of 1993, Yeltsin convened a Constitutional Conference. He proposed that representatives of all branches of government, regions, political parties, religious and public organizations take part in its work. But the leadership of the Supreme Council refused to participate in the meeting. Parliament launched a campaign to remove the President from power. By autumn the situation became insoluble. It was impossible to overcome the crisis without changing the current Constitution. On September 21, 1993, the President issued a decree on gradual constitutional reform.

He suspended the powers of the Congress of People's Deputies and the Supreme Council of the RSFSR and scheduled elections for December 12, 1993 to a new legislative body - the State Duma, the lower house of the Federal Assembly of Russia. The President instructed the Constitutional Commission and the Constitutional Conference to submit an agreed draft of the Basic Law to a popular vote. The leadership of the Supreme Council, headed by Chairman R.I. Khasbulatov did not obey this decree and adopted a resolution to terminate the powers of President Yeltsin. The Supreme Council began to form executive bodies under its control. Vice President A.V. was declared acting head of state. Rutskoy.

Yeltsin ordered the building of the Supreme Council to be surrounded by troops and the deputies to leave it. On October 2, protests organized by the opposition began in Moscow, quickly escalating into mass clashes with the police. Barricades appeared. On October 3, the rebels seized the Moscow City Hall building and approached the television center in Ostankino, demanding that they be given airwaves. Fire was opened on the demonstrators. To restore order, the President declared a state of emergency in the capital and sent in troops and armored vehicles. On October 4, the building of the Supreme Council began to be shelled from tanks. By the end of the day, the White House was occupied by troops, and the leaders of the resistance were arrested.

1.3 New Constitution of the Russian Federation

December 1993, elections to the Federation Council and State Duma took place. Some deputies were elected from electoral districts, and some - for the first time in modern Russia - from party lists.

The election results were largely unexpected. Representatives of the Liberal Democratic Party of Russia (LDPR) took first place. A significant number of voters voted for Russia's Choice and the Communist Party of the Russian Federation. 58.4% of participants in the popular vote were in favor of the proposed draft Constitution. The new Basic Law eliminated the Soviet system of power.

From the Constitution of the Russian Federation:

Article 1. Russian Federation - Russia is a democratic federal constitutional state with a republican form of government.

Article 2. Man, his rights and freedoms are the highest value. Recognition, observance and protection of human and civil rights and freedoms is the responsibility of the state.

Article 3. The bearer of sovereignty and the only source of power in the Russian Federation is its multinational people.

The Constitution enshrined the principle of separation of powers. The head of the Russian state is the President. He is endowed with broad powers: he determines the Constitution and the integrity of Russia. The highest executive body is the government. It develops and ensures the execution of the federal budget, manages federal property, ensures the country's defense, state security and public order, and pursues a unified policy in the field of science, culture, education, and health care.

Legislative functions are assigned by the Constitution to the Federal Assembly (Parliament), consisting of two chambers - the Federation Council and the State Duma. The procedure for adopting laws is as follows: draft laws are discussed and adopted in the Duma, then they are approved by the Federation Council. The approved bill goes to the President. The President signs the law and publishes it. If the head of state refuses to sign the law, the Duma with a 2/3 vote can override the presidential veto and put the law into effect.

The third branch of government is the judicial system. Her higher authorities are the Constitutional Court, which monitors the compliance of adopted laws and decrees with the Constitution, the Supreme Court, the highest authority in criminal, civil and administrative cases, and the Supreme Arbitration Court, which deals with economic disputes between enterprises and organizations.

On March 1991, a nationwide referendum was held in Russia, which established the post of President of the Russian Federation. On June 12, 1991, B.N. was elected the first President of the RSFSR on the basis of free and democratic elections. Yeltsin. He was the highest official of the RSFSR and the head of the executive branch.

However, by the end of 1992, the struggle for power sharply intensified, which changed the entire course of constitutional reform. Each of the parties - the President and the leadership of the Supreme Council of the RSFSR - presented their demands, trying to use the draft Constitution in their own interests. At the same time, many contradictions accumulated in the Constitution of the RSFSR of 1978; the numbering of chapters and articles was violated. In December 1992, Art. 121, according to which in the event of the dissolution or suspension of the activities of any legally elected government bodies, the powers of the President were subject to immediate termination.

May 1993 The Presidential Decree “On convening the Constitutional Conference and completing the preparation of the draft Constitution of the Russian Federation” was adopted. It was supposed to finalize an alternative presidential project. The Constitutional Conference included representatives of federal government bodies (deputies and representatives from the President and the Government), government bodies of the constituent entities of the Russian Federation (4 representatives from each), local government, political parties, trade unions, youth and other public organizations (up to 250 people ). During the Meeting, more than 500 amendments were made to the draft, including many articles from the draft of the Constitutional Commission.

The final draft of the Constitution of the Russian Federation was eventually prepared by a narrow group of people determined by the President of the RSFSR and on July 12, 1993 B.N. Yeltsin approved the draft prepared by the Constitutional Conference. Parallel work on the draft Constitutional Commission also did not stop.

September 1993 President of the Russian Federation B.N. Yeltsin issued Decree No. 1400 “On step-by-step constitutional reform in the Russian Federation.” The decree interrupted the functions of the Congress of People's Deputies and the Supreme Council. According to the Decree, before the start of the work of the new bicameral parliament - the Federal Assembly of the Russian Federation - and its assumption of relevant powers, it was necessary to be guided by presidential decrees and government resolutions. Temporarily - until the adoption of the new Constitution and the Law on elections to the Federal Assembly of the Russian Federation and the holding of new parliamentary elections on December 11-12, 1993 - the President of the Russian Federation put into effect the Regulation "On federal authorities for the transitional period."

The Supreme Council of the RSFSR assessed the actions of the President of the Russian Federation as a coup d'etat. On October 4, the building of the Supreme Council was shelled by tanks, and the leadership of the Supreme Council was arrested. A state of emergency was introduced in Moscow for some time. The President of Russia has concentrated all state power in his hands.

October 1993 President of the Russian Federation B.N. Yeltsin issued a Decree “On holding a national vote on the draft Constitution of the Russian Federation,” which scheduled the vote for December 12. 54.8% of registered voters took part in the voting. 58.4% of voters voted for the adoption of the draft Constitution of Russia. Thus, in fact, only a quarter of Russians voted for the Russian Constitution. The official date of entry into force of the Russian Constitution is December 25, 1993.

4 Chechen wars of 1994 and 1999

The Chechen war refers to military actions between the troops of the Russian Federation and one of its subjects, the armed formations of the Chechen Republic of Ichkeria, created in violation of the legislation of the Russian Federation. It is generally accepted that there were two such wars.

The Chechen war of 1994 is called the first Chechen war, but it began a little earlier - in the fall of 1991, when, in the context of the beginning of the collapse of the USSR, the leadership of the Chechen Republic declared the state sovereignty of the republic and its secession from the USSR and the RSFSR. The bodies of Soviet power on the territory of the Chechen Republic were dissolved, the laws of the Russian Federation were repealed. The formation of the armed forces of Chechnya began, led by Supreme Commander-in-Chief President of the Chechen Republic Dzhokhar Dudayev. Defense lines were built in Grozny, as well as bases for waging sabotage warfare in mountainous areas.

The Dudayev regime had, according to calculations by the Ministry of Defense, 11-12 thousand people (according to the Ministry of Internal Affairs, up to 15 thousand) regular troops and 30-40 thousand people of armed militia, of which 5 thousand were mercenaries from Afghanistan, Iran, Jordan, the North Caucasus republics, etc.

On December 1994, President of the Russian Federation Boris Yeltsin signed Decree No. 2166 “On measures to suppress the activities of illegal armed groups on the territory of the Chechen Republic and in the zone of the Ossetian-Ingush conflict.” On the same day, the Government of the Russian Federation adopted Resolution No. 1360, which provided for the disarmament of these formations by force.

Officially in Russia, the war was called “measures to restore constitutional order in the Chechen Republic” and pursued the goal of “disarmament of illegal armed groups.” Russian politicians and military officials expected that the fighting would not last more than two weeks. Defense Minister General Pavel Grachev said on the eve of the invasion of Chechnya that Grozny could be taken in two hours by one Russian airborne regiment. However, federal troops met fierce resistance and immediately suffered heavy losses.

The Chechens did not have aviation, were many times inferior to the enemy in artillery and tanks, but during the three years of independence they managed to turn into professional fighters, and in terms of combat training and command they were significantly superior to Russian soldiers, many of whom had recently been drafted into the army. Operations on the Chechen side were directly led by the Chief of the General Staff, General Aslan Maskhadov, a former colonel Soviet army. Chechen troops successfully combined positional defense with mobile defense, managing to escape the massive attacks of Russian aviation in time.

The assault on Grozny began on December 31, 1994. It seems that the Russian military leadership did not learn any lessons from the defeat on November 26. The assault scenario was repeated one to one on an enlarged scale - now about 250 armored vehicles were brought into Grozny. It is believed that the generals believed that one type of tank columns should discourage the enemy from resisting. But the Chechens were already prepared for such a scenario. The lack of coordination of actions between Russian units and branches of the military, normal communications, maps of the city, and most importantly, the lack of combat experience among the soldiers (even soldiers of the first year of service were sent to Chechnya) took their toll. The armored vehicles, again left without cover, came under dagger fire from Chechen grenade launchers. The western group of Russian troops was stopped, the eastern group retreated and did not take any action until January 2. The most tragic events developed in the northern direction. More than 100 Russian servicemen were captured. The total losses of the federal group during the New Year's assault amounted to more than 1.5 thousand dead and missing. Not in the best possible way The situation also developed in the troops under the command of Rokhlin. His northeastern group was surrounded by Chechen units, blocked and, due to the lack of normal communications, found itself under crossfire from friendly and foreign artillery. Fighting stubbornly, federal troops took Grozny on February 6, 1995<#"justify">The counter-terrorism operation in Chechnya, which began in 1999-2009, is called the second Chechen war. In September 1999, a new phase of the Chechen military campaign began, which was called the counter-terrorist operation in the North Caucasus (CTO). The reason for the start of the operation was the massive invasion of Dagestan on August 7, 1999 from the territory of Chechnya by militants under the overall command of Shamil Basayev and the Arab mercenary Khattab. The group included foreign mercenaries and Basayev’s militants. Fighting between federal forces and invading militants continued for more than a month, ending with the militants being forced to retreat from the territory of Dagestan back to Chechnya. On these same days - September 4-16 - a series of terrorist attacks - explosions of residential buildings - were carried out in several Russian cities (Moscow, Volgodonsk and Buinaksk).

Considering Maskhadov’s inability to control the situation in Chechnya, the Russian leadership decided to conduct a military operation to destroy the militants on the territory of Chechnya.

The final and large-scale operation<#"justify">Russian-Chechen relations originated many centuries ago, in the early Middle Ages, and have gone through a long and difficult path of development. With the end of the Caucasian War, the long and complex process of annexing Chechnya to Russia ended. An opportunity has emerged for the gradual inclusion of the region into the economic, cultural and administrative system of Russia. This was a time when broad reforms were underway in Russia, which also extended to Chechnya. Administrative, economic and agrarian reforms were carried out here. And most importantly, at the end of the 19th century, modern industry emerged in Chechnya, oil production began, and Railway, which connected the republic with the North Caucasus and all of Russia. The city of Grozny is becoming a major industrial and commercial center not only in Chechnya, but also in the entire North Caucasus.

After his untimely death, his political course was continued by R.A. Kadyrov, who became the national leader of the Chechens. During the few years of his leadership of the republic, he made a historically unprecedented breakthrough - the republic was not only restored, but also became much more beautiful and better than the pre-war one. And most importantly - R.A. Kadyrov managed to build a relationship with the Russian leadership, primarily with V.V. Putin, a particularly trusting relationship, thanks to which the Russian government, even in crisis conditions, helped and is helping in every possible way to restore and further development Chechen Republic. Thus, thanks to the Head of the Chechen Republic R.A. Kadyrov and his full support from V.V. Putin, relations between the Chechen Republic and the Russian Federation have entered a qualitatively new stage of development.

party political constitution caucasian

1.5 Caucasian wars - a means of geopolitics

A huge number of modern minds analyze various historical events, compare facts, and continue to ask questions. One of the most controversial issues Russian history the question of the Caucasian War remains - the legitimacy of this scientific term, the truth of its content, its scientific assessment. Appeal to political history The Caucasus is one of the most complex and most problematic components Russian Empire. This story, from a factual point of view, is considered well studied, but this has not prevented it from becoming the subject of acute controversy today. scientific discussions, ideological battles, nationalist and chauvinistic speculation, clumsy myth-making.

The North Caucasus has always become the center of the struggle of geopolitical interests and, accordingly, the problem from a historical one became a political one. This is where distortions of historical reality and false interpretations arise.

The term “Caucasian war” itself was introduced by the historian R.A. Fadeev, denoting with them the events taking place in the Caucasus since 1801. But there was another opinion that this is not an evaluative term, but just a geographical definition. It was also believed that the definition of the Caucasian war could not be fit into the framework of the usual terms “liberation movement” or “revolution”. It is also possible that it is not worth looking for a term that reflects the whole essence of the matter.

Most American and European studies continue to persistently and consistently emphasize the aggressive, aggressive, cruel nature of Russia’s policy in the Caucasus and the decisive, irreconcilable, “national liberation” response of the Caucasian peoples in nature. This deeply confrontational model of relations is presented, with varying degrees of scientific or scientific finesse, as a systemic, historical and enduring phenomenon. The following is the conclusion that the Caucasian issue will continue to make itself felt in one way or another, but most likely with increasing force.

The Caucasus is a political, socio-ethnic and cultural space located between the Black and Caspian seas. Until today, it has never acquired internal cohesion and homogeneity. For many centuries, ethno-sociocultural mosaic was one of its main features. This was more typical for the North Caucasus than for Transcaucasia.

Often they try to reduce Russia’s exploration of the Caucasus only to the Caucasian War, deliberately considering it in isolation from the entire history of the region. In reality, relations between the Russian and Caucasian peoples cannot be limited to such a narrow time frame, since they have much more ancient roots.

As is known, in the 13th century the territory of Chechnya was subjected to a devastating raid by the Mongol-Tatars and other nomadic peoples. From the 16th century The peoples of most of the feudal fiefs of Dagestan turned to the Russian tsars with a request to accept them into Russian citizenship. To provide a reliable route to Georgia, the Russian authorities built the Terki fortress (Tersky town) on the Terek River in 1588.

Thus, by the end of the 16th century, the Muscovite kingdom had two Cossack troops (Terskoye and Grebenskoye) in the North Caucasus as its forward outposts. However, the beginning of the “Time of Troubles” seriously weakened Russia’s position in the Caucasus. The Streltsy regiments were recalled back, and the remaining Greben and Terek Cossacks were left exclusively to their own forces.

Throughout the 17th and 18th centuries. The development of Russian-Caucasian relations was reflected in the ongoing rivalry between three major powers - Iran, Turkey (together with Crimea) and Russia. However, the peoples of the Caucasus, having experienced the cruelty of the Persian and Turkish conquerors, increasingly gravitated towards Russia. Economic ties between the highlanders and Russia expanded, and the number of Russian settlements and strongholds in the Ciscaucasia grew steadily.

After Turkey lost its largest base of pressure on the North Caucasus, and Transcaucasia turned out to be accessible to Russian troops and being unable to open armed confrontation with Russia, the Turkish command made a lot of efforts to incite the local population against the Russian authorities. In this case, the religious factor was used very effectively. At that time, a significant part of the mountain peoples professed pagan forms of religion and were distinguished by great tolerance towards Christians. From the very beginning, Türkiye tried to give the spread of Islam in this region an anti-Russian orientation.

For many years, feuds dragged on in these areas. In February 1801, the residents of Tiflis voluntarily swore allegiance to the Russian emperor. The manifesto, signed by Alexander I in September of the same year, confirmed the acceptance of Georgia into Russian citizenship. The annexation of Georgia created a new situation in the Caucasus. The feudal rulers of Dagestan, one after another, entered into citizenship of the Russian Empire. It is noteworthy that in some cases, when the local ruler was unwilling to do this, the population turned to the Russian authorities with a request to remove him and join Russia. Residents of Derbent in 1801 and the people of Karakaitag addressed the Astrakhan governor with similar requests. Iran and Türkiye, concerned about Russia's penetration into the depths of the Caucasus, with the support of England and France, tried to prevent this by armed means. In 1804, the Russian-Iranian war broke out, which in 1806 Turkey joined on the side of Iran. The fighting ended with the victory of Russian troops and the signing of the Gulistan Peace Treaty in 1813, according to which the Shah of Iran recognized the annexation of Dagestan and Northern Azerbaijan to Russia.

During this war, General P.S. covered himself with unfading glory. Kotlyarevsky, whom soldiers’ rumors rightly called “the Caucasian Suvorov.” The detachment of two thousand people he led in 1812 on the Araks River completely defeated the thirty thousand army of Abbas Mirza. In 1826, Iranian troops under the leadership of Abbas Mirza again invaded Transcaucasia through Karabakh, however, despite repeated superiority, they failed to capture the Shusha fortress defended by Russian troops. In 1827, Russian troops went on the offensive and cleared Armenia and South Azerbaijan of Iranian troops. The local population enthusiastically greeted the Russian troops. In 1828, the Turkmanchay Peace Treaty was signed, according to which the Shah renounced the Erivan and Nakhichevan Khanates in favor of Russia and confirmed Russia’s rights to the entire territory of Azerbaijan.

The annexation of Transcaucasia acutely raised a new geopolitical problem - ensuring reliable communications between the new territories and the central provinces of Russia. At that time, the only land road in Transcaucasia passed through a narrow line of fortresses in the North Caucasus. However, the political situation in the region was difficult. It was torn apart by interethnic, social, and interreligious contradictions, which were aggravated by the incitement of Turkey and Iran. The mountaineers, accustomed to living in accordance with their customs, reacted very negatively to attempts to impose Russian laws on them. The mountaineers were especially outraged by the ban on raids (at that time a type of common trade in the mountains). Often, at the beginning of the Caucasian War, they try to blame the Russian government entirely. Of course, it is impossible to renounce Russia’s imperial ambitions, but it is also impossible not to take into account the way of life of some mountain peoples who terrorized all surrounding areas. Thus, the low level of development of productive forces and the small amount of land suitable for agriculture led to the fact that the products produced were not enough to satisfy vital needs.

What was missing was confiscated from neighbors: raids were carried out on Georgia, on the road leading to Transcaucasia, on Cossack settlements and even on related mountain peoples. For many mountain tribes this was considered a natural way of life. For obvious reasons, the Russian administration could not allow the existence of such freemen on its territory. The fight against such manifestations of the “originality” of the mountaineers caused fierce resistance on their part, which resulted in the half-century Caucasian War (1817-1864). After the end of the Caucasian War, there was a rapid integration of the Caucasus into the Russian Empire. Contrary to Turkey's claims, Russian authorities were generally respectful of the traditional institutions and customs of the highlanders. A policy of religious tolerance was pursued in relation to the Muslim faith. The autocracy, while maintaining the primacy of the Orthodox Church, did not take measures to forcibly Christianize the population professing Islam. Summing up the development of Russian-Caucasian relations in the pre-revolutionary period, it is necessary to emphasize that the history of their formation has quite ancient roots. The process of integration of the Caucasus into Russia was not simple, contradictory, but still objective. Discussions about autocratic Russia as a “prison of nations” are not only incorrect, but also deliberately provocative. They pursue the goal of discrediting and discrediting the historical past of our Fatherland, sowing discord and enmity between the peoples of our multinational Motherland. Historical experience shows that Russia's imperial policy in the Caucasus is fundamentally different from the colonial policy of the West.

Conclusion

Modern Russian society has a relatively short history of existence. After all, it seems that Russia is a young country with enormous potential for development and improvement. Just recently, Russia was a country striving to realize utopian communist ideals, but today it is a young democracy, following its own, isolated path. And this is exactly what our rulers are talking about, making excuses that our country has not yet reached the heights for which other Western countries are famous. Again we are talking about the remnants of Soviet times, which we cannot abandon in any way and for which 30 years is not the time to overcome.

Therefore, the topics discussed in the work are quite relevant to this day, since these historical events still carry their echoes and are the result of what is happening now in our country.

The issue of relationship with the outside world is also important. By the mid-1980s. The USSR had a difficult relationship with him. Soviet foreign policy was made unpopular by the country's participation in numerous local conflicts (Afghanistan, Chechnya, the Caucasus, etc.). In this regard, the American administration led by R. Reagan, which declared a “crusade” against communism, did a lot to limit economic cooperation between the USSR and Western countries.

The inconsistency in the actions of the Union and Russian centers of power had a huge impact on the situation in the country as a whole, leading to consequences that hardly anyone could have predicted in 1990. On the scale of the USSR, the situation was also complicated by the fact that, following Russia, declarations of sovereignty were adopted in other union republics, whose authorities sought to pursue independent policies.

Most a difficult situation took shape in the Chechen Republic.

The endless war in the Caucasus also left its mark on the subsequent development of relations. Even now, unobtrusive but massive falsification continues historical facts. These manipulations are primitive, but accessible to the general Russian public. This general state of affairs causes irreparable damage not only to the people of Russia, but also to its reputation. The bright, unsuccessful and tragic attempt for the entire Caucasus to create an Islamic pan-Caucasian state suggests that this region inevitably had to fall into the sphere of activity of one of the great powers contending here - Russia or Turkey.

Normalization of relations with the outside world required a rethinking of the conceptual foundations of the USSR's foreign policy, aiming at abandoning clearly unjustified approaches and developing a new code of conduct in the international arena that would correspond to modern realities, meet the national interests of the country, and provide conditions for internal social and economic progress .

Bibliography

1.Constitution Russian Federation, 1993

Anishina V.I., Zasorin S.L., Kryazhkova O.I., Shcheglov A.F. Social studies without a cheat sheet. Tutorial for schoolchildren and applicants. - M.: 2008. - 208s.

Bokhanov A.N., Gorinov M.M., Dmitrenko V.P. Book III. Russian history. XX century - M.: AST, 2001. - 608 p.

Danilov A.A., Kosulina L.G., Brandt M.Yu. XX - beginning of the XXI century. - M.: Education, 2007. - 383 p.

Demidov N.M. Fundamentals of sociology and political science, Textbook for students. prof. textbook establishments. - M.: Publishing center "Academy", 2004. - 208 p.

History of Russia of the 20th - early 21st centuries. Ed. L.V. Milova. M.: 2006. - 960 p.

Novitsky Vasily Fedorovich (1869-1929). Military Encyclopedia: T. 1-18 / Ed. regiment. V. F. Novitsky and others - St. Petersburg. ; Pg. : T-vo I. Sytin, 1911-1915.

Pronin E.A. Political science. Lecture notes. - M.: MIEMP, 2005. - 70 p.

Ryabov Yu. Russia at the turn of the 20th-21st centuries, Textbook. - M.: 2006. - 344 p.

Sokolov B.V. One Hundred Great Wars. - M.: Veche, 2005. - 432 p.

Fadeev R.A. Caucasian War. - M.: 2003. - 174 p.

Andrew Heywood. Political science, Textbook for university students / Trans. from English edited by G.G. Vodolazova, V.Yu. Velsky - M.: UNITY-DANA, 2005 - 544 p.

Tutoring

Need help studying a topic?

Our specialists will advise or provide tutoring services on topics that interest you.
Submit your application indicating the topic right now to find out about the possibility of obtaining a consultation.

“Russian question” by the end of the 20th century

Today, if I want to read anything, I want to read it briefly, as briefly as possible, and about today. But every moment of our history, and today’s too, is only a point on its axis. And if we want to find possible and correct directions for getting out of the current terrible trouble, we must not lose sight of the many mistakes of our previous history that also pushed us towards the present.

I am aware that this article does not develop immediate concrete practical steps, but I do not consider myself entitled to propose them before my imminent return to my homeland.

March 1994

From the book Don't Say No author Azhippo Vladimir Andreevich

The national question People of all nationalities end up in prison, indiscriminately. The percentage ratio of prisoners of different nationalities approximately corresponds to the same ratio in freedom in a given area. At the same time, in prison there is a paradoxical phenomenon: any

From the book Dramatic Medicine. Doctors' experiences author Glaser Hugo

From the book The True History of the Russians. XX century author Vdovin Alexander Ivanovich

The Russian question is the main problem of modern Russia. The biggest problem of modern Russia and relations between its nationalities is the Russian question, which at the present stage appears as a legacy of the Russophobic, supranational in nature power in

From the book Returners. Where it is good, there is homeland. author Kunyaev Stanislav Yurievich

"AND I'M RUSSIAN!" The years 1989–1991 were terrible in terms of the intensity of Russophobia, which flared up like a targeted explosion in layers of society called by Igor Shafarevich “small people.” Every time these days, with a painful feeling, I turned on the TV, went down to the mailbox or went to

From the book The Feat Continues author Glebov I. A.

Practical question There are cities in the world that we know from childhood from the stories of our fathers and grandfathers - participants in the Civil and Patriotic Wars. We unmistakably find them on the map, we dream of seeing them with our own eyes. Volgograd is one of these cities. He's always in

From the book Monsieur Gurdjieff by Povel Louis

From the book “VIEW” - THE BEATLES OF PERESTROIKA. THEY PLAYED ON THE KREMLIN NERVES author Dodolev Evgeniy Yurievich

Question and answer (4x4) I read Alexander Lyubimov’s material in Komsomolskaya Pravda about the neo-“Vzglyad”: “In a modern reading, “Vzglyad” could be a program that is in some sense anarchist in relation to modern values- to commercialization, to unrestrained

From the book of Judas in the Kremlin. How they betrayed the USSR and sold Russia author Kremlev Sergey

From the book England. A one-way ticket author Volsky Anton Alexandrovich

Uniform question In all English schools, children wear uniforms. Each school, both private and public, has its own uniform. When you meet a child on the street, you can accurately determine which school he comes from. The uniform must be strictly observed - violation of the uniform is considered

From the book Russian Communism [Collection] author Stalin Joseph Vissarionovich

4. The question of eliminating the opposition between city and countryside, between mental and physical labor, as well as the question of eliminating the differences between them This title touches on a number of problems that are significantly different from each other, but I combine them in one chapter

From the book Why America and Russia Can't Hear Each Other? Washington's view of recent history Russian-American relations by Stent Angela

Russian World Putin justified the annexation of Crimea using two different arguments, both of which clearly showed how far Russia had gone in its efforts to distance itself from the West. By annexing Crimea, Russia created new reality, in which the rules of the game are up to

From the book For the Benefit of Horses. Hippoic Essays author Urnov Dmitry Mikhailovich

Sholokhov's question "Novel" Quiet Don"perfectly combines classical Russian and socialist realism." Ernest J. Simmons. Introduction to Russian realism. Socialist, Soviet, communist had to be crossed out - it became clear after

From the book Password - “Prague” author Goncharenko Pavlina Fedoseevna

ANSWER TO THE QUESTION For 24 hours already, the “Death to Fascism!” detachment from the partisan unit of General Naumov was resting in the newly liberated village near Brody, Lvov region. At dawn on the second day, someone

From the book Musical classics in the myth-making of the Soviet era author Raku Marina

I.6. “The Question of Romanticism” The music of romanticism occupied a special position in the ideological work of the first Soviet decades. It was romanticism that made up the lion's share of the repertoire, beloved by the public and performers. The music of romanticism also corresponded to the performing style,

From the book In Search of Energy. Resource wars, new technologies and the future of energy by Yergin Daniel

21 questions During the recession of 2001, the issue of climate change gradually lost its relevance. And after September 11, when terrorists attacked the World Trade Center and the Pentagon, the political community completely forgot about him. However, for a small but key segment

From the book The Fate of the Empire [Russian view of European civilization] author Kulikov Dmitry Evgenievich

Russian conservatism of the 21st century in the applied dimension Right today we can and must contrast liberalism (the politically correct name for the ideology and political program of our counter-revolution) with the conservatism of restoring our sovereignty and returning to